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Soumya Mishra 
 
The Government of India launched the National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) in 
2013 to address concerns of severe funding shortages, poor governance structures, and weak 
quality assurance mechanisms in the country’s public state universities. NHEM provided funding 
incentives to states conditional on the implementation of multiple reforms in the university 
systems. This study answers important questions about the policy - why and by whom was 
NHEM formulated, and how well have the policy’s reforms been implemented in Indian states.  
The study uses a theoretical framework based on Advocacy Coalition Framework and 
institutional theory. Using qualitative methods, this dissertation examines the policy formulation 
process for NHEM at the federal level and explores the implementation of NHEM reforms 
through case studies of four Indian states. The study finds that NHEM was developed when the 
federal ministry of education saw a window of opportunity to push its reform agenda. However, 
the policy was created in a short span of time, in a top-down manner, and with insufficient 
involvement of stakeholders. NHEM was created by borrowing policy problems and solutions 
from prior government reports and layering them on a pre-existing funding structure. The 
resulting policy lacked a cohesive design and theory of action.  
Implementation of the policy’s reforms in states has been limited. The findings of the 
study suggest that implementation is thwarted by four challenges; the bureaucratic higher 
education culture in states; weak political will to decentralize the government’s powers; limited 
 
technical capacity; and inadequate financial resources. As a result, states have engaged in a 
variety of reform responses ranging from avoiding compliance, engaging in proforma 
implementation of reform requirements to receive federal funds; and reinterpreting reforms in 
ways that suit their existing cultures and structures. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to The Research 
India houses the world’s second largest population of young adults and demographic 
dividends have long held the promise of catapulting it from a developing nation to a leading 
global power. Education and skilling form a critical bridge between the demographic promise 
and real economic productivity (Altbach, 2009; Hatakenaka, 2017; Kapur & Mehta, 2017). 
Without significant improvements in education, India stands to lose its competitiveness in the 
world economy and face widespread discontent and unemployment among its youth (Agarwal, 
2009; Goldman et al., 2008).  
The Indian higher education system is vast and faces multiple challenges. The system 
enrolls about 37 million students across 993 universities and 50,000 colleges and stand-alone 
institutions (AISHE, 2019). And yet, only 28% of students in the 18–24-year-old age group1 
enrolled in higher education in 2018. This rate is much higher in China (50%), United Kingdom 
(61%) and United States (88%) (World Bank, 2019). The physical infrastructure, number of 
institutions, and faculty are not enough to educate the vast number of students graduating from 
the school system (Agarwal, 2009; N. Sharma, 2019). There are considerable differences in 
access to higher education institutions by gender, caste, religion, and region. For instance, only 
17% of students from scheduled tribes enroll in higher education (AISHE, 2019).  
Further, policy makers have expressed serious concerns about the quality of teaching, 
learning, and research at Indian institutions (National Knowledge Commission, 2009). Only one 
Indian university was ranked amongst the top 200 universities in the world (QS World 
 
1
 Gross enrollment ratio is commonly used to compare education access across countries. For higher education, the 
World Bank defines it as the percentage of population in the 18-24 yr. old age group that is enrolled in a post-
secondary institution. Different methodologies can yield to different measures of access, for instance, according to 
the US Government’s Department of Education, only 40% of its 18-24 year-olds are enrolled in two or four year 
college (NCES, 2019).  
2 
 
Universities Ranking, 2021). In another example, Indian students are considerably less likely to 
develop critical thinking skills than their American counterparts (Loyalka et al., 2019). Indian 
employers have also found graduates to be severely lacking in skills appropriate for the labor 
market (Aspiring Minds, 2019).  
A sense of mounting challenges prompted the federal2 government of India to launch the 
National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) or the Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan in 
2013.3 NHEM was the first federal attempt to implement multiple reforms using a single higher 
education policy. The policy used the incentive of federal funds to promote reforms in the state 
higher education systems (NHEM, 2013, p. 18). According to the federal policy makers, the 
reforms were necessary to improve quality of higher education, increase overall access, and 
reduce inequities in access. Reforms included creating new regulatory structures in state higher 
education systems called State Higher Education Councils, altering quality assurance 
mechanisms followed by state universities and colleges, introducing new academic and 
examination practices, etc.  
NHEM has been in place for a little over seven years. By 2020, the policy has disbursed 
approximately INR 71 billion to about 1900 colleges and 136 universities across India (MHRD, 
2016; PRS Legislative Research, 2018, 2019, 2020). Despite this, there is little systematic 
evidence on the effectiveness of the policy design or implementation process. This dissertation 
examines the process of NHEM’s creation and the variations in the way Indian states have 
implemented NHEM reforms.  
 
2
 In India, the term central or center is used to denote the national level of government, both officially and 
colloquially. However, this document uses the term federal throughout.  
3
 National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) is the literal English translation for the original Hindi name of the 
policy, Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan (RUSA). The policy is commonly referred to as RUSA in India and is 
mentioned as such in official documents, media coverage, and by interviewees. However, this document uses the 
English version of the policy’s name.  
3 
 
National Higher Education Mission: Promise of a Paradigm Shift 
NHEM marked an important shift in the federal government’s higher education policy 
because it shifted the policy focus to state university systems. Apart from a lack of financial 
resources, Indian state university systems suffer from several issues such as weak governance 
and quality assurance systems, bureaucratic management, limited academic and financial 
autonomy, etc. (Agarwal, 2006a; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013; Kapur et al., 2017). Publicly funded 
institutions within the state are dependent on the state Departments of Higher Education 
(DoHEs) for funds, faculty appointments, the appointments of leadership and administrators, 
establishing faculties or departments, etc. State universities operate as bureaucratic extensions of 
the state government rather than as independent academic institutions (Altbach, 1993; Bhushan, 
2015; Chandra, 2017; Jayal, 2020). It results in a system that continues to be characterized as an 
‘immobile colossus’ (Dube, 1988; Jayaram, 2004).  
Meanwhile, states have a burgeoning private college sector that is not directly controlled 
or monitored by the government. Private colleges are connected to public universities through 
the affiliation system.4 This system has been ineffective at quality control and has become a 
largely administrative relationship between universities and colleges (Singh, 2003). Thus, states 
have developed a lopsided system with a small number of overregulated and bureaucratically 
controlled public institutions weakly associated with large numbers of poorly governed private 
 
4
 Based on the Oxford-Cambridge model, the affiliation system was designed to serve as a quality control 
mechanism (Agarwal, 2013; Raza, 2009). The affiliating university sets curricula, conducts examinations, and grants 
degrees for students enrolled in affiliated private colleges (Jayaram, 2004). Though this system started as a solution 
to manage enrollments and provide greater access to Indian students, it has now grown to an unmanageable and 
ineffective scale. Particularly because universities don’t have the resources to enforce standards for faculty 
qualifications, teaching processes, or teaching resources in affiliated colleges (Carnoy & Dossani, 2013; A. Singh, 
2003). When NHEM was formulated in 2013, at least seventeen state universities each had upwards of 400 affiliated 
colleges (NHEM, 2013, p. 66). Due to the scale of affiliation, the university manages a vast range from institutions, 
from the best to the worst, using the same standards and curriculum. Though this does pull up and maintain the 




institutions (Chandra, 2017; Kapur et al., 2017). States have not developed sectoral 
accountability or quality assurance systems for either types of institutions (Daugherty et al., 
2013). Such a system is slow to change or undergo reforms, control quality of instruction and 
research, or respond to environmental changes (Chandra, 2017).  
NHEM was introduced in this context and it stood out from previous policies in two 
ways. Firstly, NHEM was the first effort made by the federal government to consciously correct 
the funding imbalance that had favored federal institutions over state universities for several 
decades (Ayyar, 2017a; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013; Ravi et al., 2019). NHEM’s was the first 
policy that solely targeted beneficiaries in the state universities and colleges of the country. 
These institutions shoulder 87% of higher education enrolments across India (AISHE, 2019). 
NHEM also marked the first time that the federal Ministry of Higher Education (MHRD) 
bypassed the University Grants Commission (UGC) and got directly involved in funding state 
institutions. 5 For more details about the nature of federal and state relationship in funding and 
regulating higher education in India, refer to Appendix A. Thus, the policy marked shifting 
priorities and preferences about higher education funding at the federal level.  
Secondly, NHEM was different from prior policies because it offered funds to states 
conditional on their commitment to undertake a set of reforms. This funding system had been 
tried in other areas such as urban development (NHEM, 2013, p. 82; Sadoway et al., 2018). 
However, the approach was novel for higher education funding. It allowed the federal 
government a unique opportunity to take on an expansive reform agenda for the state 
universities. The NHEM policy document notes (NHEM, 2013, p. 18):  
 
5
 UGC is the primary regulator of general higher education in India. It regulates and funds state and federal 
institutions. Other such bodies include All India Council of Technical Education, Medical Council of India, etc. 
NHEM’s successor, the National Education Policy 2020 has started the process of merging all the sectoral regulators 
into one standard setting and funding body called the Higher Education Commission of India.  
5 
 
“Problems in the state universities are linked to the archaic systems and regulations that 
govern them. Without bringing about reforms in the existing governance and regulatory systems, 
it will not be possible to unleash the potential of the state universities. The reforms initiated 
under NHEM will build a self-sustaining momentum that will push for greater accountability and 
autonomy of state institutions and impress upon them the need to improve the quality of 
education.” 
The reforms initiated major changes in state higher education systems. One, each state 
had to create a buffer bodies called State Higher Education Council (SHEC) that would perform 
planning, monitoring, and regulatory functions for higher education within states. These 
functions were performed by Departments of Higher Education in most states (DoHE). SHECs 
would also provide the organizational capacity and technical expertise to implement other 
reforms in states. Two, affiliation reforms would limit the size of state universities and force 
states to consider alternate systems of managing affiliated colleges such as autonomous colleges, 
large numbers of small universities, etc. Three, autonomy reforms sought to increase the 
academic, financial, and administrative autonomy of universities as well as colleges to take 
decisions without the state’s interference. Four, accreditation reforms were designed to 
strengthen external quality control mechanisms for all institutions by making accreditation 
compulsory. Five, changes in academic and examination practices such as continuous student 
assessment throughout an academic session using means other than end-of-semester 
examinations, credit-based program design, etc. were included in NHEM to improve quality of 
teaching and learning. All these reforms were woven into NHEM’s design using funding 
incentives, implementation mandates, and proclamations.  
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According to federal policy makers, NHEM reforms were supposed to institutionalize 
structural and behavioral changes that improve the way states manage universities and colleges, 
the way universities manage academic engagement with colleges, and the ways in which all 
institutions are held accountable for their outputs. Together, the reforms promote a self-
regulating higher education sector where the state plays a smaller role in managing institutions 
and directs them through competitive and conditional funding. The federal government believed 
that these changes would improve the overall management, financial self-sufficiency and 
autonomy of state university systems (MHRD, 2013). It is important to note that most of these 
reforms had been suggested previously by government committees and experts (CABE, 2012; 
Larsen et al., 2014; MHRD, 1986; National Knowledge Commission, 2009; Zachariah, 1993). 
However, empirical evidence about their impact is limited. 
 
Purpose of This Study 
Despite the importance of higher education to the achievement of India’s economic and 
social goals, there is limited research on how national higher education policies are created and 
implemented in the country. Empirical work on higher education in India is fairly limited, 
particularly, very little has been written about policy implementation or policy formulation for 
higher education in the country (Kapur & Mehta, 2017; Sunder, 2012). This study uses NHEM’s 
implementation as an opportunity to study the process of policy implementation in India.  
A few studies provide rich overviews about the higher education system and previous 
policies (Agarwal, 2009; Ayyar, 2017a; Rudolph & Rudolph, 1972). Studies based on 
quantitative or qualitative data in Indian higher education concern topics such as financing of 
higher education (Panigrahi, 2018; Tilak, 2015; Tilak & Varghese, 1991); academic skills and 
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employability of graduates (Béteille et al., 2019; Loyalka et al., 2019, 2021); experiences with 
examination reforms over decades (Zachariah, 1993); affirmative action (Bertrand et al., 2010; 
Deshpande, 2005; Weisskopf, 2004); and student experience and politics on college campuses 
(Altbach, 1968; Jeffrey, 2010; Pathania, 2018).  
Some scholars have written about Indian higher education based on qualitative research 
and personal experience. These broad accounts highlight important problems within the system 
such as affiliation (Chitnis & Altbach, 1993; Singh, 2003), escalating private education costs 
(Agarwal, 2006a; Asha Gupta, 2015), poor quality and ineffective regulatory systems (Agarwal, 
2009; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013). Evidence about the quality, access, and equity is also available 
in the reports generated by multilateral agencies or research organizations (Blom & Cheong, 
2010; Daugherty et al., 2013; Goldman et al., 2008; Kulavelil et al., 2018; Larsen et al., 2014; 
World Bank Group, 2012). All these works provide useful but limited information about the 
structures and underlying problems of Indian higher education and, in some cases, insightful 
analysis of the political economy of higher education at large.  
To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies dedicated specifically to the analysis of 
higher education policy formation at the state or federal level and policy implementation at the 
state level. The absence of research on policy formulation or policy implementation in higher 
education and the politics of higher education reforms is the main motivation for this study. This 
paucity of literature is partly due to the fact that there have not been any large-scale policies or 
policy changes in higher education that can be systematically studied across the country (Ayyar, 
2009). Though multiple committees have been appointed by the University Grants Commission 
(UGC) or the Ministry of Human Resources and Development (MHRD) with the intention of 
understanding challenges in higher education and devising policy solutions, the reforms or 
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changes they suggested have not resulted in any concrete policies (Agarwal, 2006a; Ayyar, 
2017b; Panigrahi, 2014).  
Kapur and Mehta (2007) argue that Indian higher education faces regulatory and market 
failure precisely due to insufficient policy formulation and reactive judicial challenges to the 
unplanned developments in the sector. Research on Indian higher education is also limited due to 
the absence of established data collection systems. Indian states and institutions do not maintain 
any centralized digital administrative databases that collect information on enrolled students, 
their demographics, academic performance, movement within the education system, etc. 
(Agarwal, 2006b). Data limitations make it difficult to conduct quantitative policy evaluation or 
even provide definitive descriptive information about Indian higher education system. 
This dissertation addresses a part of the existing gap in the literature on higher education 
policy in India. The study uses the National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) to answer three 
research questions:  
1. Why, through what processes and by which policy actors was NHEM formulated at the 
federal level?  
2. Do states differ in the way they have established State Higher Education Councils? Do 
these different implementation choices match the theory of action?  
3. Have states chosen to implement the same NHEM reforms with different intensity? 
Does their implementation match the policy’s theory of action?  
The study answers the question about policy formulation at the federal level while the 
implementation research is done at the state level. The state level study is based on a sample of 
four Indian states, Kerala, Odisha, Punjab, and West Bengal. The states were sampled to differ 
across important criteria like the state’s capacity to implement NHEM reforms, degree of reform 
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implementation, income, region, etc. The focus of the study is to understand the process of 
reform implementation in states and not to produce evidence about the effectiveness of these 
reforms in the Indian context. 
The study employs a theoretical framework that uses Western theories on policy making, 
policy implementation, and organization theory along with studies on implementation and 
politics of education from developing nations. The combination of these theories creates a rich 
portrait of the state university system that shoulders most of the post-secondary enrollments in 
India.  
Study Overview 
The following presents an overview of the chapters included in this study.  
Chapter Two. Review of the Literature and Theoretical Framework  
Chapter Two reviews literature on four important areas relevant to this study. They are 1) 
policy formulation literature, 2) policy implementation literature, 3) politics of higher education 
in India, and 4) organizational theory. I combine theoretical constructs from India and other 
developing countries in each of these areas to draw out features salient to NHEM’s formulation 
and implementation.  
The last part of the chapter presents the theoretical framework underlying this study. I 
mobilize concepts from Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) theory to understand how higher 
education policies are made and implemented at the state and federal level. Politics of patronage 
is used to understand the specific context and political calculus of reforms in Indian states. 
Organizational and institutional theory are employed, along with ACF to understand how the 




Chapter Three. Research Design and Methodology  
Chapter Three presents the three main research questions answered in the study. Next, I 
describe the qualitative methods used in the study. A single case study method is used for the 
federal formulation process. The state-level implementation research includes four case studies 
on Kerala, Odisha, Punjab, West Bengal. Each state is treated as a separate case. This chapter 
details the sampling strategy used to pick these four states for data collection.  
The federal case study is based on interviews with federal officials, national, and 
international observers of Indian higher education, and documentary analysis. State case studies 
use documentary data and interviews with members of the departments of higher education 
DoHEs, state councils of higher education (SHECs), universities, colleges, faculty unions, etc. 
The chapter details the analysis methods and tools used to draw conclusions from the data.  
Chapter Four. Promising Design: Formulation of the National Higher Education Mission  
This chapter addresses the first of the three research questions about the process of 
NHEM’s creation and its theory of action. The first part of the chapter examines the political and 
social context that led to NHEM’s development; how the policy goals were developed; the 
process of crafting policy instruments; and the involvement of various actors in the process. The 
second part of the chapter presents details of the design of five main reforms included in NHEM 
and the policy instruments chosen to address them. These reforms are 1) the creation of SHECs, 
2) affiliation reforms, 3) autonomy reforms, 4) accreditation reforms, and 5) academic reforms.  
This chapter argues that the lack of a systematic policy design process is reflected in the 
poor goal definition of the policy, ineffective choice of instruments, and an unclear theory of 
action. The chapter ends with a discussion about the theories that best explain the policy making 
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process observed in this case. It uses ACF to explain the centralized nature of higher education 
policy making in India.  
Chapter Five. Unfulfilled Potential: State Higher Education Councils  
 Chapter Five answers the third research question. The chapter is dedicated to the 
state-level implementation analysis of NHEM’s first major reform: the establishment of State 
Higher Education Councils (SHECs). Differences and similarities across the four state case 
studies are discussed in each section of the chapter. The first section deals with the effects of 
NHEM instruments on the higher education subsystem and its actors like DoHEs, SHECs, and 
institutions in states. NHEM has led to the creation of SHECs but has not led to the participation 
of non-state actors in the higher education governance process.  
Next, I discuss the findings about differences and similarities in SHEC functions across 
the four states. The section discusses how many important functions related to financing, 
planning, and performance monitoring are still performed by the DoHEs. SHECs are only 
involved in academic and advisory roles in the states. Lastly, I consider the how DoHEs 
influence the operation of SHECs by controlling their resources and powers. This include 
making decisions about which SHEC leaders and members to appoint and how much financial 
resources to allot to SHECs. The chapter closes with the argument that though interests of 
DoHEs in controlling power can explain their attitude towards SHECs, it does not explain the 
lack of support shown by other actors in the state. I suggest that the implementation of SHEC 
reforms in states reflects taken-for-granted beliefs and norms about higher education governance 
shared by multiple actors in the state. The first belief is about the meaning and scope of higher 
education governance. The second belief is that sectoral governance must be managed by the 
state, not by non-state autonomous institutions like SHECs.   
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Chapter Six. Progress and Problems: Implementing NHEM Reforms 
This chapter deals with the implementation of the remaining four NHEM reforms. For 
each reform, I present the progress made under NHEM as well as the main conflicts and 
challenges that characterize the implementation of the reform. This analysis points to some 
common themes across states. The culture of the state higher education systems differs widely 
from the theory of action for NHEM reforms. Namely, most state higher education systems are 
not convinced about the need for NHEM reforms. States also lack the political will, financial 
resources, and technical capacity to implement the reforms. This leads to different interpretations 
and variations in reforms across states.   
Chapter Six closes with an analysis of the nature of state higher education systems in 
India. This chapter discusses two taken-for-granted beliefs that are reflected in the policy’s 
implementation. One, that government colleges and universities are public institutions first and 
educational institutions later. Thus, the bureaucratic identity of the institution and individuals is 
more prominent than their academic identity. This makes following centrally mandated rules 
more important than concerns about teaching, research, or academic autonomy. Two, that quality 
of higher education cannot be managed by individual faculty and institutions, its control must lie 
with a centralized body like the university or the state. This is because uniformity in the 
application of rules across the system is more important than ensuring academic autonomy and 
customized teaching and learning processes. The conclusion also highlights how the political 





Chapter Seven. Towards Better Practice: An Informed Approach to Higher Education 
Reform in India  
Chapter Seven concludes the discussions about policy formulation and policy 
implementation. Based on the findings presented in the previous chapters, I develop a four-factor 
framework to analyze policy implementation for higher education in India. The four factors 
discussed in the framework consist of political support, technical capacity, financial resources, 
and state higher education culture. While the first three factors are commonly identified 
challenges in decentralization reforms, this study’s unique contribution lies in the identification 
of beliefs that constitute the higher education culture in Indian states. After describing the 
framework, I use it to summarize the evidence on implementation of higher education reforms 
under NHEM. I also use the framework to explain how NHEM’s implementation challenges can 
be traced, in part, to the policy formulation process and policy design.  
The chapter also analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of various theoretical approaches 
in understanding NHEM’s policy formulation and implementation. Particularly, I consider the 
applicability of various theoretical constructs in the political and cultural reality of India. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion about the limitation of this study and directions for future 
research.  
 
Contributions of This Study  
As the first study based on a major national higher education policy in India, this study 
makes several important contributions to the literature on this topic. The recent formulation of 
the National Education Policy 2020 by the federal government has made this study even more 
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relevant. The practical implications of the study for policy making and implementation stand to 
inform the next wave of reforms efforts in Indian higher education.  
This study presents systematic evidence on federal actors involved in higher education 
policy making as well as the relationships between them. Unlike other areas, the higher 
education sector in India is still dominated and regulated by the government and has weak 
participation of civil society organizations. As a result, the policy making in this sector has 
occurred in a black box. Evidence on the policy actors will add to the existing literature that 
largely draws on sectors such as school education, environmental protection, market competition, 
food security, etc. that have greater public participation (Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 2017a; 
Echeverri-Gent, 1993; Mooij, 2007). The diversity of contexts can add to a clearer understanding 
of policy making and policy implementation process in India.  
The combination of individual-, institution-, and sector-level implementation analysis 
included in this study captures the complexities of how states translate and implement the federal 
higher education agenda. The study speaks to different areas of literature. The findings are an 
evidence of the gap in policy rhetoric and practice in developing countries, especially with 
regards to the influence of global scripts about higher education governance, evaluation, and 
quality on national education systems in developing countries (see Amaral et al., 2003, 2013; 
Donina & Paleari, 2019; Meyer, 2000).  
The study is unique in its use of institutional theory to characterize how Indian higher 
education institutions interact with their environment. Indian universities and colleges operate in 
a vastly different cultural, political, and bureaucratic environment from their American or 
European counterparts. This application shows how an existing strong coupling with myths 
supported by the immediate environment can create challenges for education reforms, 
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particularly when the belief system of the local environment and institutions is very different 
from the global scripts and supra-national frameworks. This raises questions about the thesis that 
global scripts and norms form overpowering forces that shape real changes in educational 
structures and practice across the world (see Bromley & Meyer, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). This research adds to the growing body of literature which suggests that traveling reforms 
may never be replicated in their original form in the countries that borrow them. Reforms are 
translated into new forms depending on the local resource constraints, differences in professional 
capacity, unique educational culture, and national or regional politics of education (see Bjork, 
2004; Donina & Paleari, 2019; Mok, 2013; Tran, 2014).  
The study also critiques the Western policy implementation literature (see Jenkins-Smith 
et al., 2007; Sabatier, 1988). It highlights the limitations of applying these theories to less 
pluralistic political systems than the US and Europe. The oversized role played by the state in 
higher education policy implementation in India exhibits how limited participation structures of 
policy subsystems can influence institutional and individual choices (see Sabatier, 1998). By 
using institutional theory with the advocacy coalition framework, I also extend the understanding 
on how the belief systems of organizational actors inform their attitudes and actions regarding a 
new policy. Applying institutional theory deepens the theoretical understanding of reform 
implementation from an organizational point of view. It also identifies implementation patterns 
like ignored reforms, proforma creation of SHECs, cooptation of SHECs by DoHEs, minimal 
changes in academic structures and procedures that satisfy reform requirements, etc.  
Apart from engaging with and adding to the theoretical literature, the findings of the 
study fulfill the practical purpose of informing future policy design and implementation. 
Specifically, the study suggests that involving more federal and state stakeholders, and using 
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rigorous and methodical policy design processes could have improved NHEM’s policy design 
significantly. The National Education Policy 2020 developed by the federal government suffers 
from similar pitfalls that have been highlighted in this study. Though NEP 2020 has gone 
through an extended period of commenting by the states, the policy has been developed without 
keeping financial resource allocations and policy instruments in mind. Like many previous 
policies, it is currently a mere statement of intent issued by the federal government. The crucial 
process of converting the proclamations into specific instruments and policy programs is yet to 
be finished. By highlighting flaws in NHEM’s design, this study can provide an important guide 
for further policy development.  
The implementation analysis done for this study presents a rich description of the 
organizational, cultural, and political characteristics of state level higher education systems. Due 
to the broad nature of NHEM’s reforms, this study describes a wide range of complex and 
interconnected issues faced by the state higher education system, from affiliation and 
accreditation to academic autonomy and governance reforms. Apart from the value of this 
descriptive to policy makers, the research also highlights the bottlenecks faced by state 
governments, universities, colleges, and faculty in implementing comprehensive systemic 
reforms suggested by NHEM. A related and important finding is that many problems in the 
Indian state university system are interconnected and need to be solved as such. Policy designs 
that don’t take a holistic approach to affiliation reforms, governance reforms, and academic 
reforms are likely to harness the potential of all three solutions.  
Previous policies and studies have identified limited financial resources and technical 
capacity in states as the main constraints in implementing any higher education policies in India. 
This study makes an important contribution by analyzing the crucial role of interests and deeply 
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held beliefs and norms in supporting the status-quo. The identification of these sources of 
resistance is crucial for designing appropriate policies to counter them. This study specifies how 
deeply held beliefs about higher education governance, quality assurance, and academic 
autonomy are reflected in the policy implementation in the states. These belief systems 
essentially represent the fault lines along which any higher education reform is likely to face 
implementation challenges.   
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Chapter 2: Review of The Literature and Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study draws on four bodies of literature that are 
pertinent to higher education policy in India. Policy formulation, and implementation studies 
from western and developing nations, politics of patronage in India, and organization theory. I 
use Advocacy Coalition Framework and organizational theory to explain reform formulation and 
implementation at the sub system level, organizational, and individual level. Implementation 
studies from developing countries are used to modify the theoretical constructs about policy 
formulation and policy implementation developed for Western contexts. I also draw on the rich 
literature on South Asian politics to lay out some hypothesized relationships critical to the 
politics of higher education in India.  
The literature review is divided into five sections, the first four sections cover literature 
from policy formulation, policy implementation, politics of higher education in India, and 
organization theory. The fifth section synthesizes the theoretical framework derived from the 
literature and presents the hypothesized relationships that inform the research methodology and 
data analysis.  
 
Elements of Policy Formulation 
This section reviews key theories of policy formulation and policy implementation that 
can inform the analysis of NHEM formation and implementation. The section also covers 
technical aspects of policy design such as the relationship between policy instruments and theory 
of action. Lastly, the literature review considers the influence of New Public Management on 
NHEM. It considers if NHEM’s design reflects the changes in the relationship between 
governments and higher education institutions across the world.  
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Policy Formulation and Policy Change 
A brief overview of the policy formulation approaches suggests that three main 
frameworks can be employed to understand the policy formulation process. The advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF) that suggests that policies get made in a complex environment that 
involves many actors over a long period of time (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). Policy changes take place within policy subsystems. These are issue-specific networks of 
government officials, elected officials, advocacy groups, research organizations, litigators, etc. 
influencing the policy agenda (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, pp. 189-191). Actors within the 
subsystem form advocacy coalitions on the basis of their ideologies, technical expertise, and 
engagement on a policy issue (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007). Coalitions usually share deep core 
beliefs and policy core beliefs though they may differ on secondary beliefs such as 
implementation strategies, specific rules etc. for a policy (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007). 
Policy subsystems and advocacy coalition formation are shaped by relatively stable 
factors such as the availability of natural resources, nature of the problem, basic cultural values, 
and legal structures in the country at the time (Sabatier, 1988, p. 188). Policy making and 
implementation also gets affected by the nature of the opportunity structure and openness of the 
policy process (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 199). Advocacy coalitions attempt to influence 
decision making authorities using the resources at their disposal. Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions 
engage in a continuous process of policy-oriented learning, they keep adapting their strategies to 
changes in the political, legislative and technical environment (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Policy 
change can happen when an issue appears on the government agenda due to an external shock or 
internal changes in the policy subsystem or when new policy learning occurs.  
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The Punctuated Equilibrium (PE) theory concentrates on explaining long periods of 
stability and short spurts of dramatic change in policy arenas. Baumgartner and Jones (2010) 
suggest that policy subsystems can be dominated by a single interest group or actor and give rise 
to stable policy monopolies that can resist policy changes for long periods. Like ACF, they also 
acknowledge the bounded rationality of policy makers and actors in the subsystem. This means 
they have limited capacity to process policy problems and solutions, a shift in their attention can 
lead to sudden policy changes (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007; True et al., 2007).  
Another explanation for policy change is offered by Kingdon’s multiple streams 
approach (Kingdon, 2011). This theory draws from the garbage can model of decision making 
(Cohen et al., 1972). According to this theory, policy problems, policy solutions, and political 
context are continuously developing and evolving ‘streams’. Policy change happens when there 
is a brief window of opportunity where the three streams can be combined (Zahariadis, 2007). 
Policy entrepreneurs are issue experts or advocates who use these opportunities created by 
shocks in the policy environment to highlight a policy problem and its solution and bring 
together a coalition to support this formulation (Kingdon, 1984; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). 
Policy entrepreneurs simultaneously engage in framing existing policy problems in the right 
terms and attaching them to policy solutions that have acceptability (Stone, 2012). They have the 
expertise to negotiate on policy proposals with various coalition members to create a wide range 
of support for their policy solution and the acumen to seize political opportunities to push their 
policy change at the right time (Mintrom & Norman, 2009).  
Each policy implementation theory has its merits. Analyzing the entire subsystem, as 
suggested by ACF, explores the contribution of multiple actors included in NHEM’s design.  
ACF has an added advantage in that it can also be used to study policy implementation. Both 
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ACF and PE are useful in explaining sudden policy changes and the dynamics of the policy 
subsystem. PE’s concept of policy monopolies can explain the dominance of the state in some 
policy subsystems in India. As a result, actors like UGC, other regulators, the World Bank, etc. 
appear to be less active in NHEM’s formulation. The multiple streams approach and policy 
entrepreneurship perspectives provide more clarity on the role played by individuals like political 
or bureaucratic leaders and experts in initiating policies at a particular point in time.  
However, ACF has been criticized for its over-reliance on beliefs rather and ignoring 
factors like short-term interests that create policy coalitions (Ladi, 2005; Nohrstedt, 2005; Te 
Lintelo, 2009). The degree of deliberation and political action assumed by PE, ACF, multiple 
streams are a characteristic of pluralist polities.  It does not always apply in a parliamentary 
polity like India (Sabatier, 1998). Findings from Indian studies suggest that the Indian political 
and social context sets apart policy processes in the country. Deep socio-economic inequities and 
clientelism shape policy choices as does systemic corruption (Dyer, 2000; Kingdon & 
Muzammil, 2009; Mooij, 2007). Policy formulation and implementation tend to be more 
centralized, rely heavily on the bureaucratic machinery and are primarily government-led or top-
down in nature (Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005; Ayyar, 2009). 
Policy Design 
In addition to the political and systemic forces shaping a policy, the study of formulation 
also needs to engage in technical analysis of a policy’s design and design process. Policy design 
is “the deliberate and conscious attempt to define policy goals and to connect them to 
instruments or tools expected to realize those objectives (Howlett, Mukherjee, & Woo, 2015, p. 
292). Policy instruments are concrete and specific operational forms of interventions by public 
authorities (Bemelmans-Videc, 2011, p. 4) or mechanisms that translate substantive policy goals 
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actions into concrete actions (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Policy makers can employ 
instruments like inducements, mandates, taxation, proclamations, capacity building investments, 
regulations, laws, etc. to affect changes through a policy (Howlett et al., 2015; McDonnell & 
Elmore, 1987; Vedung, 2011).  
Choices about policy instruments are based on the nature of the problem, the solution 
sought, and behavioral assumptions about actions of state and individual level implementers 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Instruments and causal logic also communicate the intent of policy 
makers to the state-level implementers (Linder & Peters, 1984). However, policy design is 
always rational and sequential. Researchers argue that many policies are variants or remakes of 
older policies, few are completely new formulations (Carter, 2012; Hogwood & Peters, 1982). 
Layering and borrowing of policies is part of the process of policy design (Howlett et al., 2015).  
As a result, a policy’s designed-ness can range from non-design to full-design, depending on the 
extent to which the causal logic of the policy explicitly connects policy goals with its instruments 
(Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014; Linder & Peters, 1989; Peters, 2018).  
NHEM’s policy design appears to use the incentive of federal funds to initiate reforms in 
the states. However, the policy’s document does not clarify how the reforms and funds are 
supposed to achieve the policy’s goals. Analysis of the exact nature of its policy instruments and 
their causal logic will provide greater clarity about how the policy was intended to be 
implemented.  
Influence of New Public Management and Decentralization 
Policy developments in one country or region of the world travel to, are consciously 
borrowed, or can be imposed on other nations (Mosley et al., 1995; Phillips & Ochs, 2003; 
Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2012). Globalization theory argues that the global economy is 
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dominated by uncontrollable forces that structurally shape modern states and their roles in 
governance (Dale, 1999; Meyer, 2000). Effects of globalization and transnational policy 
borrowing on higher education policy in Asia are reflected in the emergence of 
Western/European constructs about governance, financing, and management of higher education 
across the region (Kamat, 2011; Mok, 2003, 2005; Tran, 2014).  
Policy developments and growth of private higher education in India and other South 
Asian countries have been linked to globalization and New Public Management philosophies 
(Kamat, 2011; Varghese, 2004a; Varghese & Malik, 2020). New Public Management (NPM) 
were a set of managerial reforms that emerged from practical solutions for apparent failures of 
the public sector in 1980s and 1990s6 (Bleiklie, 1998; Dunn & Miller, 2007). These reforms are 
associated with a few principles such as treating higher education as a commodity, the university 
as a provider of education services, and market forces as the most effective governance 
mechanism for the sector (Ferlie et al., 2008).  
NPM is marked by a change in the state’s role in a sector. The state is supposed to 
strengthen market forces and prevent market failure, rather than lead the management of public 
services (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Neave & Vught, 1991). The menu of solutions offered in this 
paradigm changes the role of the state from ex-ante regulation (making rules, regulations and 
budget decisions) to ex-post regulation (performance monitoring related to specific goals, plans 
and by rules), and from an interventionist to an evaluative state (Amaral et al., 2003; Neave & 
 
6
 Higher education was considered a public good in most western nations till 1970s (Shattock, 1999). The state’s 
role was to fund academic institutions and protect them from undue external influence or internal politicization 
(Bleiklie, 1998). Due to financial pressures of 1980s and early 1990s, call for public sector efficiency increased. 
This triggered the reconceptualization of higher education as a commodity, the university as a provider of education 
services, and market forces as the most effective governance mechanism for the sector (Ferlie et al., 2008). This 
conception required the state to strengthen market forces and prevent market failure, rather than leading the 
management of any public service (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994; Neave & Vught, 1991). A dominant paradigm in this 
context, NPM was championed as a means of increasing the efficiency of the university as an enterprise producing 
education services (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994). 
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Van Vught, 1994). International organizations, international rankings, accreditation systems, etc. 
create pressures and supra-national frameworks that proliferate this notion (Gaus, 2019; Pollitt, 
1995; Williams & Young, 1994).  
The key principles of NPM can be summarized as follows; competition; being mission 
driven rather than rule driven; being results oriented rather than process oriented; being customer 
driven; being decentralized and market oriented (Denhardt & Catlaw, 2004). For NHEM 
reforms, decentralization is a salient concept. Decentralization or ‘the transfer of decision-
making authority, responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or between 
organizations’ (Hanson, 1998,p. 112). Decentralization is an old strategy for improving 
efficiency of service delivery that also finds favor in NPM (Brillantes, 2004; McGinn & Welsh, 
1999; Rondinelli et al., 1983).  
Decentralization takes many forms. Mainly, horizontal decentralization refers to transfer 
or sharing of power between organizations or agencies that work in parallel. Such as the creation 
of SHECs in states transfers DoHE’s powers to another agency. And vertical decentralization 
involves redistribution of control between various geographical levels like federal, state, district 
and institutional level (Bray & Mukundan, 2003; McGinn & Welsh, 1999). For instance, 
NHEM’s autonomy reforms push more decision-making powers from the state to universities 
and colleges. Decentralization is supposed to increase accountability by closing the distance 
between those in charge of actual service delivery and beneficiaries, bring about financial and 
resource efficiency, and improve quality of services rendered (Aucoin, 1990; Lauglo, 1995; 
Manning, 2001).  
Many Asian countries like China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, etc. have seen policy 
changes based on decentralized governance and management of higher education in the past 
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three decades (Mok, 2003, 2005; Tran, 2014). At the same time, the development of regional, 
national, and supra-national evaluative and governance regimes has also increased international 
and federal control education systems (Davies & Guppy, 1997; Mok, 2013). In India, principles 
of NPM are useful in understanding NHEM’s reforms and theory of action even though the 
policy does not explicitly acknowledge this connection.  
NHEM’s reforms and policy instruments attempt to change the role of state governments 
in managing education - from active management to steering using evaluation. Policy and 
administrative tools such as reform-contingent funding, state and institutional plans, norm-based 
competitive funding and performance-based funding are examples of the application of NPM 
principles (see Varghese & Malik, 2020). They mark a fundamental shift in the way in which 
institutions are governed and held accountable at the state level. Importantly, the creation of 
SHECs decentralizes authority from the state departments of higher education to SHECs in order 
to create governance capacities outside the state.  
NPM and decentralization are important for understanding the larger beliefs and attitudes 
that underline NHEM reforms. And in understanding how these new beliefs will interact with the 
Indian higher education system. NPM principles tend to clash with existing Weberian 
bureaucratic cultures in many countries and only get implemented as an additional layer on 
existing systems (Dierickx, 2003; Goldfinch & Wallis, 2010; Kuhlmann et al., 2008). Lack of 
local capacity, insufficient infrastructural and financial support for autonomy, continued political 
interference have scuttled NPM-based policies and decentralization reforms in higher education 
in Vietnam and Indonesia (Gaus, 2019; Tran, 2014). In China, efforts to decentralize university 
governance structures has led to an even stronger presence of the state in coordination and 
regulation of higher education (Mok, 2001, 2005). The theories of implementation discussed in 
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the next section delve deeper into the specific challenges of policy implementation that are likely 
to emerge in India.  
 
Policy Implementation  
Most of the theoretical work on policy implementation attempts to construct theories that 
explains how multiple factors affect implementation in any context (Smith & Larimer, 2018). 
This common theory has been elusive, studies suggest far too many concepts that are difficult to 
mobilize or variables that are difficult to measure (O’Toole, 2000). Policy-designs are often 
based on assumptions about rational behavior of individuals and systems. Yet, implementation 
literature shows that there are multiple ways in which implementation can deviate from policy 
design.  
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches 
The main debate in implementation studies has been in terms of the top-down or bottom-
up approaches towards implementation analysis. Top-down scholars stress that actions and 
processes within implementing agencies can be or are controlled by policymakers as long as 
there are clearly defined policy goals to address, there specific rules to dictate individual actions, 
and there are strong incentives and disincentives to make sure individuals adhere to the rules and 
laws (Elmore, 1979; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). On the other 
hand, bottom-up theorists believe that street bureaucrats can or do interpret policy directives and 
use their abundant discretion in implementing policies, irrespective of the policy design and 
incentives (Hjern & Hull, 1982; Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977). In the face of resource shortages 
and conflicting expectations, street-level bureaucrats tend to either resort to the dominantly 
understood definition of their responsibility or they can simplify complex new concepts into 
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rules or practices they can easily routinize (Lipsky, 1971). Policy implementation in developing 
countries can take a very extreme form, Gupta (2012) writes evocatively about bureaucratic 
writing in India and cases where government policies and actions exist solely on paper. The 
attitude of street-level bureaucrats to their clients is conditioned by their socialization on the job 
and their background. Thus, the bottom-up view suggests that street-level policy implementation 
does not always correspond with the policy design, as assumed by the top-down theorists.  
The two conflicting views advocate for different methodological approaches towards 
studying implementation (Smith & Larimer, 2017). The top-down approach focusses on the 
policy inputs and outcomes, adequacy of resources, whether rules and regulations are followed 
uniformly, etc. Bottom-up theorists are more likely to look at the processes of decision-making 
by street-level bureaucrats and how their motivations, beliefs and competing priorities map to 
policy intentions (Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1986; Saetren, 2014).  
Assumptions about individual actions rooted in incentive and performance-based logic 
predominate the design of NHEM. Thus, a top-down approach has important implications for the 
theory of action in its choice of policy funding incentives and reform mandates as policy 
instruments. NHEM follows the logic that federal funding incentive is enough for states to 
undertake key prerequisite higher education reforms and that states will continue with other 
reforms that are supported and advocated by the federal government. However, as bottom-up 
theorists suggest, discretion at the level of university or college leadership and state bureaucrats 
contributes to the direction of NHEM implementation. The existing beliefs systems, socialization 
on the job, academic background, immediate interests and competing priorities on the job will 
determine how they choose to implement NHEM reforms. Their discretion is used in the most 
crucial aspects of reform implementation, such as determining the kind of powers SHECs will be 
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given, the intensity and detail in which institutional planning or quality improvement activities 
will be undertaken, the extent to which institutions will be given academic autonomy, how 
curricular or examination reforms will be implemented, etc. It becomes evident that NHEM’s 
implementation analysis needs a mixed approach that uses both top-down and bottom-up points 
of view to understand policy implementation. 
Reconciling Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches 
This view acknowledges that fruitful policy engagement requires an understanding of the 
policy instruments and resources as well as the motivations of and incentives for the individuals 
further down the implementation chain (Elmore, 1985). Instead of assuming a rational or linear 
policy-process, these approaches assume that individuals throughout the policy system can 
interpret and implement the same policy differently (Thomas & Grindle, 1990). Therefore, 
implementation can be affected at any point through the diversion of resources, deflection of 
policy goals, resistance to control or the dissipation of personal/political energy and this can have 
unforeseen impacts on policy implementation (Bardach, 1977). I consider two theories that 
provide different frameworks that utilize both top-down and bottom-up approaches for analyzing 
policy implementation.  
Sabatier (1986)’s advocacy coalition framework (ACF) can be applied to actors within a 
policy subsystem that implement policies, bringing to fore the attitudes and beliefs of actors 
about the policy solution and instruments. He combines it with a parallel analysis of the socio-
economic conditions, legal changes and policy instruments that affect the policy subsystem 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007). ACF provides an analytical boundary of sorts by explicitly 
underscoring the need to analyze the whole policy subsystem, in this case, the higher education 
system in a state. The policy subsystem should include all the actors like the DoHEs, the SHECs, 
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the universities, colleges, faculty, and the students. According to ACF, policy implementation 
will be affected by the operation of policy instruments (incentives, mandates and reforms) and 
the resources and beliefs of the advocacy coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007). Thus, NHEM’s 
implementation analysis should address political and socio-cultural factors that shape the 
subsystem at large and examine how the beliefs and resources available in states affect 
implementation of NHEM.  
Having reviewed the traditional policy implementation theories, I now turn to studies on 
policy implementation in developing countries and to literature that comments specifically on 
policy implementation in India’s federal system of government.  
Implementation in Developing Countries 
The implicit understanding in Western literature is that if policies are created, they will 
eventually be implemented in some form or another. This assumption does not always hold true 
in developing countries (Smith, 1973). Policy implementation literature specific to developing 
countries is limited but it does highlight a few common themes. Firstly, policy formulation and 
implementation tend to rely more on the bureaucratic machinery and are primarily government-
led or top-down in nature (Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005; Ayyar, 2009; Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 
2017; Hueso & Bell, 2013; Mathur, 2013; Sadoway et al., 2018). 
Secondly, due to the hierarchical nature of the social and political systems, citizens and 
stakeholders have limited inputs during agenda setting and choice of policy instruments (Grindle, 
1980; Walt & Gilson, 1994). Instead, political participation and competition are much more 
intense during policy implementation as interest groups attempt to influence how the rules of 
implementation are exercised and who are the beneficiaries of the policy (Dyer, 1994; Jenkins, 
1999). The opportunity structure for participation in policy formulation and the process of 
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interest representation are such that citizens have limited participation in policy formulation and,  
in some cases, during policy implementation as well (Echeverri-Gent, 1992). Many of the studies 
on politics of implementation, particularly in the 1990s and later, reflect the complex dynamics 
like elite capture, tensions between bureaucratic and political interests, and the negotiated 
dynamics between social classes (Chakraborty, 2014; Gurtoo & Udayaadithya, 2014; Savicks, 
2017). Lastly, studies on implementation of decentralization in education suggest that resource 
constraints, limited local political support, ineffective community organization, and poor 
technical capacity can deeply influence education reforms in developing countries (Bjork, 2004; 
Mukundan & Bray, 2004; Tran, 2014).  
This perspective on policy implementation in developing countries underscores two 
aspects of implementation analysis for NHEM. Firstly, that implementation of NHEM will differ 
from policy design because of bottom-up pressure and variations in local understanding of the 
reforms. These will be informed by available, structural inequities between policy actors, and 
technical capacity of local implementers. Secondly, some part of the dissonance between policy 
design and implementation may be a consequence of the policy design process at the federal 
level.  
Implementation in a Federal Polity 
 The nature of India’s federal polity creates complexities in governing higher 
education in India. There is continuous strife for autonomy in resource utilization on the part of 
states and a tendency to impose uniform standards across the nation by the federal government 
(Carnoy & Dossani, 2013). This complicated relationship between the federal and states levels 
varies across time and across issues. There have not been many studies that compare Indian 
states on the basis of their response to reforms. Bajpai and Sachs (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999) study 
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the responses of states to the fiscal reforms of 1990s and categorize 15 states into ‘reform 
oriented’ (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu), ‘intermediate 
reformers’ (Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal) and ‘lagging reformers’ (Assam, Bihar, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh). This study largely bases the classification 
on the wealth of the states and their historic tendency to reform. Bajpai and Sach’s work has 
been criticized for simplistic assumptions and ignoring institutional, political and economic 
mechanisms that cause states to react in different ways to federal reforms. However, no other 
studies have suggested as alternate typology that includes all states in the country.  
Other studies about the same reforms find states strength in terms of financial or natural 
resources, existing infrastructure, markets or administrative systems were important determinants 
of the speed and fidelity with which economic reforms were adopted (Kennedy et al., 2013). 
Aseema Sinha (2004) added that these abilities are affected by complex historical factors in 
terms of states' earlier experiences with reforms, regional competition amongst states and 
institutional strength built over decades (Sinha, 2004).  
Time-specific political realities of the state were important in determining how reforms 
unfolded (Kennedy, 2004). While the rich states with more resources and established systems 
had more scope in terms of negotiating with the federal government and shaping the terms of 
reforms; the internal politics of every state and capabilities of local interest groups influenced the 
policy stances finally adopted by the states (Kennedy et al., 2013).  
The literature highlights that there are wide differences amongst Indian states in the 
institutional capacity to implement reforms and cultural orientation towards reforms. That is, 
each state has its own policy subsystem that deals with higher education. Multi-party system, 
coalitional politics and differences in historic higher education legacies also lead to important 
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differences in the political culture of the states. And this political culture becomes crucial in 
understanding the reform implementation under NHEM.  
ACF as well as other implementation literature provide us with a broad framework for 
analyzing how actors, their interests, and beliefs can shape implementation choices. However, 
the theories so far do not shed light on how large organizations such as colleges and universities 
go through the processes of reform. Also, implementation studies from developing countries are 
unable to shed light on the specifics of the political economy of higher education in India. Hence, 
in the following section, I use concepts from politics of patronage to characterize the political-
economy of higher education in India and understand the behavior of key actors like elected 
officials, students and parents. In the section that follows, I use organizational theory to probe the 
processes that lead to individual and systemic changes in an institutionalized organizational 
environment. 
 
Politics and Higher Education in India 
In this section, I explore the political economy of higher education in India. Specifically, 
I describe how politics of patronage shapes the incentives and disincentives for political behavior 
of elected officials, career bureaucrats, and businesses7 in higher education. Though investigating 
these specific relationships is out of the scope of this dissertation, some findings of this study 
may validate parts of these hypothesized relationships. More importantly, applied collectively, 
these hypotheses characterize the higher education policy-subsystem in a way that is crucial for 
understanding NHEM implementation. 
 
7
 In this discussion, businesses refer to individuals or organizations involved in the ownership of higher education 
institutions along with other commercial concerns. Businesses are also indirect consumers of higher education 
through the labor markets, however, their role in policy formulation or implementation in India is limited (Carnoy & 




Patron-client relationships have consistently been a part of the social and political life in 
the South Asian subcontinent and they are also a part of the modern democratic system (Brass, 
1994; Chandra, 2007). They undergird many socio-political and economic exchanges in India, 
whether it is electoral behavior, interactions with the state for accessing services, access to labor 
markets or access to education (Piliavsky, 2014). The feudal landowning structures, caste 
system, regional and ethnic divisions form the backbone of the politics of patronage in South 
Asia (Huber & Suryanarayan, 2015; Martin, 2014). A patron derives their power by ensuring a 
flow of resources or power to their constituents such as a caste or ethnic group (Piliavsky, 2014; 
Thachil, 2009). Sources of patronage include access to the state, access to resources like land, 
electricity, employment, education, natural resources, licenses and permissions, access to media, 
political and social connections etc. Patronage politics can translate into new yet deeply unequal 
relationships as old socio-economic differences are maintained by creating new sources of 
patronage (Martin, 2014; P. G. Price, 1989). 
Higher Education as a Source of Patronage 
Higher education is in high demand in developing economies like India. To maintain 
their patronage, patrons must ensure greater access to it by diverting public resources for 
establishing colleges or improving existing public universities to their electoral constituencies. 
Patronage also takes the form of lobbying for affirmative action for a particular caste group or 
religious constituency in educational institutions because it ensures access. This makes improved 
access to colleges and better employment opportunities visible examples of a patron’s influence. 
Public universities themselves are a site of patronage, they allow the power to grant admissions, 
make staff and faculty appointments, and grant affiliation to colleges (Agarwal, 2006a; Kapur & 
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Mehta, 2017). This explains why patrons have strong incentives to control the process of 
expansion of higher education, influence its direction and limit any regulations that hinder it. 
Decentralization of the management and control over higher education through NHEM reforms 
is likely to receive less political support. 
Creating and Sustaining Patronage Through Privatization  
The second and more complex phenomenon affected by patronage is the ownership and 
regulation of post-secondary institutions in India. The Indian government lacks resources to 
invest in higher education expansion and the demands of the citizens have been met by political 
functionaries as well as businesses (Carnoy & Dossani, 2013). Apart from control over public 
institutions, ownership of private schools and colleges creates new sources of patronage for 
politicians by providing educational and employment opportunities for their community or 
political constituencies (Mathew, 2018). The initial growth of “capitation fee” private colleges in 
South India was spurred by these motivations, many of these colleges were actively used for 
raising and funneling election campaign funds (Gupta, 2008; Kaul, 1993).8 It helps college 
owners establish and maintain a myth of benevolence and social responsibility, even if the 
colleges are effectively operating for profit and charging capitation fees. This image of being a 
“big man” is critical to establishing a patron status in India, particular for new patrons such as 
local businessmen (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).  
Establishing colleges requires affiliation permissions, land acquisitions and multiple 
regulatory approvals, this kind of political maneuvering limits ownership to politicians and 
politically connected businesses (Kochanek, 1987, 1996; Thachil, 2009). Kapur & Mehta (2017) 
 
8
 Capitation fee describes a one-time fee charged by private institutions in exchange for admissions. More 
specifically, the fee goes to the trust or society that operates the institution. This fee is usually paid in cash and off 
the books, and it can be several times the official tuition fee (Kaul, 1993). Though it is legally prohibited, many 
institutions still charge this fee.  
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also argue that it makes business sense for the owners of private institutions to starve public 
institutions of funds and resources in order to improve the market for private colleges. 
Overrepresentation of such patrons in college ownership increases their interest in higher 
education policy formulation and reforms; there are strong incentives to limit open or democratic 
decision-making processes to fewer actors. NHEM requires reforms such as limiting affiliation 
by public universities and creation of a SHEC that plans higher education expansion in a state 
according to demand, imposes strict quality control mechanisms and improves public institutions 
through capacity building and better planning. The aims of NHEM come in direct conflict with 
existing dominant interest groups.  
While patronage politics is not the only contextual aspect affecting the implementation of 
NHEM, it manages to explain the relationship between key stakeholders for policy 
implementation and the system that structures their incentives and disincentives. It also 
highlights the political economy of higher education in Indian states and hints at institutional 
capture by politicians and businesses. In the next section, I use concepts from organization 
theory to understand why NHEM reforms may face specific challenges at an institutional and 
individual level within universities and colleges.  
 
Organizational Change and Institutional Theory  
As NHEM aims to reform higher education institutions and policy formulation bodies in 
the sector, the reaction of existing state apparatus and educational institutions to the policy will 
shape the implementation process. Organization theory can be used to understand the specific 
processes through which individuals make sense of the institutional change initiated by NHEM 
and how they institutionalize it.  
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Nature of Higher Education Organizations  
Organizations are collectives of individuals that are working towards a shared goal (Scott 
& Davis, 2015). Thus, the main organizations involved in NHEM can include colleges, 
universities, DoHE and state councils of higher education. Higher education organizations have 
many characteristics that shape their internal structures and their relationship with other entities 
in their environment such as the state, regulators, other institutions etc. Colleges, universities and 
state higher education agencies are dependent on their environment for financial resources, talent 
and legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  
In the case of Indian higher education, the environment or the state also has tight control 
over most operational aspects of colleges and universities. Complexities of higher education 
institutions also increase due to goal ambiguity, they often serve multiple functions in the form 
of building human capital for the country, supplying talent for the labor market, training well-
informed citizens or furthering research productivity (Labaree, 1997; Perrow, 1970). Thus, 
individuals and subsections within the organization can follow different goals and view their 
organization through a unique lens.  
In addition, higher education is a value-driven enterprise, its institutions tend to have 
their own unique culture and identity determined by the nature of the faculty and the professional 
and administrative values they espouse (Kezar & Eckel, 2002a). Part of the uniqueness lies in the 
fact that education and research both employ unclear technologies to convert inputs into outputs. 
That is, it is not clear as to which exact process of teaching/instruction or research management 
leads to the best learning outcomes or research outputs (Weick, 1976).  
In the face of this nebulous technology, education organizations tend to build stable 
administrative structures around their technical cores so that they present a semblance of 
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structure and gain legitimacy from their environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1978). Internally, they 
rely on the professional qualification of their faculty and leaders in order to maintain confidence 
in their operations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ogawa et al., 2003). Thus, unlike business 
organizations, education organizations follow an institutional logic that is more dependent on 
commonly held norms and beliefs rather than rational or functional principles (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). As a result, they may or may not respond in a rational manner to financial incentives or 
policy mandates from their environment.  
Responses to Change 
NHEM implementation depends on how all these organizations react to the incentives 
and mandates of the state or federal governments which form an important part of the 
organizational environment. Organizational responses to environmental changes do not unfold 
rationally and can be quite complicated due to the nature organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Weick, 1976). Since I am interested in understanding the processes and ways through which 
NHEM reforms may get implemented by all the organizations in the higher education policy 
system, it is important to understand how political models, social cognition models and neo-
institutional theory characterize the process of change at organizational and individual levels. 
The non-substitutability of higher institutions’ financial dependence on NHEM’s federal 
resources, and thus the strength of the funding dependence, is easily noticeable (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). Less obvious is the fact that NHEM also places the legitimacy of institutions at 
risk in the case of non-participation. NHEM introduces new norms for all higher education 
institutions such as academic independence, financial self-sustainability, evidence-based 
management of institutions, etc. Higher education institutions derive their legitimacy from 
following institutional norms set by the environment (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Dowling & 
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Pfeffer, 1975). These fundamental dependencies (financial resources and legitimacy) explain 
why most Indian states and public institutions agree to be a part of the NHEM process. However, 
participation does not ensure that these institutions implement NHEM reforms in a way that is 
consistent with the policy intent.  
Organizational Response 
Higher education institutions and state level bodies have stable and established values, 
interests and perception, changes that conflict with their established culture are likely to be 
resisted (March & Olsen, 1983). DoHEs, colleges, universities, SHECs can actively engage in 
negotiations and bargaining with the state or federal government in order to get access to 
resources without adopting all the mandated changes (Gornitzka, 1999; Honig & Hatch, 2004). 
Institutions can also engage in proforma compliance of norms without changing their technical 
core (Kezar & Eckel, 2002a; M. W. McLaughlin, 1987). Institutions can edit and translate the 
reform ideas into concepts, ideologies or logics according to their local context, these 
translations may also be quite far from the policy intent (Honig & Hatch, 2004; Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2010; Sahlin-Andersson & Engwall, 2002; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008).  
Alternatively, institutions can opt for ritualistic conformity whereby they create symbols 
of compliance to environmental change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
This normative compliance is achieved by adopting proforma practices such as accreditation, 
methods to collect student feedback, elaborate planning exercises, the inclusion of language and 
terms that indicate normative compliance etc. The fact that teaching, research and institutional 
management is undertaken by highly trained professionals like faculty and administrators, makes 
it easier to shield these processes from external scrutiny and only implement surrounding 
administrative changes that seemingly indicate institutional reform (Ogawa et al., 2003).  
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Individual Response  
Individual reactions to reforms or environmental change tend to focus on the 
implementing agents or the street-level bureaucrats. These theories state that the actions of street-
level bureaucrats are informed by their existing cognitive structures like knowledge, attitudes & 
beliefs, their contextual situation and the policy signals (Spillane et al., 2002). All implementing 
agents are not necessarily sabotaging or deliberately misunderstanding policy directives, they are 
limited by the complicated sensemaking processes that determine their eventual actions 
(Firestone et al., 1999; Spillane, 2000). Importantly, individuals apply their prior experiences and 
knowledge structures to interpret new information and ideas they receive (Vesilind & Jones, 
1998). New ideas such as critical thinking skills can be interpreted in a very different manner 
under the current frame of reference of a faculty than the policy intended. Or, the language of 
reform can be appropriated to talk about ideas that have a different intent (Hill, 2001).  
Another aspect of sense-making suggests that without sophisticated knowledge about an 
issue, people are likely to associate and recall superficial details such as procedural aspects of an 
idea rather than the deep underlying concepts (D. K. Cohen, 1990). In the case of NHEM, for 
instance, the deeper devolution of power and establishment of administrative accountability in 
colleges through governance reforms may have lower recall value than the practices of holding 
regular Board meetings and maintaining minutes of such meetings. The latter may come to be 
understood as the main signifier of better governance, instead of the spirit of decisions that get 
taken in the Board meeting. Individuals also find it difficult to accept new ideas if they challenge 
their positive self-image, thus faculty are unlikely to reconsider those methods that they believe 
have made them good teachers for most of their life (Hargreaves, 1998). Individuals engage in 
sense-making given a broad institutional context and with other individuals within the same 
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context (Coburn, 2001). Thus, the meaning of NHEM reforms can be co-constructed by a group 
of individuals, all informed by the same organizational or historical context that biases their 
interpretation.   
A review of sense-making literature suggests that implementation is a factor of how 
individuals across an institution engage with the NHEM reform individually and as groups. Very 
importantly, leadership can play a critical role in facilitating the sense-making process (Coburn, 
2001). Thus, the views of principals, vice-chancellors, institutions like the DoHE and SHEC play 
an important role in shaping the beliefs, attitudes and interpretations of other individuals in the 
higher education system. In terms of successful policy implementation, it appears that policies 
that require a deep change in individual value systems or knowledge schemas are fairly difficult 
to achieve because of the existing values and beliefs (Spillane et al., 2002). To improve 
implementation, the policy design must be clear and implementation must continuously support 
the process of sense-making in the right direction at all levels. 
The organizational theory lens adds an important granular perspective to the 
implementation of NHEM reforms. Both implementation theories and patronage politics suggest 
broad patterns and relationships that will affect implementation. Concepts from organizational 
theory provide the language and framework to discuss how individuals and institutions react to 
the reforms under the influence of larger power dynamics. In the next section, I will bring 
together the constructs discussed in the previous sections to build a theoretical framework that 





This research framework employs four strands of literature to inform the analysis of 
higher education reform implementation in India. Firstly, it employs policy formulation literature 
to understand the process and principles behind the NHEM design. Next, it uses policy 
implementation research to model the impact of the contextual variables, the operation of the two 
main policy instruments and the processes of change in the high education policy subsystem. In 
order to add context detail, I use the literature of patronage politics to hypothesize about the 
political economy of higher education in which NHEM reforms are being implemented. Lastly, I 
apply organizational theories to understand why and how individuals and institutions will 
respond to NHEM reforms. Figure 1. captures the relationships explored through the resulting 
framework.  
 
Figure 1. NHEM Implementation in States 
The process of designing NHEM can be approached using the advocacy coalition and 
policy entrepreneurship theories at the federal level. The advocacy coalition framework suggests 
that the policy coalition that supported NHEM at the federal level shared some core beliefs about 
the role of the state government in managing higher education or the necessity to decentralize 
decision-making in state higher education systems etc. (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 
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2007). The actors would have engaged in the process of bargaining to agree on the policies that 
would be used to address the core issues and how they would be implemented. If the federal 
policy system is a policy monopoly, then one dominant actor could have created or resisted 
policy change without a larger coalition. The policy entrepreneurship theory points to the 
possibility that an organization or individual had the social acuity and political power to bring 
together the advocacy coalition, frame the policy problems and solutions and find the right time 
to push through a national higher education policy (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & 
Vergari, 1996). The policy formulation process should reveal the assumptions made by the 
policymakers in designing the policy, including the choice of policy instruments, how they are 
expected to operate and the way in which they relate to eventual policy outcomes.  
The implementation case studies of NHEM deal with four state-level policy subsystems. 
As suggested by Sabatier (1986)’s framework, NHEM’s implementation analysis should 
acknowledge the policy design, various groups of actors involved, their resources, their beliefs as 
well as the contextual details that affect the whole higher education subsystem within a state. 
Figure 1 summarizes the factors that affect implementation in states. The federal government 
believes that its policy instruments can lead to the desired changes in institutional and individual 
behaviors that will lead to NHEM reforms. However, the operation of policy instruments is 
dependent on each state’s political culture. The state’s political culture mediates how resources 
are utilized and how capacities are built to implement reforms. This, in turn, determines how 
individuals and institutions respond to reforms (see Figure 1).  
The characterization of state political culture here primarily draws from the ACF 
literature. The existing legal and governance structures of higher education systems can limit or 
enhance the opportunities for different actors to participate in implementation decisions (Jenkins-
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Smith et al., 2007). If these opportunities are limited, the subsystem can be dominated by one 
coalition and give rise to a policy monopoly (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010). The state’s 
involvement in public service delivery, weak civil society, and restrictive regulatory structures 
can lead to state-led policy monopolies in sectors like higher education (Agarwal & Somanathan, 
2005; Ayyar, 2009; Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 2017; Hueso & Bell, 2013; Mathur, 2013; Sadoway et 
al., 2018). The nature of this monopoly and its beliefs and interests would have a strong effect on 
how the state chooses to implement reforms.  
Studies on decentralization and implementation in developing countries explain how 
short and long term interests of various actors affect the local political will to support reforms 
(Bray, 1985; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Te Lintelo, 2009). In the case of India, politics of higher 
education limits local will for reforms. For politicians, higher education is a source of patronage 
in terms of making appointments, awarding affiliation, providing access to constituents etc. 
(Gupta, 2008; Kaul, 1993; Piliavsky, 2014; Singh, 2003). For businesses that own colleges or 
universities, it is a source of creating a positive social image and building stronger patronage ties 
with the community (Kochanek, 1987; Thachil, 2009). These two groups have strong interests in 
maintaining the status quo in the form of a larger private sector, affiliation statuses of existing 
colleges, existing affiliation policies and a weak system of quality regulation. Additionally, 
clientelist politics makes it unlikely that the student or parent body can unite in their demand for 
better quality or access to higher education (Kapur & Mehta, 2017).  
As a result, the political support for implementation of NHEM reforms is likely to be 
low, particularly in states that have a large private education sector in which politicians and 
businesses participate. However, support for the reform is possible in the form of strong 
universities or colleges that have old institutional legacies to maintain or hold normative power 
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in the state or national higher education system. Such institutions and their faculty can support 
reforms. A strong bureaucratic tradition or political tradition of undertaking reforms may also 
lend support to NHEM (Bajpai & Sachs, 1999; Sinha, 2004). The ‘variable geometry’ of various 
factors will be at play in states, some will exhibit a convergence of views about NHEM reforms 
while others may have open or latent conflicts (Kennedy, 2004; Kennedy et al., 2013).  
Beliefs of advocacy coalitions form the crux of ACF’s argument about policy action in 
subsystems. Belief systems bring coalitions together and they inform implementation choices 
made by the actors (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, pp. 190-191). Importantly, any policy also has 
implicit belief systems and assumptions coded into its design through policy instruments 
(Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, pp. 192). Here, organizational theory is useful in understanding how 
beliefs of NHEM can interact with belief systems of state policy coalitions.  
Organizational change usually occurs when the smallest unit or the street-level bureaucrat 
changes his or her actions (Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977). For instance, NHEM reforms aim to 
affect governance behaviors of higher education bureaucrats in the state and teaching behavior 
faculty in universities and colleges. But individuals operate in organizations on the basis of 
certain taken-for-granted norms, rules, and schemas shared with the institution (Coburn, 2001; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Spillane, 2000). These norms are reinforced through routines and 
protected by organizational myths (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). External 
changes can bring them in contact with new myths or schemas and force them to reconcile with 
the pressures to change (Honig & Hatch, 2004).  
Prior experience and attitudes shape an individual’s understanding of new ideas. In the 
process of sense-making, individuals can misappropriate meanings to new terms, or only 
concentrate on superficial aspects of a new idea, or adopt the language of reforms without taking 
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the required action (Coburn, 2001; Hill, 2001; Spillane, 2000; Spillane et al., 2002). Thus, 
whether NHEM reform is accurately interpreted by key organizations in states would depend on 
their existing organizational culture (Honig & Hatch, 2004; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Sahlin & 
Wedlin, 2008). Moreover, successful implementation also requires technical capacity and ability 
on the part of local actors so that they can understand and implement the appropriate changes 
(Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Fullan, 1986; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; M. W. McLaughlin, 1987; 
Mukundan & Bray, 2004). 
Leadership plays a critical role in shepherding the sense-making process in the right 
direction (Coburn, 2001; Kezar & Eckel, 2002a; Spillane et al., 2002). If there are large gaps in 
the understanding of leaders, it will be reflected in the way the NHEM reforms are implemented 
in all the institutions in the policy subsystem. NHEM reform implementation would be 
determined, in a large part, by the capacity of state leaders and faculty in activities such as 
institutional planning, use of data to make decisions, change management and curricular reform. 
Policy tools are the main carrier of the federal government’s policy intention, theory of 
action, and belief systems into the state. How instruments operate within the state would be 
determined by their own design as well as the influence of the state’s culture. Policy design 
requires both pressure and support (M. W. McLaughlin, 1987). That is, the policy design needs 
to use the right incentives, mandates, and legal changes to create political pressure for change. 
Additionally, they need to provide support in the form of capacity building, financial and 
technical resources, etc. Vague mandates, weak guidelines, and policy ambiguity can push 
implementation choices in favor of the existing culture and beliefs within the policy coalition 
(Matland, 1995; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979). Providing inadequate financial and technical 
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resources for implementation can also scuttle policy implementation. All these aspects of 
NHEM’s policy design and resource allocation will play a role in NHEM’s implementation.  
The effects discussed in this framework are not unidirectional. For instance, a state’s 
culture can affect the operation of instruments and also be affected by the instruments. As seen 
earlier, deviations from policy intent can occur due to institutional resistance to change and 
incongruous sense-making by street-level bureaucrats. At the same time, financial allocations, 
legal changes, and capacity building done through policy instruments can shift the political 
culture of a state and make it more receptive to reforms. Similarly, a policy can fail because 
states do not allocate enough resources to its implementation due to lack of political support. It is 
also possible that federal financial and technical resources can change interests and beliefs in the 
state.  
This framework suggests that NHEM’s reform implementation would be affected by the 
political culture of the states, the design policy instruments, availability of financial resources, 
and technical capacity in the state. In this case, what can NHEM’s implementation be expected 
to look like? The theories also point to how the deviations from policy intent will manifest 
themselves. As NHEM reforms are attached to the incentive of federal funds, states can choose 
to participate in NHEM but engage in proforma or symbolic compliance to the mandated 
reforms.  
Without consistent support, individuals and institutions have multiple opportunities for 
cooptation of the policy. Institutions can engage in ritualistic or proforma responses to the 
reforms by creating symbolic structures, procedures and processes that indicate compliance with 
reforms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2013). At the state level, this 
would include strategies such as forming a SHEC but not appointing its members, allotting it 
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very few financial or human resources, making partisan political appointments to it, etc. The gap 
between policy interpretation and policy intent may also manifest at all levels and in many ways 
(M. W. McLaughlin, 1987; Spillane et al., 2002). For instance, within institutions, when poorly 
understood, the idea of institutional planning results in short planning activities related 
specifically to the NHEM funds. A well understood process leads to the creation of long-term 
vision, actionable plans, and monitoring mechanisms that result in the development of new 
programs, new revenue sources etc. Similarly, co-optation strategies or misinterpretation of 
policy intent can occur across all the other NHEM reforms such as examination reforms, 
governance reforms and academic reforms.  
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Chapter 3. Research Design and Methodology 
The main aim of this research study is to understand the processes, actors and contextual 
factors that affect the implementation of NHEM reforms in Indian states. The introduction, 
literature review and theoretical framework explicate the policy setting and the conceptual 
approach towards this larger aim. In this section, I start by detailing the three research questions 
and their purpose. Next, I explain how a case study approach is the best method to address the 
research questions. In the next three sections, I first detail my research questions and their 
importance. Then, I describe the research methodology, the sampling strategy and the data 
sources used for the study. Lastly, I consider the limitations of the study design.  
 
Research Questions  
Research question 1: Why, through what processes and by which policy actors was 
NHEM formulated at the federal level?   
1a) What were the specific conditions or changes that led to the development of NHEM 
as a federal policy?  
1b) Which processes were used to determine key policy goals, policy instruments and 
related criteria included in NHEM? Who were the actors and agencies involved in this process? 
Were there any agencies or individuals that were intentionally or unintentionally excluded from 
the policy formulation process? 
1c) What was the theory of action underlying the policy?   
Purpose of the research question. Policy formulation theories devote significant 
attention to explain the particular time at which a certain policy is created (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2010; Kingdon, 1984; Sabatier, 1988). This study also starts with an analysis of the political 
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climate, nature of developments in the policy subsystem, and the range of actors involved in the 
policy process. The context of the policy’s development gives important information about the 
timing and need for the policy. The next question concerns the policy actors and processes 
involved in the creation of NHEM. NHEM is the first federal policy that uses competitive 
funding to push a number of reforms in state higher education systems. This research question 
examines how and to what end was the combination of reforms and programmatic aspects of 
NHEM selected. Did the actors involved in the process have any influence on the process? Were 
any critical stakeholder excluded from the design process and if so, did this affect the policy 
design.  
The third part of the research question deals with the theory of action for the policy. 
NHEM’s policy documents are unclear about the exact policy instruments that are being used 
and the causal logic using which they have been designed. This question analyzes the policy 
design using tools of policy analysis and clarifies the theory of action employed by the policy. 
This step is critical for conducting the implementation analysis because it creates a clearer 
relationship between the policy design, expected actions in states, and the policy goals.  
Research question 2: Do states differ in the way they have established State Higher 
Education Councils (SHECs)? Do these different implementation choices match the theory of 
action? 
2a) Have all states created SHECs and are all SHECs continuously operational? 
2b) Are SHECs involved in implementing NHEM reforms in the states? Do the SHECs 
perform all the functions that NHEM expects them to? Does their functioning follow NHEM’s 
theory of action?  
2c) Do SHECs have adequate resources and leadership to perform their functions? 
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Purpose of the research question. NHEM conditions participation in the policy and 
access to any funds on the creation of SHECs. SHECs are a cornerstone of NHEM’s design 
because SHECs are supposed to create the technical expertise and capacity to implement the 
other reforms in the state. The first part of the question examines whether NHEM has been 
successful in achieving this result. It also considers whether SHECs have resulted in any 
significant changes in the higher education ecosystem within the states.  
The second part of the research question collects evidence on the actual functions 
undertaken by the SHECs. Some states such as Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and West 
Bengal had already created SHECs in the last two or three decades. The activity levels and 
defined functions of SHEC have always differed between states. SHECs in Kerala and Karnataka 
have been active in creating long-term plans for the states and supporting institutions (Larsen et 
al., 2014). However, even reform-oriented states had not decentralized functions like funding, 
regulation, monitoring, and evaluation to SHECs. This analysis of the current functions of 
SHECs directly reflects their position in each state, their involvement in implementing NHEM, 
and capacity to support the implementation of other reforms. The last sub-question is concerned 
with the human and financial resources allotted to each SHEC. This comparison informs us 
about the technical capacity and expertise at SHECs as well as their capacity to undertake all 
required responsibility.  
The theoretical framework used in the study suggests that the higher education system, 
universities and colleges are sources of patronage as they command significant financial 
resources, employment opportunities and access to higher education (Agarwal, 2006a; Kapur & 
Mehta, 2007). The establishment of SHECs threatens Department of Higher Education’s 
(DoHE’s) political control over many processes of governance in this system. Hence, it is likely 
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that state DoHEs will attempt to coopt SHECs. This cooptation should be evident in the 
functions as well as resources shared with the SHECs. However, given the differences in state 
higher education cultures, I also expect to see some variations in the way SHEC reforms are 
implemented.  
Research question 3: Have states chosen to implement the same NHEM reforms with 
different intensity? Does their implementation match the policy’s theory of action? 
3a) Have states interpreted and implemented all the main NHEM reforms as intended by 
the policy?  
3b) Do these different interpretations match with NHEM's theory of action?  
3c) What are the main challenges faced by states in implementing NHEM reforms? 
Purpose of the research question. The third research questions look closely at the 
implementation of the remaining reforms included in NHEM. In this study, I limit the focus to 
four consequential reforms: affiliation reforms, autonomy reforms, accreditation reforms, and 
academic and examination reforms. Due to the lack of information about NHEM’s 
implementation, very little is known about the extent to which each of these reforms has changed 
institutional structures, governance processes, and institutional practices in the states. This 
question explores the specific understanding of key reforms held by officials in the SHEC, 
DoHE, universities and colleges. There are many ways in which SHECs and other organizations 
will interpret the meaning of the concepts undergirding NHEM reforms (Hill, 2001; Vesilind & 
Jones, 1998). If individuals in a state have had very little exposure to the concepts of academic 
and institutional autonomy or the state has no federal institutions that can share such experiences, 
their officials may out rightly reject the idea of trusting universities and colleges with their own 
governance and quality assurance (Coburn, 2001; Hargreaves, 1998). Proforma implementation 
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of the reform may be the other outcome, the reform may be implemented in a limited form to 
present the facade of change (Gupta, 2012; Ogawa et al., 2003). Interview questions aimed at 
specific steps taken by officials or powers given to institutions can throw light on these 
differences between states.  
 
Study Design 
The study employs two different designs for the three research questions. The first 
question regarding the NHEM policy formulation process at the federal level is treated as a 
single holistic case study. The other two research questions are addressed using a multiple case 
study methodology where each sample state is treated as a separate case. Case study approach is 
an appropriate method for answering why, who, how and what questions (Schramm, 1971; Yin, 
2017). Answering these explanatory questions lies at the heart of this research project, making a 
case study approach the most appropriate method for all three questions. In terms of the first 
research question, NHEM is a federal policy and it was mainly created and authored by federal 
authorities through a single process that involved multiple agencies. As the study is limited to a 
single policy and does not compare it to any other federal reforms in higher education, it can be 
studied as a single case.  
However, the first and second research questions require comparisons across states, 
hence, a multiple case study approach is more appropriate. Due to the nature of the federal polity 
in India, education policies are implemented by the states. Thus, an implementation study 
demands a state-level investigation of the implementation timeline, how the policy is perceived 
and executed by key actors in the state, the key differences it has brought about in the systems 
and how environmental factors have shaped the process. Multiple case design allows for such 
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exploration by using a variety of sources of information (Creswell, 2013). Case studies are 
particularly useful for studying contemporary events where the researcher cannot control aspects 
of the research setting (Campbell, 2009). In the present case, I can only observe the complex 
context and processes that lead to policy implementation, without any influence over the actors 
or outcomes. Instead, the source of state-variation in this design comes from the selection of the 
sample cases.  
Indian states differ widely in terms of their domestic higher education policy priorities, 
politics and administrative systems. Multiple case design can address this complexity by 
exploiting the variation in state contexts to test the theoretical predictions (Yin, 2017). 
Accordingly, sample states are chosen on the basis of similar or contrasting relationships in 
terms of the key constructs derived from the research questions. States serve as good cases 
because they are self-contained in terms of their geographical expanse as well as their higher 
education systems (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2017). The results for the case studies are discussed in 
terms of particular research questions. At the same time, parallels are drawn between the 
observations in different cases to develop a theoretical understanding of higher education policy 
implementation in the sample as a whole.  
State as a Unit of Analysis for Policy Implementation 
NHEM is a federal policy that operates at multiple levels. The policy was designed by the 
federal government, federal agencies still fund the policy, create new rules and monitor the 
progress. In terms of understanding the design of the policy, the federal level becomes critical. 
However, the bulk of the execution of the policy is at the state level where the resource 
distribution for universities and colleges is determined. Within the institutions, the NHEM 
reforms and policy components also apply at the departmental and individual level. There are 
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several reasons for moving from a federal to a state level to study NHEM implementation. The 
foremost is that the Indian constitution designates education as primarily a state subject where 
the federal government can make some regulations and policies. The constitutional primacy of 
state control over education means that the institutional and regulatory structures for higher 
education are in control of the states (Agarwal, 2009).  
Moreover, Indian state universities are created through acts of state legislatures and states 
provide for most of the recurring and non-recurring expenditures for all state public universities. 
This makes DoHE, and other bodies formed at the state level, the main bureaucratic actors in 
terms of policy implementation. The federal government depends on this bureaucratic machinery 
to implement its policies. State higher education systems also tend to be centralized (Carnoy & 
Dossani, 2013). The power and agency of individual universities and colleges in devising or 
implementing federal policies are fairly limited, there is little intra-state variation in the way 
higher education policy is interpreted or executed. The state-level authorities and agencies are 
the main arbiters that translate the federal policy for state-funded higher education institutions. 
All the above factors point to the salience of using states as the unit of analysis for studying 
NHEM implementation.   
Case Selection 
The following section details the sampling strategy adopted for state-level aspects of the 
study with regards to the first and second research question. The theoretical framework for the 
study suggests that the state political culture affects implementation through the operation of the 
two key policy instruments, the funding incentive and the reform mandate. The assumption is 
that if states adopt the mandated reforms advocated by NHEM, the influx of federal funding 
combined with the systemic changes prompted by the reforms will lead to improvement in 
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access, equity, and quality outcomes within the state. Conversely, if states do not implement the 
systemic reforms, the additional federal funds will not be able to improve important quality and 
equity outcomes substantially. To study the implementation process under different state 
contexts, I operationalize these two instruments into two indices and sample four states that vary 
on these observable aspects of NHEM implementation.  
I create the Funding Index and The State Organizational Capacity Index, discussed in 
greater detail below. The indices are based on data provided by NHEM Resource Center (NRC), 
the federal implementation authority for the NHEM, in February 2019. The sample is drawn 
from eighteen large Indian states -- Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.9  
NHEM Funding Index  
The data used to create these indices was not collected for the purposes of understanding 
NHEM funding performance or the extent of reforms implemented by the states. However, it is 
the only source of information that can be used to approximate state performance in getting 
funds from the federal government in a holistic manner and ensuring that the funds are spent. In 
a broad sense, this index indicates a state’s approach towards NHEM funding, both in terms of 
the total funds it receives and the way in which it chooses to spend the funds. More funds spent 
 
9
 Smaller states (such as Nagaland, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya), Union Territories as well as the Himalayan State 
(Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir & Uttarakhand) have not been included in the sampling. These states tend to 
have far smaller higher education systems than the large states and their challenges are not representative of the 
issues faced by a large majority of the higher education system in the country. For instance, affiliation reforms are 
not a concern for most universities in North Eastern states in India while building basic infrastructure or attracting 
faculty to remote mountainous regions is a unique problem that only these states face. Moreover, Northeastern, as 
well as the Himalayan states, receive a higher proportion of state support, they only match 1/9th of the federal grants 
for any federal policy as opposed to larger states that must match 1/3r of federal grants. The larger proportion of 
federal funds they receive biases measures of NHEM funding in their favor. While Northeastern and Himalayan 
states deserve the attention of researchers, the present study cannot accommodate them without compromising the 
applicability of the findings to other states. 
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on plans that address different types of reform outcomes indicate better performance on this 
index. Not all of this information easily indicates whether a state is performing well or poorly in 
NHEM. Hence, the three indicators are combined to create a funding index:  
•    NHEM grant received per student (in 18-25 yr. group): This indicator quantifies the 
funds a state received in all the NHEM rounds till October 2018. The funds largely depend on 
the need demonstrated by the state and the number of federal funding criteria it fulfills. The per-
student metric is used to counter the bias in favor of larger states.  
•    The utilization rate of NHEM funds (%): This indicator reflects the percentage of 
funds that the state was able to spend, out of the total that was allotted to it by the federal 
government. Fund utilization is an important way of measuring whether resources move from the 
state treasury to the institutions and whether institutions spend them.  
•    The number of components covered in the State Higher Education Plans:  The ability 
of a state to request and receive funds under multiple components serve as an approximate 
indicator of how many reform areas are being targeted by the NHEM funds. Infrastructural 
grants tend to be the most popular components in NHEM and they are only linked to 
accreditation reforms. The diversity of components reflects how many channels through which 
NHEM will be implemented, thus affecting different processes and functions in the state higher 
education system.  
Higher scores on this index indicate a stronger operation of the funding incentive. For 
instance, it can be said with reasonable certainty that a state which includes a wider range of 
components in its State Plan and has a high utilization rate for funds is actually using the 
resources to address multiple aspects of higher education. However, it is much more difficult to 
determine which combination of funding components is objectively better. States with weak 
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overall infrastructure, poorer states or states with low institutional density may benefit from 
investing a larger proportion of funds in building new institutions. Other states with established 
higher education access may benefit more from using quality-focused components. Thus, the 
focus of the index is limited to the amount of funding and its utilization for diverse needs.  
To create the index, the above data points were standardized or expressed in the form of 
standard deviation from the mean for each index. Each indicator was in a different unit, hence 
standardizing them makes the comparative position of each state clearer. The final index was 
created by averaging the standardized scores across the three indicators, each indicator has the 
same weight. The highest rating on the final index was by Odisha, Jharkhand and Tamil Nadu. 
These states were more than 0.6 standard deviations above the mean. Surprisingly, states like 
Karnataka and Kerala that are usually considered high performers in terms of education only 
appear after these four states.  
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, despite their reputation as reform-oriented medium 
income states, appear in the middle of NHEM distribution. West Bengal and Gujarat are higher 
income states but they appear in the bottom third of the NHEM funding distribution. The index 
incorporates varied bases of rating NHEM funding beyond the total amount of funds received by 
every state. Including measures that reflect the component diversity of state plans and their 
effective utilization rates captures state performance in a more holistic manner than fund-based 
measure. The inclusion of the additional measures probably explains why some states deviate 
from the expectations in terms of their funding performance.  
State Organizational Capacity Index  
The second index reflects the state’s organizational capacity to implement the reforms 
that are mandated by NHEM. The NRC collects very few data points for a state’s status on 
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reforms or its ability to implement them. The information is limited to indicators on the 
performance of SHECs. The first and third indicators discussed below are based on state 
declarations collected by the NHEM Resource Center. The second indicator is based on 
preliminary interviews with NRC State Managers who implement NHEM in various states. 
Critical information about detailed activity of the councils, frequency of their meetings, quality 
of their deliberations, reports created or initiatives undertaken by their subcommittees, etc. have 
not been systematically collected by NRC. The limited available information has been mobilized 
to create an index on SHEC functioning that reflects the state’s capacity to implement other 
NHEM reforms. For creating this index, I use the following indicators:  
•    Whether the state has formed a SHEC, either by an Act of the legislature or as an 
executive order: NHEM uses the creation of an autonomous higher education governance body 
(SHEC) as a prerequisite condition for participating in NHEM. SHECs are responsible for 
creating capacities outside the DoHE to implement all other reforms included in NHEM. Most 
states have created a SHEC by executive order and these states are assigned one point. States that 
have created the SHECs through acts of state legislatures are assigned two points. 
•    Whether the SHEC is active. The NHEM Resource Center infrequently collects 
information on the activities of SHECs. NRC managers have information on how often SHECs 
hold meetings and take decisions. Some SHECs have been formed but they are effectively non-
functional because they have met only once or twice since their creation. In such cases, the state 
has been assigned 0 points for this indicator. If the SHEC is active, I consider other aspects such 
as the council’s involvement in the creation of state plans. Councils taking minimal role in 
creating state NHEM plans are assigned one point. More active SHECs engaged with institutions 
beyond the NHEM funding period are assigned two points.  
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•    Whether academics are represented in SHEC leadership: In order to ensure that more 
advice from professional academicians is incorporated in the SHEC, NHEM encourages states to 
appoint academics as either the SHEC Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson. Well-chosen SHEC 
leadership includes the right mix of technical expertise and political mandate in order to design 
and successfully implement the right policies. The inclusion of academics in the SHEC reflects a 
political and bureaucratic commitment to share decision-making powers with the institutions. 
Hence, any state with at least one academician serving in the leadership positions has been 
assigned one point for this indicator.  
Out of the three indicators on SHEC operation, the active status of the SHEC is the most 
crucial to general reform implementation, it has been given a weight of 50% while the other two 
indicators have a weight of 25% each. The final weighted scores on these indicators have been 
added together to create the SHEC index. Due to the sparseness of underlying information, there 
is limited variability in the final scores of the states in this index. The values on this scale range 
from one to seven. The highest rated states on this index were Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Odisha & 
Telangana. The lowest rated were Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, and Jharkhand, 
etc.  
Balancing the Sample on State Political Culture  
The theoretical framework I employ suggests that the operation of the policy instruments 
as well as the processes that link them with outcomes are deeply influenced by a range of 
political, administrative, cultural and institutional factors in the state. I refer to the combination 
of these factors as the general political culture of the state. As this concept encompasses several 
aspects of a state’s contemporary politics and historic experiences with reforms, it is difficult to 
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measure or quantify it completely. I use two measures to understand the general political culture 
of the 18 major states that I stratify using the funding and organizational capacity index.  
The first measure is specific to the politics of higher education in a state, it is the 
percentage of higher education institutions in the state that are privately owned or managed. The 
growth of private colleges in India is closely linked to politicians investing in higher education 
institutions to build sources of political patronage in their communities and create channels to 
manage campaign financing (Chitnis & Altbach, 1993; Kapur & Mehta, 2017; Kaul, 1993; 
Tierney & Sabharwal, 2017). The ownership of higher education institutions by politically active 
individuals is a critical factor that makes higher education reforms far more political than they 
would otherwise be. Any reforms that attempt to change the affiliation status of private colleges, 
impose strict accountability measures or stringent quality regulations are likely to be opposed 
strongly by the owners of private colleges. States with large proportions of these colleges are 
more likely to face reform resistance. Thus, the percentage of private colleges as a share of total 
colleges is included as a measure that I balance the sample on.  
The second measure captures a broader set of ideas such as administrative capacity, 
political willingness to implement reforms that led to a success in implementing prior reforms. 
Studies that gauge the reform orientation of all Indian states are fairly limited, partly because 
there have been few nationwide reforms in India. As discussed in Chapter 2, Bajpai and Sachs 
(1997) created a classification of Indian states on the basis of their reform orientation. They 
divide states in three categories; reform-oriented states (Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu), intermediate reformers (Haryana, Orissa, and West Bengal) and 
lagging reformers (Assam, Bihar, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar 
Pradesh). Though dated, this is the only study that considers multiple factors in order to compare 
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all Indian states using a single set of national reforms. I use this classification to ensure that the 
sample of states selected using the primary basis is not biased towards any one type of state.  
Sampling Criteria  
I adopt a purposive sampling strategy rather than random sampling to achieve two 
objectives (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Maxwell, 2005). It allows me to sample cases that have 
variations on theoretical dimensions that are related to the theoretical framework and the 
research questions (Merriam, 1998), and construct a balanced sample of states in terms of region, 
socio-economic and education indicators, thus making the findings from this sample more 
analytically generalizable (see Yin, 2017).  Diverse sampling technique, or choosing cases that 
vary greatly along a set of theoretically relevant variables, allows for investigation of the 
research questions in different settings (Gerring, 2008; Seawright et al., 2008).  
As discussed above, the two constructs of NHEM funding and state organizational 
capacity are important policy instruments that are closely related to my key research questions 
regarding reform implementation. I create a sample of states that show three possible variations 
across these two policy instruments. All the states are plotted on a graph along these the funding 
and state organizational capacity indices, the four quadrants indicate all possible relationships 
that states show between the two indices (see Figure 2). I select four states that lie in different 
quadrants of the graph and maintain variation on the political culture indicators. 
The first quadrant (bottom left) includes states that are low on funding as well as SHEC 
performance ratings. Most states in this quadrant have the lowest education, income, and human 
development indicators. These states are of limited interest in the sampling, low ratings across 
both indices indicate that the state has not been interested in and benefitted from NHEM. Of 
greater interest are the states in the other three quadrants that represent high-high, high-low and 
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low-high combinations of NHEM funding and NHEM organizational capacity ratings. In the 
second quadrant (top left) Punjab presents the most extreme high-low case, it is a high performer 
on the NHEM funding indicator but a very poor performer on the state organizational capacity 
index. The state has above average per capita income levels and education indicators. Despite 
being economically strong, it is a lagging reformer. It has an above-average high percentage of 
private colleges compared to other states.  
 
Figure 2. State Funding and Reforms in NHEM 
The third quadrant (top right) has states that have performed well on getting NHEM 
funds as well as the reform implementation. Odisha and Kerala provide good contrasts within 
this quadrant, Odisha is a poor state with low education indicators and a smaller percentage of 
private colleges but it has higher reform orientation than Kerala. Odisha also has a smaller 
percentage of colleges under private ownership. In comparison, Kerala has a similar 
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organizational capacity index but lower performance on the funding index. The state also differs 
from Odisha in terms of a weaker reform orientation and far larger proportion of private colleges. 
Within the high-high quadrant, these two states represent very diverse state higher education 
environments. From the point of view of implementation theories and patronage politics, the 
contextual difference should be responsible for some variation in NHEM implementation within 
these two states too.  
Lastly, the sample includes one low-high state from the fourth quadrant. This quadrant 
has the fewest number of states in it. This appears reasonable because there are very few states 
that have low ability to receive and spend federal funds but have the organizational capacity to 
implement NHEM in the form of a reasonable SHEC. West Bengal is the only state that lies 
completely within this quadrant and can be considered as a good low-high case. The states of 
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana are at the top edge of this quadrant; however, these states were 
created due to the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh state in 2014. The consequent administrative 
and bureaucratic transition in the states makes it difficult to isolate the effects of any policy 
implementation. Thus, they have not been chosen in the sample. West Bengal is an interesting 
case also because it has the lowest proportion of private colleges or lowest resistance to reform, a 
higher reform orientation and good state organizational capacity. Yet, its funding performance is 
poor. It represents a great contrast when compared with Punjab, which lies at the opposite end of 
the distribution, it performs well on funding but the political climate and organizational capacity 
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Sampling Universities and Colleges 
 Due to logistical concerns and dependence on local officials for access, I had less 
control over the universities and colleges sampled for the study. In each state, DoHE officials 
introduced me to one public university and two colleges that were funded by NHEM. 
Additionally, in three states, I was able to include one college that had not received NHEM 
funding. This allowed me to understand the impact of NHEM reforms on institutions that had not 
directly received funds from NHEM but should have been affected by state-level reforms in 
affiliation, accreditation, autonomy, etc. The interviewees were purposefully and non-randomly 
selected on the basis of their ability to answer the research questions, mostly due to the official 
positions they hold or have held in the institution. Purposeful sampling allows the researcher to 




The number of public universities in each state ranges between six and eleven. Thus, the 
sample is representative of the university population in most states. The number of colleges 
sampled in the study are a much smaller proportion of colleges in the states. However, NHEM’s 
implementation follows centralized processes that are not likely to differ widely between 
colleges. The data from the sample also shows little intra-college variation within and between 
states.  
Universities and colleges sampled for this study were usually in a metropolitan area and 
close to the state’s capital. As a result, they are likely to be better connected to industries, have 
easier access to qualified faculty, and are preferred by more students. Thus, the findings in the 
study could have a positive bias due to their location and physical proximity to DoHEs. 
Universities and colleges in rural or remote areas of the state are likely to be even less connected 
to state-level institutions and possibly less aware of NHEM and SHECs.  
Data Collection 
The study will use two main sources of data at both levels of case studies; focused semi-
structured interviews and documentary analysis. Primary data collection for the study was done 
in July and August 2019. Follow up interviews were conducted over the telephone between 
October 2019 and July 2020. The interviews at the state and federal level ranged between forty 
to ninety minutes. The interview protocols were developed and refined after a preliminary visit 
to three non-sample states in January 2019 (see Yin, 2017).  Questions were designed keeping in 
mind some of relationships suggested by the theoretical framework (Creswell & Poth, 2017).  
 Federal Case Study on Policy Formulation  
The federal study is based on six interviews and document analysis. Interviews were 
drawn from major federal actors usually involved in higher education policy making.  
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The process of drafting NHEM was led by a few key officials in the MHRD with the help 
of research assistance from a Tata Institute of Social Sciences. As a part of this research team, I 
was aware of the senior bureaucrats that participated in formulating NHEM between 2012-2014. 
Two of the four individuals involved in the process agreed to participate in the study, both were 
part of the MHRD leadership. I interviewed two federal experts on education that are associated 
with the University Grants Commission and the National Institute for Educational Planning and 
Administration. The fifth and sixth interviewees were officials from the World Bank that were 
involved in higher education projects in India (including NHEM) between 2013 and 2019.  
The document analysis of this case study involved three types of documents, 1) all the 
publicly available versions of NHEM (NHEM, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c); 2) minutes of CABE 
meetings (MHRD, 2012a, 2012b); and 3) committee reports cited in NHEM or mentioned by 
interviews (CABE, 2012; National Knowledge Commission, 2009; Soneri, 1990; UGC, 2008, 
2009; Yash Pal Committee, 2009).  
Multiple State-Level Cases on Policy Implementation  
 The state level analysis is based on responses from forty-nine interviews as well 
as document analysis. Decision-making regarding NHEM and its implementation takes place at 
different organizations in the state. This study covers four relevant venues where NHEM reforms 
are interpreted and executed: Departments of Higher Education (DoHE); State Higher Education 
Councils (SHEC); public universities, and colleges. In two states, I was also able to interview 






Table 2. Sampled Institutions and Interviews by State 
 DoHE SHEC University College Faculty Union  
Kerala 3 2 2 5 2 
Odisha 2 2 4 4 0 
Punjab 2 0 2 6 1 
West Bengal 2 2 2 4 0 
Total number institutions - - 5 11 - 
Total number of interviews 9 6 10 21 3 
 
In each state, I interviewed two bureaucrats in the DoHE dealing directly with NHEM 
implementation. This included Director-level officers heading the State Project Directorate that 
implements NHEM. Each state has a different system of assigning responsibilities for NHEM 
and the designations do not match across the board. In the SHECs, I interviewed the Vice-
Chairman or Member Secretary of the Council as well as one administrative or research staff 
member. This was done to triangulate the responses regarding SHEC involvement at different 
levels of the organizations. Within universities, interviewees included one individual amongst 
the leadership (such as the Vice Chancellor, Registrar, or Provost) and the official dealing with 
NHEM implementation in the university (usually a Vice Provost or Head of Department). In all 
colleges, I interviewed the Principal as well as the NHEM Coordinator in the college.  
While all interviews at the federal level were recorded, four respondents at the state level 
were reluctant to be audio recorded and they have not been quoted in the study. I took detailed 
notes during these interviews. All other interviews were audio-recorded and professionally 
transcribed.  
Apart from interviews, I rely on documentary evidence from three main sources, 1) 
NHEM’s State Higher Education Plans and other plans created by states; 2) NHEM’s website, 
minutes of meetings; 3) reports and documents produced by SHECs; 4) accreditation reports and 
curriculum available on the websites of universities and colleges.  
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Analytic Approach  
This study primarily employs an inductive approach to understanding the implementation 
of NHEM. That is, the study develops a framework for reform implementation in Indian higher 
education rather than testing a particular theory in the states (Creswell & Poth, 2017, p. 188). 
There is limited existing research on higher education systems and policy formulation or 
implementation in India, thus predicting any aspect of the implementation to guide a deductive 
research design was not possible. Additionally, the use Western theories of development can run 
into many contextual differences in India that make it difficult to test them. In the vacuum of 
knowledge and familiar context, it was necessary to be open to different explanations for 
implementation suggested by the data collected in the field.  
Coding  
The theoretical framework and NHEM’s policy design were used as a guide for creating 
interview protocols and ensuring that all major actors involved in the policy were interviewed. 
All the interviews were transcribed and uploaded into NVivo’s qualitative data analysis program. 
Transcripts and documents were analyzed using thematic coding based on the theoretical 
framework and policy design.  
For instance, state interviews are coded for broad themes of ‘reforms’, ‘characteristics of 
implementation’, and ‘implementation challenge’. The broad themes were assigned sub codes. 
For instance, ‘reforms’ included all the major NHEM reforms such as ‘SHEC reforms’, 
‘affiliation reforms’, ‘accreditation reforms’, etc.  Characteristics of implementation included 
subcodes such as ‘implemented with fidelity’, ‘ignored’, ‘proforma implementation’, 
‘implementation with narrow interpretation’, etc. The characteristics were double-coded for 
‘implementation challenges’ such as ‘financial/time resources’, ‘limited interpretation’, ‘culture 
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and leadership’, ‘centralized decision making’, etc. Individual codes were used to capture 
responses regarding private colleges, faculty unions, state-specific politics, etc. Themes, sub-
themes and codes were added and reassigned as the process of analysis progressed. Details about 
the coding scheme are shared in Appendix B. 
Data Analysis 
The federal case study uses theoretical concepts from policy making literature to anchor a 
description of NHEM’s formulation process. For instance, the analysis was done around broad 
themes of problem identification, choice of policy instruments, and engagement with 
stakeholders (Peters, 2018; Smith & Larimer, 2018; Stone, 2012). The study mainly uses direct 
interpretation of the facts from interviews and documentary analysis to recreate the chronology 
and other details of the policy making process (Stake, 1995). Explanation building is used to 
create a detailed description about the timing of policy creation, why few stakeholders were 
involved in the process, and why the policy was created by a limited number of actors (Yin, 
2017). The case was built iteratively, by drawing on alternatively on interviews and checking the 
claims against documentary evidence and responses from other interviews.  
The state-level implementation study uses two approaches for the analysis: cross-case 
analysis and explanation building (Yin, 2017). Cross-case analysis identifies common and 
unique strategies, activities and institutional relationships across states. To do this, I used NVivo 
queries to create analytic tables. The tables were run for each reform as they were the focal point 
of the analysis. Then, other codes such as characteristics of reforms and challenges in 
implementation were cross tabulated to uncover patterns across reforms and across states. These 
patterns were further refined into naturalistic generalizations (see Creswell & Poth, 2017, p. 
188). For instance, interviews across the states showed that SHECs were not involved in any 
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planning for NHEM and that universities and colleges expected to deal with DoHEs for planning 
activities. These patterns, and others, were aggregated to articulate the underlying theme about 
attitudes towards SHECs and higher education governance in the states.  
Explanation building is also used to describe why each state developed a certain 
implementation strategy for NHEM. Both interview data, documentary evidence, and 
information on the state political culture from other sources were used to build an understanding 
about each state’s attitude and actions towards implementation. Cross-case comparisons were fed 
back into the explanation building for each specific state by pointing out major differences 
between the states and the possible explanation for them.  
Validity and Reliability  
The main threats to validity of this study stem from internal validity of the findings, 
reliability in terms of the replicability of the study, and external validity with regards to their 
generalization (Yin, 2017).  
Internal Validity  
Validity and reliability were a bigger concern in the federal case where I could not resort 
to cross case comparisons and identifying patterns to eliminate spurious causal explanations for 
the observations (Yin, 2017). One of the main ways in which the federal case study avoids 
concerns about internal validity is through data triangulation. The case study uses documentary 
evidence and other interviews to test and confirm the opinions and recollections shared in the 
interviews (Maxwell, 2005). The case study analysis also presents evidence on both aspects so 
that the reader can assess the validity of the inference (Yin, 2017). For instance, federal policy 
makers often mention that NHEM was created after detailed consultation. I present this claim 
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along with details about three types of consultations, to clarify why I dispute the characterization 
of stakeholder involvement by the interviewees.  
At the state-level, case studies rely a lot on my inference about what interviewees said. 
Logistical concerns and the nature of NHEM reforms did not leave any scope for checking my 
inferences against observation of practice (see Maxwell, 2005). Instead, I relied on pattern 
matching across states and triangulating data using documentary evidence. By design, the 
interview questions and interviewees also helped in conducting validity checks on the. For 
example, each institution had more than one respondent and all respondents were asked about 
their institution’s relationship with the other actors in the higher education system. The 
perspectives of all stakeholders ensured that I did not include any outliers observations in the 
making inferences (Maxwell, 2005). Additionally, because the study lasted almost two years, 
federal interviews and follow-up interviews were used to check the working hypotheses 
regarding state-level findings. 
As seen in the discussion sections of this study, observations about all states are only 
included only when respondents from three or four states corroborate it. Powerful observations 
from one or two states are pointed out to the reader as such, along with my explanation about the 
deviation from the pattern observed in other states. 
External Validity  
The sampling criteria for the state-level case studies ensures that the findings of the study 
have some degree of generalizability across Indian states (see Maxwell, 2005; Yin, 2017). In 
order to ensure comparability of findings from this study, states were sampled across regions, 
state political culture and performance of primary education systems within the states. The 
primary aim of the sampling was not statistical generalization of the findings but choosing cases 
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that could support analytic generalizations (see Yin, 2017). Having said that, the states chosen 
represent a lot of variation in economic development, educational indicators, and political party 
systems. Thus, the finds from the study should be generalizable to other large Indian states.  
Reliability  
To maintain the reliability of the study, the data collection processes were designed and 
documented carefully. The actual data collection for the study did not vary widely from the 
initial design. The data collection process strictly followed the interview protocols and 
interviewees were chosen from specific, predetermined categories of individuals based on their 
responsibilities in the state and federal government (Yin, 2017). This ensures that even when 
data can be collected in another state or at another point in time using the same protocols. The 
data analysis also uses a coding scheme that can be easily replicated because it relies on 
theoretical constructs and the stable aspects of the policy design. Lastly, the study uses publicly 




Chapter 4: Formulation of the National Higher Education Mission 
The National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) is the first federal policy in India that 
funds the state university system contingent on systemic reforms. NHEM is also the first 
mission-mode policy operated by the Ministry of Human Resource and Development (MHRD) 
for higher education institutions. NHEM attempts to address multiple issues of poor access, 
equity, and quality in the state higher education by funding states and guiding them in 
undertaking a range of academic, administrative, and governance reforms. Though the policy 
problems addressed through NHEM have been present and widely discussed for decades, the 
policy was only formulated in 2012-13. This chapter explores the contextual factors that led to its 
creation and the process of goal and instrument choice. The chapter also analyses the policy 
instruments and the theory of change underlying the policy design.  
This chapter addresses a few research questions. First, what were there any specific 
conditions or changes that led to the development of NHEM as a federal policy? Which actors 
and agencies were involved in determining the policy goals and policy instruments included in 
NHEM? What was the process through which the individuals and agencies chose the policy 
goals and policy instruments? Lastly, what was the theory of change supporting the NHEM 
reforms? I start the discussion with a brief introduction to NHEM and the timeline of its 
development. The main findings are discussed in three main sections.  
The first main section of the chapter considers how contextual factors affect the 
development of NHEM. I discuss how concerns about the quality of higher education in general 
and state universities were a part of the policy problems discussed in the higher education sub-
system. In 2012-13, both the political and bureaucratic leadership with the government (Ministry 
of Human Resources or MHRD) supported the idea of acting regarding state universities. They 
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were also interested in limiting the financing role of University Grants Commission (UGC) and 
reforming the federal regulation systems. The gridlock in the parliament blocked any legislative 
path of action for MHRD. As a result, NHEM was developed as an executive action. This section 
highlights a recurring theme, that the MHRD played a leadership role in all stages of NHEM’s 
development. The next two sections also discuss the consequences of this concentration of 
control.  
The second section explores the policy design process: goal setting, instrument choice, 
and feedback processes adopted for creating NHEM. The evidence suggests that NHEM’s policy 
goals and policy solutions were pulled together by layering funding arrangements for increasing 
enrollments with reform solutions borrowed from existing reports and policies. As a result, these 
phases of policy development were not distinct. Importantly, the policy did not undergo a 
systematic process of aligning distal goals, instrumental goals, and their relationship with the 
policy instruments. The decision-making regarding policy goals and policy instruments was done 
by a small group of actors associated with MHRD. The policy formally engaged with 
stakeholders and received feedback at every stage. However, these interactions were not long 
and substantial enough to add value to the formulation process. Particularly, stakeholders at the 
state level such as Departments of Higher Education (DoHEs) at state governments, state 
universities, and affiliated colleges were not actively involved in determining the contours of 
NHEM.  
The third main section delves into the design of NHEM and the theory of change it 
applies. The analysis of the policy’s instruments and its theory of change sets an important 
analytical scaffolding for the implementation analysis done in Chapters 5 and 6. The findings of 
this section reiterate the lack of conscious cogitation about the policy’s problems, the distal and 
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proximal goals, the instruments chosen to address them, and the calibration of the tools. NHEM 
defines broad reform goals, but the policy instruments chosen are either too weak to promote the 
right action or focused on a narrow set of activities. The tool calibration supports infrastructural 
development over capacity building and system change. As a result, the theory of change 
suggested by the broad solutions is only partially activated through policy instruments. Further, I 
suggest that all NHEM reforms can be characterized in terms of decentralization, but the policy 
makers do not articulate and highlight this theme.  
In the Conclusion, I revisit the common themes in the findings, consider their interplay, 
and provide explanations for some of the findings. I discuss two aspects of NHEM: the lack of 
designedness of NHEM and the fact that NHEM does not acknowledge the decentralizing nature 
of its reforms. I explore how the policy making process and power structures explain these flaws. 
Further, I use multiple streams theory and advocacy coalition framework to under the policy 
making process. I conclude that advocacy coalition framework provides the best explanation for 
the structure of the higher education policy subsystem, its effects on policy actors, and the policy 
making process.   
 
NHEM’s Main Features 
Before delving into an analysis of the policy’s formulation and design, I clarify some 
important features of the policy and how it operates. Aspects mentioned here such as its 
operational mode (centrally sponsored scheme), policy goals, strategy, and policy instruments, 
are also discussed in detail in later sections of the chapter.  
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The National Higher Education Mission is a centrally sponsored scheme (CSS) for 
publicly funded universities and colleges in Indian states.10 This implies that the policy is a 
federal executive action that is funded partly by the federal government and partly by the states. 
It is not supported by any federal legislative action. The target beneficiaries of NHEM funds 
include publicly funded state universities and colleges. The policy does not fund federal 
institutions or privately funded universities and colleges in states. The main federal publication 
on NHEM, its Vision Document (NHEM, 2013a, p. XIII) discusses the goals and strategy of the 
policy as, “…maintain a focus on quality of higher education in the country, to make it more 
relevant to the global needs and to remove the inequities in access to education amongst various 
social groups. Such objectives are sought to be realized by providing adequate inputs and 
implementing much needed governance and regulatory reforms in the sector.”  
NHEM ties participation in the program with certain reform ‘pre-requisite’ reforms. 
Operationally, states sign a Memorandum of Understanding committing to implementing several 
systemic reforms at the state and university/college level (NHEM, 2013c). These include 
creation of State Higher Education Councils, affiliation reforms, accreditation and autonomy 
reforms, academic and examination reforms, etc.11 (NHEM, 2013b, p.9). These reforms are 
discussed in greater detail in the section on policy instruments. After signing an MoU, states 
present their State Higher Education Plans for the federal government’s approval. Funds can be 
 
10
 Centrally Sponsored Schemes or mission-mode schemes are a mode of federal development programs that 
supplement state resources. CSSs are created to address specific goals in a sector within a fixed timeframe. Federal 
government funds a uniform 65% (or 90% for special category states) of all such schemes and states assist the 
federal government in implementation. Other examples include the Green Revolution, National Health Mission, 
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna (rural road development), etc. CSSs do not require legislative approval. They are 
directed by the executive branch of the federal government.    
11
 The list of pre-requisites included in NHEM is much larger (NHEM, 2013c, 2018). In this chapter, I focus on 
these five categories of reforms that are substantial in nature. Minor or poorly defined pre-requisites such as creating 
a state plan; timely utilization of funds, removing state-level bans of faculty recruitment; equity commitments; and 
establishment of management information systems have not been included (NHEM, 2013b, p. 9; 2018, p. 145)   
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sought under a set of predetermined categories.12 Each category has detailed rules regarding the 
spending. Broadly speaking, most grants allow up to 70% the expenditure on creating or 
maintaining infrastructure and 30% on procurement of equipment (NHEM, 2013c, 2018). States 
are given funds in installments. The state must spend funds from previous tranches according to 
federal rules which triggers the release of subsequent installments (NHEM, 2013b, p. 52).  
According to the last publicly available data as of March 2019, NHEM has spent roughly 
INR 37 billion (Indian National Rupee). The final financial allocations approved for NHEM give 
about 70% of the funds under components related to infrastructure grants. About 8% of the funds 
have been dedicated to faculty and leadership development, about 9% to equity initiatives. The 
remainder has been divided between research and development, vocationalisation of higher 
education, etc. The following section briefly covers the timeline of NHEM’s formulation.13  
 
NHEM’s Timeline  
To ground the discussion regarding NHEM’s formulation I review the major milestones 
in the formulation process of NHEM. Discussing the sequence of events beforehand allows me 
to concentrate on analyzing the nature of involvement of policy actors and other aspects of the 
formulation process in later sections. 
The policy formulation process of NHEM lasted from October 2011 to October 2013. In 
2011, the Planning Commission and Ministries were in the process of creating the XIIth Five 
 
12
 NHEM’s has provided funds under the following components: creation of universities by way of upgradation of 
existing autonomous colleges; creation of universities by conversion of colleges in a cluster; infrastructure grants to 
universities; new model colleges (general); upgradation of existing degree colleges to model degree colleges; new 
colleges (professional); infrastructure grants to colleges; research, innovation and quality improvement; equity 
initiatives; faculty recruitment support; faculty improvement support; and vocationalisation of higher education.  
13
 These proportions should have changed in favor of research and development expenditure when NHEM altered 
its funding components to include INR 500 million research grants for universities. However, this updated data is 
not available on NHEM’s or MHRD’s website as of January 2021.  
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Year Plan (2012-17).14 To inform the plan, MHRD commissioned a report from the UGC (UGC, 
2011a) and proposed its own approach (MHRD, 2011). The idea of NHEM first appeared in 
UGC’s report for the XIIth Plan. By March 2012, MHRD had taken over and presented the idea 
of a new centrally sponsored scheme (CSS) for higher education to the Central Advisory Board 
of Education (CABE).15 At this point, the policy idea included a basic framework of reforms and 
funding priorities for improving access (MHRD, 2012b). To work out the details of this policy 
CABE appointed a sub-committee on state university reforms.  
In August 2012, the MHRD invited researchers from Tata Institute of Social Sciences to 
support the research process for the policy.16 Between August 2012 and November 2013, the 
policy changed from its skeletal form to a more detailed policy document. In October 2012, the 
MHRD presented the framework for NHEM and the CABE sub-committee approved it (MHRD, 
2012a). After CABE’s approval, NHEM was included in the XIIth five-year plan, which was 
eventually released in May 2013. In January and February 2013, the policy was shared with 
state-level stakeholders and regional consultations were held. A detailed budget outlay and 
institutional structures were defined by end of March 2013 for approval from the Expenditure 
and Finance Committee (Ministry of Finance) of the federal government (F1).  
 
14
 India followed a centralized planning model from 1950s till 2014. The Planning Commission (later replaced by 
Policy Commission/Niti Aayog) was a planning body headed by the Prime Minister. It created national five-year 
plans that included policy directions, goals, and financial allocations for most social sectors like education and 
indicated the intentions of the administration in power. Individual ministries were consulted and involved in creating 
the Five-Year Plans for their area. 
15
 CABE is a forum for federal and state government to work together. Any major policy decision of the MHRD 
must be approved by the CABE (F1). Members consist of the federal education ministry and education ministers 
from all the states, six Members of Parliament, heads of different bodies including University Grants Commission, 
Central Board of Secondary Education, National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, and members 
from industry nominated by the government etc. The committee tends to meet a twice a year to approve policies, 
approve five-year plan proposals, suggest improvements, consider recommendations made by sub-committees, etc.  
16
 The author was a research assistant in this team from Tata Institute of Social Sciences. Some of the evidence in 




NHEM was sent for mandatory inter-ministerial consultation and shared for open 
comments on the MHRD’s website in July 2013.17 MHRD adjusted the policy design and the 
budget in response to the feedback. In October 2013, NHEM received the final approval from the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet (Committee on Economic Affairs) to proceed with implementation in 
states. By this time, the MHRD had staffed the federal implementation bodies and the first 
meeting about policy implementation was held on 6th of November 2013 (Project Approval 
Board meeting). 
With this timeline in mind, I now look at the higher education context that influenced the 
formulation of NHEM. Particularly, I consider the influence of contextual factors on the timing 
of the policy and the influence of political factors on its mode of operation (as an executive 
action).  
NHEM’s Formulation in 2012-2013 
In this section, I review the political and higher education context when NHEM was 
formulated (2012-2013). Whether treated as part of the political stream, internal shocks, or 
external shocks, the political and sectoral context of a policy matters in shaping its timing and 
framing (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010; Kingdon, 2011; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
The calls for reforms in the management of state higher education systems go back to the 
1960s. I find that the presence of political will to take federal action and the approaching 
deadline to create the XIIth Five Year Plan created the opportunity for a new higher education 
policy. Evidence about poor quality, limited access, and structural bottlenecks of the Indian 
higher education had been repeatedly highlighted in prior education policies and government-
 
17
 A policy must be sent to relevant federal Ministries for comments before it is approved by the Prime Minister’s 
Cabinet for funding allocation. Period of open comment and inter-ministerial consultation are mandatory steps in the 
federal policy creation process in India.  
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commissioned reports (National Knowledge Commission, 2009; Soneri, 1990; UGC, 2009, 
2011b; Yash Pal Committee, 2009). The poor performance of Indian universities in global 
rankings and on-going higher education projects in states with the World Bank created additional 
pressures to address the quality of state universities in India. United Progressive Alliance’s 
second term (2009) started with the appointment of Kapil Sibal as the new Minister for Human 
Resource Development. His arrival brought substantial political and bureaucratic will to create 
new policies for higher education.  
Between 2009 and 2013, the Ministry simultaneously created a range of reform 
legislations to be introduced in the Parliament and reevaluated its existing programs for higher 
education improvement. By 2011, it became clear that despite the willingness to act, the coalition 
government in power would not be able to pass any major legislation that required bi-partisan 
support in the Parliament. This scuttled the government’s legislative agenda and re-focused 
MHRD’s attention on alternate means of addressing its higher education agenda. The process of 
creating the XIIth Plan provided a ‘window of opportunity’ to create a centrally sponsored 
scheme (CSS) for higher education (J. W. Kingdon, 2011). The Ministry already had two major 
CSSs in school education: the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan and Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha 
Abhiyan. Their perceived success predisposed the MHRD towards creating a CSS. Next, I 
consider the details of each of these factors. 
Expected Increase in Higher Education Enrollment 
In the three decades leading up to NHEM, federal policies were focused on improving the 
quality of the K-12 education system. MHRD had launched multiple policies and CSSs. The 
National Literacy Mission was launched in late 1980s, followed by Operation Blackboard in 
1987, the District Primary Education Program in 1994, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA or 
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Universal Elementary Education) in 2002, and Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan (RMSA 
or National Secondary Education Mission) in 2009. During this time, the only legislative action 
of note was the passage of the Right to Education (RTE) Act in 2009 that made free and 
compulsory education a right for all children from ages of 6 to 14. The success of various school 
education CSSs had created an impetus for creating a higher education policy (CABE, 2012; F3, 
F2). NHEM’s vision document opens with the following sentences, “The success of SSA and 
RMSA has laid a strong foundation for primary and secondary education in India. However, the 
sphere of higher education has still not seen any concerted effort for improvement in access or 
quality... In the coming decades, India is set to reap the benefits of demographic dividend with its 
huge working age population…herein lies the significance of higher education.”  
Need to Address Poor Quality and Reforms in State Higher Education  
The reasons for and solutions to improve the falling standards of quality of higher 
education in state universities were not an unknown issue (for details regarding the development 
of state universities, refer to Appendix D). They had been discussed in numerous government-
commission reports and policies. For instance, specific issues like improvements in examination 
systems (UGC, 1973), ill-effects of uncontrolled affiliation (UGC, 2011b), and lack of autonomy 
in higher education (Biswas & Prakash, 2005) had been discussed in detail by some reports.18 
Further, the National Education Policy Plan of Action (1992), Gnanam Committee’s report on 
academic quality (Soneri, 1990), the National Knowledge Commission (2009), and Yash Pal 
Committee (2009) had advocated for comprehensive systemic reforms including more public 
 
18
 A quality control system followed in India where only Universities have the legal right to design the curriculum, 
conduct examinations, and award degrees to students. Public and private colleges need to be affiliated to universities 




investment in higher education; better higher education planning; greater autonomy for state 
universities and colleges; and the necessity for enforcing quality standards on institutions.   
Before 2012, the federal government had limited success with piecemeal solutions aimed 
at quality assurance through federal agencies like the UGC (Agarwal, 2009). For instance, UGC 
had been promoting autonomous colleges since the 1970s but these colleges were limited due to 
the significant bureaucratic barriers in getting autonomy in states (MHRD, 2013, p.68). The 
federal government also created the National Assessment and Accreditation Council in 1994 but 
70% of universities and 85% of colleges in states were unaccredited in 2012 (MHRD, 2013, 
p.41). However, the success of these initiatives was dependent on state universities, state 
governments, and their ability to enforce standards on affiliating institutions. The CABE sub-
committee on University Reforms noted that there is a need for “reforms in affiliation, 
autonomy, accountability, increasing the institutional base to increase the GER etc. However, 
these initiatives have often been independent of each other and undertaken at different points in 
time thereby diminishing the impact of the reforms” (MHRD, 2012a, p. 75). 
In 2011, MHRD did not have a holistic policy that addressed higher education in state 
universities.19 A senior MHRD federal official noted that they were aware  
“that very focused and direct intervention was required for some time at least, to bring 
state universities and colleges at par with central universities…we had been hearing from state 
governments, from academics from various quarters, that there was a need to do something about 
state universities. And that's how this project came about.”  
Political Will Thwarted by Legislative Gridlock  
 
19
 Apart from regular funding, MHRD was only operating two higher education programs with limited success: 
funding Model Degree Colleges in all educationally backward districts and incentivizing states for improving the 
gross enrollment by proving funds to build colleges (CABE, 2012). Both projects were aimed at improving access to 
higher education and were eventually subsumed under NHEM. 
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As mentioned in the policy overview, NHEM was created as a Centrally Sponsored 
Scheme (CSS) in 2012-13. I find that during this time, MHRD had an energetic political and 
bureaucratic leadership that was determined to take policy action. They considered both 
legislative and executive avenues of action across a range of higher education problems. Due to 
legislative gridlock in a coalition government, their options narrowed down to executive action. 
NHEM was devised under these externally determined constraints.   
NHEM was formulated in the last two years of the United Progressive Alliance’s ten 
years in power (2004 to 2014). The HRD ministry was headed by Mr. Kapil Sibal from 2009 to 
2013. He attempted to undertake multiple higher education reforms upon assuming leadership of 
MHRD. In his new position as the head of MHRD, he had set out an extensive legislative agenda 
to reform the higher education markets and regulatory authorities in the country (The Economic 
Times, 2009). While discussing the legislative plans Sibal spoke about the urgent need for 
reforms and that India only had a 10-12-year window to take the required actions (Chopra, 
2012).20 The Minister of HRD’s personal interest in pushing legislative action for higher 
education reforms appears to be a key factor motivating the MHRD’s activities during this time 
(Goswami, 2009). In India, the personal ambition and interest of politicians and bureaucrats are 
important driving factors in policy creation (Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005; Ayyar, 2009). 
Further, the term of the UPA government was ending in 2014. This could have created pressures 
to showcase some education-related achievements for the government’s second term.  
 
20
 Large proportions of young people in the population can propel a nation’s economic growth. However, this 
dividend is dependent on the population being skilled and productive. Poor education will produce a large under-
skilled and underemployed population which will lead to social unrest and economic challenges. Within a period of 
10-12 years, a whole generation of underprepared students can exit the education system. This framing is reiterated 
in NHEM (2013a, p. XIII). 
84 
 
Under Sibal, MHRD prepared multiple new legislation aimed at creating structural 
changes that would improve higher education quality.21 However, the United Progressive 
Alliance’s coalition government was unable to pass these bills.22 Sibal blamed owners of private 
colleges for applying public pressure and scuttling the bills on accreditation and education 
malpractices (Times of India, 2012). Others complained that Sibal and MHRD had not attempted 
to consult all the stakeholders and create the consensus required to pass the bill (The Economic 
Times, 2009). The political machinations of the coalition government aside, the legislative 
gridlock meant that the ruling party had no new legislative accomplishments in education. A 
high-level federal official involved with the formulation of NHEM spoke about a sense of 
impatience at the MHRD, “we had a lot of these legislative actions that the government had 
already contemplated which did not see light of the day. Because they were all languishing in 
Parliament at various stages. It was decided that an executive action probably would be a better 
way to deal with some of the more pressing issues, one of which was of course, the condition of 
State universities.”  
The gridlock influenced the timing of NHEM’s creation and precipitated its formulation 
in 2012. It also limited the federal government to one avenue, executive action (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007a). Both these factors about the policy making process were important in 
determining NHEM’s eventual design. Legislative actions planned by the government had 
 
21
 This included creating new federal authorities for governance of higher education and management of 
information (Universities for Research and Innovation Bill, 2012,  Higher Education and Research Bill, 2011); 
improving quality control (National Accreditation Regulatory Authority for Higher Educational Institutions Bill, 
2012); checking malpractices by educational institutions (Prohibition of Unfair Practices in Technical Educational 
Institutions, Medical Educational Institutions and Universities Bill, 2010); and forming a national education agency 
(National Accreditation Regulatory Authority for Higher Educational Institutions Bill, 2010), etc. (Chopra, 2012; 
Outlook India, 2012; The New Indian Express, 2011). 
22
 The government was formed by a coalition of multiple parties that held power by a thin majority in the lower 




included mandates, new federal entities, and other laws to control the HE sector. Some of these 
options are unavailable through executive action. This route limits the government’s options to 
using a targeted federal system through CSSs. CSSs don’t have the same mandate as laws but 
they can use monetary inducements and funding conditions to push developmental goals in states 
(Routray, 2013; Saxena, 2004). Creation of CSSs is also entirely under the purview of the federal 
government and does not require wide-scale political support.   
XIIth Plan Deadline 
I find that the XIIth Plan appears as a prominent determinant, both for the timeline of 
policy formulation and in influencing the policy goals. The months leading up to a new plan 
usually triggers evaluation of existing policies and formulating future proposals in different 
Ministries (Swenden & Saxena, 2017). Creation of the XIIth Plan triggered the same processes 
within MHRD (F1, F2). Till 2014, the five-year plans projected national budgets and accordingly 
allocated resources for different ministries (India shifted to annual planning after 2014). A new 
CSS would need to appear as a line item in the MHRD’s budget. Thus, including a new policy in 
the plan gave it official sanction as well as a claim over financial resources. Advocating for these 
resources outside the five-year plan would be difficult.  
To be included in the XIIth Plan, any new policy had to be ready for approval by 2012. 
For MHRD, the process of creating the XIIth Plan started in 2011 when the UGC and MHRD 
produced proposals to approach the plan (MHRD, 2011; UGC, 2011a). NHEM first appeared in 
these proposals as a program to improve enrollment capacity. Over the next twelve months 
MHRD broadened NHEM’s goals to be in line with the XIth plan. It defined the institutional 
structure, chose the policy instruments, and determined the resource distribution. The details 
were developed in time to receive CABE’s approval in November 2012. This allowed the policy 
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to be included in the official plan by May 2013. Interviewees from MHRD indicate that the plan 
process served as an externally imposed deadline for the formulation of NHEM (F1, F2). 
The discussion in this section highlights a few important aspects about NHEM’s 
formulation. Political support, legislative gridlock, and the development of the XIIth Plan 
influenced the timing of policy creation by opening a window of opportunity for the MHRD to 
create new policies.23 The policy makers (political and bureaucratic leadership of MHRD) made 
the most of this opportunity. Importantly, interviews and documentary evidence do not suggest 
that other organizations, state or group of states, or federal regulators played an important part in 
pushing for a new higher education policy. Lastly, it is evident that the policy problems and their 
solutions were already a part of the policy subsystem. Thus, the policy makers were not 
addressing any radical new issues. However, they were taking a bold step in terms of creating the 
first reform-contingent funding policy for state universities.  
 
Policy Design Process 
Whether the policy analyst views policy making as a political or rational process, each 
pays attention to sign posts like agenda-setting, goal definition, choice of policy instruments, etc. 
(Anderson, 2014; Bardach & Patashnik, 2019; Dunn, 2015; Howlett, 2009). The process of 
policy design is defined as the “deliberate and conscious attempt to define policy goals and 
connect them to instruments or tools expected to realize those objectives” (Howlett et al., 2015). 
This section looks at the policy design process of NHEM. I use the scaffolding of policy goals, 
development of instruments, and stakeholder engagement for the discussion. 
 
23
 The World Bank also indirectly contributed to the process of policy creation. Details included in Appendix B. 
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I find that MHRD played a leadership role in determining the policy goals as well as 
instruments. Most of the formulation process involved a small group of bureaucrats and experts 
from or related to the MHRD. Stakeholders, including the states and other federal agencies, were 
invited to participate in the process in a controlled manner. I conclude that NHEM did not follow 
a linear policy development process. Policy makers simultaneously engaged in problem 
definition, goal setting, and instrument choice. This aspect is discussed in detail in the 
conclusion.  
The policy was created by pulling together a variety of existing problems and solutions 
from prior reports and policies. Most reform and funding components of the policy were 
assembled rather than generated. NHEM’s target beneficiaries were always state universities (F1, 
F2). NHEM’s earliest designs sought to improve access to higher education by creating greater 
enrollment capacity. Its funding components were designed accordingly. Through the influence 
of CABE and other experts, the goals were broadened to include other distal goals of equity and 
access.24 Instrumental goals like academic and financial autonomy of universities, academic 
reforms, and affiliation reforms were folded into NHEM altogether. The reform goals were 
tacked on to an existing access-focused funding formulation. The policy instruments were not 
adequately identified or redesigned to accommodate these instrumental goals.  
I also highlight the fact that NHEM had policy as well as political goals, the latter is not 
explicitly addressed in the policy documents. The MHRD has used NHEM to limit UGC’s 
(University Grants Commission) funding functions and restrict its influence on standard-setting. 
This goal has influenced the institutional arrangements chosen for the policy design as well as 
UGC’s involvement in policy formulation.  
 
24
 Distal goals are ‘upstream’ or distant goals. Instrumental goals are ‘downstream’ and affect the achievement of 




Developing Policy Goals and Instruments 
I suggest that a large part of the misalignment in NHEM’s design occurs at the stage of 
setting policy goals. As discussed in this section, NHEM’s goals were not developed organically 
or sequentially. They were borrowed from existing policy reports and policy priorities. The 
conflict between the policy’s primary goal of promoting access and additional reform goals was 
not resolved.  
Policy Problems 
NHEM’s framing of policy problems in state universities is broad and encompasses many 
resource constraints and structural issues. The policy takes its three broad concerns from the XIth 
and XIIth Plans: access, equity, and excellence in state higher education (MHRD, 2011; UGC, 
2011b). Problems are discussed in terms of statistics such as gross enrollment ratio, faculty-
student ratio, low accreditation levels, etc. (MHRD, 2013b, pp. 8-43). Additionally, the policy 
discusses systemic issues in state universities that contribute to problems of low access, 
inequitable access, and poor quality of higher education in states. These policy problems are 
grouped under five broad categories: inadequate federal funding for state universities; poor 
higher education planning and funding at state level; archaic academic practices and 
unmanageable scale of affiliation in states; limited autonomy of state universities; and poor 
governance and administrative processes in universities (MHRD, 2013b, pp. 47-73).  
Emergence of Distal and Instrumental Goals 
Before analyzing NHEM’s goals and the process of determining them, it is important to 
note that NHEM does not distinguish between distal and instrumental policy goals. The logic 
connecting the policy’s distal goals and instrumental goals is not explicitly discussed. However, 
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it can be inferred through other official reports and policies published prior to NHEM (discussed 
in the third section of the chapter). I employ the terms of distal and instrumental goals to 
distinguish between different policy goals included in NHEM and to inform the implementation 
analysis in later chapters. The distal or ultimate goals of NHEM are easily identifiable as 
improvement in access, equity, and excellence in higher education (MHRD, 2013b, pp. 5). I 
consider the reforms included in NHEM as its instrumental goals. The reforms are an important 
part of NHEM’s strategy to achieve improvements in access, equity, and excellence.  
NHEM’s earliest (and narrow) version was suggested by UGC in November 2011. It was 
a part of their approach to the XIIth Plan. Here, NHEM addressed the issue of increasing the 
enrollment by incentivizing states to establish more colleges and universities (University Grants 
Commission, 2011a).25  
As policy formulation process within MHRD progressed, the policy goals were 
broadened to include equity and excellence. Also, reforms that were included as separate 
solutions in UGC’s plan were folded into NHEM. The deliberations of the CABE sub-committee 
(MHRD, 2012b) show that inclusion of reforms as a pre-condition was suggested by a state-level 
bureaucrat in the sub-committee. Pointing to past difficulties in enforcing reform requirements 
on states, he suggested that compliers should be given priority during funding.26 MHRD officials 
agreed to this addition and suggested that NHEM’s bottom-up planning feature would allow 
states to create their own reform plans (MHRD, 2012b).  
 
25
 UGC’s plan included reforms such as affiliation, autonomy, governance reforms, and SHECs as stand-alone 
solutions to be included in the XIIth Plan.  
26
 Other CSSs have included state-level reforms as pre-conditions for participation. Notably, the Jawaharlal Nehru 
National Urban Renewal Mission conditioned funds for cities on reforms in their urban development boards 
(MHRD, 2013c pp.82; Sadoway, Gopakumar, Baindur, & Badami, 2018). In education, reforms like granting 
institutions autonomy were a pre-condition for funding in the Technical Education Quality Improvement Project 
operated by the World Bank and MHRD (Dubey et al., 2019).  
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Interviewees within the MHRD were not able to identify exactly how and why some 
reform goals became a part of the policy, except that they had all been discussed in prior 
government reports and policies (F1, F2). A majority of reform goals included in NHEM were 
discussed in UGC’s XIIth plan approach (University Grants Commission, 2008, p. 2-7). This 
suggests that NHEM’s policy makers assumed that the articulation of policy problems and goals 
in the source documents was accurate.  
One reform goal, the State Higher Education Council (SHEC), received much greater 
prominence in NHEM than in earlier policy solutions. Documentary analysis shows that SHEC 
reforms had not been discussed in detail in any reports other than the National Education Policy 
of 1986 (MHRD, 1986). The creation of these institutions had not been a part of NHEM’s initial 
design. It was only mentioned once in UGC’s Plan (UGC, 2011a). The inclusion of SHECs as a 
reform was important because combined with other reforms, it signaled a multi-level change in 
the state higher education ecosystems.  
I suggest that this instrumental goal could have travelled from other higher education 
reform projects in states. MHRD had invited an academic, Dr. Venkatesh Kumar, to provide 
technical assistance and research for NHEM in August 2012 (F1, F2). A professor at a federal 
university, Dr Kumar had worked with the Governor of Maharashtra on university reforms, and 
with the World Bank on education reforms in Madhya Pradesh (Anant & Kumar, 2010; Kumar, 
2009; USIEF, 2012).27 The reform goals included in NHEM were quite similar to World Bank’s 
policy prescriptions for Madhya Pradesh.28 SHECs occupied a central role in both sets of reforms 
 
27
 Dr Kumar was a mid-career faculty member at a federally funded social sciences university in Mumbai, the Tata 
Institute of Social Sciences (TISS). From August 2012 to August 2014, Dr. Kumar was assisted by another 
researcher at TISS, Ms. Soumya Mishra (author). Dr. Kumar and Ms. Mishra worked directly with the two-officer 
team at MHRD in researching and preparing NHEM’s Vision Document (NHEM, 2013b). 
28
 Consultations and research for this project occurred almost simultaneously with NHEM, between February and 
September 2012. For more details on the World Bank’s involvement, please refer to Appendix B.  
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(World Bank Group, 2012). Thus, it is possible that SHECs reforms were developed within state 
projects and travelled to NHEM through informal channels or influence of experts like Dr. 
Kumar. 
Higher education experts interviewed at the federal level agreed that the policy covered 
most of the pressing policy problems in the higher education system (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6). 
International observers believed that NHEM addressed too many goals under one policy and 
would fail to resolve any one effectively (F4, F6). One critical issue not addressed in NHEM was 
the highly fragmented nature (small enrollment size) of most colleges in India. One international 
observer (F6) mentioned that this a structural flaw in the higher education system that prevents 
institutions from operating at scale and efficiently using public resources.29 Any policy 
addressing access should expand existing institutions rather than creating new ones (F6). There is 
no indication in documentary evidence that MHRD policy makers were aware of this issue or 
debated whether this was a policy goal that needed to be addressed. 
Goal Clarity 
Clarification and definition of goals is part of the policy making process. NHEM’s goals 
lack clarity in a few different ways. The distal goals are poorly defined in terms of quantitative 
and qualitative targets. NHEM has only one specific distal goal, the target of a 32% gross 
enrollment ratio by 2022.30 Equity and access goals lack specificity in terms of target 
quantification and timelines. For instance, the regional equity goal is only described as, “Correct 
regional imbalances in access to higher education by facilitating access to high quality 
institutions in urban & semi-urban areas” (NHEM, 2013b, p. 84).  
 
29
 The National Education Policy of 2019 addresses this problem by prioritizing consolidation of smaller institutions 
and promoting multi-disciplinary institutions (MHRD, 2019, p.211).  
30
 Gross Enrollment Ratio is a commonly used measure of access in India. It refers to the proportion of 18–24-year-
olds in the nation that are enrolled in any higher education institution.  
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The distal and instrumental goals are not explicitly connected. For instance, it is not easy 
to understand exactly which distal goals are related to the creation of SHECs. If SHECs are 
supposed to support all the distal goals, to which extent do they affect each? Further, the policy 
often describes reforms as goals unto themselves. Accreditation reforms are described as a goal, 
“[to] improve the overall quality of existing state institutions by ensuring that all institutions 
conform to prescribed norms and standards and adopt accreditation as a mandatory quality 
assurance framework.” (MHRD, 2013b, p. 84). It is difficult to point out exactly how NHEM 
relates the goals of access, equity, and access with reforms like accreditation, creation of SHECs, 
university autonomy, etc.  
The lack of clarity in the distal and instrumental policy goals for NHEM is puzzling. 
Keeping the goals of the policy vague could have been a conscious choice. Decision-making 
regarding policy specifics was done within a relatively closed group consisting of two MHRD 
officers and Dr. Kumar. While this group may have shared an understanding about the goals, 
they may not have wanted to commit to any targets prematurely and create political conflict. This 
would avoid the problem of stakeholders or states getting mired in debating specific targets and 
scuttling the underlying reforms. After all, ambiguity is used by policy makers to create larger 
coalitions and gather support for policies (Stone, 2012). However, this lack of clarity is also 
observed in the policy instruments. This points towards a less deliberate reason for poor clarity. I 
discuss it at the end of this section.  
Policy Instrument Choice  
NHEM does not identify specific policy instruments employed in the policy. Instead, it is 
arranged along two dimensions: reforms, pre-requisites and funding components. As a result, 
NHEM’s tool choice analysis needs to be constructed using these dimensions. The nature of the 
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instruments themselves is analyzed in the third section of the chapter. Here, I consider the 
changes in these two aspects over time to determine if they were redesigned to effectively serve 
the policy’s goals.  
The interviews with policy makers did not provide details about their policy instrument 
choices. As a senior Ministry official mentioned about the design of policy solutions, “…great 
reports that have been written by very XIIth learned people on higher education. The Kothari 
Commission [1968] report and more recently there has been Professor Yashpal’s [2009] report”. 
This suggests that the understanding of both policy problems and solutions came from prior 
reports and not from deliberations within the ministry. Even if the goals and policy solutions are 
borrowed together from old policies, the policy makers still need to adjust the solutions to suit 
the new policy’s context and develop appropriate instruments (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014; 
Peters, 2018). I argue that NHEM did not undergo such a process.  
Between March 2012 and December 2013, NHEM’s policy goals broadened from 
improving access to a reform-centric approach targeting access, equity, and quality. Yet, the 
earliest version of NHEM uses a similar set of funding components as the final version of the 
policy (MHRD, 2012b, University Grants Commission, 2011a, p2). Early plans shared with the 
CABE sub-committee included grants for converting autonomous colleges into universities, 
creating cluster universities, providing infrastructure grants to existing colleges and universities, 
etc. (MHRD, 2012b). All of them aimed at increasing enrollment capacity by adding physical 
infrastructure. 
After reforms became a part of the policy goals, three different versions of the policy 
were shared publicly (MHRD, 2012a, 2013; NHEM, 2013b). Infrastructure grants remained in 
the same form in all these documents and accreditation criteria were added as a pre-condition for 
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them. Other funding components were added and removed between versions. For instance, 
funding for affiliation, academic, administrative reforms, and creation of accreditation agencies 
was added when the policy went for state consultations (MHRD, 2012a, p. 129), but by the time 
funding NHEM guidelines was issued in December 2013, reform support had been reduced to 
two funding components: institutional restructuring and capacity building (NHEM, 2013c, pp. 
41-43). Eventually, when the policy began funding the states, funds to support capacity building 
had completely disappeared (NHEM, 2013c, p. 42; RUSA Mission Authority, 2020). 
The policy did change between March 2012 and November 2013. More detail was added 
about reform requirements, federal implementation agencies, and state implementation 
structures. The state higher education council guidelines were developed, an institutional 
structure at federal and state level was defined; the formats for strategic and annual plans to grant 
funding were created; and specific rules for the funding components were decided (Biswas & 
Prakash, 2005; MHRD, 2012b, 2013). However, there was no change in the instruments that the 
policy was employing to promote compliance in the states. Funds were still flowing for specific 
purposes of developing infrastructure.   
Policy instruments for changing institutional processes and individual behavior needs to 
support different activities in states when compared to instruments for improving enrollment 
capacity. The evolution of NHEM’s goals did not prompt the policy makers to consciously 
resolve this issue in the policy’s design. Interviews with policy makers did not throw light on 
why the policy makers chose these funding instruments or what was the logic that connected the 
funding components and reform pre-requisites (F1, F2). 
The evolution of the funding and reform components highlights the fact that NHEM 
came together when an existing set of funding objectives were combined with widely known 
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reform solutions. Thus, policy goals and policy solutions entered the policy together, but they 
were not reconciled with each other and with the funding priorities. This aligns with the findings 
about lack of articulation of distal and instrumental goals. It becomes apparent that policy 
makers did not adopt a systematic process of mapping the theory of change for the policy.  
Political Goals of NHEM  
I suggest that NHEM did not just fulfill policy goals. It was also designed to address a 
political goal. Though NHEM does not formally mention any criticism of the UGC, the 
interviews at the federal level mention that NHEM fulfilled the goal of reducing UGC’s sphere 
of influence. As mentioned by a senior federal officer (F2), the goal of NHEM was “on the one 
hand to engage the state governments in this higher education policy, and on the other, to 
minimize the role of UGC. In fact, it tantamount to bringing down their role and having an 
alternative to UGC.”  
The University Grants Commission has been the main regulating and funding body for 
higher education since its establishment in 1956. Thus, any new federal policy for higher 
education should have been implemented through the UGC. However, NHEM was designed as a 
Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) to be operated directly by MHRD. By choosing to 
administer NHEM through the MHRD rather than through the UGC, the effective budget of the 
UGC and its ability to interact with state institutions was drastically reduced (F1, F3, F4). With 
this, the MHRD was able to achieve the goal of limiting UGC’s influence without taking any 
ambitious legislative action.31  
 
31
 The National Higher Education and Research Bill introduced in the Parliament in 2011 was attempting to achieve 
the same goal. It would have repealed the University Grants Commission Act and replaced the multiple professional 
councils with a single standard setting body called Higher Education Commission of India.  
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Though UGC officially participated in processes of creating NHEM, it did not have any 
real power to affect the outcome. UGC had one member on the CABE sub-committee for 
university reform. The minutes of the meetings suggest that this member was not able to mount a 
strong enough protest against NHEM’s design as a CSS. UGC continued to appeal to MHRD to 
reconsider the implementation of NHEM through UGC. However, a senior MHRD leader noted 
that, “The chairman of UGC was very disturbed about it and he wrote several letters to us. But 
the state governments were very happy because now they could directly get money”. The 
response suggests that UGC’s protests were ineffective and MHRD had already decided its 
course of action (more details on the relationship between MHRD and UGC included in 
Appendix A).  
MHRD had the power to allocate resources and make staffing decisions about UGC. Why 
didn’t MHRD attempt to reform the UGC so that it could implement NHEM? Instead, it chose to 
reduce UGC’s responsibilities. There are a few possible explanations for the actions of MHRD. 
The first, that the level of corruption or dysfunction in UGC’s federal and regional centers had 
reached a point that creating a new organization would have been more effective than reforming 
the UGC. The organizational culture, established relationships, and power dynamics may have 
been too institutionalized to change. The other possibility is that the leadership of MHRD wished 
to directly wield funding powers. Any solution that diversified funding decisions to other 
organizations was not acceptable to MHRD. The data collected in this study does not 
conclusively support either of the explanations. A combination of both types of motivations may 
have prompted the establishment of NHEM as a policy directly under MHRD’s control. It is 
clear that MHRD’s dominant position in the policy system gave it the power to determine UGC’s 
position in the sub-system. 
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Engagement with Stakeholders 
Actors other than MHRD engaged with NHEM at three main points. First, the CABE-
subcommittee on university reforms commented on the initial drafts of the policy (MHRD, 
2012a). I argue that more state participation at this stage would have been helpful. Second, states 
were consulted in four regional consultations. This process was short and involved few 
individuals. Additionally, the consequent changes in the policy were limited. Third, the policy 
was sent for inter-ministerial consultation within the federal government. This resulted in greater 
implementation details but not many changes in the policy goals or instruments. This section 
discusses the details and effects of these engagements.  
The involvement of a large CABE sub-committee in NHEM’s early stages (March 2012) 
gives the impression that the policy was created by a large group of federal and state 
representatives (MHRD, 2012a). However, this subcommittee only met twice in a span of six 
months to give comments on the policy design (p. 74). Between meetings, the choices regarding 
policy instruments and reforms were made by MHRD’s team32 (F1). The sub-committee itself 
was dominated by state and federal bureaucrats33. One can argue that for a national policy that 
requires reform implementation at state and institutional level, the sub-committee did not include 
a diverse enough group of stakeholders that could critique the policy design. The policy makers 
may have engaged with the committee in good faith. However, the engagement could have more 
representation from state administrations, universities, and colleges.  
 
32
 The team consisted of the Joint Secretary of the Higher Education Department at MHRD and a Director at 
MHRD.  
33
 MHRD bureaucrats from the Higher Education Department that were formulating the policy were in the sub-
committee. Other members included three bureaucrats from the states, one Vice Chancellor of a state university, one 
professor from a federal university, and one officer from the UGC (MHRD, 2012b). 
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Before regional consultations, NHEM’s policy making and feedback process only 
involved federal actors like the MHRD, CABE sub-committee, and experts approached by 
MHRD34. An international observer mentioned that their first suggestion to the MHRD upon 
hearing about the policy and its ambitious scope was, “you have to get out there and speak to the 
states about it. That, in itself, took some convincing”.  
The second source of feedback for NHEM was a mandatory internal practice in 
Government of India. Every policy needs to go through inter-ministerial consultations and a 
period of open comment. NHEM was open for public comment for a few months. Though many 
responses were received, it is not clear if MHRD systematically responded to the suggestions 
(F1, F2). Inter-ministerial consultations happened from April to July 2012. 
Department of Finance provided the most detailed comments on the policy35. This 
department has the authority to veto a policy or drastically reduce funds for it. They touched 
upon the limited capacity of states to absorb NHEM funds, the lack of clarity on the planning 
process adopted in NHEM, the shortage of quality faculty that would implement the policy, etc. 
In response, MHRD justified the inclusion of grants for supporting reforms to increase state 
absorption capacity. They also added detailed formats for state and institutional planning within 
the policy (author’s notes). Policy makers reiterated in inclusion of faculty recruitment and 
capacity building grants.  
MHRD addressed the concerns raised through additions to the policy design or through 
clarifications of existing design elements (author’s notes). This process was useful because it 
 
34
 The broad contours of the policy may have been informally discussed with other experts. Formally, the policy 
was also present to a parliamentary committee. However, these did not invite detailed feedback on the policy 
solutions.  
35
 Responses from other ministries were succinct, positive, and largely concerned the scope of the policy. For 
instance, the Health Ministry suggested that the funds should cover medical institutions as well (author’s notes). 
However, medical institutions were removed from the policy on the recommendation of the Department of Finance. 
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forced federal policy makers to add details about policy implementation. Federal structure for 
plan appraisal, details about norms and outcomes for universities and colleges, etc. were added 
as a result. However, no changes were made to the fundamental structure of the policy, the 
design of policy instruments, and the commitment of financial resources to non-infrastructure 
activities.  
The states expected to implement the policy were mainly consulted through four regional 
consultations. One senior MHRD official described it as “was wide ranging and a long 
engagement” (F2). However, each state and its numerous higher education institutions were 
represented by just 5-7 participants from the DoHEs, SHECs etc. (F6, Author’s notes36). For a 
CSS aimed at all hundreds of universities and thousands of colleges in the country, the length 
and quality of interaction with state level institutions appears inadequate.  
International observers as well as domestic policy makers argued that NHEM needed 
more engagement with the states. They mentioned that NHEM was based on a limited 
understanding of the institutional reality and complexities of planning and reform 
implementation in state higher education institutions (F3, F4, F5, F6). For instance, the 
international observer pointed out that,  
“it is notoriously difficult to get information on how universities and colleges plan, their 
budget cycles, expenditures, sources of funds.…planning requires trade-offs in terms of goals 
and expenditure. From what I know, this information was never sought [by NHEM]”.  
An education expert (F3) who had previously worked on designing K-12 education 
programs with the MHRD noted that other programs were created after months-long 
consultations at state, district, and block levels. He suggested that the federal government had 
 
36
 The author participated in three of the four regional consultations and assisted in drafting internal memos 
summarizing consultations.  
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missed important constituents in formulating and implementing NHEM; intensive conversations 
should have involved “four types of partners. The State Council of Education, the Department of 
Higher Education, the Directorate of Education, and leaders of colleges and universities”. 
MHRD officials believed that they had consulted many stakeholders before designing the 
policy. One senior federal official mentioned that,  
“…Once the idea took root in the ministry and we did decide to go ahead with this 
[policy]. In order to give shape to the idea, to determine what would be the contours…there were 
a series of consultations held all over the country by the Ministry. Where you had academics, 
other stakeholders, the state governments, colleges and the university, Vice Chancellors, 
principals etc. …It was wide ranging and a long engagement that the ministry had.”  
The regional consultations mentioned here did take place, but they occurred after the 
policy had been fairly well-defined in terms of reform requirements, funding components, and 
institutional arrangements (MHRD, 2013). They also don’t appear to be very extensive. 
Consultations were held as day-long events in Mumbai, Bhopal, Bangalore, and Delhi, through 
January and February 201337. Participants for the consultation included State Principal 
Secretaries of Higher Education of states in the region, Vice Chancellors of universities, 
principals/heads of colleges, professors, state officials, and education experts.  
The feedback from the consultations covered a wide range of topics (F6, author’s notes). 
A recurring criticism of NHEM was that the number of prerequisite reforms were too high and 
poorly defined.38 As a result, no state would be able to apply all of them. The policy documents 
show no indication that the number or definition of prerequisite reforms were changed materially 
 
37
 Only 2-3 weeks after the first version of the policy had been shared online in January 2013 (MHRD, 2013). 
38
 The feedback from the consultations was never published by MHRD.  
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after the consultations. In both documents they occupy multiple pages of suggestions (MHRD, 
2013, pp. 98-120; NHEM, 2013a, pp. 105-129). During consultations, several state bureaucrats 
raised concerns about the lack of DoHE’s representation on the State Higher Education Councils, 
lack of clarity regarding DoHE’s reduced role, poor administrative abilities of academics, and 
challenges of not including the Minister of Higher Education as the Chairman of the Council (F6, 
author’s notes). However, the SHEC design remained largely unchanged after the regional 
consultations.  
The only two noteworthy changes resulted from the consultation. One, that the 
appointment of an academic as SHEC Chairman was changed from “required” to “preferable”.  
Two, earlier guidelines had included the establishment of a state accreditation agency as a 
prerequisite (MHRD, 2013, p. 101). However, concerns were raised about the technical capacity 
of every state in establishing an agency and the possibility of local political pressures or 
corruption rendering the accreditation decisions meaningless (author’s notes). These concerns 
about accreditation are valid (Tierney & Sabharwal, 2017). NHEM eventually removed this pre-
requisite and only insisted on compulsory accreditation by national authorities (NHEM, 2013b, 
p. 110). Feedback from the consultations foreshadowed some of the implementation challenges 
that are discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. The policy’s provisions regarding most of the issues did 




 Other concerns voiced in the consultations included the fear that filling faculty positions was a financial issue out 
of the higher education department’s hand; that existing data collection systems were not sophisticated enough to 
help planning or performance monitoring; and apprehensions of resistance to academic reforms like introducing 
semester systems in the state universities (author’s notes). Despite NHEM’s initial design including a federal 
Technical Support Group, states were concerned that they would need intensive capacity building and assistance to 
undertake reforms. Faculty positions and academic reforms did not change after the consultations (MHRD, 2013; 
NHEM, 2013b). Both versions included financial support for creation of Management Information Systems in states. 
As discussed in the previous section on policy instruments, the funding components for reform support and capacity 
building were included in the policy but eventually never funded under NHEM (RUSA Mission Authority, 2020). 
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Common Patterns in NHEM’s Formulation  
In this section, I have reviewed the process of NHEM’s formulation. A few common 
themes about the actors involved and the process of creating the policy. In the conclusion of the 
chapter, I consider these findings in the light of various policy making theories.  
The first, MHRD emerges as a dominant actor within the federal policy subsystem. 
MHRD’s team, two bureaucrats and one academic expert, closely controlled the policy’s 
development and shepherded it from one stage of the policy making process to another. Thus, the 
policy’s emergence and passage were dependent on the active involvement of the bureaucratic 
leadership of the Ministry. The discussion of the contextual aspects also underscored the 
importance of MHRD’s political and bureaucratic leadership in creating the policy.  
Importantly, key federal organizations involved in higher education such as the 
University Grants Commission, All Indian Council of Technical Education, and National 
Institute for Education Planning and Administration did not play a significant part in the process 
of creating the policy. They only provided feedback for the policy at forums like the CABE sub-
committee and regional consultations. At the same time, the views of UGC or other experts did 
influence the policy through reports and policies published earlier. What remains unclear in this 
analysis is whether MHRD deliberately excluded other stakeholders from the formulation 
process or this is a common feature of policy making in India. I consider this question in the 
Conclusion section of the chapter.  
It is notable that the discussion about engagement with stakeholders does not mention 
many actors that are prominent in Western literature on policy making. Organizations 
representing interests of businesses, trade associations, faculty and student unions, professional 
bodies, etc. (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010; Birkland, 2019; J. W. Kingdon, 2011). Some of these 
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actors like businesses (Kochanek, 1996), interest groups, and civil society organizations 
(Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 2017b) are becoming more active participants in India. However, they do 
not appear to be important participants in the higher education subsystem as yet. It is also 
possible that the formulation of legislation may attract wider participation than the creation of a 
CSS because the state has more discretion over executive actions than over legislative processes.  
The second observation is that despite being a policy about state higher education 
systems, the policy formulation process has remarkably little involvement of the state 
governments, the state universities, and affiliated colleges. Though NHEM sets out ‘bottom-up 
approach’ as one of its guiding principles, the value is not espoused during the process of 
formulating the policy (NHEM, 2013b, p. 162). The necessity to create a new policy addressing 
state higher education systems was felt at the federal level, the demand was not made by state 
universities or their colleges. The policy goals and policy instruments to address them were 
chosen at the federal level. States have token representation at every stage of the policy making 
process. Members from states are part of the CABE, the CABE sub-committee, and the regional 
consultations for NHEM. Yet, their feedback did not lead to any major changes in the policy’s 
distal goals, instrumental goals, or the policy’s design. In fact, there is little evidence from 
consultations suggesting that states question the assumptions underlying NHEM’s policy 
instruments.  
It is worth asking why the MHRD did not engage in wider consultation with other actors 
in creating the policy. After all, it is the dominant actor in the policy subsystem and in theory, 
can create the policy as it wishes. One possibility is that the XIIth Plan as well as upcoming 
general elections of 2014 created a timeline for the creation of a new policy. Within this 
timeframe, it was not possible to arrange high-quality consultations at the state level. If the 
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consultations raised contentious issues that the policy could not solve, the policy could get mired 
in a protracted political negotiation with states. Perhaps policy makers found it preferable to 
create the policy and then incorporate the feedback during implementation. Also, Grindle and 
Thomas (1990) noted that in developing countries, the hierarchical distance between policy 
makers and beneficiaries is large. Beneficiaries are often not involved in policy making but they 
are able to affect implementation rules at the local level by exercising their political power. If 
this pattern holds, then policy makers are also cognizant of the malleability of policy during 
implementation. 
Even after states participated in the consultations, they did not strongly oppose any 
provisions of NHEM. It is possible that like the federal government, the state bureaucratic 
culture is also centralized (Akhil Gupta, 2012b; Mangla, 2015). Thus, the feedback from DoHE 
bureaucrats and selected Vice Chancellors is likely to suffer from the same blind spots common 
to top-down policy making, namely, assumptions about compliance of federal mandates. A more 
likely explanation is that the states were interested in the federal funds being provided through 
NHEM (F1). Experiences with other federal policies or with higher education regulators may 
have created the sense that federal reforms are never truly mandatory. The states would be able 
to dilute the norms or negotiate with the federal government once the policy was operational 
(Grindle, 1980). Thus, they did not mount a significant opposition to the policy. In any case, the 
feedback process for NHEM did uncover some criticisms but did not lead to significant changes 
in the policy design.  
The last emergent theme is about unclear articulation of policy goals, instruments, and a 
theory of change. The policy lacks a model of causation, model of evaluation, and a model of 
interventions (Linder & Peters, 1989). This makes its analysis and evaluation difficult. This lack 
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of clarity can be traced to the process of policy formulation. NHEM was created by borrowing 
reform solutions from existing policies and attached them to access, equity, and excellence goals. 
The causal relationships between them were not articulated, even the goals were not specific. 
NHEM calls the inclusion of state university reforms  as a ‘strategic shift’ in the federal higher 
education policy (NHEM, 2013b, p. 6). Yet, the policy dedicates little funding towards this goal. 
Improvement of infrastructure remains the mainstay of the policy. The next section delves deeper 
into the design of NHEM instruments. It provides further evidence regarding the lack of 
conceptual clarity present in the definition of goals and choice of instruments. Discussions in 
Chapters 5 and 6 consider the impact of the policy design on implementation.  
 
Analyzing NHEM’s Theory of Change 
This section analyzes NHEM’s policy design to understand which instruments are being 
applied in the policy and what type of assumptions are made in the process. A policy’s design 
analytically links the policy problems with policy instruments and policy goals with a causal 
logic (Linder & Peters, 1989; McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; Peters, 2018; Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1984; Salamon, 1989). As discussed previously in this chapter, NHEM does not provide a clear 
relationship between its policy goals, policy design, and targets. Without these guides about the 
policy design, it becomes difficult to analyze the implementation of the reforms included in the 
policy. This task is further complicated when policy makers are unable to shed light on the 
assumptions and tradeoffs made in choosing the policy instruments. This section of the chapter 
addresses these aspects of NHEM for each of the five main reforms40. 
 
40
 I focus the analysis on five reforms that are substantial in nature and consistently appear across different version 
of the NHEM document. Minor or poorly defined pre-requisites such as creating a state plan; timely utilization of 
funds; removing state-level bans of faculty recruitment; equity commitments; and establishment of management 
information systems have not been included in this analysis (NHEM, 2013b, p. 9; 2018, p. 145) 
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I find that NHEM’s policy design does not easily fall into categories of policy 
instruments. Policy makers combined their funding components with reform solutions without 
specifying all of the linkages between the two. As a result, the assumptions underlying the 
instruments are not adequately articulated or tested.  
Further, the reforms prerequisites included in the policy lack definition. Thus, the federal 
government’s priority in terms of state-level and institution-level actions remains unclear. The 
specific rules for funding called tool calibration (Howlett, 2009) supports the creation of 
infrastructure. Resources are not provided for capacity building and organizational change. 
These findings support the theme uncovered in the analysis of the policy design process which 
suggested access-related funding items from the core of NHEM’s funding structure.  
Lastly, I argue that many of the reforms under NHEM can be characterized as vertical or 
horizontal decentralization within the state higher education system. Though centralization is 
mentioned as a problem (p.70, 94) in the policy document, decentralization is not articulated as a 
unifying concept for the whole policy. I trace the concept of decentralization across the main 
reforms of NHEM. 
 
Policy Instruments  
Policy instruments are concrete and specific operational forms of interventions by public 
authorities (Bemelmans-Videc, 2011, p. 4) or mechanisms that translate substantive policy goals 
into concrete actions (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Various typologies of policy instruments 





authority by the state.41 I use McDonnell & Elmore’s classification that includes four policy 
instruments; mandates (rules without financial incentives); inducements (incentives for short-
term and specific outcomes); capacity building (investments to build long term capacity); and 
system-changing (changes in distribution of authority) (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). I also 
borrow the concept of hortatory tools (exhortation or proclamation) from Schneider & Ingram 
(1990) to capture policies that may not be mandatory but are suggested in NHEM. This 
classification allows me to characterize all types of policy instruments employed through 
NHEM’s funding and reforms.  
As discussed in previous sections, NHEM’s goals and policy instruments were a coalition 
of policy prescriptions made in previous decades (F1, F2). The interviewees that were a part of 
this study could not identify any specific processes that were undertaken to design the policy 
instruments (F1). This is not surprising. Policy makers often make policy instrument choices 
based on prior experience, not theoretical constructs. Instruments are usually chosen based on 
costs of alternative, preferences of stakeholders, who bears the cost of the policy, etc. 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). However, a degree of coherence between goals and instruments is 
necessary for effective implementation (Sabatier, 1986). Analysis of NHEM’s policy instruments 
presents two analytical problems. 
The first, NHEM uses reforms as both policy goals and instruments. For instance, the 
establishment of SHECs is a goal unto itself, but the policy also entrusts SHECs with 
 
41
 For instance, Anderson’s maximalist categorization details thirteen policy instruments including direct provision 
of services, taxes, general expenditure, sanctions, etc. (Anderson, 2014). Vedung offers a minimalist classification of 
policy instruments largely based on the state’s exercise of coercive control. He categorizes them as regulation (the 
stick), economic means (the carrot), and information (the sermon) (Vedung, 2011). Schneider and Ingram’s 
categorization of policy instruments is based on their underlying motivational strategies. They categorize policy 
instruments as authority tools, incentive tools, capacity tools, symbolic and hortatory tools, and learning tools 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1990). 
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implementing other reforms. It is possible that policy makers did not see any conceptual conflict 
in treating reforms as both goals and as mandates in the policy. I do not treat the reforms as 
separate policy instruments because they cannot operate as anything other than hortatory tools 
unless funding components are considered. Thus, I analyze NHEM’s design as pairs of reform 
prerequisites and funding components that work in conjunction with each other. Each pair of 
reform and funding component aims to achieve the instrumental goal of the reform and one or 
more distal goals.  
NHEM’s policy design presents a second challenge. The funding and reform components 
do not fall into clean categories of policy instruments (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). All the 
reforms are called prerequisites for participation in NHEM, but all of them are not enforced as 
such. I turn to the theory of change to determine if they have system-changing effects, capacity-
building effects, if they are inducements for specific actions, or if they serve as hortatory tools 
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Attaching more than one policy 
instrument to reform and funding combinations allows me to approximate the full extent of the 
logic adopted by NHEM’s policy makers.  
In the following sections, I analyze the policy problems, policy instruments, theory of 
change and assumptions for the five main reforms included in NHEM. Table 3. summarizes the 
policy instruments, funding components and my assessment of their theory of change.42 
 
42
 For the benefit of readers that are unfamiliar with the Indian higher education system, this section uses 
Appendices to detail the nature of some policy problems and solutions. It is worth noting that the Indian higher 
education system is structurally different from American and European systems. Though it was influenced by the 
British system in the early stages, it has grown in a different direction in the last several decades to develop a unique 
culture and structure. Terms such as autonomy and affiliation hold specific meanings in India. I point them out, 
wherever applicable.  
 
 
Table 3. NHEM Reforms and Policy instruments 
Policy design Type of Tool Causal Logic Assumptions 
Reform Funding component 
SHECs 
Reforms 
- Preparatory grants for 
states (INR 100 million) 
given at the beginning of 
NHEM. The grant also 
covers administrative 
expenses of operating the 












- The preparatory grants help 
states in creating planning, 
monitoring, quality 
enhancement capacities through 
SHECs. The SHECs then create 
these capacities in institutions.  
- The SHEC Act enshrines the 
division of power between 
DoHE and SHEC, horizontally 
decentralizing authority over 
many aspects of higher 
education management 
- The resources are sufficient to 
create the required capacity 
through SHECs  
- Operation of SHECs will 
establish effective process to deal 
with problems of access, equity, 
and excellence in states 
- Legal changes will translate into 
actual transfer of authority from 
to the SHECs 
Affiliation 
reforms  
- Grants to create cluster 
university (INR 0.55 
billion) 
- Grants to convert 
autonomous colleges into 
universities (INR 1.1 
billion) 
(70% of funds for new 
infrastructure or 
upgrades, 30% for 










- States will create new 
universities out of colleges. 
New universities will reduce 
the burden on the old affiliating 
universities by taking some of 
their affiliated institutions. The 
responsibility of academic 
quality will be decentralized 
horizontally from a few state 
universities to many state 
universities. This will improve 
each university’s ability to 
guide affiliated colleges and  
support higher quality in the 
state. 
- Willingness of colleges to 
participate in the conversion has 
not been tested, particularly for 
Cluster Universities  
- States will bear the cost of 
technical capacity building, 
investment in faculty recruitment, 









Policy design Type of Tool Causal Logic Assumptions 




- Infrastructure grants for 
autonomous colleges are 
larger (INR 50 million) 
(70% of funds for new 
infrastructure or 
upgrades, 30% for 















- More administrative and 
financial freedom will allow 
universities to be more goal-
oriented, agile, and flexible. 
They will be better at 
improving access, equity, and 
quality.  
 
- Grants will promote more 
colleges to apply for autonomy. 
Going through this process will 
improve the quality of 
institutions by building self-
assessment and quality 
assurance capacities. 
- States will undertake the legal 
actions, change in administrative 
rules, and change in attitudes 
required to ensure that 
universities operate without 
DoHE’s or political intervention  
 
-The tool assumes that attaining 
autonomous states has a positive 
effect on quality. This assumption 




Accreditation scores used 
to prioritize:  
- Infrastructure grants to 
universities (INR 200 
million)  
- Infrastructure grants to 
colleges (INR 20 
million)  
- Grants for research and 
development to 








- Grants will incentivize 
unaccredited institutions to get 
accredited and achieve the 
target of 100% accreditation. 
Accredited institutions will 
strive to improve their scores.   
- Accreditation decentralizes 
and devolves the responsibility 
of quality assurance from the 
university and DoHE to other 
external agencies 
- Assumes national accreditation 
agencies will have the capacity to 
fairly assess all institutions  
- The accreditation process 
improves quality of higher 












Policy design Type of Tool Causal Logic Assumptions 











Vertical decentralization of 
academic decisions to the 
individual faculty and 
curricular choice to students 
will foster an academic system 
that is more responsive to the 
needs of the students as well as 
an increasingly interdisciplinary 
labor market. This is a broadly 
defined pre-requisite without 
any specific plans for 
enforcement, hence it is not a 
mandate.  
- The assumption that the 
adoption of academic and 
examination reforms will 
improve quality has not been 
tested 
- Assumption that SHECs will 
assist states and institutions in 
interpreting and implementing the 








State Higher Education Council (SHEC) Reforms  
SHECs address two main problems at the state level. 1) States don’t plan systematically 
for higher education expansion and development despite having a centralized system (under 
Departments of Higher Education) 2) States have poor technical capacity to manage and 
implement reforms in the sector. NHEM’s vision document echoes that “it is necessary to create 
SHEC as a body that is at an arm’s length from the state as well as center, synergizes their 
resources and fulfills [these] functions of planning, monitoring, quality control and coordination 
at the state level”. NHEM also argues that DoHEs control over higher education management 
limits the development of institutional capacity to implement critical reforms in states, “in states 
where there are no such councils [SHECs], the decisions about policy and planning are taken at 
level of bureaucrats or political executive, with no or little representation from academia. 
Consequently, the entire approach reeks of favoritism, ad-hoc decision making and myopic 
perspectives” (MHRD, 2013b, p. 64).  
Policy Instruments. Creation of SHECs was first discussed in the National Education 
Policy (NPE) of 1986.43 NHEM revisited it as a policy solution. The creation of SHECs is a 
prerequisite for participation in NHEM (NHEM, 2013, p. 86). That is, creating SHECs through 
Acts of state legislature is a mandate (not always enforced).  
This policy uses two tools and logics to realize its goals. The system-changing logic 
suggests that SHECs will be autonomous bodies “at an arm’s length from state government” that 
will have legal authority to undertake a range of planning and quality improvement processes for 
 
43
 From 1986 to 2009, only seven states created SHECs. Further, World bank’s comparative study on their 
functioning suggested that existing SHECs were only performing academic and advisory functions. They were not 
involved in planning activities (Larsen et al., 2014). Larsen et al., (2014) concluded that compared to councils of 




all institutions in the state (NHEM, 2013, p. 149). This logic is supported through the policy’s 
‘mandate’ to create a legislative basis for SHECs existence and for the division of powers 
between the DoHE and SHECs. In the next chapter, I revisit both these logics to understand how 
SHEC reforms have been implemented in the states.  
The capacity-building logic (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987) is supported by preparatory 
grants given under NHEM (INR 100 million). They can be used to make initial investments in 
the Councils (NHEM, 2013b, 2018). These funds support hiring of new staff, equipment, office 
premises, etc. (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). This logic dictates that investments in creating the 
SHECs will build technical and institutional capacity in states to support and implement higher 
education reforms over a long period of time (NHEM, 2013, p. 71, 86). NHEM’s policy design 
also supports capacity-building by promoting the appointment of academic members and leaders 
in SHECs. This gives SHECs access to technical expertise, distance from DoHEs, and the 
process of appointing members does not become politicized.  
Theory of Change. I suggest that the processes triggered by SHECs can be most aptly 
described as horizontal44 decentralization of the higher education management out of the hands 
of DoHEs (Mcginn & Welsh, 1999). The establishment of similar provincial councils in China 
are widely characterized as vertical and horizontal decentralization of power (Larsen, Linden, 
Cheong, Kumar, & Mishra, 2014, p. 34; Mok, 2002). The policy instruments are designed to 
support this decentralization by creating SHECs and giving them resources. In turn, the SHECs 
will “guide the entire transformative process” of reform in the state (NHEM, 2013, p.XVIII).  
 
44
 Horizontal decentralization is when the state diffuses powers from one central authority to multiple organizations, 




Figure 3 illustrates this change in Indian states. The left panel approximates the higher 
education systems of many states in India before the introduction of NHEM in 2013. The DoHE 
ratifies decisions regarding hiring their leadership and faculty; getting approvals for 
expenditures, raising funds, undertaking programmatic expansions, and dealing with retirements 
or transfers of their employees are taken by the DoHE (NHEM, 2013, p. 73). Functions such as 
strategic planning, performance monitoring, quality assurance, are not performed or ineffectively 
performed if the DoHE’s capacity is poor or limited. Dashed lines show DoHE’s indirect control 
over state public universities and public colleges. 
 
 
Figure 3. State Higher Education Ecosystem: With and Without SHECs 
 
The right panel depicts the shift after SHEC reforms are implemented. Firstly, the 
number of functions in the ecosystem increases as SHECs lead planning, monitoring and 
advisory functions for the state, universities, and colleges. Secondly, the authority to undertake 
these functions shift to SHEC, shown in the figure through dashed lines. Practically, it translates 
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into fewer dependencies on the state government for small and large financial, administrative, 
and academic decisions (Malik, 2020). This should increase the autonomy and speed of decision 
making in the state. Additionally, periodic activities like planning and monitoring will give better 
direction to investments in higher education. SHEC would also lead the process of implementing 
affiliation reforms, academic and administrative reforms, and governance reforms that promote 
vertical decentralization of power to universities and colleges (NHEM, 2013, p. 71, 86). 
Ultimately, SHECs are supposed to support and lead a higher education system that can provide 
equitable access to high quality education to a larger number of students in states.  
Clarity of Policy Instruments and Assumptions. NHEM treats SHEC reforms as a 
‘non-negotiable prerequisite’ (NHEM, 2013, p. 86). NHEM guidelines specify the membership 
and responsibilities of SHECs to ensure that the right type of capacity-building and system-
changing processes are triggered through SHECs. The operation of these tools is dependent on 
assumptions about how states and institutions will act. I deduce the assumption underlying the 
policy instruments. The first is that the operation of SHECs will establish an effective process to 
deal with problems of access, equity, and excellence in states. Though not explicitly tested, this 
seems to be a reasonable assumption.  
Second major assumption is that legal changes through SHECs Acts will translate into 
actual transfer of authority from the state Departments of Higher Education (DoHE’s) to the 
SHECs. That is, the mandate created by the federal government will be followed in states. This 
assumption can be challenged on a few grounds. The guidelines contain too many specific details 
about membership and responsibilities that are difficult to monitor. For instance, one provision 
suggests that SHECs should have 15-25 members, each with a term of 6 years and a third of the 
council retires every two years (NHEM, 2013, p. 149). Presumably, this allows the SHEC to 
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remain functional between changes in administrations and prevents partisan capture of the 
institution.45 Even if states do create Acts according to NHEM guidelines, it is not clear how the 
federal government is going to monitor the implementation of such aspects of the law (examples 
of other specific provisions of SHEC guidelines are available in Appendix C). As seen in 
Chapter 5, tracking the division of responsibilities becomes even more difficult than monitoring 
the membership of SHECs.  
The third assumption is that the preparatory grant investments will create sufficient 
technical capacity in states. The one-time grant is probably not enough to cover costs of setting 
up SHECs, let alone their continuous operation. This means the federal government counts on 
states to support SHECs. The assumptions underlying SHEC reforms are not stated or tested 
anywhere in the policy document. It appears that policy makers assumed that federal guidelines 
would be complied with. If these assumptions are inaccurate, it begs the question if there were 
other policy instruments that could have been used to supplement the current design? NHEM 
does not answer this question either.  
Affiliation Reforms 
The academic centralization created by large-scale affiliation and its ineffectiveness as a 
quality assurance mechanism has been identified as an important stumbling block in efforts to 
improve higher education quality improvement in India (Ravi et al., 2019; A. Singh, 2003).46 
NHEM summarizes the effects of the affiliation system as follows (p. 68), “the relationship 
 
45
 This principle is followed in the upper house of India’s Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. It ensures that non-elected 
bodies continue to function irrespective of change of government and delays in appointments.  
46
 In this system, degree granting authority is limited to universities while colleges are centers for undergraduate 
teaching (World Bank, 2011). Consequently, all colleges must be affiliated with a public university. University 
Academic Councils approve the types of programs that are offered in colleges and the curriculum for the programs 
(Raza, 2009; Zachariah, 1993). Any changes in the program or courses must go through bureaucratic channels for 
university (and in some cases DoHE) approval. Additionally, the universities are in-charge of designing and grading 
examinations and processing degrees for all the undergraduate students they enroll (World Bank, 2011). 
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between state university and affiliated colleges is one of administration – affiliation, course 
recognition, syllabus prescription, and examination. The university departments as a source of 
academic strengthening of college teachers, are generally very weak and unstructured”. 
Initially designed as a system of controlling quality, affiliation has failed at the scale to 
which it has grown. States universities have grown to have anywhere between 40 to 700 
affiliated colleges and up to 300,000 students (NHEM, 2013, p. 67). At this scale, universities 
are limited to designing standardized assessments that can be reliably administered and evaluated 
for thousands of students (NHEM, 2013, p. 68). The university cannot monitor each affiliated 
college, so they use the same university-level assessments to prevent malfeasance. As a result, 
the space for curricular and teaching innovation by undergraduate faculty is stifled. Affiliation 
system also creates an immense administrative burden for universities (Soneri, 1990, p.7). Thus, 
the practice of affiliation at a large scale prevents any type of academic decentralization and 
quality-improvement measures for curriculum or assessment. Details about the affiliation system 
are included in Appendix D.   
Policy instrument. NHEM has two funding components and reform guidelines that 
support affiliation reforms. Given the fact that the federal government is making a financial 
investment in states to improve their long-term capacity to manage colleges, I treat this 
combination as a capacity-building tool rather than an inducement (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). 
Both funding components combine with the affiliation reform guidelines and apply the same 
logic. They invest in states to create new institutions that should reduce the affiliation burden of 
existing universities (NHEM, 2013, p. 111). The investments are made in converting existing 
autonomous colleges into universities (INR 1.1 billion), or for converting a cluster of accredited 
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colleges into a university (INR 0.55 billion) (NHEM, 2013, p. 89).47 NHEM does mention that 
universities should affiliate no more than 100 colleges (NHEM, 2013, p. 111). However, the 
policy does not include a mandate that enforces this limit, it appears to be symbolic in nature. 
It is important to note that simply reducing the scale of affiliation does not immediately 
resolve the problems stemming from it.  
Theory of change. The theory of change for both policy instruments applied by NHEM 
is based on the same principle. Systemic change in the scale of affiliation can fundamentally 
change academic quality assurance capacity of the whole system. Reducing the size of the 
university and including more college faculty and principals in on University Academic Councils 
will make the curriculum design more flexible (Gajendragadkar Committee, 1971; UGC, 2011b). 
Smaller universities can manage decentralized assessments that are linked more closely with 
undergraduate teaching, this would improve quality of instruction as well (NHEM, 2013, p 68). 
Larger number of small universities will create a more diversified higher education market with 
more players in competition (NHEM, 2013, p 68). (For details on policy solutions, see Appendix 
D) 
Using existing colleges for the conversion reduces the burden on their existing affiliating 
university. It also minimizes the need for new appointments. Converting autonomous colleges 
 
47
 The University Grants Commission has granted ‘autonomous’ status to colleges with proven ‘high quality’ since 
late 1980s. This status gives colleges greater autonomy over their curriculum and assessment. NHEM suggests that 
such colleges ca be converted into universities.  
Another solution suggests that four to six well-established colleges within a few miles of each other can pool 
resources and faculty to operate as a cluster university. This reduces the burden on the affiliating university, 
minimizes the need for new appointments, and including multiple colleges maintains a sense of collective 
accountability (UGC, 2011b; Yash Pal Committee, 2009). Kerala experimented with the idea of cluster universities 
in late 2000s and started with three voluntary clusters but were not successful in establishing any universities 
(Tharakan, 2017). 
NHEM proposed investing in completely new universities in states in early versions (NHEM, 2013b). However, it 
was removed by the time the funding guidelines were issued in December 2013 (NHEM, 2013c). Federal policy 
makers may have decided that the time and investments required to start a new university are higher than converting 
college into universities. 
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capitalizes on the existing high-quality institutions and promotes them to expand. Cluster 
universities rely on the collective sense of accountability of multiple colleges to create robust 
new institutions. This formulation of NHEMs instruments and theory of change says little about 
the academic freedom and powers of colleges that do not become autonomous and remain in 
relatively large universities.  
Clarity of Policy instruments and Assumptions. In principle, NHEM’s affiliation 
reforms solve many critical issues in higher education. However, I argue that some of the 
assumptions about functioning of autonomous and cluster universities have not been tested.  
Firstly, NHEM assumes that many clusters of colleges and autonomous colleges will be 
eager to participate in the program to convert into universities. However, it is possible that 
institutional inertia may prevent many colleges from wanting to become universities. Few 
colleges have applied and successfully received autonomy since 1986. There were only 414 such 
colleges (out of 34,000) in the country before NHEM was launched (MHRD, 2013, p 71). 
Further, UGC’s scheme on cluster colleges did not end up establishing any operational 
universities (Tharakan, 2017). NHEM’s policy instruments include much larger financial 
incentives than previous policies, but this may still not be enough to entice institutions to 
participate. NHEM assumes that the funds being offered will be enough to incentivize states to 
support new institutions. However, the policy also acknowledges that states are reluctant to 
create future payroll burdens for themselves (NHEM, 2013, p 42). In this case, the assumptions 
about states’ interest would be tested during implementation.  
Secondly, NHEM’s policy instruments are calibrated such that federal funds can only be 
spent on new construction, renovation, or procuring equipment (NHEM, 2018, p. 48). There are 
no expenditure heads supporting organizational capacity changes, upgradation of faculty 
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knowledge, and creation of a large cadre of educational administrators that would be necessary 
to smoothly handle this type of academic decentralization in almost every state university in the 
country.  NHEM’s affiliation reforms assume that states have the technical capacity and financial 
resources to manage the complicated transitional processes of converting colleges into 
universities. The tool calibration does not support all aspects necessary to achieve the goals of 
creating new institutions. Lastly, NHEM fails to set any specific targets for the states. The limit 
of 100 colleges for each university is only symbolic, it is not implemented as a mandate. 
Autonomy and Governance Reforms  
Even though calls for autonomy date back to the 1960s, the Indian state higher education 
system is marked by strong financial and administrative centralization (Carnoy & Dossani, 
2013). The concept of autonomy in higher education takes on many hues in India, in this section 
it implies two broad issues, 1) excessive influence of DoHEs in the operational and strategic 
management of state universities, 2) lack of academic autonomy of affiliated colleges. NHEM 
(2013) views the principle of autonomy as, “broadly emphasizing the freedom of each institution 
to function in order to achieve academic excellence and to administer the institution through its 
own rules and regulations” (p. 93).  
NHEM also discusses effects of poor university governance structures that leave 
universities political or bureaucratic influence. NHEM notes that the “major sectoral problem of 
governance is that the state governments micromanage universities.” (NHEM, 2013a, pp. 114).  
When the state interferes with universities, they become more bureaucratic and less academically 
oriented (Biswas & Prakash, 2005; Soneri, 1990). It translates into political interference in 
university leadership, faculty, and staff appointments that affects university operations; hampers 
financial autonomy; and inhibits research and curriculum development (Biswas & Prakash, 2005; 
121 
 
Gajendragadkar Committee, 1971; MHRD, 1992; National Knowledge Commission, 2009; 
Soneri, 1990; Yash Pal Committee, 2009). Documentary analysis suggests that NHEM and most 
previous commission reports are primarily concerned with university autonomy and 
comparatively little has been written about the academic autonomy of individual faculty in 
affiliated colleges.48 The reports presume that the ‘autonomous’ status granted by the UGC 
guarantees all required types of autonomy for a college.  
Policy instruments. NHEM uses hortatory tools and inducements to promote autonomy 
in states. NHEM includes multiple examples of the practices and processes that contribute 
towards the decentralization of powers from the state to the universities (NHEM, 2013a, pp. 91-
98). The policy details the meaning of administrative, financial, and academic autonomy of 
universities. It also suggests a slew of ‘sectoral and institutional governance reforms’ (pp. 113-
116) that give universities more freedom from the DoHE and depoliticizes appointments of 
university leadership. However, NHEM does not have any funds or enforceable mandates 
attached to these reforms. The policy does not indicate which reform solutions on the list are 
mandatory. I conclude that NHEM intends to impart a message regarding university autonomy 
rather than prompting specific action in states.  
The policy and the interviewees (F1, F2) did not clarify why other instruments like 
inducements or system-changing tools were not employed to ensure these reforms were 
implemented in states. NHEM does acknowledge that ensuring autonomy would require 
complicated decisions in states like revising university acts, streamlining recruitment processes, 
changing membership of university governing bodies, changing institutional leaders, and altering 
 
48
 This is explained, at least in some part, by the fact that affiliated colleges truly grew in numbers only after mid-
1980s. Till then, most Indian state universities were reasonably sized. Presumably, the question of academic 
autonomy of colleges was not as salient at the time. 
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perceptions of politicians and civil servants about universities (p. 96). Perhaps the policy makers 
recognized that NHEM could not muster the financial resources or political support to implement 
such an extensive reform agenda in all states and included the concept of university autonomy 
for its symbolic effect.  
The approach for supporting autonomy of colleges is relatively direct. NHEM employs 
inducements with regards to college autonomy. The funding component of infrastructure grants 
offers more funds to autonomous colleges (INR 50 million) than to regular colleges (INR 20 
million) (NHEM, 2018). As a result, colleges have a direct incentive to apply for autonomy with 
their affiliating university and UGC. However, in choosing to induce this behavior, the broader 
solutions like developing financial, administrative, and governance structures of colleges get 
ignored.  
Theory of change. The discussion about university autonomy, sectoral governance, and 
institutional governance reforms in NHEM paints the picture of an entrepreneurial university 
(Clark, 1998; NHEM, 2013a, pp. 91-98). The reform prescriptions vertically decentralize many 
powers from the DoHE to the universities. The resulting academic, financial, and administrative 
independence should make state universities more agile, goal-oriented, and self-directing. Such 
universities can engage with more innovations and experimentation for quality improvement; 
improve societal relevance of teaching and research; ensure deeper involvement of teachers in 
the entire governance system; increase the scope for educational reforms; and speedy 
implementation of programs (Kanti Biswas Committee, 2009, p. 22). This theory of change does 
connect university autonomy with NHEM’s distal goals of improvement in access, equity, and 
quality. However, the hortatory tools employed in NHEM have limited power of persuasion. 
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They may not be enough to pull together the legislative, political, and bureaucratic consensus 
required to implement decentralization from the state to the university.  
The theory of change underlying college autonomy is similar. Greater academic and 
operational flexibility for colleges is expected to improve the quality of undergraduate education. 
Creating more “autonomous” colleges through UGC has been a constantly repeated policy option 
(Biswas & Prakash, 2005; Kothari Commission, 1966; MHRD, 1986; Soneri, 1990; Yash Pal 
Committee, 2009). NHEM assumes that more autonomous colleges would mean better overall 
quality of higher education in the state. Unlike university autonomy which is expansive and 
allows universities many more powers, college autonomy is viewed only in terms of UGC’s 
autonomous status.  
Clarity of policy instruments and assumptions. The inducements for more colleges to 
apply for autonomy are straightforward. A key assumption is that this status actually leads to 
improvements in academic quality. In theory, an autonomous college has almost total freedom to 
make curricular changes, hold examinations, and determine its program offerings. This sort of 
flexibility is supposed to improve the quality of teaching and learning. However, evidence on the 
quality of autonomous colleges is not unanimous. Originally, autonomous colleges were to have 
significant academic autonomy to design courses and syllabi, ability to determine their own 
admission policies, and conduct assessments (UGC, 2004). In practice, colleges follow 
university and UGC guidelines for curriculum and do not deviate more than 20% from the 
syllabus of their affiliating university (A1, B4).  Further, studies on autonomous colleges also 
show that they do not follow a significantly different curricular framework than the one 
suggested by affiliating universities (Kulavelil et al., 2018). Thus, NHEM’s policy instrument 
may be effective at encouraging colleges to apply for autonomy, its assumption about the 
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relationship between autonomy and improvements in quality can be questioned. (See Appendix 
E for more details on challenges in fostering institutional autonomy). 
Accreditation Reforms 
Accreditation reforms address the problem of poor quality-assurance in the state higher 
education system. As discussed in previous sections, the affiliation system weakens the academic 
quality assurance in state universities and their affiliated colleges. The university is primarily 
concerned with conducting assessments and adequate supervision of the teaching and learning in 
affiliated institutions is lacking (NHEM, 2013a, p. XV). In addition to this, DoHE’s concentrate 
on adherence to administrative and financial rules rather than tracking processes and outputs at 
universities and colleges (NHEM, 2013a, p. 114). This results in a system that does not truly 
hold universities and colleges accountable for improving internal processes or their outcomes.  
NHEM also discusses the ineffectiveness of regulators like UGC and DoHEs in quality 
assurance, “The interactions between institutions and regulatory bodies are cumbersome and do 
not promote expansion of quality institutions. The quality assurance mechanisms in the sector are 
weak… financial planning and allocations are not related to performance” (NHEM, 2013a, p.  
114). India did try to approach quality through accreditation.49 The National Assessment and 
Accreditation Council was established in 1994. Even in 2012, 70% of universities and 85% of 
colleges in states were unaccredited (NHEM, 2013a, p. 41). It is not surprising that a study on 
autonomy and accountability in World Bank client countries found that Indian public and private 
higher education institutions have far less autonomy as well as accountability than institutions in 
 
49
 National Education Policy of 1986 introduced voluntary accreditation as a means of ensuring that autonomy 
would be balanced by accountability measures ((MHRD, 1986)Biswas & Prakash, 2005; National Knowledge 
Commission, 2009; Yash Pal Committee, 2009). However, accreditation was never linked to any secondary 
incentives (such as federal or state funding) which may have led to limited participation in the process (Raza, 2009). 
Compulsory accreditation became a part of the policy solutions only in early 2010s when UGC and NHEM both 
suggested it. UGC declared that no unaccredited institutions could receive funds through it after 2022. 
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Chile, China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, etc. (Raza, 2009). NHEM 
attempts to address this problem of poor internal and external quality assurance systems mainly 
through accreditation.  
Policy instrument. The main policy instrument used for promoting quality assurance are 
inducements. The accreditation scores of colleges and universities are used as criteria in 
evaluating their proposals for infrastructure grants (INR 20 million for colleges and 200 million 
for universities), research grants (INR 500 million), etc. These criteria are clearly defined in 
NHEM’s guidelines. For instance, in 2018 NHEM gave 20% weightage to accreditation criteria 
for assessing proposals for grants to autonomous colleges (NHEM, 2018, p. 92).  
NHEM’s vision document also mentions other processes of internal quality assurance 
that have been discussed in previous policies. This includes accountability measures like regular 
internal academic audits and institutional bodies like Internal Quality Assurance Cell 
(Gajendragadkar Committee, 1971; NHEM, 2013a, p. 93; Soneri, 1990) to ensure that colleges 
and universities follow standards laid down by the state and UGC. However, there are no policy 
instruments that specifically include these aspects as evaluation criteria, etc.  
Theory of change and assumptions. The assumptions underlying inducements for 
accreditation are clear. Firstly, NHEM assumes that more colleges and universities will apply for 
accreditation to become eligible or compete for NHEM funds. Secondly, the policy is designed 
on the belief that the accreditation process can assess quality and institutes processes for future 
improvements in quality. Specifically, the policy says that,  
“Assessment and accreditation in higher education, through transparent and informed 
external review process, are effective means of quality assurance in higher education. 
These mechanisms provide a common frame of reference for students and others to 
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obtain credible information on academic quality across institutions.” (NHEM, 2013a, p. 
110).  
At the time of the policy’s formulation, only the National Assessment and Accreditation 
Council and National Board of Accreditation could accredit institutions. These institutions have 
limited capacity to process accreditation applications (Glendinning et al., 2019) and are 
susceptible to corruption (Tierney & Sabharwal, 2017). Thus, it is possible that relying heavily 
on the process of accreditation by external bodies can create unintended consequences. The 
design of policy tools also ends up focusing on accreditation as the sole approach to quality 
assurance. This overshadows the development of broader quality assurance and accountability 
systems that involve multiple actors and measures of quality.  
Academic and Examination Reforms 
Academic and examination reforms relate to several practices at the heart of the teaching 
and learning process in state universities (NHEM, 2013b). The reforms address a few basic 
issues: who chooses what to study, who teaches and evaluates students, when and how are 
students evaluated, and who decides what is taught?  
Discussions regarding quality concerns stemming from examination-based rigid 
academic systems and lack of inter-disciplinary training are almost as old as the UGC (Bloom, 
1961; Zachariah, 1993). Due to the affiliation system followed by state universities, curriculum 
design and evaluation are not done by faculty in charge of undergraduate teaching. The process 
of syllabus upgradation at universities involves a large bureaucracy which often leads to delays 
and only small alterations to syllabi that everyone can agree on (NHEM, 2013a, p. 68). As a 
result, there is little flexibility in teaching methods or flexibility in assessment according to 
student needs. Indian universities largely follow the tradition of annual summative evaluations 
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using written examinations conducted by universities (Zachariah, 1993). This affects the 
teaching and learning process throughout the academic year by placing a disproportionate 
amount of student and instructor focus on succeeding in the annual evaluation. 
The annual external examination system also promotes poor learning behavior amongst 
students. For instance, the syllabus does not change often and there are a predictably limited 
number of ways in which thousands of students can be tested on their knowledge of a topic 
(NHEM, 2013a, p.123). Students can succeed in exams by limiting preparation to past question 
papers rather than the whole syllabus. The annual system also reduces academic flexibility 
because it only allows aggregation of topics into a subject or course over a year, rather than three 
or four months (Hrdayakumari, 2012). This system cannot support student choice as well, 
because of lack of variation between choices and logistical challenges of multiple offering year-
long courses. Thus, the centralization of curricular and assessment decisions combined with the 
pressures created by large scale eventually led to poorer quality teaching and learning processes.  
Policy instruments. NHEM basically suggests three sets of solutions to the vast 
problems of academic centralization and bureaucratization. The use of a semester system rather 
than annual system, adoption of the choice-based credits system (CBCS) for designing degree 
programs rather than an subject-based approach, and the use of 25%-40% internal assessments in 
undergraduate and graduate education (NHEM, 2013a, p. 118, 119, 123).50 NHEM includes 
academic and examination reforms amongst the list of pre-requisite reforms (NHEM, 2013a, p. 
118-125). However, the policy does not suggest that this would be enforced as a mandate. The 
policy’s guidelines require states and institutions to disclose the implementation of choice-based 
credit reforms and semester system as binary variables. Other reforms in examination systems 
 
50
 Internal assessments are done by the faculty teaching a course, the examinations by the university are termed as 
external assessments.  
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and internal assessments are not tracked (NHEM, 2013c, 2018). Thus, I categorize academic and 
examination reforms included in NHEM as hortatory tools. The federal government wants to 
promote these practices in states. These reforms can run into the same enforceability challenges 
as other hortatory tools.  
Theory of change. Over the years, the UGC and Association of Indian Universities have 
been at the forefront of promoting examination and academic reforms.51 CBCS system, internal 
evaluation, and semester system have been promoted repeatedly by the UGC and committees 
concerned with higher education quality (National Knowledge Commission, 2009; UGC, 1973, 
2009; Yash Pal Committee, 2009). These reforms are discussed in NHEM as obvious and 
commonly accepted solutions to the problems of academic centralization. The policy only details 
the three solutions, it does not provide any justification or evidence on their efficacy (NHEM, 
2013a, p. 118-125). It is possible that the policy makers themselves do not question the 
relationship between the reforms and improvements in education quality.  
In the absence of explanation in NHEM, I use previous policy reports to understand the 
theory of change applied by the three solutions.52 A choice-based credit system views degrees in 
terms of credit hours split between required and choice-based credit hours instead of using a 
fixed number and sequence of compulsory and optional ‘papers’ (Hrdayakumari, 2012). The 
resulting degree requirements allow students more choice in terms of the time and combination 
of courses they choose, ability to repeat failed courses without repeating all courses of a 
 
51
 UGC’s most extensive examination of the issues and suggested reforms is included in their 1973 and 2009 reports 
(UGC, 1973, 2009). Zachariah (1993) notes that UGC signficattly retreated from its 1973 plan of amibitious 
academic reforms in the decades that followed and narrowed down its recomendations to a few reform packages. 
52
 Indian scholars and policy makers usually use ‘Western universities’ or Indian technical universities as the 
exemplars for academic management practices (Zachariah, 1993). The solutions are practices ascribed to high 
quality institutions. They are supposed to replicate some features of reference institutions like higher academic 
autonomy for faculty, wider curricular choice for students, and agile design of degree programs. In other words, they 
aim to decentralize more academic agency to faculty and students. 
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semester, mobility between institutions, etc. (Hrdayakumari, 2012). Adoption of a semester 
system instead of annual system dovetails with CBCS reforms. It breaks the curriculum into 
smaller units and allows more variations between required and choice-based coursework. 
Semester end assessments also aid in continuous evaluation of students. Lastly, greater share of 
internal examinations gives teaching faculty the ability to assess students and modify teaching 
practices accordingly (Hrdayakumari, 2012). The implementation of these reforms is supposed to 
create a more responsive and agile academic system that can impart relevant skills and 
knowledge to students (UGC, 2009).  
Tool clarity and assumptions. NHEM’s prescription for academic and examination 
reforms run into several pages, mainly because these reforms are not based on one or two actions 
in states and institutions. Their adoption requires across a number of institutional processes at 
universities and affiliated colleges. As a result, the hortatory tools are not clearly defined. 
Additionally, the policy assumes that federal proclamations will be sufficient for states to 
undertake these reforms. However, there are some obvious challenges in implementing this 
reform. The policy does not address if faculty have the technical capacity to undertake 
assessments and make pedagogical choices. Colleges would need the physical and academic 
capacity to overhaul curricula, offer new course choices, conduct internal assessments, etc. 
NHEM does not assign resources for the extensive support needed for the reforms.  
An explicit, systematic policy design consciously links policy problems to policy goals 
and policy goals to policy instruments that will realize them.  In considering a policy’s design, 
“the basic question is the extent to which designs emerge from conscious attempts to find a 
solution, considering a range of options, to processes based on routine, path dependence, and 
simple borrowing of interventions” (Peters, 2018). The above discussion shows that NHEM does 
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not have a cohesive policy design. Instead, the policy borrows from prior policy solutions 
without attempting to think through how they fit together and address policy goals. These 
findings foreshadow some of the implementation challenges that the policy is likely to face. I 
revisit the problem of poor design in the Conclusion and consider some explanations for it. 
 
A Unifying Theory of Change? 
Analysis of NHEM’s reforms reveals a cohesive conceptual thread that ties them 
together. However, this logic or theory is not explicitly discussed in the policy. All the reforms 
follow the logic that decentralization of higher education governance and management in states 
will lead to achievement of the policy’s distal goals. Analytically, the use of this concept clarifies 
the theory of change underlying the reforms. It also helps in characterizing the type of challenges 
that can appear during implementation: lack of political support and technical capacity.  
Horizontal and vertical decentralization can be used to improve the efficiency of service 
delivery (Brillantes, 2004; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Rondinelli et al., 1983). Horizontal 
decentralization refers to transfer or sharing of power between organizations or agencies that 
work in parallel. Another type, vertical decentralization, involves redistribution of control 
between various geographical levels like federal, state, district and institutional level (Bray & 
Mukundan, 2003). Various rationales justify decentralization of control as a remedy for problems 
observed in public systems. This includes greater efficiency due to limited bureaucracy, greater 
responsiveness to local demands, etc. (Weiler, 1990). I argue that vertical and horizontal 
decentralization frames all the NHEM reforms. The relationship between the reforms is 




Figure 4. Decentralization and NHEM Reforms 
 
Decentralization in state higher education systems implies more autonomy for the higher 
education sector to manage itself without government interference (Malik, 2017; Varghese & 
Malik, 2020). NHEM reforms support this in multiple ways. Firstly, SHECs devolve powers for 
sectoral planning and monitoring from the DoHE to an autonomous body. NHEM guidelines try 
to ensure the division of powers between the state and SHECs is clear. SHECs should be led by 
members of universities and colleges rather than politicians or bureaucrats. SHECs are also 
supposed to support implementation of other reforms in the institutions that lead to 
decentralization of financial, administrative, and academic autonomy to the institutions.  
The affiliation reforms are an important step in this direction. They deconcentrate 
academic decisions from a few state universities to multiple smaller universities. Implicit within 
this horizontal decentralization is the logic that smaller affiliating universities can give more 
academic freedom to each affiliated college. Autonomy and governance reforms give greater 
substantive and procedural autonomy for universities and colleges to take responsibility for their 
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own financial and administrative operations. Academic and examination reforms focus on 
decentralizing academic powers to faculty within universities and colleges. They also try to 
create a system that gives more choice to individual students. As many of these reforms 
essentially increase the freedom of operation of institutions, NHEM reforms to deconcentrate 
accountability responsibility through two means. Mandatory accreditation increases the 
involvement of external and autonomous organizations in assessing quality. The data and 
performance management systems developed by SHECs also hold institutions accountable for 
outcomes.  
NHEM does not directly frame SHECs and other reforms in terms of decentralization. It 
is not the policy’s espoused theory (Argyris, 1980; Argyris & Schon, 1974), but the discussion 
above shows that it is the theory-in-use. Further, reports commissioned over multiple decades 
such as the Kothari Commission Report, 1966; Gajendragadkar Committee Report, 1969; and 
Kanti Biswas Committee Report, 2005 have repeatedly noted the need for more decentralization 
in the state higher education systems. NHEM’s policy solutions are borrowed from 
recommendations of the same reports, thus they are likely to follow the logic of decentralization. 
Similar reforms in other Asian countries like Vietnam and China have also been characterized as 
decentralization measures (Mok, 2001; Tran, 2014). I use this characterization of NHEM reforms 
to inform the implementation analysis conducted in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to answer research questions about the nature of the policy making 
process and theory of action underlying NHEM. The discussion about factors leading to 
NHEM’s development show that the political and bureaucratic support for creating the policy 
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was the strongest determining factor in the policy’s development. MHRD played a crucial role in 
the development and ensured that NHEM was formulated within the timelines imposed by the 
XIIth Plan. MHRD acted as a gatekeeper through the policy formulation process, including and 
excluding federal and state-level stakeholders in the policy process. Due to the centralized policy 
making process and time constraints, the policy was not developed sequentially. It was created 
by combining MHRD’s funding plans with reform suggestions from older reports. Though the 
policy does not clearly articulate a theory of change, analysis of the reforms suggests that 
decentralization of higher education management is part of the policy’s approach towards state 
university systems.  
In this section, I explore two important observations about NHEM. The first is that 
NHEM has a weak relationship between the policy’s problems, goals, and instruments. I consider 
some explanations for this weak designedness. Chiefly, the limited time available for policy 
makers, their low technical capacity, and poor engagement with stakeholders explains this aspect 
of NHEM. Next, I analyze why NHEM’s theory-in-use of decentralization has not been espoused 
as its theory of change. I try to determine if it was a conscious or unconscious choice on the part 
of the policy makers. Lastly, I return to the larger theme of NHEM’s formulation process. I 
explore two alternate theories of policy formulation; the multiple streams approach (MSA) and 
the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) apply to NHEM. I find that while MSA captures the 
non-linear and non-rational process of NHEM’s development, it provides fewer conceptual tools 
for analyzing the participation of different actors and their effects on policy design. In 
comparison, ACF captures NHEM’s creation in relation to multiple federal and state actors. It 
provides a framework for analyzing the participation structure of the subsystem and the degree of 
134 
 
consensus required for policy making, both of which are important determinants of policy 
making in India.  
  
Designedness of NHEM  
One of themes that appears repeatedly across the three sections of the chapter is the lack 
of clarity in NHEM’s goals and its policy instruments. Specifically, the policy design does not 
clarify how the policy instruments relate to instrumental reform goals and how the instrument 
goals lead to the distal goals of access, equity, and excellence. Peters (2018) uses the term 
`designedness’ to capture the extent of ‘conscious cogitation and consideration’ of how the cause 
of the problem relates to the values, instruments and interventions in a policy. Policies can lie 
anywhere on the spectrum between full design to non-design. Much of the evidence discussed in 
the chapter illustrates how NHEM does not fall at the high end of the designedness spectrum.  
NHEM was created by borrowing problems and solutions from existing reports and 
layering them on to a funding framework aimed at expanding access. The addition of reform 
goals was not a result of an organic development of the policy solutions within the MHRD team 
to address specific problems. They did not stem from discussions with states and other 
stakeholders. This layering and borrowing of policies is part of the process of policy design 
(Howlett et al., 2015). Researchers argue that many policies are variants or remakes of older 
policies, few are absolutely new policy formulations (Carter, 2012; Hogwood & Peters, 1982). 
Policies are created by ‘layering’ new ideas on top of the old policies and ‘displacing’ others that 
do not work (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). In this process, policy makers need to be aware that the 
eventual policy design should connect the goals and the instruments. i.e., its designedness should 
remain high. Because policies can fail to achieve their goals when they lack design cohesion 
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(Sabatier, 1986). I argue that NHEM’s suffers from a low level of designedness because it 
borrows reform solutions without articulating their relationship with policy goals and policy 
instruments.  
The sources from where NHEM borrows are committee reports or older National 
Education Policies (1968, 1986, 1992). These documents usually provide an analysis of policy 
problems and a menu of options for addressing the problems. It is very important to note that in 
the case of NHEM, the policy solutions such as a switch to semester system, use of choice-based 
credit system, creation of SHECs, governance reforms, etc. are based on expert advice and 
observations of education systems in other countries. Empirical evidence supporting their 
efficacy in India is limited. For instance, recent evidence from engineering colleges in India 
shows that different attitudes towards institutional governance don’t necessarily translate into 
better learning outcomes for students (Loyalka et al., 2020). At the same time, such findings do 
not prove that whole-system reforms such as those suggested by NHEM will not have a positive 
effect on student learning or research outcomes. 
The policy solutions suggested in the committee reports do provide a model of causation 
based on vertical and horizontal decentralization that can be expected to have positive impacts on 
the higher education system in India (Linder & Peters, 1989). However, unlike federal policies or 
programs, they are not constrained by budgets, political concerns, implementation structures, 
timelines, etc. Thus, they do not present a model of instruments or model of evaluation of the 
policies. In other words, the solutions NHEM borrowed needed to be developed further before 
they could become effective policy instruments. Instruments that can lead to concrete actions in 
states that further NHEM’s goals in a measurable manner. The design of NHEM suggests that 
policy makers did not pay adequate attention to this crucial step.  
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The inattention can be explained by the time-constraints under which NHEM was 
created. It is possible that policy makers lacked the technical capacity to engage in policy 
analysis and design. Career-bureaucrats, the likes of which created NHEM, are not formally 
trained in policy designing (Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005). The federal policy making structure 
also lacks flexible means of inviting technical experts and formal channels of engagement with 
stakeholders (Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005). Further, a closed development process like NHEM 
also limits opportunities for other stakeholders to inspect the policy. This is often a safeguard 
against poor policy design. Engagement with federal stakeholders was done over a short period 
of time with a limited number of participants, given the scale of the policy. Even after the 
feedback was received, the concerns of state-level respondents were not adequately addressed in 
the policy’s design.  
The lack of consultation with state level stakeholders and a top-down policy making 
approach likely limited NHEM’s opportunities for building support for the policy in the states. 
Support from interest groups and implementers is needed to sustain a policy through the long 
phase of implementation (Bardach, 1977; Sabatier, 1986). Particularly when the policy aims for 
structural reforms in the state higher education system. This becomes even more critical because 
NHEM uses hortatory tools and instruments to target a portion of the systemic reforms needed 
for improvements in quality. The state’s interpretation of the reforms and motivation to 
implement them assumes greater significance (Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Without sustained 
engagement, this support and motivation will be weak.  
The lack of designedness of NHEM creates foreseeable challenges for the 
implementation of the policy. These effects are explored in greater detail in the next chapter. It 
also raises important questions about the policy making process. What about the policy making 
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in India or higher education policy making in India allows for a policy like NHEM to be created? 
How can important systemic reforms be developed and become a part of the policy agenda 
without being supported by thoroughly designed and tested policy solutions? Applying policy 
making theories will answer some of these questions. For now, I consider another key aspect of 
NHEM’s design.  
Theory-in-Use: Decentralization 
The analysis of NHEM’s policy design reveals that many of the reforms included in the 
policy decentralize the management and governance of the state higher education system. While 
decentralization is the theory-in-use behind NHEM, it is not the espoused theory for the policy 
(Argyris, 1980; Argyris & Schon, 1974). That is, NHEM’s reforms and expected actions in states 
are based on the logic of decentralization and its benefits. Yet the policy does not explicitly name 
the fundamental change that reforms are attempting to affect. I argue that the policy should 
clarify the espoused theory and examine some explanations for why NHEM does not already do 
so. 
NHEM promotes decentralization mainly through its reforms. They move the control 
from the state to autonomous coordinating bodies or to universities and colleges. The policy 
supports vertical and horizontal decentralization in states by promoting accreditation systems and 
outcome-based management as means of ensuring accountability. In fact, the use of norm-based 
funding, competition, and result orientation as guiding principles suggests a New Public 
Management approach to higher education governance (Denhardt & Catlaw, 2004; Neave & Van 
Vught, 1994). This supports a different world-view from the present centralized and bureaucratic 
approach to higher education management in Indian states (Chitnis & Altbach, 1993; Jayaram, 
2004).   
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Rational approaches to policy making suggest that policy problems, solutions, and 
instruments should be developed using a cogent theory of change that can play an important role 
in communicating the intent of the policy makers  (Linder & Peters, 1989; J. McLaughlin & 
Jordan, 2004; Peters, 2018). For NHEM, articulation of decentralization can help the policy in 
tying together reforms that appear to be stand-alone solutions. Without an explicit guiding 
principle regarding the distribution of authority, NHEM’s implementation can be based on a 
narrow interpretation of the reforms. This is an even more serious concern when the policy relies 
a lot on hortatory tools and the inducements target only a small portion of desirable actions in 
states. Importantly, articulating a common principle can underscore the need for reforms to be 
implemented together to activate the underlying mechanisms for improvements in access, equity, 
and excellence.53  
I consider a few possible explanations for NHEM having a theory-in-use but no espoused 
theory. The first possibility is that the policy makers never considered decentralization as a 
feature of all the reforms included in the policy. As the policy solutions were borrowed from 
previous policies and not developed organically, the inherent similarity in the reforms never 
surfaced (Linder & Peters, 1984). This view is supported by the fact that all the reform 
prescriptions in the policy do not uniformly promote decentralization. For instance, much of the 
discussion about operational and academic autonomy centers around universities and the same 
issues are ignored at the level of affiliated colleges. The limited designedness of the policy also 
indicates that even after the solutions were chosen, the policy makers did not engage in formal 
policy design processes that would reveal these themes. It is unlikely that policy makers were 
 
53
 For instance, greater use internal assessments as a part of examination reforms depends a lot on the extent of 
academic freedom and autonomy enjoyed by undergraduate faculty in colleges. Internal assessments have less value 
if 100% of the curriculum is decided by the university. This, in turn, is dependent on the scale of the affiliating 
university and academic decentralization that it implements.  
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completely unaware of decentralization as a concept. Fiscal, administrative, and political 
decentralization to rural and district levels large in Indian public administration (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2006). It is more likely that policy makers do not associate the concept of 
decentralization with governance and management of sectors such as higher education. 
The other possible explanation is that the lack of articulation was a conscious choice 
made by policy makers. Policy makers can choose to be ambiguous about a policy’s underlying 
values and theories (Stone, 2012, p. 181). It helps to gather the support for the policy from a 
wider group of actors. More importantly, it avoids political conflict about the policy’s 
fundamental nature. In the case of NHEM, suggesting greater decentralization at the state level 
directly affects the powers and influence of the state governments. Feedback from the regional 
consultations shows that many DoHEs were concerned that NHEM was giving away many of 
their powers to SHECs. Openly stating the idea of decentralization may have garnered even more 
attention and conflict at the state level and jeopardized the policy.   
Additionally, NHEM was created as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS) and 
deliberately kept away from the UGC. With this move, the MHRD concentrated even power in 
its own hands and further centralized control over higher education. It is possible that policy 
makers did not want to draw attention to the contradiction in their own approach, that of 
promoting decentralization at the state level while doing the opposite at the federal level. 
Interviews on the policy’s implementation show that states such as Kerala have been wary of 
federal interference in state higher education. They have noted and criticized the concentration of 
power in the hands of the state at the federal level (A3, A15).  
The lack of an espoused theory in the form of decentralization appears to be a political 
tactic. However, it is also possible that it stems from a poor understanding of the reforms 
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themselves. It is also possible that due to the short time frame in which the policy was created for 
fear of missing the window of opportunity, the policy makers did not have the time to articulate 
the espoused theory clearly. In either case, it speaks to the nature of the policy making process 
and the policy environment in which MHRD operates. The next analyzes how policy formulation 
theories explain these considerations as a part of NHEM’s policy making process.  
NHEM’s Formulation 
Policy theories provide different models to explain the when, how, and who of policy 
creation. Here I consider whether the multiple streams approach (J. W. Kingdon, 1984; 
Zahariadis, 2007) or the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 
Sabatier & Weible, 2007) best explains the process of NHEM’s formulation. I pay particular 
attention to the applicability of the policy theories to the specific context of higher education 
policy making in India and their ability to explain the timing, the formulation process, and the 
design of the policy. 
The multiple streams approach aptly captures the non-linear nature of NHEM’s creation. 
Issues regarding state universities were already a part of the policy problems stream and had 
been highlighted previously. Aspects of the problem definition such as the indicators and the 
framing of the structural issues in the states had been used in XIth Plan, Yash Pal Committee 
(2009) and the National Knowledge Commission (2009). The reform solutions were also part of 
the `policy primeval soup’, discussed in various forms in prior reports by committees and the 
UGC (Kingdon, 2011, p.116). The policy solutions had been tried in different venues, as part of 
the National Education Policies, as UGC’s guidelines on specific issues, and as unsuccessful 
legislations. Thus, the reforms were policy solutions in search of a problem to solve and a policy 
window to get on the government-attention agenda. Though NHEM, the solutions had a chance 
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to be part of a CSS. This formulation could finally provide financial resources to the policy 
solutions.  
NHEM was created when the bureaucrats in MHRD saw a window of opportunity 
created by the presence of political will and the upcoming XIIth Plan deadline. The MHRD 
bureaucrats had the authority to create a policy and they were interested in acting. In India, the 
personal ambition and interest of bureaucrats are important driving factors in policy creation 
(Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005; Ayyar, 2009). A new policy for state universities was a notable 
achievement and an additional means of increasing the financial allocations for the Higher 
Education Department. Thus, NHEM benefitted from a combination of an interested Minister 
like Kapil Sibal and bureaucrats who wanted to leave their mark on the higher education policy 
space. 
Due to the approaching XIIth plan deadline and general elections in 2014, this window of 
opportunity was short and necessitated quick action. Given the time constraints, policy makers 
relied on the existing formulation of the policy problems and combined them with the policy 
solutions that had already been offered by organizations like UGC. The resulting coupling took 
the form of NHEM (Kingdon, 2011). Despite limited evidence regarding their success, the 
reform solutions are added to NHEM (Kingdon, 2011, p.184-188). The policy instruments in the 
policy were created by roughly combining the existing funding components with the reform 
solutions in the same decision context. The garbage-can analogy is particularly evocative 
because it characterizes this study’s observations about the seemingly undesigned nature of 
policy instruments (Kingdon, 2011, p. 84). It shows that policy makers are boundedly rational 
and do not consider all possible problem and solution definitions rationally. They consider a 
narrow set of options limited by their decision context.  
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Multiple streams theory is useful in understanding the timing and non-linearity of 
NHEM’s creation, but it has some shortcomings. Policy entrepreneurs play a key part in finding 
and exploiting the window of opportunity in this theory (Kingdon, 2011, p. 101) but they lack 
the issue-specialization and persistence that is associated with Kingdon’s policy entrepreneurs.54 
Though academic experts like Dr. Kumar were involved in the process of creating the policy, 
such individuals did not have the agency or political power to initiate the coupling that led to 
NHEM’s creation.  
Multiple streams theory also lacks a strong formulation of interactions between different 
actors and institutions in the political stream. The stream consists of national mood, interest 
groups, and government (Kingdon, 2011) but the conditions under which their interactions lead 
to policy creation is not clear (Herweg, Hub, & Zohlnhöfer, 2015). For NHEM, it does not help 
in understanding how MHRD drew on UGC’s policy solutions for creating the policy but 
excluded them in creating the policy. Did UGC contribute to both the policy stream? Or their 
conflict with the MHRD is part of the political stream? And what explains the fact that MHRD 
could create NHEM despite excluding most other stakeholders? These issues are better explained 
through the policy subsystems approach of Advocacy Coalition Framework. ACF also lends 
itself well to applications beyond the policy formulation stage, which is a useful addition to this 
study in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The formulation of policy sub-systems in the advocacy coalition framework allows for 
policy analysis at the multiple levels of a political system and over a much longer period of time 
(Cairney & Heikkila, 2014). The higher education policy sub-system in India consists of the 
MHRD, the UGC, AICTE, international organizations, and the states. NHEM was formulated 
 
54
 Bureaucrats in India move from federal to state levels and from one ministry to another, every 3-5 years. As a 
result, it is difficult to say if they have technical specialization or attachment to any particular policy issues.  
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because the MHRD’s leadership changed and there was greater political and bureaucratic support 
for taking a new course of action with regards to state universities. This is the type of internal 
event in the governance coalition that can start the process of policy change under ACF (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2007). MHRD’s prominence in the policy subsystem ensured that the policy was 
made in a relatively expedient manner because the stakeholders at the federal level were unlikely 
to oppose the state. The MHRD team was able to create the policy, secure CABE, and Cabinet 
approvals, and make it a part of the XIIth Plan in a short span of 16-17 months55.  
If viewed over a decade, as ACF suggests, MHRD and other federal regulators are part of 
the same advocacy coalition (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The fact that NHEM’s policy 
problems and solutions have been repeatedly discussed in multiple forums shows that the federal 
actors are part of a policy coalition that share common beliefs, values, and causal reasoning 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). For instance, all the actors believe in equitable improvement 
of access to higher education and the state’s role in providing it. Policy core beliefs about the 
nature of the problems such as the affiliation system in state universities and the possible 
solutions are also shared. This allows the dominant actor, MHRD to freely borrow from the 
menu of policy solutions devised by the UGC and other academic experts over a period of a few 
decades. States are not a part of the same coalition, because they do not share policy core-beliefs 
about decentralization-based reforms. 
Members of the advocacy coalition disagree on secondary beliefs regarding who should 
control the implementation of NHEM the federal level56. Though the coalition exists over a long 
 
55
 In comparison, the process of creating a policy like the Right To Education Act in India had lasted thirty years. It 
involved multiple stake holders from states, political groups, children’s rights organizations, research organizations, 
federal regulators, etc. (Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 2017a). 
56
 ACF acknowledges that is possible for MHRD and UGC to have different policy core beliefs when it comes to 
other issues (Cairney & Heikkila, 2014). Like the role of UGC’s role in federal higher education structure. The 
MHRD wanted to replace the UGC with separate new bodies that handle regulation and funding of higher education.  
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period of time, at the time of NHEM’s formulation the MHRD and other actors do not share 
secondary beliefs. However, while MHRD and UGC shared many goals and policies instruments 
for HE reform, they disagreed on whether MHRD or UGC should be heading the reform process.   
This is particularly applicable to India where a parliamentary political system and 
different administrative approach determine the character of policy subsystems and coalitions. 
There are fewer avenues for other actors to enter the policy making process and the state can 
create many policies without requiring broad consensus (Ayyar, 2009; Rao, 2009). Policy elites, 
i.e. political and bureaucratic leadership, wield more power in policy formulation than other 
actors (Agarwal & Somanathan, 2005; Ayyar, 2009; Grindle & Thomas, 1989). Thus, the 
structure for participation for various actors is limited. Extent of participation of states, federal 
regulators, and international organizations in creating the policy design, evaluating options, or 
providing feedback is dependent on the state. NHEM’s formulation lacks the processes of 
bargaining and adjustment amongst coalition actors that could improve the policy’s design.  
Factors specific to policy areas affect the level of consensus required by the state to 
create a policy (Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 2017a). This aspect affects the relationship between 
MHRD and other federal actors as well as states. The state never divested its control in higher 
education through systemic reforms in the 1990s, the way it did in many other sectors of the 
economy (Kapur & Mehta, 2007; Krishnan, 2014). Its control continues through financing and a 
labyrinthine regulatory regime (Carnoy & Dossani, 2013). The federal government influences 
federal regulators, financing bodies, and advisory institutions through funds and appointment 
decisions (F5, F6). Thus, organizations like UGC cannot be a part of an opposing coalition 
within the sub-system when they disagree with MHRD. Similarly, states depend on federal funds 
for major infrastructural investments in state universities (Tilak, 2004; Tilak & Varghese, 1991). 
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The incentive of funding is large enough for them to participate in NHEM, even when they are 
not consulted in creating the policy. Especially if they believe that NHEM’s mandates are 
negotiable.  
It is important to note that the relationship between the main state actor, MHRD and other 
federal actors and states can change over time and is dependent on venues (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1999). For instance, right before MHRD created NHEM, it had faced a legislative 
gridlock that stalled its policy agenda. Thus, the rules of the legislative arena and executive 
action differ due to the difference in structure of participation for other actors. Time-specific 
factors also determine the power of other actors. During NHEM’s formulation, UGC did not 




Chapter 5: State Higher Education Councils 
A key premise of National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) is that education quality 
in state universities can be improved by introducing important reforms in state higher education 
systems and providing funds to the resource-starved state universities and colleges. The reforms 
form a foundational pillar of NHEM’s design (NHEM, 2013b). The reforms attempt to 
decentralize the management of the higher education sector by creating the State Higher 
Education Council (SHEC), strengthening institutional autonomy by promoting affiliation and 
governance reforms, and introducing accountability mechanisms through accreditation.  
This chapter focuses on one specific reform, the creation of State Higher Education 
Councils. State Higher Education Councils (SHECs) are autonomous bodies that are supposed to 
take over planning, monitoring, assessment, capacity building, and quality enhancement 
functions from the Department of Higher Education (DoHEs). This fundamentally changes the 
state higher education ecosystem by horizontally decentralizing the higher education governance 
and management in states. The creation of SHECs is closely related to other reforms. NHEM 
aims for SHECs to promote new practices and reforms in state universities and colleges. This 
includes strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation of institutional performance; interpreting 
and implementing academic, administrative, and financial autonomy in institutions; supporting 
accreditation and other quality assurance mechanisms; and managing the down-sizing of the 
affiliation system.  
This chapter is dedicated to understanding the inter-state variations in the creation and 
operation of SHECs. The chapter addresses the research question: do states differ in the way they 
have established State Higher Education Councils? Do these different interpretations match with 
NHEM’s theory of action? The research question is explored using sub-questions. Firstly, have 
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all states created SHECs and are all SHECs continuously operational? Secondly, are SHECs 
involved in implementing NHEM reforms in the states? Do the SHECs perform all the functions 
that NHEM expects them to? Does their functioning follow NHEM’s theory of action? Thirdly, 
do SHECs have adequate resources and leadership to perform their functions? 
My findings suggest that though states have created SHECs through legislative Acts, 
DoHEs have not devolved power to SHECs. Despite having a robust legal basis, SHECs have 
not emerged as a powerful institution within the state higher education policy subsystems. This is 
because DoHE influences the division of responsibilities and resources of SHECs in order to 
maintain the status-quo. DoHEs have not decentralized planning, monitoring, evaluation, or 
funding functions to the SHECs. DoHEs also retain control over the implementation of NHEM 
in the states. SHECs primarily operate as advisory bodies that assist the DoHEs with specific 
technical issues like evaluating rules about faculty qualifications, degree equivalency between 
institutions, etc. SHECs assist in implementing academic reforms and developing curricular 
standards, though with very limited resources. It is clear that DoHEs still control the governance 
and management of higher education in states, even though SHEC reforms were supposed to 
decentralize this control to SHECs.  
DoHEs limit the influence of SHECs by controlling their leadership and financial 
resources. For instance, most SHEC leadership positions are held by bureaucrats and political 
leaders rather than academic leaders. This maintains DoHE’s direct control over SHECs and 
prevents SHECs from diverging from the state on any issues. DoHEs delay appointments to 
SHEC positions and choose a majority of SHEC members that do not serve the Council full time. 
Thus, SHECs remain inactive and depend on very few leadership resources. Further, DoHEs 
allocate very limited funding and human resources to SHECs. This results in little technical 
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capacity and financial resources to engage with institutions in the state. Limitations of leadership 
appointment also prevent SHECs from building enough credibility to normatively influence 
institutional behavior.  
Within these broad themes, there are some state-level differences. Amongst the sample 
states, Kerala stands out due to the academic leadership of the SHEC and greater financial 
resources. As a result, the state has built greater technical capacity to interpret and implement 
more expansive academic and quality assurance reforms than other states. Odisha and West 
Bengal’s councils are less active, their leadership contains fewer academics and their SHECs 
operate with fewer financial resources. Odisha and West Bengal SHECs also initiate fewer 
academic initiatives, and they exhibit stronger tendencies towards centralization even in 
academic matters. Punjab offers the most extreme case of SHEC proforma reform 
implementation. The state has created an SHEC to comply with NHEM requirements but never 
appointed any members or attempted to operationalize the council. NHEM’s implementation in 
Punjab is led completely by the DoHE, and its progress with reforms is the most limited.  
I conclude that the imbalance between DoHEs and institutions is shaped by a few factors 
across states. DoHE has strong legal and financial bases of power in a policy subsystem that has 
limited venues for participation by other actors. DoHEs are motivated by their wish to retain 
control over other institutions, planning decisions, and financial allocations. NHEM’s funds play 
a mixed role in this process. As expected by NHEM policy makers, the incentive of NHEM 
funds was large enough to prompt the creation of SHECs in states. However, the increased flow 
of funds also creates perverse incentives for centralization. As a result, DoHEs route funds 
through SHECs but retain control over decision making about NHEM. No other aspect of 
NHEM’s policy design or policy making process that addresses DoHE’s reluctance to 
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decentralize power. The limited form of SHECs in the states prevents the higher education 
system from building the technical capacity required to implement other NHEM reforms.  
DoHE’s political motives do not entirely explain why SHEC members, faculty unions, or 
institutions have not mounted a stronger opposition to centralization. I argue that many actors in 
the states share a common belief system that explains the lack of support for SHEC reforms. I 
find that DoHEs, SHECs, and universities and government colleges form one advocacy coalition. 
Their actions reflect a belief system that suggests that governance of higher education should be 
led by the state and not an autonomous body like SHEC. As a result, neither the DoHEs nor the 
SHECs see the need for SHECs to play a larger role in the state. However, there are slight 
variations in these beliefs by state. This explains why a state like Kerala can devolve more 
powers to SHECs than other states. The themes about the beliefs of advocacy coalitions and 
complexities of state-level differences are detailed in the conclusion of the chapter.  
The chapter reviews evidence on the operation of State Higher Education Councils 
(SHECs) in five sections. I start with an overview of the theoretical approach to implementation 
analysis that is primarily informed by the advocacy coalition framework. Next, I present an 
overview of the operation of policy instruments with regards to SHEC reform implementation. I 
discuss how all states have legally created the SHECs. However, SHECs have not changed the 
higher education ecosystem or involved multiple stakeholders in the states. The third section 
looks at how DoHEs have controlled the division of responsibility with states. I present evidence 
on the limited functions of SHECs across the states. I find that DoHEs have been reluctant to 
share financial, planning, and governance functions, while being amenable to handing over 
academic and quality assurance functions to SHECs. The fourth section of the chapter reviews 
DoHE strategies regarding leadership appointments and financial resources through which 
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SHECs are co-opted. The concluding section of the chapter discusses NHEM’s implementation 
using Advocacy Coalition Framework and discusses the nature of beliefs that tie together the 
policy actions of the advocacy coalition.  
 
Theoretical Approach to Implementation Analysis 
I use the advocacy coalition framework to inform my implementation analysis. Rather 
than using this study to test the hypotheses suggested by the framework, I used it to explore 
different facets of NHEM’s implementation. This framework uses top-down and bottom-up 
approaches of implementation analysis (Sabatier, 1986; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). As a result, 
this implementation analysis does not focus exclusively on the DoHE or the operation of the 
policy instruments. The analysis looks at all the principal actors in the policy subsystems, i.e., in 
each state.  
I treat NHEM as a change external to the state policy subsystem (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007),  because it is a policy created in the federal subsystem that is trying to affect changes in 
the state policy subsystems. The implementation analysis examines a few key elements of state 
policy subsystems in relation to NHEM. I identify policy coalitions operating in the subsystem 
that are interested in influencing implementation etc. (Sabatier, 1988) I identify the resources 
that are employed by the coalitions in the process of implementation. Resources include legal 
authority, information, normative power, financial resources, leadership, ability to mobilize 
public support, etc. (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2007, p. 198).  
I also explore the nature of policy beliefs and attitudes shared by the coalition (Sabatier, 
1988, p. 144-146). Beliefs are the values, priorities, and causal patterns held by actors in a 
coalition (Sabatier, 1988, p. 132). The data collection for this study has not been designed to 
151 
 
identify belief systems of actors. Thus, the findings about the belief systems are based on the 
actions and strategies of actors observed during the implementation.  
Belief systems and related causal relationships are an important aspect of understanding 
NHEM’s implementation. According to Sabatier (1998, p. 132), “public policies/programs 
incorporate implicit theories about how to achieve their objectives…they can be conceptualized 
in much the same way as belief systems”. As discussed in Chapter 4, SHEC reforms are based on 
a belief that decentralization of powers from DoHEs to SHECs will be beneficial for state higher 
education systems. The analysis will try to establish if implementation of the reforms reflected 
this belief system.  
 
Effects on the Higher Education Institutional Ecosystem 
Before delving into a detailed discussion about the functions and resources of SHECs, 
this section summarizes the current state of SHECs across the four states. I discuss the extent to 
which NHEM has been successful in establishing SHECs. I also examine evidence on whether 
SHECs have successfully emerged as a venue for involving non-state actors in state-level higher 
education management.  
As established in Chapter 4, the long-term view in establishing the SHECs follows the 
logic of horizontal decentralization of DoHE’s control over higher education through a larger 
ecosystem of institutions in the states, involved in the governance and management of higher 
education, in the states. In this ecosystem, the SHEC would operate as an influential player 
alongside the DoHE, universities and colleges (NHEM, 2013, p. 86). With time, accreditation 
agencies, research funding agencies, etc. also would develop and create an institutional 
infrastructure that provides checks and balances for the education system (Larsen et al., 2014). 
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SHECs are supposed to provide a venue for multiple actors to participate in higher education 
planning and regulation by drawing membership from a range of non-state actors and interacting 
with them through day-to-day functions (NHEM, 2013, p. 149).  
NHEM uses two policy instruments to achieve this goal. Firstly, the policy uses a system-
changing tool. All states are required to create SHECs, either through legislative orders or 
through executive action. This is a condition for NHEM funding eligibility (NHEM, 2013b). 
Secondly, the policy provides a capacity building grant of INR 100 million to cover the expenses 
for establishing SHECs and any other reforms. As discussed in the previous chapter, the policy 
document also includes detailed guidelines about SHEC design and functions. All the specifics 
included in the guidelines are supposed to be mandates but they operate as proclamations, mainly 
because federal implementing authorities do not enforce them. Data is collected about two 
aspects of SHECs: whether they have been created through an Act of the state legislature and 
whether an academic has been appointed as Chairman or Vice Chairman in the Council.57  
I find that all the four sample states have created SHECs but DoHEs are, by far, a 
stronger actor in the states than SHECs. In fact, SHECs are dependent on DoHEs for their 
resources as well as legitimacy. There are some small variations between states. In Kerala, more 
colleges are aware of the SHEC and their role in academic decision-making. In contrast, Odisha 
and West Bengal’s Councils are known but their relationship with the institution is limited to a 
few areas. In Punjab, faculty in colleges are completely unaware of the SHEC. Relatively 
speaking, the Kerala SHEC occupies a much more influential position in the state’s higher 
education system than SHECs in West Bengal and Odisha. Overall, NHEM’s causal logic has 
not been successful in institutionalizing SHECs in states.  
 
57
 These variables were shared by the NHEM federal implementing authorities. They were used to create one of the 
composite indices used in the sampling strategy.  
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Success of the System-Changing Tool  
NHEM’s causal logic has been accurate in the sense that all the sample states have 
created SHECs by legislative action. Thus, the system-changing tool has effectively created a 
legal basis for transfer of authority from DoHEs to SHECs. However, this does not imply that all 
other guidelines have been followed or that authority is shared. Sample states fall in two 
categories, 1) where SHECs are continuously operational like Kerala, West Bengal, and Odisha, 
and 2) where the SHEC is a nominal institution that only exists on paper like Punjab. All four 
states have created SHECs through Act of state legislatures (see Appendix G for details of the 
legal provisions regarding SHECs). However, they differ in the way they adhere to the reform 
requirements. Table 4 captures key details about the SHECs. Many of these aspects are discussed 
in greater detail in the sections that follow. 
Table 4. Operational Status of SHECs in Sample States 
 Kerala Odisha West Bengal Punjab 
Established Act (2007, 2017) Act (2017) Act (1995, 
2015) 
Act (2018) 
Operational Yes (except 
2016-2017) 
Yes, since 2018 Yes, since 
1995 
No 
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members appointed 


































Source: Compiled using SHEC Acts, interviews, documentation on SHEC websites 
Kerala and West Bengal created their SHECs following the National Education Policy of 
1986.58 In both states, SHECs are well established organizations with their own dedicated office 
premises where the interviews were conducted. Odisha’s example is typical of most states in the 
country that created SHECs after NHEM was implemented. Odisha’s SHEC was created in 2017 
through an Act of the state legislature but the Vice Chairperson was only appointed in 2018 and 
other members came much later in June 2019. As shown in Table 4, other councils in the sample 
have had similarly long or short spells, without leadership and members, because their 
appointment has not been a priority for the states.  
Punjab’s SHEC stands out amongst the sample states because the creation and operation 
has been a purely pro forma response (see McLaughlin, 1987). Punjab SHEC has been created 
through an Act of the state legislature (passed in August 2018). The only appointed leaders of the 
SHEC are both Ministers in the state government. Currently, the SHEC does not have any other 
members, does not meet regularly, and does not have any designated office space (C11, C8).59 
The fact that the SHEC has not met for the last 2 years or undertaken any activity other than the 
approving State Higher Education Plans (SHEPs) is evidence that the SHEC has only been 
established to fulfill prerequisites of NHEM and receive federal funds. 
NHEM had a simple effect of adding a new actor in the state policy subsystems (Sabatier 
& Weible, 2007). Importantly, it has altered the legal structures of the subsystem. In the short 
term, this is an important achievement. It may prove beneficial for policies that follow NHEM.  
 
58
 The SHECs in Kerala (established in 2007, reconstituted in 2017) and West Bengal (formed in 1995, 
reconstituted in 2015) predate NHEM. Before NHEM was launched, eight out of the 28 states had SHECs. Kerala 
specifically amended its Council Act in 2017 to incorporate some (not all) guidelines laid out by NHEM. West 
Bengal amended is Council Act in 2015.  
59
 Alphanumeric codes in parenthesis indicate the interviewees from which the information is drawn.  
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Limited Changes in Ecosystem and Involvement of Other Actors 
An important part of NHEM’s causal logic in creating SHECs is to decentralize the 
governance powers from DoHEs to an autonomous body that draws its membership from various 
parts of the higher education system in a state. This includes universities, colleges, businesses, 
civil society organizations, other concerned government departments, etc. (NHEM, 2013, p. 
149). Despite the legal bases that support SHECs in states, they have not emerged as a venue for 
involving non-state stakeholders. SHECs are not involved in NHEM implementation which 
limits their interaction with universities and colleges (this aspect is discussed in greater detail in 
the next section). Other actors such as private colleges, businesses and unions also have no 
involvement in SHECs.  
Universities and colleges interact with the SHECs for very specific activities. The SHECs 
work with university Boards of Studies for the academic reforms. In turn, universities hold 
workshops with their affiliated institutions (A2, A15, D6). In a few cases, university leaders had 
attended SHEC meetings because specific issues such as the National Education Policy 2020 
were being deliberated in the state (B1, A15). Some SHECs, like West Bengal, have been 
involved in holding administrative training under NHEM. SHECs train institutional leaders on 
how to create the NHEM plans as per federal specifications, how to use the online portal for 
creating the plans, and how to follow the procurement or contracting rules under NHEM (D6, 
A2). In Odisha, a SHEC leader noted that universities cooperate with the SHEC on academic 
matters (such as curriculum redesign etc.) because the DoHEs approve of SHECs involvement in 
that process (B1). 
Colleges do not report any interactions with the SHECs across all the states. In Kerala, 
some of the college faculty have attended curriculum-related training with the SHEC (A6, A7, 
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A8, A9). In Odisha and West Bengal, the college level interviewees had not interacted with the 
SHEC at all. While some of the interviewees were unaware of the SHEC, others were unsure of 
its purpose (B4, B5, B6, D4, D5, D8, D9). In all four states, college and university respondents 
talk at length about the implementation of NHEM. However, the SHEC is not mentioned as a 
part of these discussions. Specifically, none of the SHECs have undertaken capacity building 
measures or discussions regarding important NHEM reforms such as strategic planning at the 
state and institutional level, transitioning large affiliating universities into smaller set ups, 
navigating the process of creating cluster universities etc.  
There are no formal mechanisms for businesses, student, or faculty unions, etc. to be a 
part of the policy making process in Indian states. Traditionally, they approach the states 
individually for their concerns (A5, A10, A15, B1, B3, B6, C8, C9, C11, D1, D2).  By and large, 
none of the three states with SHECs show any evidence of sustained interactions with 
representatives from private higher education institutions or with local or state businesses and 
trade associations. 60 The respondents from the SHECs in all the states believe that such 
interactions are outside the scope of their responsibilities. They only make recommendations 
closely related to academic matters; thus, any issues concerning businesses or private institutions 
are outside their scope (A5, A15, B1, D1). The DoHE is the only authority in the state that can 
take decisions concerning other stakeholders. According to the SHEC respondents, the main 
concern for private institutions regards the fee setting mechanisms, common admission, or 
entrance examination guidelines etc. All these issues fall outside the purview of the SHEC. 
 
60
 This is surprising and noteworthy because more than two third of the colleges in the sample states are partially or 
completely privately owned and operated. It is unlikely that these institutions have no means of communicating and 
dealing with the state. It is more likely that such interactions are done through political channels that do not overlap 
with NHEM’s implementation.  
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Businesses usually approach the state as owners of private institutions and not as potential 
employers. There was little variation in this response across the four states.  
Faculty unions and their interactions with the SHEC and the DoHE do vary by state. Out 
of the sample, Kerala is the only state with strong faculty unions. Kerala and Punjab are the only 
states where I was able to interview union members. In Kerala, despite being active, the unions 
do not deal with the SHEC. This is primarily because the SHEC cannot address matters related to 
salaries, promotions or transfers, fee-regulation, autonomous status etc., which are the main 
concerns for unions. However, faculty unions are an active stakeholder at the university level and 
in making representations to the DoHE (A3, A10, A11). In Punjab, faculty unions are primarily 
concerned about filling the large number of vacant faculty positions (C9, C11). These faculty 
unions do not have the option of approaching an SHEC as it has not been appointed in Punjab.  
In Odisha and West Bengal, faculty unions exist but they do not have a large 
membership, and they do not deal with the SHEC. 61 Their interactions with the DoHE also seem 
fewer and limited to service matters (salaries, promotions, and transfers). A respondent in Odisha 
(B1) said, “unions are there but I believe that they need to focus more on academic activities than 
grievances”. This concern about the role of unions is shared across all DoHEs. All the DoHE 
interviewees and some institutional leaders primarily associate unions with service matters of 
faculty rather than academic interests of students.  
Evidence discussed in this section shows that DoHEs have continued to be a dominant 
actor in the state policy subsystems. NHEM has successfully altered the legal framework for 
 
61
 Interestingly, in Odisha, the SHEC works with “professional societies” of college faculty in some subjects such as 
Chemistry and Physics. These are faculty associations (like Orissa Chemical Society and Orissa Physical Society) 
that are only concerned with academic or scientific matters. They assisted the SHEC in their curriculum revision 
efforts (B1). However, I could not find such professional societies across all subject groups or in other states. This 
feature could be unique to Odisha. 
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participation of other stakeholders by creating SHEC Acts in all the states. But its 
implementation has not led to actual changes in the institutional dynamics in the states. One 
possible reason for it is that the DoHE’s sources of power remain intact in many ways. Legal 
structures such as University Acts, governance systems, and financial relationships that maintain 
institutions’ dependence on the state have not been altered.  
Next, I examine other evidence about the limited role and powers of SHECs. First, I 
consider the functions of SHECs and then the resources at their disposal.   
 
Limitations of SHEC Functions 
Horizontal decentralization of Department of Higher Education’s (DoHE’s) control over 
higher education is the main rationale for creating State Higher Education Councils (SHECs). 
After the implementation of National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) reforms, the SHECs 
should emerge as an organization that now performs multiple functions of Departments of 
Higher Education (Larsen et al., 2014; NHEM, 2013b). These functions are usually considered 
important in the governance and management of the higher education sector. Responsibilities 
like strategic planning for the state and institutions, monitoring and evaluation, academic 
functions, etc. are included in the legislative Acts for SHECs. This section looks at the evidence 
of SHEC’s involvement in each of these functions. These findings are important for two reasons. 
First, shared and non-shared functions point towards the continued dominance of DoHEs. Thus, 
indicating that DoHEs interests dominate the implementation of SHEC reforms in states. Second, 
the evidence directly points to reform areas and activities where SHECs are unable to play their 
part in NHEM’s theory of action.  
159 
 
I find that SHECs are engaged in fragmented activities that do not form part of a holistic 
higher education development plan for the state or for NHEM. Table 5 summarizes the state-
level differences and similarities in SHECs functions. The three active SHECs are similar in their 
perfunctory involvement in state- or institutional-level planning, monitoring and assessment of 
performance, and implementation of NHEM. More importantly, there is little evidence to suggest 
that these functions are thoroughly performed by the DoHE either.  
The differences between SHECs are within a very narrow area of operation. Advisory 
functions, academic and quality assurance emerge as the main responsibilities discharged by the 
SHECs. The involvement of three active SHECs in academic functions like the implementation 
of choice-based credit system, semester system, etc. has been similar. Only Kerala’s council 
stands out in its efforts to establish new quality assurance mechanisms and data collection 
systems. 
I examine evidence regarding SHECs activities under five categories. 1) NHEM 
implementation and funding (SHECs do not figure prominently in these structures), 2) 
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 According to NHEM guidelines, academic functions include faculty improvement and support, promoting 
research and innovation, promoting curricular quality, improving assessment and evaluation, accreditation and, 




NHEM Planning & Funding 
In all the states in this sample, the SHECs have no significant role to play in the 
implementation of NHEM. The main authority for all NHEM in the state is the Secretary, 
Department of Higher Education/Education, or the chief bureaucrat in charge of the DoHE. The 
day-today operations of NHEM in each state are overseen by the NHEM directorate (an office 
that deals with NHEM). This office has anywhere between eleven (Kerala) to four (Punjab) 
people. The NHEM directorate is usually headed by a mid-level state bureaucrat or college 
faculty on deputation with the state government. The head of the NHEM directorate reports 
directly to the Secretary of DoHE. The staff working for this officer are either government 
employees from the education or finance services, or contractual staff. No chain of command 
links this office with the SHEC.  
However, as SHEC leaders tend to be very senior appointees that command professional 
respect, NHEM directorates do cooperate with SHECs. Operationally, the NHEM directorate 
makes the higher education plans, and the SHEC Chairperson and Vice Chairperson sign it. The 
Secretary of DoHE signs the utilization certificates for expenditure sent to the federal 
government, even though all the funds are routed to institutions through the SHEC’s account. All 
the intervening processes between planning and utilization of funds are also handled by the 
NHEM Directorate and the SHECs do not play an important role in coordinating with 
universities and colleges. Eventually, both SHECs and DoHEs have one common leader, the 
Minister for Higher Education/Education in the state.  
Strategic planning is supposed to provide direction to higher education expansion and 
improve outcome orientation of the universities and colleges. The SHECs are supposed to 
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provide the expertise, data, and manpower in guiding the planning process (NHEM, 2013, p. 
153, 162). I find no evidence of important differences between states in this regard. SHECs are 
not substantially involved in any part of the planning process in the sample states. Participation 
of the SHECs is limited to review meetings held by DoHEs where they can comment on the 
probable challenges and solutions for NHEM implementation. SHECs do not undertake any 
exercises to create state plans, institutional plans, or plans for implementation of important 
NHEM reforms.  summarizes the limitations of SHEC involvement in planning across states. 
Table 6. Strategic Planning and SHECs 
 Kerala Odisha Punjab West Bengal 
State and institutions have regularly 
updated strategic plans and annual plans 
X X X X 
SHEC leads in creating plans X X X X 
SHEC can change existing plans X X X X 
SHEC provides training for strategic 
planning 
X X X X 
SHEC provides feedback on NHEM plans ✓ ✓ X ✓ 
Source: Compiled using interviews.  
Note: X indicates activities not observed in states, ✓ denotes activities performed  
 
Strategic planning in higher education has been implemented in the United States and 
European Union for at least a few decades (Dooris et al., 2004; Kotler & Murphy, 1981). 
However, it is a relatively new concept for Indian higher education. The practice of strategic 
planning is not a part of the institutional culture of DoHEs or of educational institutions (Blom & 
Cheong, 2010; Larsen et al., 2014). Very few states have detailed plans, strategies, and 
monitoring systems to meet their educational goals. As a result, NHEM and many previous 
policies have called for better planning and coordination mechanisms at the state level. 
Universities and colleges, particularly those dependent on state funding, do not engage in 
extensive financial or academic planning on a regular basis.  
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NHEM is supposed to initiate strategic planning by setting state and institutional plans as 
a requirement for determining the distribution of NHEM funds. As noted in NHEM’s vision 
document (NHEM, 2013, p. 162),  
“NHEM will follow a bottom-up approach for planning and budgeting. The process 
begins at the institutional level. Institutional Development Plans are based on inputs/ discussions 
with the multiple stakeholders and sent to the SHEC…SHECs should not function merely as 
agencies to aggregate the Institutional Development Plans into State Higher Education Plans 
(SHEPs). They must consider the entire state as a single unit of planning…this would require 
setting up of planning teams and committees at various levels and active participation of multiple 
stakeholders which will help perform both planning and on-going monitoring functions.” 
The SHECs are supposed to provide the technical capacity and support for detailed 
planning within the states. However, this vision has not been realized in the states (for details 
about the quality and scope of NHEM planning, see Appendix F).  
I find that the NHEM planning is done by the institutions with the DoHE. Respondents in 
every SHEC confirmed that they are not involved in authoring the details of SHEPs. In Kerala, 
the council provides a general approach to quality issues raised in the plans (A1), but the 
implementation is done by the DoHE (A1, A12). In Odisha and West Bengal, the SHEPs are 
discussed with the SHECs after they have been created (B1, D1). This is usually done in a 
meeting that is held by the DoHE.  
Lower-level DoHE respondents believed that the SHEC leadership had been important in 
creating the state plans (B9, D2). When asked for the specific ways in which the SHEC leaders 
had contributed, I received vague responses about creating a “broad picture” and providing a 
“vision” (B9, D2). Senior DoHE leaders did not think that the SHEC created the plans, but they 
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also mentioned that SHEC leaders provided direction. The responses across the state indicate that 
the SHECs do not actively lead the process of creating the state plans.  
The same is true for institution-level planning. As discussed in the earlier sections, the 
colleges and universities do not have any interaction with SHECs. Kerala and West Bengal 
SHECs have conducted training for colleges, but these are for curriculum redesign programs and 
not for any assistance in strategic institutional planning. Ideally, the SHECs would have been 
involved in capacity building for planning and other reforms at the state level. Universities and 
colleges get administrative training for completing NHEM plans with fewer errors. These 
training are exclusively about the specifics of NHEM requirements, procurement rules that 
institutions should follow, using the online plan submission portal, etc. The training is conducted 
by the DoHE (A9, B3, B4, B9, C2, C4, D4, D5).  
Importantly, none of the SHECs in the sample states make any decisions regarding the 
allocation or disbursal of NHEM funds, although states do route the funds through an SHEC 
bank account to fulfill the federal government’s condition.63 Several interviewees mentioned that 
they diligently follow all the NHEM regulations in the state (A4, B9, D2, D3). But the SHEC 
leadership is not involved in deciding which institutions or policies are included in NHEM plans 
and receive funds. In trying to explain the relationship between SHEC and NHEM, one SHEC 
leader noted (A15),  
“In the beginning there was a perfect understanding between the council and the 
department with regard to NHEM, but in the middle they parted ways…Once funds began to 
 
63
 SHECs preceding NHEM did not have any financial powers. They were only expected to advise the DoHE on 
priorities for funding. The new Acts (Odisha and Punjab) created after NHEM explicitly include “timely 
disbursement of NHEM funds” amongst SHEC responsibilities. NHEM’s rule specify that NHEM disbursals need to 
be made from the SHEC’s bank account. By insisting that the funds flow through the SHEC, NHEM attempted to 
give the SHECs a financial basis for power. Specifically, NHEM entrusted SHECs with state and institutional 
planning as well as collection and disbursal of the state and federal funds (MHRD, 2013, p.164).  
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flow, the higher education department, they took control of the funds. The…council did not take 
up that issue because we have a lot of other functions also. So, what we do at this point of time, 
with regard to NHEM, is we discuss the state education plan. And everything else including 
finance is under the control of the Department of Education.”  
SHEC’s current involvement in planning highlights a few noteworthy points. Firstly, 
DoHEs are reluctant to share their planning, resource allocation, or funding powers with SHEC. 
Control over resources is key source of power that gives DoHEs their central role in the 
ecosystem (see Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; Pfeffer, 1994). NHEM assumes that giving NHEM 
funds to SHECs will increase their financial power. But evidence suggests that far from having a 
decentralizing effect, inflow of more federal funds may have created incentives for DoHEs to 
coopt the SHECs (see Selznick, 1949). Giving SHECs a funding role allows the state to 
symbolically fulfill NHEM’s conditions without sharing any real authority (see DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991). In some ways, it also parallels the MHRD’s use of NHEM to centralize funding 
powers (away from UGC), as discussed in chapter 4.  
Second, the quality of planning and SHEC’s involvement suggests that the idea of 
planning itself has been adopted in a symbolic manner (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Honig & 
Hatch, 2004). One of the federal interviewees familiar with education planning in India 
mentioned that NHEM’s planning was merely a “form-filling exercise” (F3). The SHECs are not 
involved in supporting universities and colleges in areas where they have no pre-existing 
technical capacity. This includes strategic planning, transitioning from autonomous colleges to 
universities, navigating the process of reducing university affiliation, size, etc. This is a crucial 
link in NHEM’s causal logic. Without the SHECs expertise and planning for implementation, 
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institutions are likely to adopt the simplest or minimal form of the reforms or abandon them. 
Some of these effects will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Monitoring and Evaluation 
In addition to the initial planning, NHEM also envisages a role for SHECs in monitoring 
the implementation of NHEM plans. NHEM also expects that the SHECs will create 
management information systems covering all institutions, collect and analyze data on 
improvements over time, and share these findings publicly (NHEM, 2013, p153). This study 
finds that SHECs are not involved in monitoring institutional or state progress in implementing 
NHEM (see Table 7). Monitoring and evaluation of the policy is led by DoHE and focuses on 
tracking the use of funds.  
Table 7. Limited Monitoring and Evaluation Activities Across States 
In theory In practice 
SHEC monitors NHEM progress 
DoHEs monitors funding utilization; SHEC members 
participate in DoHE meetings  
SHEC conducts performance 
evaluations 
Neither DoHEs nor SHECs have any performance 
evaluations 
Well-defined outcome measures 
States have not defined specific outcome measures for 
institutions or the state 
SHEC creating data collection 
mechanisms 
Only Kerala has created an annual state survey 
(institutional level) to collect data; other states do ad-
hoc data collection 
Source: Compiled using interviews, planning documents on SHEC, and DoHE websites. 
 
NHEM expected the SHECs to evaluate institutional and state progress under NHEM, but 
none of the four SHECs has done performance evaluations so far. Instead, colleges and 
universities attend regular monitoring meetings headed by the DoHE. The meetings track 
progress of utilizing NHEM funds, but not institutional performance. Respondents can point to 
outcomes and monitoring processes unrelated to fund tracking, but they are not asked to do so. 
DoHEs also have not used clearly defined outcome measures about the general performance of 
167 
 
institutions. No systems regularly collate student progress, research activities, or labor market 
outcomes that can be used to identify poorly performing institutions and improve them. A few 
respondents confuse NHEM outcomes with the outcome-based education guidelines that the 
University Grants Commission has been promoting. Apart from a failure of implementation, this 
issue also relates to flaws in NHEM’s design. The federal authorities do not link specific 
institutional outcomes to NHEM or to the reforms included in it.  
A functional monitoring system in NHEM, would entail data collection and analysis of 
state and institutional progress. Ideally, this process would be done on a quarterly or yearly basis. 
In my interviews, I did not find any evidence of such data systems or processes except for Kerala 
to an extent. Kerala is the only state where the SHEC has started an annual survey to collect 
program and department level data from public and private colleges and universities (A1, A15, 
A5). Though an improvement on the present system, this data collection effort will not be at the 
student level (A15). Thus, the Kerala SHEC still cannot hope to do granular analysis of student 
outcomes or experiences.  
The other three states have not started any specific programs or initiatives to improve 
data collection and analysis. The fact that the SHEC is not involved in data monitoring does not 
mean that there is no monitoring for NHEM. In fact, most institutions do send data to the DoHE 
and MHRD, but this data is very specific to the NHEM requirements (B1, B3, B5, B6, B7, C1, 
C3, C4, C11, C12, D1, D2, D4, D9). The information sought by the MHRD is either about broad 
measures such as total enrollments in the institution, enrollments by student groups, graduation 
rates, whether the institution has a library, whether it has access for disabled students, etc. Thus, 




Whether it is for outcome or process evaluation, collection of data is a critical part of the 
NHEM policy implementation (Bingham & Felbinger, 2002; K. Smith & Larimer, 2018). 
Evaluation provides important feedback about the effectiveness of the policy instruments that 
can improve future design. The World Bank report on SHECs also viewed this as an area where 
SHECs could add value in states (Larsen et al., 2014). Findings of this study show that NHEM 
does not engage in this process, neither through SHECs nor DoHEs.  
Apart from improving policy implementation, data collection systems serve a larger 
purpose in NHEM’s context. As discussed in Chapter 3, many reforms included in the policy are 
based on principles of  “new managerialism” such as competition, market-orientation, outcomes- 
and standards-based approach to governance, etc. The reforms decentralize powers to institutions 
while creating systems to hold them accountable for outcomes. This shift towards an evaluative 
governance model rests on measurement and comparison of institutions (Bleiklie, 1998; Neave, 
1998). Thus, poor data collection and monitoring systems affect the theory of action of multiple 
reforms in NHEM.  
 
Advisory Function  
Advisory functions tend to cover a very wide variety of tasks and issues on which DoHEs 
ask for the SHECs’ opinion. NHEM guidelines are not very clear on what the SHEC’s advisory 
functions are. The functions include advising state government on strategic investments in higher 
education and advising universities on statute and ordinance formulation. Larsen et al. (2014) 
interpret advisory functions as an umbrella term that includes advising the state as well as 
institutions on managing their resources, improving academic and managerial practices, 
improving accountability measures etc. 
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I find that Kerala’s SHEC stands out in its autonomous use of its advisory powers. The 
Council has commissioned multiple studies and reports on academic, administrative, and 
regulatory policy issues faced by the state higher education system (see Table 8.). The advisory 
role of the other two active states (Odisha and West Bengal) is limited to issues on which DoHE 
asks for their inputs, such as comments on federal policies, UGC regulations, or degree-
equivalence advice for faculty recruitment etc. Meanwhile, in Punjab, the council is not 
operational.  
Table 8. Advisory Functions of SHECs 
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 SHEC is asked for its expert opinion on suitability of a candidate qualifications for an open faculty/job position: 
for instance, eligibility of a PhD in Financial Economics for a teaching position in a public policy department.  
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According to NHEM, advisory powers allow the SHECs to advise DoHEs on a vast range 
of issues from implementation of NHEM to creating new regulations in the state. Importantly, 
SHECs can choose the issues they want to bring to the DoHE’s attention. For instance, they can 
assist the DoHE in creating common guidance on affiliation reforms, on sharing resources in 
cluster universities, suggest legal changes required to support university autonomy, and 
appropriate design for performance-based fund systems, etc. Kerala is the only state that comes 
close to this interpretation.  
Most activities undertaken by the Kerala SHEC are advisory in nature. This includes 
multiple policy reports and evaluation studies on prior policies, guidance for fee regulation, etc.65 
Kerala SHEC creates sub-committees with a few SHEC members and outside academics or 
specialists for these advisory activities (A1, A15, A5). Thus, the SHEC draws on a wide set of 
academic experts. The minutes of meetings of the Kerala SHEC also show several other 
academic matters on which the council issues resolutions and recommendations.66 In 
comparison, the scope of advisory work for West Bengal SHEC and Odisha SHEC is quite 
limited.67  Neither of these councils advises the government proactively. Nor do they have the 
freedom or resources to comment on any issue they deem important.  
 
65
 The latest and most discussed of these was a report on the performance on autonomous colleges (released in 
2019) which recommended that DOHE must be careful in granting autonomy to institutions in the future as it does 
not guarantee better student learning. Other reports are on the implementation of outcome-based education in the 
state, on creation of a state academy for training college faculty, advising the state to create a state accreditation 
authority etc. Most of these reports are either in response to UGC regulations regarding new initiatives or requested 
by the DoHE. 
66
 These include determining the equivalency between degrees from different universities, giving their opinion on 
rules for staff for self-financing colleges, evaluating and forwarding proposals for new research centers or 
departments in state universities etc. 
67
 The West Bengal Council is represented in committees that inspect colleges for new programs, they also 
scrutinize proposals for new affiliated colleges. In both cases, they provide their recommendations to the state. 
Though these inspections are an important function for the SHEC, and presumably for the state, the SHEC reported 
that it was not very common for them to reject affiliation applications after the inspections. The West Bengal SHEC 
also issues advice regarding degree equivalency to the DoHE, universities or the College Service Commission (D1). 
The Council gives its opinion on reformulation of university rules etc., upon requests from DoHE. Odisha council’s 
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Even though many interviewees view SHECs as “advisory bodies”, the nature and scope 
of the SHEC’s advisory function is unclear and varies by state.68 It appears that this function, like 
others, is also dependent on the DoHE’s willingness to involve the SHEC in higher education 
decisions. This points to the political power of DoHEs to interpret and buffer calls for reforms in 
a manner suitable to them (see Honig & Hatch, 2004). DoHEs can set the norms and create 
structures that shape the contours of SHECs role. While well-established councils such as Kerala 
seem to take a lot of matters under their purview and the DoHE welcomes this (A3), West 
Bengal’s council advises the government only when it is approached to do so. Many councils 
like the one in Odisha are relatively new and may still expand their activities. When functional, 
Punjab’s council can be more active, if the DoHE and political leadership support it.  
Quality Assurance and Academic Functions 
Quality assurance and academic functions place multiple responsibilities with the SHEC 
such as faculty quality enhancement, examination and curriculum quality, promotion of research 
and innovation, promotion of autonomy in the state and accreditation reforms (NHEM, 2013b). 
SHECs are supposed to draw on the academic experts in the state and academic functions 
naturally fall under their domain.  
The findings of this study suggest that in states where functional councils exist, academic 
and quality assurance functions form a bulk of the SHEC’s activities. Academic functions largely 
revolve around the implementation of UGC guidelines on semester system and choice-based 
credit system. The differences in the quality assurance functions by state are captured in Table 6. 
Other than Punjab, all the states have implemented these practices. The attitude of SHECs 
 
recent advisory activities include commenting on the National Education Policy and providing suggestions for 
creating new scholarship schemes and research incentivization schemes.   
68
 I believe that by using the term “advisory body” the interviewees are trying to indicate that SHECs are primarily 
advise-oriented, not action or implementation-oriented organizations in the state. 
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towards quality assurance is more varied. Kerala has chosen to approach curricular 
improvements by implementing outcome-based education, regular curricular revision, and 
creating a state-level accreditation agency. Odisha and West Bengal have standardized their 
undergraduate curriculums to maintain minimum standards. Only two Councils devote resources 
and efforts to promote research in the state and only Kerala operates a program for training 
faculty beyond the minimum requirements for promotions.  
Table 9. Quality Assurance and Academic Functions of SHECs 
 Kerala Odisha West Bengal Punjab 
Trainings for semester & 
CBCS implementation 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Implement outcome-based 
education 
Yes No No No 











Track and support 
accreditation 
Yes On request On request No 
Creating state-level 
accreditation bodies 
Yes No No No 
Set other quality norms 
and standards 
No No No No 
Faculty development 
support 
Yes (all newly 
recruited faculty) 
Yes (only for 
curriculum 
changes) 




Research funding/support Yes Yes No No 
Source: Compiled using interviews, documents on SHEC websites and college/university 
websites 
 
Most of the interviews with SHECs and DoHEs members suggest that academic 
functions are primarily interpreted as the implementation of academic standards set by the UGC. 
Of these, most attention is paid to the ones included in NHEM: switch to a semester system and 
the use of choice-based credit systems for designing degrees and curricula. The West Bengal and 
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Kerala SHECs held training for implementing these changes.69 In Odisha, the council does not 
directly provide training; it only coordinates activities between state universities. In Punjab, the 
transition is managed by the DoHE as the SHEC is not functional.  
In terms of quality assurance, there is an interesting divergence between SHECs. Odisha 
and West Bengal SHECs have led the creation of standardized undergraduate curriculums.70 
Whether such standardization is in line with quality improvement and innovation is discussed in 
the next chapter. Odisha is also creating faculty trainings and question banks based on the new 
curriculum. According to the SHEC, these steps are important in controlling the quality of the 
curriculum as well as the examination and assessment processes. These methods are centralized 
means of quality control and leave little scope for promoting decentralized curricular decision 
making at the universities or in the colleges.  
Kerala’s approach to curricular reforms and quality control has been fundamentally 
different. Instead of standardizing and centralizing the curriculum, it has undertaken two 
programs that maintain institutional academic autonomy of universities. Firstly, Kerala SHEC 
has conducted university and college level training sessions for the implementation of outcome-
based education (OBE) in the state. Multiple college and university respondents that I spoke to 
participated in these training sessions. Whether the implementation of OBE has affected 
classroom teaching or curriculum quality will probably become clearer over time.71  
 
69
 These trainings usually cover changes in the curriculum (C2, C4, D8, A7, A9). These are not pedagogical 
trainings to change teaching methods or professional development that helps in advising students on making 
curricular choices, etc. 
70
 In West Bengal, this has been done for twelve science subjects. In Odisha, it has been done across all 
undergraduate subjects. The Councils involved multiple universities and colleges across the state, revised their 
syllabus guidelines and adopted a common framework for all the universities across the state. 
71
 Details about the state’s approach towards OBE have been documented on the SHEC website and in a report 
authored by the SHEC. The OBE implementation was preceded by a revision of the undergraduate syllabus in 2016 
when the choice-based credit system and semester system were implemented in the state. A quick review of college 
websites shows that most colleges offer the same curriculum as their affiliating university and adopt the same OBE 
framework as well. It is possible that is likely to remain a symbolic change in the short term.  
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Secondly, Kerala SHEC has promoted the idea of establishing an accreditation council 
specifically for the state. The Act created by the SHEC has been approved by the DoHE and is 
being considered by the state legislature (A1, A5, A15). The capacity of the national 
accreditation council is limited and has come under pressure after the NHEM requirements for 
accreditation were announced. The establishment of a state agency will allow for better state-
level quality control mechanisms that will prepare state colleges for accreditation by the national 
agency (A15). While the SHEC does not work closely with private colleges, the accreditation 
will be able to ensure quality control in the non-public institutions. The establishment of the state 
accreditation council is also an important step in creating an ecosystem of agencies outside the 
DoHE that can support higher education governance in the state. The decentralization of key 
higher education functions such as planning, funding, regulation, and external quality assurance 
amongst multiple organizations increases specialization of each organization, prevents 
concentration of authority in one institution, and helps in improving accountability due to 
specificity of the functions (Larsen et al., 2014, p. 5).  
All the sample states generally fail to provide faculty development support or large-scale 
support for research and innovation in the state. Odisha has taken a few substantial steps such as 
conducting faculty training for a standardized undergraduate curriculum and instituting junior 
research fellowships and early-career research grant programs for young faculty.72 Kerala does 
not have similar funding for research grants or research fellowships. But the state has long-
standing scholarship programs to support selected students from undergraduate to doctoral 
levels. Kerala SHEC funds and organizes visiting scholar and faculty programs to expose state 
 
72
 In Odisha, many of the SHEC and DoHE’s activities also tie in with the World Bank project being implemented 
in the state. For instance, the funds for these research-focused programs and the interdisciplinary centers of 
excellence in the state have come from the World Bank and DoHE, not NHEM. But the SHEC leadership has been 
instrumental in supporting the project at the state level. 
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faculty to national and international-level research. Faculty development efforts in Odisha in 
West Bengal have been limited to faculty training associated with the new curricula. However, 
Kerala has started a program to provide intensive pedagogical training to all freshly recruited 
faculty in the past year.  
Quality assurance and academic matters are the only areas where SHECs in all states can 
operate with freedom and without the explicit direction of DoHEs. An important similarity is that 
none of the states have been involved in managing large-scale faculty development for academic 
reforms or in the creation of systemic governance and performance management regimes that 
promote quality assurance in the state. The observations do highlight some differences within 
these spheres of operation. The first is that some SHECs (like Kerala) have a broader 
interpretation of their role and their scope than other councils. They go beyond NHEM’s 
guidance and proactively adopt reforms, UGC guidelines, etc. Second, the same SHECs have 
adopted decentralized approaches towards quality assurance (accreditation authority as opposed 
to standardized curriculum). The reasons for these differences are explored in the next section.  
Limited Interpretation of SHEC’s Role 
The evidence on the effective functions of SHECs throw light on the power dynamics in 
the higher education policy subsystems as well as the operation of NHEM within the subsystems. 
It becomes apparent that the functions performed by the SHECs are far more limited than their 
Acts suggest or the NHEM mandates. Equally importantly, DoHEs still perform most of the 
functions that NHEM has assigned to SHECs. There are some notable patterns and 
contradictions in the division of responsibilities between the SHECs and the DoHEs.  
The first pattern shows the reform implementation strategy applied by the DoHE. SHECs 
are coopted by selectively decentralizing those functions that the DoHE does not deem important 
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(see Andersson & Liff, 2018; Selznick, 1949). Cooptation is the “adoption of a strategic element 
of another logic that retains the most important elements of its own logic” (Andersson & Liff, 
2018, p. 72). This selective adoption of the decentralization logic allows DoHEs to maintain a 
façade of reform compliance without devolving powers. 
Across all active state councils, the ability to make any financial allocations (NHEM and 
non-NHEM related), set targets and create plans, incentivize, or censure universities and colleges 
remains with the DoHE. Activities related to academic quality improvement and advisory are led 
by the SHEC. This shows that DoHEs prioritize control over resources, regulations, and their 
implementation while academic standards and policy advisory powers are more easily shared 
with a non-state actor.  
There is no evidence to suggest that this prioritization is questioned or opposed by the 
SHECs or the institutions. In fact, there is no evidence of the SHECs or universities and colleges 
mobilizing political support in a bid for more functions for the SHEC. I take this lack of 
resistance to mean that all the actors share the same attitude and beliefs about the position of 
SHECs in the state and how the SHEC reforms should be implemented. The attitudes appear to 
be taken-for-granted because the interviewees don’t suggest any sense of conflict or negotiation 
regarding these topics amongst different actors.  
The evidence discussed in this section mainly reflects attitudes about the division of 
responsibilities between the DoHEs and the SHECs. Within the broad similarities discussed 
above, there are small variations in the at the state level. Kerala’s beliefs allow the SHEC to take 
more initiative than Odisha or West Bengal. Meanwhile, in Punjab, the council is not considered 
important enough to be established properly. Kerala’s SHEC takes more types of initiatives than 
other states. The DoHE also relies on SHEC’s advise on important policy matters. Within the 
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initiatives that Kerala’s SHEC takes, it has used a less centralized interpretation of its functions 
and of the reform itself. Both the Kerala SHEC and DoHE have been committed to developing a 
state level accreditation body in the state. Meanwhile, the Odisha, West Bengal, and Punjab 
councils do not have the power to suggest or implement such a change. They also have more 
centralized approaches for quality assurance such as the use of a standardized curriculum.  
This brings me to the second pattern observed in this section about the interaction of 
NHEM instruments with the state systems (system-changing SHEC Acts and capacity-building 
funds). It becomes clear that NHEM’s instruments have not been not strong enough to affect the 
DoHE’s political will to decentralize control over a range of functions. It is possible that the 
funding incentives have not been large enough to motivate DoHEs to give up this control. It also 
appears that the financial resources provided as a part of NHEM may have created perverse 
incentives for DoHEs to centralize power rather than decentralizing it.  
The third pattern regards the responsibilities neglected by both SHEC and DoHE.  
NHEM’s design rests on the state’s ability to undertake many academic, administrative, and 
governance reforms. The SHEC activities indicate that neither are these capacities developed 
within SHECs nor are the SHECs in any position to build them in universities or colleges. The 
capacity of states to undertake important higher education management tasks has not changed 
substantially. SHECs and DoHEs have not created systems for strategic planning, established 
data collection and monitoring systems to assess the progress, or devised governance regimes to 
hold institutions accountable for performance.  
Similarly, the SHECs (except in Kerala) have not created capacities to investigate or 
address important policy problems like quality assurance in the affiliated system, the expansion 
of private colleges, financing research and innovation in the state, improving academic autonomy 
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for institutions, etc. The limited attention paid to developing these capacities suggests that they 
are not considered to be an important aspect of higher education governance in the states. DoHEs 
are in a position to assign the financial and technical resources required to build these capacities 
with the state or through SHECs. I suggest that these capacities have not been developed because 
DoHE’s beliefs regarding higher education governance do not prioritize these functions.  
This section examined the evidence regarding the implementation of SHEC reforms in 
terms of the functions of the Councils. The next section takes a step back and explores the 
strategies employed by DoHE to ensure that the influence of SHECs remains limited. The 
findings also deal with attitudes and interests of different actors involved in SHEC reform 
implementation.  
 
Resources and Powers of SHECs 
The National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) provides a detailed set of guidelines on 
the structure of State Higher Education Councils (SHECs), their powers, responsibilities, 
processes of appointments of leadership, etc. SHEC Acts across states are comparable, that is, 
there is no legal basis for differences in SHECs across the states (details about the legal 
provisions are in Appendix G). All the sample states follow NHEM guidelines regarding SHEC 
structures.73 Yet, there is remarkable variation in the way states operate their SHECs. Differences 
 
73
 Two notable exceptions: First, all the states make the Education Minister/Chief Minister as the Chairman of the 
SHEC. NHEM guidelines suggest that SHECs should be chaired by academics. I find that this choice is not 
necessarily a cause for concern. States report that having minimal political involvement in the SHEC streamlines 
communication and coordination with DoHEs and promotes the implementation of NHEM. This choice needs to be 
seen in conjunction with other appointment and the DoHE’s interest in maintaining SHEC’s independence. Second, 
in line with a New Public Management approach, the federal guidelines suggest smaller and less bureaucratic 
governance structures for SHECs. These prescriptions assume that smaller structures increase accountability by 
making fewer individuals more clearly responsible for an organization and reducing chances of politicization. 
NHEM guidelines suggest small SHECs (15-25 members) are likely to be more effective (NHEM, 2013b). But the 
data from sample states suggests that a leaner governance structure is not necessary for SHEC operations. Kerala’s 
SHEC performs well despite a three-tier structure, while Odisha and Punjab have small structures but little activity. 
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emerge in the quality and timeliness of SHEC appointments, and funding for SHECs.  I argue 
that the process of decentralization of higher education governance and management differs 
because states vary in the political support for decentralization through SHECs.  
Kerala has managed to maintain stable academic leadership for the Council without any 
large periods of inactivity. However, although the Council has the largest operation budget in the 
sample, the funds are not sufficient to implement NHEM’s expansive vision of SHECs. In 
contrast, West Bengal has reduced academic participation in SHEC leadership and relies on a 
larger proportion of ex-officio members in its leadership. Bengal’s Council also suffers from 
long periods when the Council leadership positions are vacant.  
Odisha’s council is relatively younger and even weaker. It has some academic leadership, 
but the leadership largely comprises ex-officio administrators. Odisha SHEC’s budget is only a 
fraction of Kerala and West Bengal, limiting the number of activities it can undertake. Finally, 
Punjab’s Council is almost inactive. It has not been fully formed and only appears to be 
operating on paper to fulfill NHEM’s prerequisite conditions. The SHEC’s leadership consists 
only of ex-officio political and administrative leaders of the higher education department.  
I find that the strategies adopted by SHECs continue to maintain centralization of power 
in the DoHE’s for a few key reasons. By controlling academic involvement in leadership of 
SHECs, the participation structure in the coalition is restricted. This prevents any strong 
dissenting actors from using the legal provisions to assert the powers of the SHECs. Without 
strong academic leaders, the SHECs cannot mobilize enough political power to advocate for their 
own functions or points of view. In states that do allow prominent academics within SHECs (as 
 
Thus, the structure of SHEC’s governance bodies seems to matter less than the political support for the Council in 




in Kerala), the authority of the SHEC increases. Crucially, this changes their relationship with 
institutions even when financial resources do not change. Lastly, controlling financial resources 
and access to experts limits the technical capacity of SHECs. This also prevents them from 
executing functions assigned to them. 
  
Politics of Leadership Appointments 
As discussed in the previous section, the legal provisions regarding the leadership of the 
SHECs differ across states. In this section, I analyze how the practice of leadership and 
memberships appointments differ by state. The SHEC Acts in all the states provide to the state 
governments the power of appointing SHEC leaders and members. Here, I present evidence on 
how DoHE controls the functioning, legitimacy, and influence of an SHEC by making leadership 
and membership appointments.74 I consider three aspects of leadership and membership 
appointments to the SHECs. The first is whether the leadership of SHEC brings any expertise or 
experience in higher education. The second is delays in making SHEC leadership appointments. 









 For the purposes of this discussion, the leadership of SHEC includes the officers mentioned in the SHEC Acts: 




Table 10. Leadership of SHECs 
 Kerala Odisha West Bengal Punjab 
No. of leaders Four Three Four Three 
Academic 
leaders Three One One None 
Vacant 
leadership 




leaders  One Two Two Three 
Periods with no 
or only ex-
officio 














(appointed)  Twenty-one 
Source: Compiled using interviews, latest data available on SHEC websites, newspaper reports 
Academic, Non-Academic Leaders, and Ex-officio Members 
The main purpose of creating SHECs is to decentralize the governance and management 
of higher education. Fundamentally, this involves devolving powers of decision making from the 
state and its bureaucrats to professionals from the higher education sector. NHEM assumes that 
decentralizing control over the management of higher education should involve academics 
because they have technical expertise and knowledge about the operation of higher education 
institutions. In comparison, the appointment of Ministers, DoHE bureaucrats, or other non-
academic leadership maintains DoHE’s control over SHECs. The appointment of ex-officio 
members also deprives SHECs of access to full-time engagement of its members.  
Amongst the SHECs leaders in the sample states, the interviewees with academic 
backgrounds were able to speak in much greater detail about the challenges faced by institutions 
in implementing the semester system and CBCS reforms, the quality of private institutions in the 
state, and the state’s views on academic autonomy in colleges (A15, B1 & D1). Kerala and 
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Odisha’s SHEC leaders were acutely aware of the challenges in the implementation of NHEM. 
The leader’s views echo strongly with the theory of functional decentralization that attempts to 
involve professionals and specialists in managing organizations. Conversely, appointing more 
bureaucrats and political leaders allows the DoHE to maintain a unity of command and similar 
organizational culture between the DoHE and SHEC. The efforts to maintain the unity of 
command were the strongest in Punjab, and a little weaker in West Bengal and Odisha and least 
prominent in Kerala. 
Apart from concerns about non-academic leaders, SHECs rely too heavily on ex-officio 
members.75 In principle, inclusion of ex-officio members should lead to better governance by 
keeping multiple stakeholders involved. However, it becomes a problem when the entire or 
majority of the membership of a body consists of ex-officio members. The last two rows of 
Table 10. shows the extent to which SHECs rely on ex-officio leaders and members. Ex-officio 
members only devote part of their time and attention to the SHEC. Thus, they are unable to serve 
the SHECs full-time.  
Most SHECs draw their ex-officio membership from Vice Chancellors and Principals of 
the state institutions who are appointed to their positions by the DoHE. This creates a conflict of 
interest for the members. Do they advocate for their institution, for the SHEC, or do they serve 
the DoHE? (F6). This practice is not likely to promote independence and good governance in 
SHECs. It certainly does not achieve decentralization of higher education management away 
 
75
 Ex officio members of governing bodies are the members who hold their position on the Board or SHEC by the 
virtue of occupying a position in another organization. For instance, the senior-most bureaucrat of the higher 
education department would be a part of the SHEC. As would Vice Chancellors of state universities. This is done to 
improve coordination between the state and the autonomous body. This practice is common in Indian public 
organizations. Senior appointees in DoHEs and universities may hold ex-officio memberships in more than one 
organization like government bodies, local bodies, universities, etc. For instance, some states place the bureaucrat in 
charge of DoHE on the Board of Governors of public universities in states.  
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from the DoHEs. In fact, it serves to concentrate the power in fewer hands while creating a 
façade of distributed governance structures. 
Despite guidelines to appoint qualified academics in the SHEC leadership, there is 
variation in the sample in terms of leadership and membership appointments.76 Kerala’s Council 
has the strongest academic leadership in the sample.77 The SHEC has two well-known academics 
as Vice-Chairperson and Member Secretary of the SHEC. Both individuals have served as Vice 
Chancellors of other universities and are reputed researchers. The SHEC’s academic leadership 
also receives a lot of support from Kerala's Minister of Higher Education, an erstwhile faculty 
member of the Kerala state university system. Kerala also draws the smallest proportion of its 
Executive Council leadership from ex-officio members. Only two-thirds of its Executive Council 
members are ex-officio.  
In Odisha, the SHEC is headed by a retired Vice Chancellor (VC) of the flagship state 
university. His leadership and established reputation appear to be critical in ensuring that the 
SHEC recommendations are taken seriously by the state. The DoHE (B3, B8) and the university 
administration (B2, B10) mention the Vice Chairperson’s leadership and capabilities in steering 
the SHEC.78 However, Odisha SHEC’s member secretary is an administrative officer who has 
many other responsibilities in addition to the SHEC and NHEM (C8). This implies that the 
 
76
 NHEM’s vision document clarifies the guidelines with respect to the kind of individuals who should occupy these 
positions and the process that must be followed for their selection. As discussed earlier, this is because the federal 
government has reservations about politicized decision-making for such positions in states (NHEM, 2013; p. 150). 
The policy explicitly mentions apolitical decision making as one of its tenets (p. 91). 
77
Kerala is also unique because its Higher Education Minister (also the Chairperson of the Council) is retired faculty 
from a state government college. The Minister in Kerala also happens to be the only politician who agreed to have a 
conversation about this study. Though he did not consent to be interviewed for the study or make any comments on 
the record, he did acknowledge that research on the implementation of higher education reforms is of critical value.  
78
 This Vice Chancellor also worked on the state university’s plans for World Bank funded projects. Views about 
his leadership and vision were corroborated by officials who worked on the project (F5).  
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SHEC has only one leadership role fully dedicated to the concerns of the Council. All others are 
ex-officio members.  
West Bengal’s government has had a contentious relationship with academics. The 
council has suffered through long vacancies of academic positions. In fact, the government also 
amended the SHEC Act in 2015 to reduce the representation of academics.79 After the change, 
only one in four leadership positions was required to be held by an academic, the Academic Vice 
Chairperson. This position was vacant between 2013 and 2019 (Times News Network, 2013; 
WBSCHE, 2019). The other two leadership positions are occupied by individuals with no 
academic or higher education experience. The state SHEC confines itself to minimal academic 
and advisory activities specifically assigned to it (D1). 
Apart from the leadership, West Bengal’s SHEC is rather large because it includes VCs 
from all the state universities as ex-officio members. Including all VCs in the state in an ex-
officio capacity only improves participatory governance on paper. In practice, it diffuses the 
responsibility of over a very large number of individuals.  
As mentioned in Table 10, Punjab’s Council has three leaders. The SHEC is headed by 
the Chief Minister of the State (equivalent of a Governor in an American state). The Minister of 
Higher Education is Vice Chairperson of the Council. The Member Secretary is the bureaucrat in 
charge of DoHE. No academics serve in the leadership of the Council. On paper, the state’s 
SHEC has no vacant leadership positions. However, it has no academic leaders or leaders that 
serve the organization full-time. Including its leaders, all the members of Punjab’s SHEC are ex-
 
79
 Prior leaders of Councils in Bengal were VCs and researchers of national repute from West Bengal’s flagship 
universities. This culture seems to have been upset after the Trinamool Congress came to power in the state in 2011. 
The conflicts between SHEC and Minister of Education appear to have increased. In 2013, the Chairperson of the 
Council, Dr Sugato Marjit resigned (Times News Network, 2013). The Council did not appoint anyone to this post 




officio. None of them are appointed to and specifically serve the SHEC full time.  Choice of 
leadership is a crucial decision for the SHECs and DoHEs. Appointing multiple non-academic 
leaders and members to SHECs reduces the technical capacity of the SHECs by limiting the 
involvement of academic voices in the governance and management of higher education (Larsen 
et al., 2014, p.8). Apolitical decision making is also compromised when the leadership 
appointments are made without a transparent process of selection (see Bhushan, 2015; 
Fukuyama, 2013). Similarly, over-reliance on ex-officio members weakens the SHEC 
governance structure rather than making it more participative.  
I also argue that the SHEC derives normative power amongst educational institutions in 
the state if it is led by established academic leaders. Involvement of DoHE’s bureaucrats and 
political leaders undermines a fundamental purpose of functional decentralization i.e. the use of 
profession-specific expertise in the management of a sector (see Mcginn & Welsh, 1999). It also 
sends a message regarding the supremacy of the state’s control over the higher education sector.  
The nature of appointments has had opposite effects in Kerala and West Bengal. Kerala’s 
academic leadership has established a wide range of advisory activities and new quality control 
functions. In West Bengal, limited academic involvement in the SHECs has resulted in the 
SHEC only undertaking affiliation inspections and advising the state on faculty qualifications for 
appointments or student transfers from one institution to another. Despite the oldest SHEC in the 
sample, Bengal’s SHEC has not established its presence over a wider range of academic, 
advisory, and planning functions. I associate this with the weak appointments to the leadership 
and membership of SHECs.  
In comparison, Odisha’s SHEC is young and has only one academic leader. However, 
this leader appears to be a dynamic academic who enjoys the DoHE’s support. He has been able 
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to take a few more advisory actions such as establishing young scholars and postdoctoral support 
grants in the state. Punjab’s SHEC and its contributions are unclear. The SHEC can participate in 
NHEM because its ex-officio leadership can fulfill the formalities of approving the SHEP. But 
without any other full-time leaders or members, the Council has been virtually defunct.  
 
Delayed Appointments 
The state government can influence the power of the Council through inaction (Stone, 
2012). States leave SHECs leadership positions vacant for extended periods of time.80 None of 
the four states have included this condition in their SHEC Acts. All sample states have a poor 
record of maintaining continuously functional SHECs. Punjab typifies the most extreme case 
where members have never been appointed. In Kerala, the SHEC did not have members between 
2016 and 2017 when there was a transfer of power from the United Democratic Front to Left 
Democratic Front (Gurukkal, 2017). Odisha’s SHEC functioned with just the Vice Chairperson, 
Member Secretary, and support staff between January 2018 and April of 2019. West Bengal’s 
academic leadership position was vacant for three years before it was filled in October 2019. 
Additionally, the SHEC did not have any Member Secretary between 2013 and 2016.  
In Odisha, appointment delays seem to stem from slow decision-making by the DoHE 
leadership. In Punjab, this appears to happen due to inaction and disinterest of the DoHE leaders 
in keeping the council functional. West Bengal’s SHEC vacancies were driven by political 
concerns (see footnote in previous section). Whether the reason for delays is a change in 
administration (Kerala) or inaction, it reflects the fact that DoHEs wish to control the 
 
80
 NHEM attempts to address this issue by suggesting that only a third of the council should be reappointed every 
year (NHEM, 2013, p. 151). This feature is also present in appointments to the Upper House of the Indian 




composition of SHECs and other actors in the state policy subsystem to not consider this to be a 
problem. For instance, a non-academic SHEC member in Bengal (D1) insisted that the Council 
has never been without leadership because DoHE leaders are always on the Council. Thus, 
implying that vacant academic leadership positions are not cause for concern.  
 
Financial Resources  
Autonomous control over financial resources or lack of financial dependence on the state 
is an important part of establishing a regulatory or coordinating agency that can independently 
advise or assess the state government. Effective functional decentralization can only occur when 
the new agencies have independent sources of finance or have a guaranteed level of funding 
from the state. Financial dependence on the DoHEs can limit the functionality of organizations 
like State Higher Education Councils.  
SHEC Acts in all four of the sample states leave the task of funding the SHECs with 
DoHEs. All the SHEC Acts state that any additional funds required for the operation of the 
SHECs will be determined by the state government on an on-going basis. As seen in Table 11, 
each SHEC has a different budget. The budgets include salaries for the staff of the Council and 
other operational expenses (National Institute for Education Planning and Administration, 2018). 
While Kerala and West Bengal have sizable budgets, Punjab and Odisha SHECs operate on 
significantly smaller amounts of funds. Still, for all the states, the SHEC budgets in states are 
vastly disproportionate to the number of tasks that NHEM expects SHECs to do.  Even in states 
like Kerala and West Bengal, the amount of operational expenditure is insufficient to do myriad 
tasks like conducting policy research, providing technical assistance to institutions, creating a 
management information system, managing institutional evaluations, etc.  
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Table 11. Financial Resources of SHECs 
 Kerala Odisha West Bengal Punjab 
Budget (last 
available) 
INR 170 mil 
(2019-20) 
INR 18 mil 
(2019-20) 
INR 130 mil 
(2017-18) 
- 
Endowment fund None None None INR 50 million 
Salaries of staff and 
operational 
expenses 
Paid by DoHE Paid by DoHE Paid by DoHE Paid by DoHE 






Staff other than 
leadership 
11 4 11 0 
Source: Compiled using interviews, documentation on SHEC websites, and (NIEPA, 2014, 
2019).  
Note: As Punjab’s Council has not been active, no information about its budget is available with 
NIEPA or Punjab DoHEs.   
 
The SHEC in Kerala had the largest operational budget of 170 million INR in 2019-20. 
About 55% of this budget was for the scholarships managed by the SHEC and another 24% for 
salaries of staff.81 The remaining 20% of funds are applied towards a variety of other initiatives 
such as the State Assessment and Accreditation Council (5 million INR), conferences, training 
for institutions, faculty training center, research studies, the higher education survey, etc. This 
budget does not support extensive outreach to institutions on a regular basis for capacity 
building, planning, monitoring or evaluation activities.82  
In West Bengal, the Council mainly depends on grants from the state; its last available 
budget was 130 million INR (NIEPA, 2019). The budget covers salaries and operational 
expenses of the council. Exact details of the Council’s budget have never been included on the 
 
81
 Calculated using budgetary memos of the Kerala State Higher Education Council (KSHEC, 2019a) 
 
82
 Kerala’s SHEC took a decision to create a Council Development Fund to collect the fees charged by the Council 
for consultancy or other work done for colleges and universities (KSHEC, 2019b). The new sources are unlikely to 
make the SHEC completely independent financially of the state. The fees are likely to be small because of strong 
focus on affordable provision of public services and education in Kerala.  
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website. The SHEC does collect some inspection fees from universities and colleges, but this 
does not fund any major activities other than procuring office equipment etc. The SHEC did not 
share any plans of expanding their sources of funding.  
In Odisha, the Council has a very small working budget. Though the Council does not 
have a website where the budget and accounts are shared, the DoHE’s budget shows that the 
Council was allocated 10 million INR in 2018-19 and 18.7 million in 2019-20. This Council is 
one of the youngest in the sample and it is possible that the budget will increase as the SHEC’s 
position in the state strengthens. At the current level of funding, its activities are likely to be 
limited.  
Punjab’s council does not have a dedicated annual budget. In Punjab, The SHEC Act 
dictates that an amount of INR 50 million is set aside as an endowment fund (the interest income 
or dividend income from it is used to meet basic organizational expenditures). The income from 
this amount is likely to be insufficient to support the operation of SHEC at a scale that NHEM 
requires. Annual budgets of Kerala and West Bengal Councils are substantially larger than the 
corpus created in Punjab. 
Limited financial resources of SHECs directly affect their human resource capacity. 
SHECs have no independent sources of revenue and need DoHE’s permission to hire any staff 
(see Appendix C for legal provisions). Most SHECs are not staffed with enough people to 
conduct all their duties. For instance, Kerala SHEC has seven administrative staff and four 
research staff in addition to the leadership. Odisha SHEC has three clerical staff and one research 
officer. The DoHE is planning to appoint three or more staff to the SHEC (B3). The West Bengal 
council has eleven staff members apart from the Member Secretary who deal with finance, 
accounts, and legal matters. Punjab SHEC does not have any support staff.   
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To understand how limited these resources are, they need to be contextualized in terms of 
the size of the higher education system they are meant to serve. Punjab and Odisha have about 
1000 colleges each and 0.56 to 0.72 million students enrolled in them. The staff of the SHECs in 
these states is clearly not enough to support any type of reforms or capacity building in a system 
this large. 
Implications for NHEM  
The shape of the State Higher Education Councils (SHEC) reform in every state is 
determined by the extent to which federal policy instruments have been successful in spurring 
change in the state higher education system. The evidence regarding DoHE resources 
underscores the finding that state policy subsystems are dominated by DoHEs.  
DoHEs have the authority and financial resources to coopt SHECs. They control SHEC 
appointments as well as the financial allocations. DoHEs choose to create SHECs because it 
allows them to gain access to federal funds and it provides them access to expertise in areas 
where they are not interested in getting involved (like academic decisions). However, the logic of 
decentralization through academic expertise is only applied partially. SHECs are never given 
enough resources to fully exploit their legal powers and rival the SHEC’s position in the state.  
Why do DoHEs want to limit or control the powers of SHECs? A simple explanation is 
that DoHEs wish to retain control over the ability to plan for and allocate financial resources in 
the state. At least one respondent in Kerala suggested that DoHEs’ interest in SHEC activities 
increased when NHEM funds began flowing through the Council. While it may be true that 
DoHEs are driven by their self-interest, it does not explain why SHECs and the stakeholders that 
should be represented in SHECs don’t act in their own self-interest and mobilize for greater 
resources. There is no evidence that SHEC leaders or colleges and universities have mobilized 
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against the state to strengthen SHECs and to decentralize governance of the system. In fact, most 
institutions are largely unaware of the SHECs and don’t have much to say about them.  
SHECs and DoHEs in states do not see bureaucratic leadership of SHECs as a problem. 
In fact, in trying to explain the important position of the SHEC, a respondent in West Bengal’s 
SHEC (D1) said that, “Council is the highest apex body in the state...all the Vice-Chancellors are 
the members. Our Minister is the Chairperson of the council. And our principal secretary is the 
Vice Chairperson”. According to this respondent, the SHEC gains its legitimacy from sharing 
leadership with the DoHE, and not from academic expertise of its leaders.  
The next section of the chapter summarizes the findings using the advocacy coalition 
framework.  
  
Summary and Conclusions  
The establishment of SHECs is a cornerstone of NHEM. In this chapter, I compare the 
implementation of this reform in Kerala, Odisha, Punjab, and West Bengal. The findings suggest 
that my hypotheses about the implementation of SHEC reforms have been largely accurate. 
States have not established strong SHECs that share significant financial, regulatory, or 
administrative powers with DoHEs. I suggest that the main motive for establishing SHECs was 
to horizontally decentralize planning, monitoring, assessment, academic and quality assurance 
functions from the DoHE to other state-level bodies, particularly the SHECs (NHEM, 2013, p. 
107). NHEM attempted to achieve this through system-changing tools that were supposed to 
create a legislative basis for the transfer of authority and capacity-building investments in the 
initial setup of SHECs (see Ingram & Schneider, 1990; McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).  
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I find that the policy instruments were able to ensure the establishment of the SHECs 
through legislative acts, but they did not create political or bureaucratic support for functional 
decentralization in the state. As a result, the SHECs have not emerged as important players in the 
governance and management of higher education in the states. DoHEs continue to control many 
functions such as financing and planning. Few activities related to academic functions and 
advising are performed by existing SHECs. And many functions critical to NHEM’s causal logic 
such as performance monitoring, capacity building for reforms, etc. are not fulfilled by DoHEs 
or SHECs.  
The influence of SHECs is limited in the states. This is primarily due to decisions taken 
by DoHEs. DoHEs have not followed federal guidelines entirely. Political or bureaucratic leaders 
dominate the leadership of SHECs, many appointments are delayed for extended periods, and 
there is excessive reliance on ex-officio members in the Councils. This limits the technical 
capacity of councils to understand concern of academic institutions and reduces their normative 
power over institutions. Additionally. SHECs are financially dependent on DoHEs and have 
limited budgets. These strategies effectively prevent powers from being decentralized to SHECs.  
Nature of the Subsystem and Policy Coalition 
Implementation analysis using Advocacy Coalition Framework requires a focus on an 
entire policy subsystem rather than the specific institutions implementing the policy (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2007). In this case, I treat each state higher education system as a separate policy 
subsystem. The higher education subsystems in the states are relatively stable. Between 2013 and 
2019, financial resources of states, their legal frameworks for DoHEs, universities, and colleges, 
etc., have remained the same. There has only one major external change, the creation of NHEM 
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in the federal policy subsystem. This has affected state subsystems and each has reacted slightly 
differently to the policy.   
The state subsystem can consist of different actors such as DoHEs, SHECs, universities, 
government and private colleges, academic experts, faculty unions, professional organizations, 
etc. In this study, I only observe a few actors that are interested in influencing the affairs of the 
subsystem (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, p. 192). These actors are DoHEs, SHECs, universities, 
government colleges. For specific issues that relate to them, private colleges and faculty unions 
also get involved in subsystems.  
Policy implementation of any issue in the subsystem is influenced by advocacy coalitions 
of the state (Sabatier, 1986). I find only one coalition operating in all the state subsystems. I find 
that DoHEs are the most powerful actor in the subsystem and they head the only advocacy 
coalition in the subsystem. For SHEC reforms, SHECs form a part of DoHE’s coalition. For 
other reforms, universities and government colleges are prominent members of the coalition. 
Thus, NHEM’s implementation is influenced by the coalition consisting of the DoHE, SHECs, 
universities and government colleges.  
I do not find any evidence of other coalitions operating the subsystems. No other groups 
of actors coordinate their efforts and try to influence the implementation of SHEC reforms in the 
states. Private colleges and faculty unions only get involved with specific issues and even then, 
they may not coordinate their actions on the basis of beliefs. The laws and regulatory systems in 
Indian state education give a lot of power to states and create few formal mechanisms and venues 
for other non-state actors to interact with the state or with educational institutions in the state. 
With such limited opportunity structures for participation (see Sabatier & Weible, 2007), few 
actors get actively involved in policy subsystems and even fewer form coalitions against the 
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state. In case of grievances, the state is usually approached by actors individually and not as a 
part of a coalition of different actors. The involvement of businesses and politicians in owning 
higher education institutions creates another possibility. That explicit coalition formation by 
private colleges is not required, because they can rely on unofficial channels of influencing 
policy. These channels have not been observed as a part of this study.  
Thus, state-level implementation for NHEM appears to be driven by the policy monopoly 
headed by the DoHEs and other state-related actors (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010, p. 159). A 
single interest or belief system dominates the higher education policy subsystem. These beliefs 
are discussed in the next section. Punctuated equilibrium theorists argue prolonged phases of 
policy stability occur because monopolies “systematically dampen pressures for change” when 
the changes are not in line with the monopoly’s beliefs (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010). I find the 
same to be true in state higher education policy subsystems.  
The policy monopoly headed by DoHEs has two important resources at their disposal. 
The legal authority to make multiple decisions about SHECs and institutions, and control over 
financial resources. These resources allow them to adopt strategies regarding division of 
functions, leadership, membership, and financial resources of SHECs that influence the 
functioning of SHECs (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, p. 193). As the evidence in this chapter 
has shown, these strategies allow DoHEs to fulfill federal mandates performatively and yet retain 
control over the higher education sector in the state (see Honig & Hatch, 2004).  
Next, I discuss the beliefs that appear to characterize the advocacy coalitions.  
Belief System and Strategies of the Coalition  
The analytic framework of this chapter clarified that this study’s data collection is not 
designed to identify the belief systems of the policy coalitions. Here I work backwards and use 
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the evidence regarding policy actions, strategies, and other information available on states to 
identify the taken-for-granted beliefs and attitudes that appear to shape the actions of individuals. 
This study’s scope does not allow me to make claims about the strength of the relationship 
between the belief systems and actions of states. Further research in this area can focus on 
confirming and clarifying the existence of these belief systems within policy coalitions and the 
extent to which they shape actions of the actors.  
As discussed in the previous sections, DoHE’s resistance to decentralizing powers to 
SHECs can be motivated by their self-interest. mainly, DoHE’s are unwilling to share financial 
resources and control over institutions with SHECs (A15, B1). Scholars of decentralization refer 
to this as a lack of local political will to devolve control (see Bray, 2013; Hanson, 1998; Mcginn 
& Welsh, 1999). Some scholars of ACF have also found this to be a motivating factor that brings 
coalitions together (Nohrstedt, 2010). However, this does not explain why other actors in the 
subsystem that stand to benefit from decentralization (like SHECs, colleges, and universities) 
have not attempted to support the implementation of SHECs. SHECs offer a venue for multiple 
actors to participate and advocate for their concerns regarding higher education management in 
the state. Why have these actors not mobilized their resources to support the reforms?  
I suggest that this lack of support for decentralization through SHECs is driven by beliefs 
and taken-for-granted norms that affect DoHEs, SHECs, as well as universities and colleges. 
Beliefs are the attitudes, values, and causal logics held in common by members of an advocacy 
coalition (Sabatier, 1988, p. 132). They inform the understanding of policy problems and 
solutions in the coalition. This chapter uncovers two main aspects of the belief systems of the 
dominant advocacy coalition in states. Both aspects relate to the governance and management of 
higher education in the state (see Lauglo, 1995). The first, is the belief that the authority and 
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responsibility for governance lies in the hands of the state. The second, is a belief about the 
meaning and scope of higher education governance in the state. And these beliefs do not match 
NHEM’s theory of action for SHEC reforms.  
NHEM and its reforms draw on New Public Management-type principles of sectoral 
governance. These principles include the use of competition as a driving force, mission driven 
rather than rule driven management, and evaluative role for the state rather than an 
interventionist one (Amaral et al., 2003; Denhardt & Catlaw, 2004; Neave & Van Vught, 1994). 
In this view, governance of higher education is understood as a set checks and balances created 
to ensure that the whole system achieves its objectives. SHEC’s reforms observe these principles 
in many ways. Firstly, the creation of active SHECs transfers many governance responsibilities 
from the state to an autonomous body thereby creating a buffer between the state and institutions 
(NHEM, 2013, p. 15). The reliance on an ecosystem of autonomous institutions rather than the 
state is a characteristic of a diffused governance system (Larsen et al., 2014). It is supposed to 
improve performance orientation and accountability of the entire system.  
Secondly, NHEM takes a broad view of higher education governance. Recommended 
functions of the SHECs reflect this change. SHECs should involve the state and institutions in 
higher education planning processes that orient participants towards specific goals (NHEM, 
2013, p. 63-64). They are also supposed to develop data collection systems that help in assessing 
institutional performance on various goals (p. 153). SHECs are expected to advise the DoHEs in 
developing performance-based funding systems. Additionally, other reforms discussed in 
Chapter 6 decentralize powers from DoHEs and institutions (pp. 91-97). This allows institutions 
the autonomy to make outcome-based decisions rather than focusing on rules set by the DoHEs. 
All these changes signal a shift for the DoHE’s role in managing higher education in the state. 
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Instead of directly managing compliance of rules, planning, hiring, etc. for many institutions, the 
state’s focus moves to setting goals and creating systems that steer universities and colleges in 
the required direction.  
Does the current implementation of SHECs in states reflect these changes or a move 
towards such a system in states? My analysis shows that decentralization using SHEC reforms 
conflicts with both tenets of the coalition’s belief system. Policy beliefs of DoHEs, universities, 
colleges, and even SHEC members do not align with NHEM’s beliefs.  
Firstly, most actors in the system believe that the authority and responsibility for higher 
education governance should be in the hands of the state. This belief system places the state at 
the center of governance, rather than an ecosystem of institutions holding each other 
accountable. SHECs derive their power from the fact that they are led by DoHE bureaucrats and 
political leaders. This belief is also reflected in DoHE’s continued control over funding, 
planning, and evaluation systems. None of the actors in the advocacy coalitions believe that the 
SHECs should have more powers for planning or monitoring and evaluation. Indeed, SHECs do 
not even play an important role in implementing federal policies like NHEM and most actors in 
the state systems do not contest this minimal interpretation of the role of SHECs.   
Even when SHECs are formed, their leadership and financial resources keep the SHECs 
tied to DoHEs. In the view of some interviewees, SHECs draw their legitimacy from the fact that 
they share their leadership with the DoHEs. Ex-officio appointments also extend the DoHE’s 
control over the SHECs. SHECs and other actors do not demand for greater academic 
representation on the council or for more financial resources. This reflects the belief that 
bureaucrats and political leaders provide important and necessary leadership in higher education 
governance of the state. Thus, they are natural leaders of the SHECs. Representation of 
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academics on the SHECs in one or two leadership positions and in ex-officio capacity is 
sufficient. The financial dependence of the SHECs on the DoHEs is considered a taken-for-
granted reality of an autonomous body in the state. 
Secondly, the advocacy coalition’s belief system has a limited view of what higher 
education governance implies. Many actors still understand issues of governance and 
management in higher education as compliance with rules and regulations set by the DoHE. This 
is reflected in the kind of functions and processes that DoHEs continue to focus on. For instance, 
the planning for NHEM is bottom-up and informed by institutional needs. But it is limited to the 
funds offered by NHEM. Thus, instead of using strategic planning as a tool for overall 
development of institutions, it is reduced to proforma planning that lists out key heads of 
expenditure.   
Monitoring of NHEM and evaluation of its progress mainly centers on the conformity to 
federal rules for spending and timely use of the funds. Capacity building done by SHECs for 
NHEM is also mainly concerned with reducing bottlenecks in the funding application process 
and ensuring that institutions submit error free funding requests and follow rules while spending 
funds. Data collection is sporadic and limited to details required by federal implementing 
agencies. Thus, all the processes that are supposed to promote evaluation-based governance of 
institutions get reduced to rule-based compliance. There is virtually no evidence of performance-
based funding systems that look beyond an institution's ability to utilize funds on time or of data 
systems that can collect information on institutions.  
This view of governance further fuels practices that place the state at the center of 
governance. Most interviewees in institutions, DoHEs and SHECs believe that non-state actors 
like SHECs do not have the authority to hold a state-funded institution accountable or handle 
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disbursement of federal funds. This is mainly because managing either process requires 
familiarity with the government spending rules and ensuring compliance of regulations. When 
compliance of rules is the main concern in governance, bureaucratic expertise is bound to be 
more valued than academic/professional expertise in governing institutions (see Merton, 1940). 
This explains why DoHEs wish to retain control over functions relating to financing of 
institutions, hiring of faculty and administrators, establishment and closure of institutions, 
permissions for program offerings, etc. In comparison, the management of curricular standards, 
improvements in examinations and assessment, determining learning outcomes, means of 
encouraging research, etc. are secondary goals under this belief system. When SHECs are 
introduced into the institutional ecosystem, academic and advisory activities are more easily 
shared than planning and monitoring functions.  
Having noted the common attitudes and beliefs across states, I will discuss some of the 
differences between them. Before I do so, I will reiterate that when it comes to following 
NHEM’s theory of action or accurately interpreting its beliefs, states are more similar than they 
are different. Kerala’s SHEC is the only one that stands out from other active SHECs in terms of 
its activities and relative status in the state.  
Kerala’s SHEC addresses specific requests made by the DoHE but they also enjoy room 
to maneuver in discharging the advisory function. This autonomy does not extend into the 
management of federal policies like NHEM, but it does allow the Kerala Council to undertake 
activities that are much more expansive. KSHEC has issued committee reports on establishing 
clusters of colleges, on the effects of autonomy on Kerala colleges, on the implementation of 
outcome-based education in the state, on revised norms for staff and faculty or private colleges, 
etc. Kerala DoHE and institutions are receptive to these advisories because some of them have 
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also been acted upon and widely discussed by institutions. As a result, more Kerala colleges are 
aware of the SHEC and their role in academic decision-making.  
Two factors differentiate Kerala from other states. The first, that Kerala’s political culture 
is generally more open to decentralization across sectors when compared to other Indian states 
(Heller et al., 2007; Kalirajan & Otsuka, 2012; Mukundan & Bray, 2004; P. Singh, 2011) Some 
researchers have attributed it to wider political mobilization and to the political competition 
created by multiple left-of-center parties that have dominated the state politics (Heller, 2001). In 
comparison, West Bengal has also had left-of-center political parties in power but limited 
political mobilization across social classes has stifled decentralization efforts in local governance 
and caused a reversion to patronage-based relationships in politics (Harriss & Törnquist, 2015).  
The second, that Kerala SHEC’s strong academic leadership has more political and 
normative power to shape the policy implementation options and interpretation. In contrast, 
Odisha and West Bengal’s Councils are known within the state but their relationship with the 
institutions is limited to a few areas. They mainly advise the government on technical 
qualifications during faculty recruitment and support the implementation of UGC guidelines. In 
Punjab, faculty in colleges are completely unaware of the Council.  
Beliefs about governance are only one aspect of the belief systems that pull policy 
coalitions together in states. Other factors affect coalition formation. Self-interests of each actor 
can determine their participation in a coalition (Nohrstedt, 2010). The next chapter will consider 
the interests and other aspects of the coalition belief system that affect NHEM’s implementation.  
The next section examines the strategies adopted by the dominant coalition to influence the 




Implications for NHEM  
This discussion considers how the design of NHEM instruments affects the 
implementation of SHECs and if there are any ways of improving their efficacy.  
NHEM instruments operate in a complicated state higher education environment. The 
SHEC reforms face considerable challenges in their implementation. There is a lack of political 
will on the part of the DoHEs to share control over the management of the higher education 
sector (see Mcginn & Welsh, 1999). The policy actions with respect to NHEM also suggest that 
other actors in the state have certain beliefs about the meaning of higher education governance 
and the SHEC’s role in it. It is clear that NHEM’s beliefs about these issues are incompatible 
with advocacy coalitions in states.  
The primary policy tool employed for SHEC reforms is a system-changing tool. NHEM 
conditioned all federal funding on the creation of SHECs through legal or executive action. And 
this tool has been successful in states. Primarily, because the DoHEs are interested in getting the 
federal funds. It is also possible that the legal structure for SHECs has been created with the 
knowledge that its implementation can be controlled by the DoHEs. Thus, it is unlikely to 
become a threat.  
But Chapter 4 found that the policy making process did not include extensive 
engagement with state policy subsystems. Thus, NHEM’s policy makers did not attempt to 
understand and engage with the attitudes of state actors regarding the SHEC reform. This means 
that the state actors were not prepared for the new belief system associated with the reforms. It 
also means that the policy design and instrument choice of NHEM was probably blind to the 
attitudes in the states. As a result, no provisions were made for on-going engagement with states 
about the functions of the SHECs and reinforcing new beliefs about the importance of 
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decentralization in improving the governance of higher education. NHEM only provides a one-
time grant for the initial setup of SHECs. There are no on-going incentives to ensure that it 
remains operational. Secondly, there are virtually no federal monitoring systems that track the 
development of SHECs in the state.  
Changing the belief systems or culture of the system can be very challenging, if not 
impossible to achieve (see Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Mcginn & Welsh, 1999). However, it might be 
possible for NHEM to create incentives for such change by stricter enforcement of performance 
management systems that promote this change. For instance, the limited understanding of 
governance and management of higher education has led states to neglect substantive planning, 
monitoring, or evaluation with regards to NHEM. NHEM’s vision document views planning, 
monitoring and evaluation as a cyclical process that is aimed at creating a culture of self-
assessment, competition and gradual improvement in the states, universities, and the colleges 
(NHEM, 2013, p. 88). NHEM’s implementation at the federal level can reinforce the new belief 
system through a more extensive process of plan appraisal and active federal support for plan 
creation. While the belief systems in states may not change entirely, effective implementation 
can move them in a more desired direction.  
Importantly, federal implementation needs to involve SHECs rather than DoHEs, as a 
partner in NHEM implementation. Currently, NHEM’s federal implementers also focus on 
tracking funds and coordinate with DoHEs for these purposes (B1). SHECs need to be built up as 
important organizations in the state ecosystem and the state policy subsystem does not provide 
them with resources to do so. In this case, the federal government can provide the financial 
resources and normative power to SHECs. This would include involving the SHECs in 
generating solutions and developing technical capacity for improved governance of the state 
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systems. Federal implementers can involve SHECs in creating plans for management of 
affiliation reforms, creation of cluster universities, governance reforms in government and 
private colleges, rationalization of administrative processes, etc. in the states.  
This chapter deals exclusively with the creation and operation of SHECs.  The next 
chapter looks at the implementation of all the other reforms included in NHEM. Though the 
analysis also employs the advocacy coalition framework, it broadens the nature of belief systems 
operating in the states and looks at less overt and less political strategies of implementation 
adopted by the advocacy coalition. As a result, the analysis in the next chapter draws more on 





Chapter 6. Progress and Problems: Implementing NHEM Reforms 
The National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) differentiated itself from other policies 
and federal funding schemes by making federal funds contingent on reforms in the state higher 
education systems. NHEM aimed to initiate reforms that would have a “self-sustaining 
momentum” and help in improving the access, equity, and quality of higher education (NHEM, 
2013, p.17). The first such reform was the establishment of State Higher Education Councils 
(SHECs), that would horizontally decentralize the control of higher education management in the 
state to newly created autonomous bodies. Other reforms address vertical decentralization of 
powers from Departments of Higher Education (DoHEs) to universities, colleges, and external 
bodies like accreditation agencies. This is done through affiliation reforms; autonomy reforms; 
accreditation reforms; and academic reforms.  
Chapter 5 examined the evidence on the origins and impacts of State Higher Education 
Councils. This chapter analyzes the implementation of the remaining NHEM reforms. This 
chapter answers the fourth research question: Have states chosen to implement the same NHEM 
reforms with different intensity? And do these different interpretations match with NHEM's 
theory of action?   
I find that by and large, NHEM’s policy instruments have been unsuccessful in 
institutionalizing the reforms in the states. NHEM has not decentralized administrative, 
academic, or quality assurance processes at the heart of the state university system. Instead of 
procedural reforms, the focus of NHEM implementation has been on the creation and renovation 
of infrastructure such as college or university classrooms, laboratories, equipment, etc. 
Some common challenges appear in the implementation of all the reforms. Firstly, the 
state policy subsystems have certain belief systems about the academic autonomy and quality 
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assurance that differ from NHEM’s theory of action. This limits political support for the reforms 
from all the actors. Secondly, key members of the state policy subsystems, specifically the 
universities and colleges, lack the technical and financial resources required to implement the 
reforms. As a result, the actors within the subsystem have translated the reforms in ways that suit 
their organizational resources and culture but not necessarily the aims of NHEM.  
There are some state-level differences in the implementation of all reforms. None of the 
states have seriously attempted to solve the policy problem of large-scale affiliation by state 
universities. Kerala and Odisha have experimented with creating cluster universities, and Odisha 
has also converted some autonomous colleges into universities. However, these states have faced 
several legal, coordination, and financial challenges in establishing new institutions. Meanwhile, 
West Bengal has created new universities but outside the ambit of NHEM and Punjab has not 
made any efforts to try either solution. Importantly, states have not created any strategies to 
counter the pressure to affiliate colleges in the future and to develop alternate systems of quality 
assurance.  
Autonomy reforms are only implemented in colleges, not in universities. Autonomy is 
interpreted narrowly as the attainment of “autonomous status” granted by UGC. It is not 
understood as a broader set of processes that ensure financial, administrative, and academic 
freedom for universities and colleges. In Kerala, the opposition to the idea is ideological and 
centers around concerns that autonomous colleges ignore equity considerations during 
admissions. In other states, the reform progress has been slow because colleges lack the physical 
resources and faculty required to operate autonomously, or universities and DoHEs distrust the 
ability of private colleges to maintain quality standards after becoming autonomous.  
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In comparison with autonomy, accreditation has been much more acceptable as a 
measure of quality assurance in all the states. The number of accredited institutions (mostly 
government and government aided colleges) has been rising in all the states but not enough to 
meet the target of universal accreditation by 2022.83 Kerala’s efforts to create a state-level 
accreditation authority make it a forerunner in the implementation of accreditation reforms. 
Odisha and West Bengal have adopted systematic processes to encourage accreditation with the 
National Assessment and Accreditation Agency (NAAC). Punjab has not made any such efforts.   
Academic and examination reforms have been implemented in most states; however, the 
quality of reform implementation is unlikely to have affected teaching and learning in the states. 
State implementation is shaped by restrictive affiliation norms, limited faculty resources, and a 
belief system that does not support faculty autonomy. Most states except Kerala have struggled 
with the aftermath of implementing the semester system. All states (other than Punjab) have 
implemented choice-based credit systems, but students effectively choose less than 10%-15% of 
their coursework and they are rarely offered open choices across other programs. Internal 
assessments are followed in all states but at a level much lower than that suggested by NHEM.84 
Additionally, in three states, universities determine the exact assessments, their frequency, and 




 The discussion in this chapter will mention three types of colleges. Government colleges (fully funded by the 
DoHEs), aided colleges (partially funded by DoHEs), and unaided or private colleges (receive no government aid). 
The first two types of colleges must follow, to varying extents, DoHE rules about hiring faculty; remuneration; 
student admissions; affirmative action; tuition fee limits; major expenditures; etc. Private colleges do not follow 
such rules.  
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This chapter devotes separate main sections to each of four reforms: 1) affiliation 
reforms, 2) autonomy reforms, 3) accreditation reforms, and 4) academic reforms. In each 
section, I look first at the progress with the reform after NHEM was introduced. Then I discuss 
the major belief system or conflicts that shaped the implementation of the reform across a state. 
This is followed by an analysis of reform implementation in the subsystem. Each section 
concludes with a short discussion about the operation of NHEM’s policy instruments. In the 
concluding main section of the chapter, I consider the emergent themes about how beliefs and 
resources affect implementation.   
Analytic Framework 
This chapter applies the same analytic framework based on Advocacy Coalition 
Framework as Chapter 5. The framework analyses the entire higher education policy subsystem 
in each state rather than focusing only on the operation of policy instruments (see Jenkins-Smith, 
Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2007; Sabatier & Weible, 2014). As in the previous chapter, I 
find only one active advocacy coalition consisting of the DoHEs and government-aided 
universities and colleges. I find no evidence that other actors within the subsystem such as 
private colleges, or faculty unions, attempt to coordinate or influence the implementation of 
NHEM reforms in the state (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, p. 190). Actors such as businesses or 
other collective organizations are not involved in influencing the policies and are not treated as a 
part of the subsystem.  
The previous chapter largely concentrated on changes at the sectoral level and attitudes 
about reform implementation at DoHEs and SHECs in each state. This chapter shifts the focus to 
the implementation of NHEM reforms in colleges and universities. As a result, I draw more 
heavily on institutional theory to understand the role of beliefs, schemas, myths, and 
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organizational structures in shaping reform implementation (see Honig & Hatch, 2004; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977).  
I suggest that organizational structures and practices in Indian higher education 
institutions are coupled with myths about centralization that pervade their organizational 
environment (see Hallet, 2010). NHEM presents higher education faculty and administrators 
with many new ideas that follow a different belief system. Changes in the affiliation system, 
academic & financial autonomy, and changes in examination systems follow a logic of 
decentralization of powers to individuals and institutions to improve quality (discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4). Their implementation is determined by how individuals and institutions engage 
with the new myths and logics.  
We know that actions of street-level bureaucrats are informed by their existing cognitive 
structures formed by technical knowledge, attitudes & beliefs, their contextual situation, and the 
policy signals (Spillane et al., 2002). Complicated sensemaking processes and prior experiences 
determine how they use knowledge structures to interpret new information and take actions (see 
Firestone, Fitz, & Broadfoot, 1999; Spillane, 2000; Vesilind & Jones, 1998). Policy 
implementers may not necessarily sabotage or deliberately misunderstand NHEM’s policy 
directives. New ideas can be reinterpreted in ways that match existing norms. Or, language of 
reform can be used without making required changes in practice (Hill, 2001). Institutions can 
choose to bridge themselves with new requirements of the environment or they can attempt to 
buffer such pressures (Honig & Hatch, 2004). The analysis in this chapter identifies these 
patterns of action in NHEM’s implementation.  
I explore how the observed actions are related to institutional structures, organizational 
relationships, and common attitudes of individuals. I suggest that the common attitudes 
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constitute a belief system that informs individual actions. By using actions to determine beliefs, I 
run the risk of engaging in circular reasoning. However, interview protocols in this study were 
designed to identify actions and not coalition beliefs. Therefore, I only present them as a possible 
explanation for the observed implementation. I also check these observations by drawing on 
implementation literature from other contexts and countries (Bjork, 2004; Mok, 2013; Tran, 
2014). Further research in the area can directly engage in confirming the nature and 
characteristics of the belief systems found in this study. 
 
Affiliation Reform  
NHEM’s affiliation reforms are designed to address the problem of very large affiliating 
universities (NHEM, 2013, p. 66). Universities with hundreds of affiliated colleges and hundreds 
of thousands of students are unable to promote responsive teaching and learning in colleges. This 
results in poorer quality of undergraduate education. The causal logic behind NHEM is that 
smaller universities can allow more decentralized decision-making on curriculum and 
assessments while maintaining effective oversight. For readers unfamiliar with India details 
about the affiliation system are included in Appendix H. 
NHEM uses two policy instruments. The first are capacity-building investments in new 
affiliating universities. Clusters of colleges and autonomous colleges are funded to convert into 
universities with the hope that they can eventually affiliate other institutions. The second is a 
hortatory tool, whereby states are given guidelines and exhorted to reduce the size of their 
affiliating universities to 100 or fewer colleges. This section looks at the implementation of 
affiliation reforms in states.  
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The section starts with an overview of the progress in affiliation reforms since 2013 and 
the state differences in the use of NHEM instruments. I find that NHEM has had mixed success 
with affiliation reforms. The policy has not been successful in ensuring that states significantly 
reduce the size of affiliating universities to 100 colleges. Next, I examine whether and how the 
affiliation problem and issue of quality assurance is understood in the states. Two notable aspects 
about reform implementation emerge. Interviews indicate that state higher education systems do 
not share NHEM’s skepticism about the role of the university and the affiliation system in 
quality assurance. DoHEs and institutions still believe that a system of centralized academic 
control is the most effective means of maintaining academic standards.  
Lastly, I identify the challenges in implementing NHEM’s policy instruments for 
affiliation reforms. Firstly, implementation of affiliation reforms runs into financial challenges at 
the level of states and universities. DoHEs and affiliating universities. Secondly, states run into 
legal and administrative difficulties in converting cluster colleges and autonomous colleges into 
universities. Now I present a detailed discussion of these issues along with inter-state variations.  
Progress After 2013   
Though the size of the universities is recognized as a problem in all the states, none have 
made a commitment to limit public universities to 100 affiliated colleges. Figure 5 shows the 
distribution of colleges in each state by the type of affiliating universities they are associated 
with. For instance, West Bengal has the largest undergraduate enrollment amongst the sample 
states and 30% of its colleges are affiliated to very large universities with 200 or more colleges. 
In fact, at least 75% colleges across all four states are still affiliated to universities in charge of 





Figure 5. Distribution of Affiliated Colleges in The State by Affiliating University 
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NHEM funds for converting autonomous colleges into universities have only been used 
in Odisha (see Table 12). Both Odisha and Kerala have attempted to establish cluster 
universities. While Odisha has used two NHEM components to build new universities, Punjab 
has made no such efforts. West Bengal has created three new affiliating universities since 2013 
but these decisions preceded NHEM and NHEM funds have not been used for them. The Bengal 
DoHE does not see affiliation reforms as an important part of NHEM (D2, D3). Affiliation 




 Source: All India Survey for Higher Education survey data 2018-2019 analyzed by the author. Size of the bubble 
reflects the undergraduate enrollments in the state. For instance, West Bengal enrolls 17.3 million students while 
Punjab enrolls 7.8 million students. Only universities affiliating across several disciplines or affiliating engineering 
colleges are included. Single discipline institutions Sanskrit universities, ayurvedic studies universities, etc. are 
excluded from the sample. Small to very large university categorization is created by the author. 
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 This appears in line with the fact that the state has not considered creating cluster universities or upgrading any 




Table 12. Progress with Affiliation Reforms 
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aided colleges  76% 65% 64% 76% 
Source: Interviews, DoHE websites, All India Survey for Higher Education survey data 2018-
2019  
 
Odisha and Bengal’s new universities have only brought them up to par with other 
similarly sized states in terms of number of state universities. Both states still have large 
affiliating universities that have more than 200 affiliated colleges. New universities have been set 
up in rural districts that previously did not have any universities.88 Perhaps this fulfils electoral 
 
87
 Over the past two decades, many Indian states such as Kerala, Karnataka, Odisha, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh have 
concentrated the affiliation of engineering and management education across the state into one technology 
university. This does reduce affiliation burden of existing state universities, but it leads to further separation of 
disciplines. This type of affiliation reform does not support curricular choice, multi-disciplinary teaching, or 
research because arts and science universities are separated from engineering, management, medical, and language 
studies (Hatakenaka, 2017).  
88
 Bengal’s universities have increased from 13 in 2011 to 31 in 2019. About seven of these universities are public 
and three are general affiliating universities. They are in northern districts of the state that have no other universities. 
Similarly, two out of Odisha’s three universities are in rural districts. However, these are non-affiliating universities. 
Others new institutions are either single-discipline or non-affiliating universities. 
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promises made in such districts or addresses long neglected regional needs. The two states did 
not share plans about when or how the newly established general universities will affiliate new 
colleges from existing institutions.  
Why Is Affiliation Reform Needed?  
As seen in the last chapter, many federal policy makers, experts, and international 
organizations consistently identify the size of the affiliation system and its effects on academic 
autonomy as a cause for poor quality (NHEM, 2013b; World Bank, 2011; Yash Pal Committee, 
2009). Affiliation centralizes academic decisions at the university level even though most 
undergraduate instruction takes place in colleges. This creates a distance between those who 
teach and those to set the curriculum or assess students. However, state universities, DoHE, and 
SHECs do not share this view. Affiliation is viewed as an administrative problem caused by the 
size of the university, not as a structural problem that impedes quality assurance and academic 
autonomy in colleges. Thus, the part of NHEM’s causal logic that addresses academic quality 
through affiliation reforms is lost on the states. If states do undertake this reform, they focus on 
reducing the university size. They have not seriously considered alternatives to the affiliation 
model.  
The problem of a state university’s size is widely acknowledged by many institutional 
leaders. But colleges across all states were not familiar with affiliation reforms as a part of 
NHEM (A5, A6, B6, C5, C8, C11).89 Generally, university faculty managing NHEM 
implementation were not familiar with mechanisms or workflows of the affiliation department of 
the university (B7, C4, A5). They believe that as a university faculty dedicated to teaching and 
internal administration, affiliation does not really concern them.  
 
89
 Alphanumeric codes in parenthesis indicate the interviews from where the information is drawn. 
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Affiliation is seen as an administrative problem of conducting examinations and 
managing assessments by the universities, colleges, and DoHEs (A8, A1, B3, B6, C4, C1). The 
cumbersome logistics of holding examinations are identified as the main challenge. For instance, 
a college faculty mentioned that affiliation reforms will be useful because (B5) “with a small 
number of colleges under one university, there will be proper amount of interaction [with 
university] and the administration will be easier for conducting examinations”.  
Only a couple of interviewees related affiliation with poor quality assurance in state 
universities or with lack of academic autonomy in colleges (C1, A15). Other effects such as 
lengthy permission processes involved in starting new colleges, new programs, and new courses 
were not identified as problems. These processes are considered a natural consequence of any 
large system and expected to reduce if universities become smaller (D1, B3). There is no 
evidence to suggest that states have considered alternative means of managing quality assurance 
in colleges.  
Surprisingly, very few respondents relate political influence in higher education with the 
problematic relationship between affiliation and quality control in colleges (C11, A15, A8). 
However, existing literature suggests that private unaided and aided colleges are owned and 
operated by education trusts and societies. Many of these entities have been linked to politicians 
and businesses (Kaul, 1993; Singh, 2003; Tierney & Sabharwal, 2017). The university is 
dependent on the state for its funding and its leadership appointments. This creates opportunities 
for the use of political influence to ensure that universities grant affiliation to the politically-
backed private colleges. It is possible that respondents at public institutions were uncomfortable 
discussing this issue, but they do view private colleges as profit-making enterprises that cannot 
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be trusted with self-regulation. I discuss this issue in greater detail in the conclusion of the 
chapter. 
Passing the Buck for Quality Assurance 
The attitude of interviewees regarding affiliation reforms raises an important question. 
Do all the stakeholders in the state higher education system agree about the mechanisms and 
institutions responsible for quality assurance? My interviews suggest that state higher education 
systems cannot point to one entity accountable for ensuring quality. The DoHE officers point out 
that universities are autonomous institutions that they cannot influence. They also claim to have 
no relationship or dealings with half or three-quarters of colleges in the state that are privately 
owned (A5, C11). As mentioned by a state officer about private colleges (A12),  
“We don’t have any kind of control over unaided colleges… Some say that the condition 
is very pathetic; they are not giving salaries for the teachers. Teachers are not even qualified. We 
do not have any statistics, data. The university only gives affiliation for courses and conducts 
examinations”.  
Thus, DoHEs in most states do not believe they are responsible for the quality of 
universities or private colleges.  Universities also shrug at the question of quality assurance for 
affiliated colleges, particularly private colleges. De-affiliation remains rare in all the states and 
largely limited to engineering colleges (B1, D1, A15, Haneef, 2012). The university officials 
believe that their responsibility is limited to setting the curriculum and conducting the 
examination. They cannot monitor the hiring of poor quality or contract faculty in their affiliated 
colleges (C5, C11, A5). One SHEC leader (D1) outrightly denied the idea of poor quality in the 
state’s institutions, pointing out that the state has very high rates of graduation and not as many 
private colleges as other states. Other SHEC leaders explained that the state applies “basic 
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minimum standards” set by the UGC to its colleges, so quality should not be a concern (B1, 
A2).90 Application of federal standards is used as a façade to deflect questions about the lack of 
effective means of quality control in colleges. More recently, a college’s accreditation by NAAC 
is used also as a means of freeing the university from being solely responsible for the quality of 
colleges.  
Underlying the confusion about quality assurance is a lack of clarity about the role of a 
university. Administrators in the DoHE and colleges see the university as an exam conducting 
body. University faculty feel their primary function is postgraduate teaching and research. The 
affiliating role of the university is secondary and not their concern. University administrators see 
affiliation as a source of revenue but do not consider teaching and learning in colleges as their 
responsibility. Confusion about the function of education operates at all levels and in all 
countries (see Birnbaum, 1988, p. 10; Labaree, 1997). This lack of clarity affects how effectively 
organizational structures and routines are created to fulfill the affiliation function of universities 
(Scott & Davis, 2015). The faculty and administrative beliefs and schema shape the way in 
which they interpret their role in maintaining quality and mobilize resources to implement the 
affiliation reforms (Spillane et al., 2002). Ideally, NHEM should have facilitated the complicated 
and multi-faceted discussions needed to resolve these priorities and consequent structural 
changes in the state systems. Instead, states have continued to operate using the affiliation model 
 
90
 The requirements are regarding the amount of land that a college needs (2 or 5 acres), its undisputed ownership 
by the education trust or society, registration of the society, the number of square feet of building space required per 
student, the corpus fund determined by the number of programs taught, intake size, faculty ratios etc. These 
standards do not specify outputs or outcomes. The UGC, university, DoHE, or NHEM have no established data 
collection systems that can be used to assess institutions. States follow a centralized system revolving around the 
university and DoHE. There are no independent agencies looking into different aspects of a college or university. 
The culture of accreditation is nascent and involves only one major accreditor so far. Thus, states have few systems 




as a fait accompli. NHEM’s instruments have had limited success in promoting smaller 
universities or alternate models of quality assurance.  
Challenges in Implementing Affiliation Reforms 
Leaders in DoHEs, SHECs and universities pointed out multiple challenges in addressing 
the affiliation system. The main issues are the financial concerns of the states and state 
universities. West Bengal and Odisha appear to have greater political support for making these 
financial commitments to new universities, but Punjab and Kerala have not. I consider some 
explanations for these interstate differences. The other important challenge is that states lack the 
legal, administrative, and leadership capacity required to transition affiliated colleges into 
autonomous universities.  
Financial Concerns of DoHEs and Universities  
The financial implications of solving the affiliation problem emerged as a main deterrent 
in multiple states. Lack of resources is a critical concern that prevents effective decentralization 
(see Hanson, 1998; McLaughlin, 1987), even when there is cultural support for a policy 
(Weaver, 2009). Resource constraints are a recurring concern in program implementation in 
developing countries (Jessop & Penny, 1998; Schweisfurth, 2011; Thomas & Grindle, 1990). 
Creation of one or a few new universities carries a very large financial burden for the 
state. Universities need to be granted land, funds for infrastructure, and most importantly, 
multiple academic positions with high pay scales and retirement benefit obligations (B1, B3, 
A12, C11, D1). All states are not willing to make this expenditure. NHEM’s inducements for 
converting colleges into universities cover the infrastructural expenses, but they do not cover 
costs of land acquisition or the recurring payroll burden. West Bengal and Odisha have been able 
to create multiple new universities within and outside of NHEM. I interpret this as a sign of 
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greater political will to mobilize resources for higher education that goes beyond NHEM 
reforms. Meanwhile, the political leadership in Kerala and Punjab has not committed to such an 
investment in the sector. As discussed earlier, the political calculus and developmental priorities 
of each state might create different electoral payoffs for investment in higher education.  
The other source of financial concern are the state universities themselves. Affiliation 
creates a revenue stream for universities, they can charge between INR 600-1500 per semester 
from 150,000-250,000 students.91 The fee charged for these operations exceeds the costs, so that 
affiliation becomes a source of income for the universities (B1, B3, D2, A12, A15). The DoHEs 
pay salary bills for universities but the funds for infrastructure and other maintenance have been 
dwindling for many years (Panigrahi, 2018). This has increased universities’ reliance on 
affiliation income. As mentioned by an erstwhile Vice Chancellor (B1)  
“For example, at XXX University the exam revenue is about NR 100 to 110 million in 
collections. Expenditure would be about 5 crores. So, the difference is about 6-7 crores per year. 
That takes care of the electricity bill that the government does not pay. Suppose they do not have 
it then they will not be able to pay their electricity bill. So, the number of students in a university 
… and revenue is a major issue”.  
Differences in the university financing system explain some inter-state variations in 
affiliation reforms. In West Bengal, the universities do not directly charge fees from students in 
affiliated colleges. The student fees go to the state which reallocates some portion of it to all 
colleges and universities in the state. Thus, universities do not have a direct stake in increasing 
 
91
 Admission/application fee per student for the management of enrollment of new students; examination fee per 
student for conducting admissions; miscellaneous fees per student for releasing degrees and transcripts; they also 
charge one-time or recurring affiliation fees from colleges. 
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the number of students in their affiliated colleges.92 This could explain why the West Bengal 
government has found it easier to establish new universities and reallocate affiliated colleges. In 
Kerala and Odisha, universities have variable policies on permanent and temporary affiliation. 
Many private colleges are granted one-year affiliation and they have been paying affiliation fees 
for each program for twenty-five years (A12, B6, B1). This creates perverse incentives for a 
university to continue charging temporary affiliation fees under the guise of evaluating a 
college’s performance. Similarly, Punjab’s higher education institutions rely much more heavily 
on student fee and affiliation than other states.93 Thus, they face strong pressure to avoid 
affiliation reforms.  
Legal and Administrative Hurdles in Converting Colleges into Universities 
Experiments with cluster universities and conversion of autonomous colleges into 
universities point to some organizational and administrative challenges involved in such 
transitions. Kerala’s attempts to create three cluster universities preceded NHEM but they have 
fructified.94 Currently, the colleges share some physical resources, services, and activities, but 
they do not operate as cluster universities yet. Similarly, Odisha received funds from NHEM to 
create a cluster university that has not become operational (B3, B1). In Punjab, the Patiala region 
briefly considered the idea of creating a cluster university, but local colleges were not able to 
reach a consensus (C4).  
 
92
 However, it does increase the involvement of DoHE in university and college financing. It goes against the idea 
of financial autonomy of institutions.  
93
 Different policies on public subsidies for higher education affect pressures for affiliation. For instance, Punjab’s 
universities and colleges receive fewer funds from the state and charge a higher fee than colleges in other states. 
Punjab’s colleges need to cover a part of the expenses of hiring large numbers of contract faculty (C1, C3, C5). A 
study of state university finances shows that a university in Punjab got as much as 50% of its annual budget from 
student fees (Panigrahi, 2018). For Odisha’s flagship university, the contribution was 11%-12%. 
94
 The idea of Cluster of Colleges had been suggested by the University Grants Commission in 2012 as a part of the 
XIIth Five Year Plan. Cluster Universities were to be created out of two to five colleges in close physical proximity 
and with established reputations. NHEM adopted the idea from UGC’s recommendations.  
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In both Kerala and Odisha, clusters ran into similar problems. Firstly, the existing state 
statutes in both states cannot accommodate non-affiliating universities created by merging 
colleges. State University Acts restrict the kind of institutional arrangements and management 
structures needed for degree-granting institutions. Cluster universities need new rules to support 
sharing of physical resources between different legal entities, accountability systems for the 
diffused decision making in such a set-up, division of academic decision making and degree-
granting powers, etc. (B1). Creating new legal frameworks requires considerable political 
support from the DoHE leadership in the state and from the colleges, but this appears to be 
missing in the states (see Mcginn & Welsh, 1999).   
Odisha is the only state that has converted two autonomous colleges into regular 
universities. None of the other states have tried to do the same using NHEM funds. The 
conversion of autonomous colleges into universities creates fewer legislative challenges than 
cluster universities because they can use existing University Acts for legal guidance. However, if 
an autonomous college is partially publicly aided or wholly private, it can be a challenge to 
convert it into an affiliating public university (A15).95 Kerala faces this problem because of its 
many partially publicly aided colleges (A15). Similarly, Punjab and West Bengal do not have 
government autonomous colleges that can be easily converted into affiliating public universities 
(D3, C11). Additionally, they face concerns about terms of faculty selection and service.96 
 
95
 Colleges need to deal with questions about their funding status as universities. Can colleges be established with 
private or part-private investments covert into fully public universities? If so, what happens to the private 
investments in the entity? If they become private universities, can they be eligible for any public funds?  
96
 In most state institutions, faculty are treated as employees of the state rather than of an individual university or 
college (Jayal, 2020). Recruitment of college and university faculty is managed by Public Service Commissions that 
hire across departments, and faculty salaries are pegged to administrative jobs across the state bureaucracy (D1). 
Thus, public colleges and universities follow specific rules about faculty pay grades, retirement benefits, 
qualifications like PhD or masters, etc. Standards for universities are always higher than those for colleges. 
Transitioning from one phase to other triggers legal and administrative complications about employee status that 
institutions need to sort out.  
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Secondly, clusters have faced problems in reaching a consensus about the exact 
mechanisms of sharing resources, premises, and students. Colleges have not been able to enter 
agreements and create plans of action needed to proceed with the process. This problem is 
compounded when government colleges work with government-aided colleges. They run into 
thorny issues such as sharing existing publicly and non-publicly funded resources, level of 
government control over the new entity, terms of service for faculty, etc. (A15).97 The 
government colleges see it as a free-rider problem and aided institutions see it as an increase of 
state control in their institution (A1, A15, B1, A8). Any transition for a college into a university 
also runs into administrative and legal questions about the pay and qualifications of college vs. 
university employees. Resolution of these issues requires a coordinated effort across the colleges, 
DoHEs, and SHECs. Typically, colleges lack stable principal leadership or guidance required to 
negotiate these processes (B1).  
Conversion of autonomous colleges into universities side-steps some of the coordination 
challenges faced by cluster universities. But all states do not have enough autonomous colleges, 
or such colleges are not willing to be converted into universities. As seen in the next section (see 
Figure 6), Odisha has historically had many more autonomous government-aided colleges than 
other states.98 It was probably better positioned than other states to benefit from NHEM’s funds. 
Kerala continues to have concerns about autonomous institutions (also discussed in the next 
 
97
 This reappears as an issue across many states. The interviewees are of the view that funding an institution’s land, 
infrastructure, and salaries gives the state a right to determine the fee structure, hiring standards, and admission 
policy of an institution. Any disposal or sharing of these assets also requires state permission. Allowing public 
colleges to participate with private or partly aided colleges requires them to navigate complex rules regarding these 
issues.  
98
 Even when states have autonomous colleges, their conversion does not follow a clearly planned process for 
becoming a university or for dealing with affiliation. I find no evidence of transition plans, capacity building for 
managing affiliating duties, or organizational change plans created by the college, DoHE or SHEC in Odisha (B7). 
The interviewees in the university only knew details about the utilization of NHEM’s funds; they could not point to 
any more details of the transition process (B5). The conversion process is left to unfold on its own.  
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section) that can impede their conversion into universities. Punjab and West Bengal do not have 
enough autonomous colleges to encourage their conversion.  
Few university leaders across the sample thought that NHEM’s solution of converting 
autonomous colleges into universities had adequately considered the capacity of colleges to 
manage university functions. The interviewees pointed that academic audit and other quality 
assurance processes were very weak even in autonomous colleges. These processes and systems 
need to be strengthened slowly to develop university-like structures, even before the conversion 
happens (B1). It would take an autonomous college 5-10 years to prepare itself to become a 
university, shorter timelines were likely to give poor results (B1, A15). Even after this time, 
some colleges may not be able to develop good enough infrastructure and strong departments to 
become universities.  
Issues faced by conversion of cluster colleges and autonomous colleges underline the fact 
that states lack political interest in bringing together the legal and administrative capacity to 
create new institutions out of existing colleges. Experiences with successful institutional mergers 
in other countries show that they need strong leadership and management of organizational 
change (Harman & Harman, 2003; Skodvin, 1999). But in the sample states in this study, neither 
the DoHEs nor the colleges have taken ownership of the idea. No institution has brought together 
all other stakeholders to forge a solution to a complicated organizational and political problem 
(B1, A8).99 The lack of idea ownership and innovation directly affects local efforts to create 





 The NHEM authorities have not issued any federal guidelines, recommended legislative structures, or other 
capacity building support to manage the transitions. 
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Implications for NHEM  
The evidence discussed above shows that affiliation reforms face many challenges. Their 
implementation requires financial resource mobilization to address state and institutional 
concerns; legal changes to facilitate establishment of new institutions; and organizational and 
behavioral changes help in the development of new quality assurance alternatives to affiliation. 
NHEM’s instruments provide some financial inducements but do not foresee and address the 
other two types of challenges.  
The one-time financial incentives provided under NHEM are limited compared to the 
recurring salary costs that the state will have to undertake to expand the universities. Even if the 
federal government cannot increase the financial allocation, it is in the position to hold a national 
dialogue about the idea of academic quality assurance as well as the threat that large-scale 
affiliation poses to quality. On a related note, if NHEM aims for affiliation reforms, it must also 
provide an alternate solution for inadequate university and college financing such as shifting 
higher education costs to students through fee hikes and allowing revenue generation through 
other sources.  
NHEM has failed to prompt any serious discussion about possible solutions for the 
problem of university size in the states. The formulation and implementation processes did not 
provide enough evidence to convince states that its solutions for the affiliation problem will 
work.100 Building early consensus about the goals of a policy and efficacy of a solution is critical 
for implementation (see Hanson, 1998; Johnstone, Arora, & Experton, 1998). As discussed in 
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 The policy has been thin on the details regarding the splitting up of existing universities into smaller universities 
or the scaffolding that needs to be created to make an autonomous college into a university. These deficiencies have 
not been addressed during NHEM’s implementation. There is no evidence in terms of policy briefs, academic 
research, documents sharing best practices or case studies from states, model acts for cluster of colleges, examples 




Chapter 4, NHEM’s state consultations did not engage this process thoroughly. It is also 
important to have clear connections between new policy goals and changes in practice in 
colleges and universities (see Cohen & Hill, 2008). NHEM’s weakness in this regard can also be 
traced back to the policy design. The policy instruments do not support universities or affiliated 
colleges in changing their instruction, training administrators, faculty, or developing alternate 
systems for quality assurance etc. This external support is especially critical when the policy 
solution has not been designed due to bottom-up pressures.  
Affiliation reforms are not the only reform under NHEM that revolves around the theme 
of decentralizing financial powers, improving quality assurance in Indian higher education, and 
spurring the role of academic autonomy of colleges and faculty in service of improving quality. 
The next section looks at the implementation of autonomy and accreditation reforms across 
states.  
Autonomy Reforms 
NHEM promotes institutional autonomy for universities as well as colleges. The theory 
of action is based on academic decentralization and limiting bureaucratization of higher 
education institutions in the states. In colleges, autonomy is aimed at improving the quality of 
instruction through vertical decentralization of academic decision making in favor of 
undergraduate faculty. Like affiliation reforms, it reduces the gap between curriculum setting, 
instruction, and assessment in colleges. In universities, it is supposed to improve quality through 
vertical decentralization of financial and administrative powers in favor of university leadership 
and departments. This would allow universities to operate more freely, like “entrepreneurial 




NHEM uses two policy instruments to promote autonomy. Financial inducements in the 
form of larger infrastructure grants are offered to any autonomous colleges. And hortatory tools 
are used to promote the legal and operational changes required to give more freedom to 
universities.  
The interviews in sample states suggest that autonomy is only discussed in relation to 
colleges. Even in colleges, autonomy is only understood as the “autonomous status” granted by 
the University Grants Commission.101 States have not adopted a broader interpretation of 
autonomy that allows colleges expansive administrative, academic, and financial freedom from 
the DoHEs. Respondents across the states voiced concerns about misuse of autonomy by private 
unaided institutions. There are apprehensions about the effectiveness of autonomy given the 
limited physical and financial resources of many colleges in the states. The issue of university 
autonomy has received very little attention across all states. Universities are considered totally 
autonomous institutions and none of the states have taken any steps to improve university 
governance or limit the DoHEs’ influence on them. Each of these issues is discussed in detail in 
the following sections.  
Progress after 2013 
Autonomy reforms have only occurred in relation to colleges in the states. Universities 
are already considered to be completely autonomous institutions in most states (A3, A5, A12, 
B1, B2, B3, C5, C8, D3, D1). NHEM’s hortatory tools have had little effect on the idea of 
university governance and autonomy, even though the policy documents discuss this issue at 
length (NHEM, 2013, pp. 113-118).  None of the interviewees in the sample states mentioned 
 
101
 Colleges can apply to the University Grants Commission to get “autonomous status”. This allows them to 
manage their own curriculum, conduct assessments, develop courses and programs, as long as they follow their 
affiliating university’s guidelines. The degree granting power remains with the affiliating university.  
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universities when autonomy reforms were discussed. Also, none of the states reported making 
any major legislative or administrative changes that affect the relationship between the DoHE 
and universities.  
 
 
Figure 6. Growth of Autonomous Colleges after NHEM102 
 
States have made more progress in granting autonomy to some colleges. Figure 6 
illustrates the difference in growth of autonomous colleges across states. Odisha, Punjab, and 
West Bengal have seen a steady increase in autonomous colleges in the last seven years. Odisha 
has been successful in granting autonomous status to more colleges. Even so, Odisha’s DoHE 
and SHEC do not support wide-ranging academic, administrative, or financial autonomy for 
colleges (B1, B3, B8). Punjab started out with very few colleges that were autonomous and 
continues to have a limited number. The DoHE claims that they have encouraged colleges to 
apply for autonomous status but have not been successful in getting participation (C2, C6, C7, 
C8). In Bengal, interviewees observed that few colleges have considered applying for autonomy 
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 Source: Compiled by author using University Grants Commission’s List of Approved Autonomous Colleges 
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(D9, D4). The DoHE or SHEC have not systematically encouraged more colleges to become 
autonomous. DoHE and SHEC officials believe that autonomous colleges need a minimum size, 
quality, and engagement in research that most colleges do not have (D1, D9). Thus, the DoHE 
grants support for autonomy only when the request is made by the college (D1, D2). Greater 
emphasis is placed on quality improvement through accreditation and the National Institutional 
Ranking Framework (D3)103.  
The growth of autonomous colleges in Kerala has stagnated. The state granted autonomy 
to most of the 19 colleges between 2014 to 2016 under the United Democratic Front 
government.104 However, the administration that followed has halted granting this status to any 
more colleges. Interviewees in Kerala mentioned a few times that autonomy was a “political 
issue” (A1, A10, A11, A12). I discuss the specifics of Kerala’s political context later in the 
section to show how the framing of a reform can have a very different effect in a state.  
Varied Interpretations of Autonomy  
The concept of autonomy is not understood clearly in states. The discussion below shows 
that the concept of autonomy brings forth fundamental attitudes in states about who is 
responsible for maintaining quality and faith in centralized processes of academic control.  
Autonomous Status vs Autonomy  
Autonomy is believed to mean only one thing at the college level – attaining the 
autonomous status granted by the UGC. The autonomous status is granted to affiliated colleges 
by the University Grants Commission (Stella, 2004). In theory, this status should provide total 
 
103
 This ranking framework was introduced by the federal government in 2015. NIRF uses five parameters to rate 
institutions: Teaching, learning and resources; research, professional practice and collaborative performance; 
graduation outcome; outreach and inclusivity; and perception. Most of the data is self-reported. 
104
 A prominent political coalition led by Indian National Congress. UDF’s main opposition, the Left Democratic 
Front, is led by Communist Party of India and came back to power in 2016.  
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academic autonomy. In practice, government and government-aided autonomous colleges still 
require DoHE’s permission to establish new programs, start new courses, make hiring decisions, 
etc. (George, 2011; Malik, 2017; Sancheti & Pillai, 2020). In fact, most autonomous colleges do 
not use the autonomy granted to them. Interviews (B5, B6) and document analysis of the syllabi 
of all autonomous colleges in the sample show that curricular autonomy is not used to change the 
curriculum (see Appendix J) for details on powers of autonomous colleges). Often, colleges 
make only cosmetic changes to a few lectures within a course to cover additional or different 
material than the university syllabus (Kulavelil et al., 2018).  
The fact that autonomy is understood in a limited form is reflected in the fact that the 
exact academic, administrative, and financial benefits of autonomy remain unclear for many 
college leaders and faculty (A10, B4, B6, C3, C4, D8). Respondents in Odisha, West Bengal and 
Punjab did not appear to understand the eventual intent of NHEM’s autonomy reforms. A few 
respondents in Kerala understood that autonomous status is the first step in making sure that 
colleges can develop financial and administrative capacity to become universities (A10, A15). 
Interviewees indicated that autonomous colleges have only one major benefit. They can conduct 
exams and declare results internally. This makes it possible to manage the process on time (A9, 
A10, B5, C1, C3).105 None of the interviewees mentioned that autonomy affected the teaching-
learning processes of the faculty in colleges or the ability of colleges to offer more innovative 
programs and curricula, etc.  
The substitution of the wider concept of autonomy with UGC’s autonomous status is an 
example of colleges and universities bridging external calls for reforms by adopting a version of 
the reform idea that gives the impression of compliance (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Morris 
 
105
 When handled by universities with thousands of students, these processes get delayed. Therefore, many 
universities have been asked to create and adhere to academic calendars, as a part of academic reforms.  
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& Scott, 2003; Spillane, 2000). However, this does not mean that the reform is implemented as 
intended. If autonomy is limited to getting the UGC status, then DoHEs, state universities, and 
colleges need to fulfill far fewer criteria. System-wide autonomy reforms that create 
entrepreneurial colleges and universities require far greater decentralization of powers and 
changes in existing relationships and rules through which DoHEs govern institutions. 
Standardization and Centralization vs. Autonomy 
The limited interpretation of the autonomy reforms is supported by a deeply held belief 
that individual faculty are not qualified to innovate in curriculum, teaching, or student 
assessment (A3, B1, C4, C11, D1, D4). Only a few respondents thought that autonomy would 
help the faculty by allowing them to make small changes in course syllabus, methods of 
teaching, and assessment methods in tutorials. (D1, D8, C2).  
In fact, Odisha and West Bengal have employed a common undergraduate syllabus for all 
universities in the state. In Odisha, this effort is also supplemented by a common “question 
bank” which can be used to create the university assessments (B1). As noted by an interviewee 
in Odisha, the University Grants Commission issues structured guidelines for undergraduate 
syllabus across many subjects. Thus, it is not incongruous for a state to do something similar at 
the state level (B1). This is a valid argument and points to the contradiction between centralized 
federal regulation and the rhetoric of autonomy used in policies like NHEM.  
The idea of a common syllabus seems consistent with the beliefs held by many 
individuals at all levels of the state system. DoHEs and SHECs believe that it will help 
universities in maintaining higher standards of quality and student mobility across institutions 
(B1, B8, D1, D2, D3). Respondents do not see a common curriculum as being incompatible with 
high academic quality; instead, it is teaching methods and dedication of the faculty that are key 
230 
 
to student learning (B4, B6, D4). Curiously, this belief system does not acknowledge the need 
for an individual faculty’s autonomy over instruction in the majority of colleges in the state.  
In terms of undergraduate education, the university is primarily seen as an examination-
conducting body. Affiliating universities do not offer any differentiated value to students through 
their curricula.106 Thus, having a common curriculum across the state should not affect quality. A 
bureaucrat even spoke about standardized examinations across the state (B8) saying:  
“For undergraduate education, I don't find any great benefit of having colleges affiliated 
to different universities…why do we need seven universities with seven examination systems? It 
does not make any sense. If your university has a special course, its okay. But if it is for 
undergraduate physics...why should undergraduate physics be different in University A and B? 
What is the meaning of that?” 
One possible explanation for this lack of initiative is that most college faculty in states 
study and receive pedagogical training in systems that never expose them to decentralized 
academic decision making. As a result, making decisions about the syllabus or assessments is not 
a part of their understanding of the concept of teaching. This belief is shared by higher levels of 
the system. Universities that determine the curriculum also do not believe in the technical 
capacity of individual faculty to make such decisions. Instead, they believe that curricular and 
academic decisions are more effective when they are centralized and uniform.  The development 






 It is important to note that the interviewee was talking about this issue specifically in the Indian context where 
many colleges are under-resourced and working with minimal infrastructure and faculty quality. 
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Challenges in Implementing Autonomy Reforms  
Apart from a basic difference in understanding the concept of autonomy, NHEM reforms 
run into a few other challenges.   
Apprehensions about Misuse of Autonomy by Colleges  
Faculty and administrators of the state higher education system have deep misgivings 
about institutions. Particularly, it is believed that private colleges use autonomy to improve their 
financial returns without improving quality. Many respondents were concerned that once 
autonomy is granted and colleges manage their own assessment, there is no way of ascertaining 
if private colleges follow the quality standards set by the university. Autonomous institutions 
could inflate their grades or use lower curricular standards (A8, C11, A8, C5, A11, A9, B3). A 
DoHE official in Punjab voices these concerns as follows:  
“I have my doubts about autonomy for private colleges. Because this is like giving them a 
free rein. They have no checks, they can do whatever they want, they can use and misuse the 
money the way they want…Who will rectify the course content? Who will ensure that the faculty 
is of the best possible level? …It will be like establishing personal fiefdoms.” 
An important part of the argument against autonomy is the supposed “money-making” 
nature of private colleges (C11, A15, A1, A11, B3, B8). The autonomous status is a signifier of 
quality. Private colleges can capitalize on it and charge higher fees for new courses they offer. 
There is limited faith in the intention of the private colleges and a common belief that an 
educational institution needs an external body for effective quality control. Thus, high quality 
government colleges are more likely to be encouraged to apply for autonomy. This focus 
precludes private colleges, which make up more than two-thirds of colleges in the states.  
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Concerns about quality deterioration due to autonomy are framed in different manners in 
Kerala when compared to other states. Firstly, in Kerala, the academic autonomy achieved with 
the autonomous status is considered a first step towards a gradual privatization of higher 
education. It is assumed that academic autonomy will be followed by financial autonomy. And 
this would, in turn, increase pressures for higher education institutions to be financially 
sustainable. Autonomy is seen as a slow withdrawal of the state from supporting faculty salary 
and pension commitments, and eventual marketization of higher education (A5, A7, A9, A11, 
A15).  
Secondly, Kerala’s respondents are the only ones that repeatedly mention equity concerns 
regarding the operation of private autonomous colleges. The possibility of private colleges 
charging high fees from poor students and ignoring the affirmative-action norms in admitting 
students were cited as the main threats to disadvantaged students in autonomous institutions (A7, 
A8, A10, A11, A5). A faculty union leader opined that “private colleges do not apply proper 
affirmative action policies; they reserve half the seats for the management. These seats are sold 
off at very high prices, hundreds of thousands of rupees.”. These doubts do have some basis. 
Autonomous colleges have been found to limit representation and grievance redressal 
mechanisms for students and faculty (Kulavelil et al., 2018).  
I believe that this unique framing of autonomy issues in Kerala is because of the state’s 
distinct political culture that is characterized by broader political mobilization across social 
classes and the leftist ideology of political parties and faculty unions (Harriss & Törnquist, 2015; 
P. Singh, 2011).107 As a result, the broader political culture as well as the higher education 
 
107
 The difference from other states is also noticeable in the language used in Kerala’s State Higher Education Plans. 
The plans explicitly reaffirm the state’s commitment to being a welfare state and fulfilling the primary responsibility 
of providing equal opportunity to disadvantaged students. 
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culture is more sensitive to issues framed through the lens of equity or privatization (Sachs et al., 
2002).  
Institutional Resources and Autonomy  
Autonomy runs into two main types of resource-related issues, which determine the 
strength of university and college support for autonomy reforms. First, state universities are not 
supportive of autonomy because it limits their revenue sources. Universities do not get paid any 
examination fee by autonomous colleges (A12). Autonomous colleges only pay an affiliation or 
admission fees that are relatively small amounts. If autonomy is adopted as a wide-ranging 
policy, the fiscal impact on universities may become substantial (A12).  
Second, many colleges in states do not have the physical and human resources necessary 
to be autonomous. According to a senior academic expert in Odisha (B3),  
“The conceptualization of academic autonomy in a country like India and in a state like 
Odisha, where 24% students belong to tribal areas is a utopian concept. If I want to implement it, 
then I must have a stronger will on the ground, to have teachers, to have laboratories, to have 
libraries, and to have the adequate learning infrastructure for academic autonomy to be there…If 
I have a level playing field then uniform rules apply. If I do not have a level playing field, my 
first job is to make the playing field level. And that is what NHEM lacks.” 
As the interviewee suggests, NHEM’s funding incentives may not be enough to bring 
most colleges to a minimum level of infrastructure quality. Also, the existing faculty vacancies 
and poor student-teacher ratios may make autonomy an impossibility. Faculty at autonomous 
colleges have to take on examination and assessment management duties in addition to teaching. 
Thus, receiving an autonomous status means that the workload of the faculty increases (A7, A9, 
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C3, D8). If faculty are already strained due to unfilled vacancies or contractual appointments to 
the positions, they do not support autonomy.  
The problem of faculty vacancy is particularly acute in Punjab. About 66% or more of the 
faculty positions are vacant and recruitments have not happened since 1992 (C1, C2, C3, C4, C6, 
C7, C9, C11, Sharma, 2019). As a result, many eligible government colleges that enjoy high 
accreditation grades are unwilling to apply for autonomy (C7). Thus, the financial constraints of 
the state and colleges also shape the support for this reform.  
Further, faculty are also concerned that academic autonomy may be followed by higher 
standards for research output and resource generation, another change that they resist (C8). 
Faculty resist any changes that require them to perform additional tasks or bring new outcome 
measures like getting grants or external funding.  
Implications for NHEM 
Both affiliation and autonomy reforms highlight fundamental beliefs and attitudes of the 
state university systems that are opposed to NHEM’s theory of action. NHEM is attempting to 
create more institutions of a smaller size that have more academic and operational freedom. 
However, this conception of an institution is very far from the existing higher education structure 
(see Bjork, 2004; Tran, 2014). The dominant advocacy policy coalition (including the 
universities, public colleges, DoHEs and SHECs) subscribes to the same belief system that 
curriculum or assessment do not need to be handed over to individual faculty to improve 
instruction or teaching (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).  Other 
aspects of this belief system and its relationship to attitudes towards other reforms are discussed 
in greater detail in the chapter conclusion.  
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In terms of policy design, a few design flaws in NHEM’s instruments become more 
apparent during implementation analysis. Firstly, similar to affiliation reforms, the financial and 
human resources required for operation of autonomous colleges have been severely 
underestimated by the policy. As a result, even after the inducements in terms of larger 
infrastructure grants, few colleges are likely to volunteer for autonomy. Secondly, the hortatory 
tools used by NHEM to promote a broader concept of autonomy in colleges and the issue of 
university autonomy have had no effect in the states. There is little evidence that autonomy of 
public universities is even discussed in states.  
One possible explanation for the neglect is that public universities are a source of 
patronage in India. They can offer faculty and staff appointments, make affiliation agreements, 
and award contracts for procurement and construction (Kaul, 1993; Krishnan, 2014). The 
existing administrative systems and practices give DoHEs the power to intervene in all these 
matters. This increases opportunities for rent seeking and corruption in the process (Tierney & 
Sabharwal, 2017). Any changes in this system threaten an important (albeit informal or even 
illegal) resource for the most dominant member of the policy coalition in the state: the 
bureaucratic and political head of DoHE.108 Hence, it is not surprising that hortatory tools are not 
sufficient to build political support for these reforms in the state.  
The new National Education Policy released in 2020 (MHRD, 2020) carries on many 
ideas included in NHEM. Amongst them is the vision that all colleges in India either need to 
become autonomous or be subsumed by large multi-disciplinary universities (MHRD, 2020, p. 
36). The current attitudes and beliefs about affiliation and institutional autonomy are far from 
 
108
 Autonomy reforms in universities reinforce the autonomy of universities in many ways. They require DoHEs to 
withdraw from the governing bodies of universities, they expect universities to have simpler governance structures 
with independent boards of governors, universities must adopt transparent processes of hiring, the Presidents or Vice 
Chancellors must be appointed without political interference and be answerable only to Board of Governors, etc. 
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supportive of this vision. To work, the new policy needs to acknowledge the substantial financial 
and cultural barriers in achieving this end. Specifically, it needs to engage the diverging belief 
systems at the state level and provide alternate solutions to concerns in states about giving 
colleges more autonomy. 
 
Accreditation Reforms 
Accreditation reforms or compulsory accreditation is a part of NHEM’s effort to improve 
internal and external quality assurance mechanisms in states (NHEM, 2013b). Affiliation and 
autonomy reforms decentralize more powers to colleges and universities. Accreditation 
processes are supposed to strengthen the role of non-state actors (accreditation agencies) in 
holding institutions accountable to performance standards. Most states have been encouraging 
colleges and universities to get accredited by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council 
(NAAC). NHEM uses the accreditation grades as a criterion for determining eligibility and 
amount of infrastructure grants for universities and colleges.109  
By and large, accreditation reforms have been more successful than the other two 
reforms. The proportion of accredited colleges has risen in all states since the launch of NHEM. I 
conclude that the main reason for it is the belief that considers external evaluation and 





 The National Accreditation and Assessment Agency uses a rubric to grade any institutions that apply for 
accreditation. Institutions are scored on a 4.0 scale and given one of eight letter grades ranging from A++ to D (not 
accredited). Accreditation grades are usually given for a period of five years. Accreditation grades can improve or 
deteriorate from one cycle to the next. NHEM links accreditation grades to determine eligibility for infrastructure 
grants and what size they can take and to compare institutional proposals. This aspect of the instrument design 
encourages more institutions to apply for accreditation. 
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Progress After 2013 
NHEM has not made great strides towards achieving universal accreditation, but it has 
been more successful than other NHEM reforms.110 As shown in Figure 7, Kerala has the largest 
proportion of accredited colleges which is only 27%. Punjab is at the other end with only 13% of 
colleges accredited. Both are far from NHEM’s target of universal accreditation.  
Even when colleges go through accreditation, a majority receive B++ or lower grades. 
Punjab has the smallest imbalance between colleges with higher grades and those with lower 
grades. This implies that well-established colleges are more likely to apply for accreditation in 
the state.  
Though not captured in the graph, more government colleges are accredited as compared 
to aided and unaided colleges. The fact that unaided institutions do not get any funds from 
NHEM probably limits their incentives for getting accredited (B3, A11, A15).  
 
Figure 7. Accreditation in Sample States111 
 
110
 NHEM was not the first effort by the federal government to get more colleges and universities accredited. The 
pressure to accredit institutions intensified with 2013 when UGC also released regulations that required all higher 
education institutions in the country to be accredited by 2022. NHEM did not mention a timeline but it did adopt this 
goal (NHEM, 2013, p. 113).  
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If the goal of getting all colleges accredited by 2022 is set aside, there has been a steady 
increase in accreditation levels of all states in the years after the launch of NHEM (see Figure 8). 
Though Punjab started out with the highest proportion of accredited colleges in 2013, its 
progress has been slow. The total number of colleges in Punjab has not risen as much as other 
states. Punjab’s problem of faculty vacancies might be limiting many colleges in applying for 
accreditation. In comparison, Kerala and West Bengal have shown remarkable improvements in 
the accreditation rates in a span of three-four years. Both states have been helping government 
colleges apply for accreditation. Odisha has steadily increased the accreditation rate from 5% to 
19%. The DoHE as well as the World Bank project in the state has emphasized a phase-wise 
approach to accreditation (B3, B8). That is, the state supports a set of 100 or so colleges to apply 
for accreditation in every phase.  
 




 Source: Approximated by author using NAAC annual reports and All India Higher Education Surveys from 
2013 to 2020. Institutions get reaccredited every five years. The percentage of total institutions with valid 
accreditation can fall from one year to the next if all institutions do not get accredited regularly or if there is a sharp 
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Interviewees indicate that the accreditation precondition for NHEM funding has had a 
positive effect on accreditation applications and grades (A1, A9, A15, B6, B8, B9, C11, D9, D7). 
Across states, the process of accreditation is viewed as a useful exercise for quality improvement 
that forces an institution to self-evaluate, plan for improvements, and compete with other 
institutions (A1, D5). In many colleges, the challenges and shortages identified in the NAAC 
accreditation process informed the Institutional Development Plans for NHEM (A7, C11, D7). 
Implementation Support for Accreditation  
Kerala’s strong performance on accreditation is owed partly to the educational 
investments the state made over the last three decades (A15). The state is also making continuous 
efforts to improve accreditation levels in the state. Kerala interviewees mentioned that the state 
has a separate accreditation fund to help colleges address infrastructural and resource barriers in 
getting accreditation (A8). The Kerala SHEC and DoHE regularly follow up regarding the 
progress with accreditation applications (A4, A5, A15). Recently, the SHEC has proposed the 
creation of a State Assessment and Accreditation Council (SAAC) to support and improve the 
unaccredited private aided and unaided colleges to the point that they can apply for national 
accreditation (A5, A15). The SAAC will have access to financial resources as well as faculty 
mentors. All these factors point to a greater political support for proactively improving 
accountability systems, especially because creation of the SAAC and allotment of financial 
resources require legislative and budgetary action by the state’s leadership.113  
Other states have similar organizational setups to encourage accreditation, but their 
higher education culture does not support the creation of a SAAC. West Bengal DoHE conducts 
 
113
 Kerala is also the only state to establish a Kerala State Higher Education Survey that collects institution-level 
data from colleges and universities (A1, A15). The Kerala SHEC has developed this system to support planning and 
performance monitoring in the state.  
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accreditation workshops and has organized mentoring visits. Every university has nodal officers 
that are asked to coordinate with the affiliated colleges (D1, D2, D3). This coordination at the 
state level initiated under NHEM may explain the four-fold change in the state’s accreditation 
levels. Odisha’s colleges are being supported by their universities in the process of accreditation; 
the DoHE has chosen to work on about 100 colleges each year. Universities are provided some 
funds to let one faculty mentor 15-20 colleges (B1, B6).114 Odisha’s progress with accreditation 
has not been as impressive as West Bengal’s. The state does have a large proportion of very 
under-resourced colleges in rural areas that primarily serve tribal students. Thus, they face much 
steeper challenges in getting the requisite infrastructure and faculty quality necessary to get 
accredited.  
Punjab has not held any systematic activities to promote accreditation in the state, 
although universities have been asked to lead the process (C8). The state does give funds when 
institutions request it (C11). Colleges in the rural areas of the state suffer from poor 
infrastructure and high faculty shortages (C8, C11). The lack of systematic initiatives explains 
the low overall accreditation rate in Punjab even when a high proportion of colleges receive an A 
grade or higher. Colleges that are motivated and well-established can voluntarily apply for 
accreditation., but others need additional financial support and recruitment drives. Punjab also 
faces similar challenges in promoting autonomous colleges. In the case of Punjab, it is possible 
that the state’s declining per capita income and rising budgetary deficits are causing an overall 








Implications for NHEM  
The introduction of accreditation and other externally managed regulatory regimes has 
been resisted by academic faculty and higher education institutions in many countries (Lucas, 
2014; Salto, 2018). They are seen as constraining the professional autonomy of faculty and 
university and deepening the control of the state and other agencies over higher education 
institutions (Neave & Van Vught, 1994; van Kemenade & Hardjono, 2009). However, I find no 
evidence of such resistance against the idea of external accreditation in Indian colleges and 
universities.  
A possible explanation is that Indian institutions are not organized around ideas of 
academic and professional autonomy. Colleges and universities in India are accustomed to 
external involvement in their quality assurance and governance processes. The affiliation system 
puts academic control outside a college, with the university. Interventionist state practices place 
administrative and governance control outside a university/college, with DoHEs. Thus, 
accreditation by outside bodies will not conflict with any existing norms and attitudes regarding 
quality or autonomy within the institution.  
However, lack of resistance does not imply that state institutions welcome accreditation 
and understand the benefits of the process. Institutions may apply for short-term interests, like 
adding to institutional prestige or for eligibility for federal funds. As a result, faculty and 
administrators are not entirely convinced about the value added by accreditation or credibility of 
the NAAC rating system (A15, B1, B8).  
Apart from a lack of faith in the value of accreditation, the reform’s impact is limited due 
to another issue. The lack of autonomy that makes institutions comply with accreditation, also 
curtails the institutional freedom to undertake academic innovation or make administrative 
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changes (see Pham, 2018). Without these powers, accreditation can be a symbolic process that 
does not affect institutional quality (see Fanelli, 2012; Nguyen, Oliver, & Priddy, 2009; Pham, 
2018). Thus, NHEM’s instruments may succeed in getting more institutions accredited. But their 
contribution to the quality of higher education would depend on the implementation of other 
reforms. This points to a larger problem with the implementation of NHEM reforms that will be 
discussed in this chapter’s conclusion. The reforms included in the policy are interrelated and 
need to be implemented together in order to achieve the policy goals.  
 
Academic Reforms 
Academic reforms are the part of NHEM that most closely relates to academic quality in 
the universities and colleges within state university systems. The main academic reforms 
suggested by NHEM are moving from an annual to semester system, adopting a choice-based 
credit system (CBCS) for designing degrees, and improving examinations by adding more 
internal assessments at the college level.115 NHEM mainly employs hortatory tools to implement 
these reforms. These tools are not persuasive enough when large-scale behavioral and systemic 
changes are required of state systems, but additional resources and technical support are not 
provided. As a result, while states have implemented these reforms in some form, it has not led 
to substantial change in curricular choice for students or assessment autonomy for faculty.  
 
115
 The University Grants Commission began promoting academic and examination reforms before NHEM was 
created (UGC, 2009). Thus, they are not novel ideas for the universities and colleges. For instance, Kerala had 
adopted the semester and choice-based credit systems in 2010. The logic of these reforms is mainly to introduce 
greater flexibility in curriculum and assessment (UGC, 2009). For instance, breaking up a degree into semesters 
rather than years helps to arrange the curriculum in smaller courses. Thus, more courses can be choice-based or 
taken flexibly across the duration of the degree. The choice-based credit system allows the program to be designed 
in terms of credit hours, optional courses, and compulsory courses. This gives students more options in terms of the 
timing and choice of courses. In examination reforms, faculty teaching a course are expected to conduct 25%-40% 
of assessment internally while the affiliating university does the rest externally. This increase (from 0% or 10% 
internal assessment) creates a closer relationship between faculty teaching a course and student assessment. It allows 
some degree of formative and continuous evaluation across a semester (Zachariah, 1993).  
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Interviewees in this study were largely unaware of academic reforms that have happened 
as a part of NHEM. Often, the respondents were not sure what the question regarding 
implementation of academic reforms entailed. When explained, the semester and CBCS reforms 
were identified most often. In fact, many interviewees believe that NHEM is primarily a policy 
for infrastructural improvement and has little effect on the academic work of universities and 
colleges (D3, C4). One interviewee said, “you can't connect everything with NHEM. This is a 
complex network and NHEM is only helping with some parts.” This suggests that states do not 
necessarily associate academic reforms with NHEM implementation.  
There is limited inter-state variation in the implementation of reforms.116 Table 13. 
summarizes the implementation of semester and CBCS reform (see Appendix K for the 
differences between the states in curricular reforms). To the extent that there is a difference, it is 
attributable to variations in academic cultures across states. Kerala’s culture supports an active 
SHEC and its recommendations about adopting new academic reforms such as outcome-based 
education or creating a state accreditation council. On the other hand, Punjab has no academic 
leaders in sectoral governance. As a result, even the implementation of the choice-based credit 
system is still pending.  
All states face some common challenges in implementing these reforms. Their physical 
and faculty resources are not enough to manage internal assessments and offer choice-based 
course taking at full scale. Additionally, management of centralized external assessments as part 
 
116
 It is important to note that academic reforms directly affect how and what individual faculty teach. However, the 
affiliation system requires that all academic changes be implemented at the level of the affiliating university. If a 
university switches from an annual to semester calendar, then hundreds of its affiliated colleges do so as well. In this 
case, the real question is whether the implementation of semester system has introduced any promised academic 
flexibility or is it just a mechanical division of the syllabus into smaller portions? Similarly, the university can 
change its curriculum from older systems to the CBCS system. This does not imply that students studying in 
colleges are offered all the choices mentioned in the university curriculum.  
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of the affiliation system compounds the difficulty in maintaining two or three semesters in a 
year. Importantly, faculty and administrators in institutions do not have the technical capacity or 
training to change their daily practices in line with the reforms.  
 
Table 13. Semester and Choice-Based Credit Systems Across States 
Reform Kerala Odisha West Bengal Punjab 
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Source: Interviews in states, websites of all six universities and ten colleges in the sample, 
newspaper articles (Financial, 2018; Mishra, 2016; Sharma, 2013; The Hindu, 2020), 





 This comparison is done to determine if colleges and universities offer any curricular choice to students. It is 
worth noting that most regular colleges did not share program structure or courses offered on their websites. There 
was only one autonomous college in this sample, and it shared a program structure. However, comparison with the 
university syllabus showed very little difference in the course offerings (comparisons were made for two popular 
programs: BA in Economics and BSc. in Mathematics). 
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Semester System  
Semester system entails the adoption of a two-semester system instead of an annual 
academic calendar. So far, all the sample states have implemented this system (B6). The nature 
of the affiliation system is such that all the activities and changes regarding the semester system 
happen at the few affiliating universities in a state. Colleges do not have an option of not 
following the system. The Board of Studies at a university rearranges the existing syllabi into 
semesters and the examination section of the university manages the transition to semi-annual 
assessments. Affiliated and autonomous colleges follow the changes made by their affiliating 
university.  
Without any changes in the scale of affiliation or of university-managed end-of-term 
assessments, the switch to a semester system has negatively impacted colleges. Other than 
Kerala, college faculty in three states complained that conducting university exams twice a year 
has reduced the effective teaching time to three months (D8, D1, D5, B1, C8, D5, C3).118  This 
has a direct negative impact on teaching and learning experiences because faculty are forced to 
rush through their syllabus. Holding large-scale examinations twice a year creates more chances 
for poor planning, logistical issues, or natural disasters to cause delays in examinations, result 
declaration, and subsequent admissions (B1, B6, C3, D8).119  The examination delays negate 
 
118
 This is because the university-level external examinations require four to six weeks of dedicated time each 
semester. Tested courses need to be offered at the same day and time to thousands of students taking that course in 
the university. To avoid overlaps of subjects and semesters, the exam schedule is much longer. If these assessments 
are managed within one autonomous college or by one faculty for their class, the entire process is shorter and 
flexible. It does not require the entire college to suspend teaching for long periods of time.  
119
 As universities transition from the annual to semester system, they often must conduct both annual and semester 
assessments until all students in the older system have graduated (B6, C11). In the case of University of Kerala, as 
many as 14000 separate examination papers have had to be designed in some semesters to cater to all the past and 
present patterns of examination and curriculum (A2, A3, A5). If any of these papers is poorly managed, the students 
giving that exam cannot get admitted into the next semester till they know their result from the previous semester.  
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NHEM and UGC’s efforts at maintaining an academic calendar in educational institutions that 
students, faculty, and employers can rely on.  
Punjab is considering reverting from a semester system to an annual system (C11). This 
could also be due to the example of a neighboring state, Himachal Pradesh120. The state 
implemented the semester system in 2013 and decided to switch back into the annual system in 
2018 (Financial Express, 2018). Odisha and West Bengal have adopted the semester system, but 
they have similar concerns about shorter teaching times and examination delays (B1, B6, D5, 
D8). These issues were not raised in Kerala. It suggests that the transition to a semester system 
takes a few years to stabilize. Kerala implemented the change in 2010 and may have had more 
time to align its systems. States with better digital infrastructure and fewer rural areas may also 
find the process less challenging.  
At the same time, issues faced in the semester system highlight the fact that academic 
reforms are closely tied to the scale of the affiliation system and autonomy of individual faculty. 
Universities cannot maintain centralized examination systems for hundreds of colleges and 
successfully manage the process twice a year. Adopting one reform without the others may well 
create more problems than it solves. Thus, state systems may have to be convinced about the 
implementation of an entire package of reforms that support decentralization and academic 





 Himachal is an entirely mountainous state; the terrain and remoteness of colleges can compound logistical 
challenges. The state’s government had included revoking the semester system in its election manifesto. Oddly 
enough, the newspaper announcements about the change claim that it has been done as a part of NHEM 




Choice Based Credit System  
The choice-based credit system (CBCS) fundamentally changes the way in which degrees 
are designed, dictating the level of curricular choice and flexibility that students have. Three out 
of the four sample states have implemented this reform, but their implementation does not offer 
students much curricular choice in colleges. Punjab is the only state that has not implemented 
this reform at the undergraduate level (C2, C4, C8). The interviewees could not explain why 
Punjab has not chosen to implement the reform. Poor experiences with the semester could have 
dampened any interest in adopting a new credit system (C11).  
From the interviews as well as the analysis of syllabi from undergraduate institutions, the 
students do not have much curricular choice. Pasha (2014) notes that the CBCS implementation 
in Kerala has been a “cosmetic change” that has used the jargon from Western nations to rename 
all the aspects of the traditional Indian system without offering choice or rethinking program 
design. For instance, about 70% of the courses included in the university undergraduate syllabus 
are part of a core curriculum that students cannot change. Even for the remaining courses that are 
termed electives, the university structure does not allow open choice. Students must choose one 
out of a set of two or three courses, and they get to make these choices only in the second or third 
year of the program. By the time that these courses are taught in colleges, the choices are 
reduced because of the college’s limitations in providing all the courses. A student doing a 120-




 Amongst the colleges sampled for this study, only one shared the syllabus of their programs on their website. 
The websites offer little to no specific information about the specializations or choices that undergraduates can 
make. This implies that colleges either do not offer course choices or that the choices are not significant enough to 
be shared with prospective students.  
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Very few interviewees identified that CBCS’s implementation was deficient. A few 
respondents acknowledged that the interpretation of CBCS has been limited (C2) and students do 
not have substantial choices to explore different disciplines or take interdisciplinary coursework 
(B6). More often, the faculty had no issues with the way in which credit-based systems are 
implemented. Often interviewees could not specify how choice-based credits were offered in the 
main undergraduate program of their undergraduate department (B4, D4, D8). When asked 
specifically about the extent of curricular choice, DoHE and SHEC noted that the quality of 
choice depends on the resources of the colleges (D1).  
The lack of understanding about the intent of the reform as well as structural and resource 
barriers create challenges for the implementation of this reform. Firstly, the Indian higher 
education system is very fragmented (F6) and mostly consists of small single and one or two-
discipline colleges like Arts, Commerce, or Science (AISHE, 2018). Engineering, medical, 
architecture, management, etc. are offered in professional colleges dedicated to one discipline. 
Multi-disciplinary undergraduate institutions are rare. In such a system, open enrollment across 
subjects does not offer a lot of choice to students. Structurally, it is difficult for such colleges to 
offer interdisciplinary or cross disciplinary enrollment (A15).  
Secondly, colleges cannot schedule and offer all the choices that the university 
curriculum suggests. They often do not have specialized faculty to teach the courses and enough 
classrooms to hold the lectures, or they need to maintain the number of teaching hours per 
faculty that are negotiated by faculty unions (A15, B3, B8, D1, D2). Offering unrestrained 
student choice is not logistically possible for colleges. Kerala State Higher Education Council 
commissioned and published a report on the challenges in the implementation of CBCS system 
(Hrdayakumari, 2012). A key observation was that most colleges in the state do not enjoy a high-
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enough student-faculty ratio to support curricular choice for undergraduate students. Given that 
most states are facing challenges in filling up sanctioned positions, it is difficult to imagine that 
additional recruitments can be done without strong political will.122  
Examination Reforms  
Examination and curricular reforms suffer from similar challenges as other academic 
reform. The foremost being that without changes in the affiliation system, usage of internal 
assessments adds little value to students or faculty. Second, colleges cannot implement these 
systems till the student-faculty ratios become lower and the faculty receive technical and 
pedagogical training in assessments and curriculum design.  
NHEM suggests that internal assessments should range between 25% to 40% of total 
assessments. West Bengal comes closest to this range with a 35% share for internal assessment. 
Other states fall in the 20%-25% range. Respondents were ambivalent about the ability of faculty 
to impartially conduct assessments, adding that efficacy of internal assessments depends too 
much on the sincerity of individual faculty (C4, C6, B6, D8). And this creates an unreliable 
system of assessment. Thus, the university is considered the appropriate authority for conducting 
assessments. Culturally, college faculty and universities are not attuned to the idea of trusting 
individual faculty with assessments. This echoes broader attitudes towards affiliation reforms 
and autonomy reforms.  
Given these apprehensions, it is not surprising that universities also try to prescribe how 
internal assessments are done. In Kerala, the design of internal assessments is left to the college 
 
122
 Sanctioned positions are faculty positions which the state has already committed to fund. In most colleges, 
sanctioned strength has not changed for a few decades while enrollments have continued to rise (N. Sharma, 2019). 
The mounting costs for salary and retirement benefits suggest that states are unlikely to create new sanctioned 
positions to reduce the student-faculty ratios, especially when states like Punjab have about 66% or more of 
sanctioned positions vacant (C1, C2, C3, C4, C6, C7, C9, C11).  
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and flexibly allocated by the faculty (See Appendix C). Other states take a more prescriptive 
approach; they divide the internal assessment into attendance, tutorials, or fixed number of 
exams/activities through the semester (D8, D9). The latter provides less flexibility and freedom 
to the individual faculty to assess a student’s learning.123  
However, Kerala’s experience with the reform has raised questions about possible grade 
inflation and biased grading by faculty (Hrdayakumari, 2012). As a result, the state is now 
considering a reduction in the internal assessment component to 10%, at least till the student-
teacher ratios improve and more personal attention can be paid in internal assessment (The 
Hindu, 2020). This change is a great example of how reform implementation without adequate 
technical support and accountability measures can often backfire and lead to a rejection of the 
reform solution itself.  
Apart from some changes in the proportion of internal assessments, no other major 
changes were mentioned by the interviewees in Kerala, West Bengal, or Punjab (A1, C3, D1, 
D8). In Odisha, the SHEC is planning to create a centralized question bank to complement the 
common undergraduate syllabus and to digitize result tabulation and sharing. SHEC believes this 
will help in automating assessment management and reduce the logistical concerns of managing 
examinations in universities (B1, B8).  Of course, this move strengthens centralization and 
standardization of examinations and cuts into the autonomy of individual faculty. I found no 
evidence to suggest that NHEM’s other suggestions about examination reforms were followed in 
the states.124  
 
123
 As noted in Chapter 4, NHEM’s advocacy of these reforms is not based on any evidence. None of the states or 
the federal implementing authorities have attempted to determine the best allocation of internal and external 
(university) assessment that work in the current university structure. 
124
 This includes practices such as public declaration of internal assessment results by each faculty on the college 
website and notice board and openly shared analysis of student feedback to curb tendencies of grade inflation and 
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NHEM also suggested that states should undertake curricular reforms (details in 
Appendix K). This included using practices like regular review of curriculum by university 
academic councils, inclusion of skill-based components, creation of outcome-based frameworks 
for curricula, etc. Odisha and Kerala have adopted some of these practices. However, similar to 
the adoption of choice-based credits, the scope of implementation is limited. And the changes do 
not have a substantial effect on the quality of curriculum or teaching.  
Implications for NHEM 
The UGC had been promoting semester and CBCS reforms for a few years prior to 
NHEM’s creation (UGC, 2009). Efforts to change the examination system are even older 
(Zachariah, 1993). Thus, the idea of these reforms is older and perhaps, more widely accepted in 
the states. This explains why the policy has had reasonable success with implementation of these 
reforms even though it only employs hortatory tools for implementation. However, this does not 
imply that the reforms have been implemented in a manner that decentralizes academic powers 
to individual faculty or gives greater curricular choice to students. In fact, implementation of 
academic reforms is a classic case of adopting reform language without changes in practice (see 
(Hill, 2001; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008)). The discussion in this section highlights the main reasons 
for the limited implementation of reforms.  
First, NHEM’s design and implementation has not considered how the reform solutions 
interact with the existing structural features of state universities and their resource constraints. 
High faculty vacancies, prevalence of single-discipline undergraduate institutions, affiliation 
constraints, and poor physical infrastructure create real and immediate hurdles in implementing 
 
unfairness. None of the colleges in the sample mentioned following these practices to check their internal 
assessment systems.  
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the reforms properly (see AISHE, 2018; N. Sharma, 2019).125 Thus, the basic structure of the 
higher education system and its available resources are incompatible with implementing 
curricular-choice and continuous assessment at scale.  
Second, the academic reforms have been interpreted and implemented in a limited form 
because the benefits and theory of action of the NHEM reforms are not understood universally in 
the states. This lack of understanding directs individual and institutional choices about the reform  
(see Bjork, 2003; Mcginn & Welsh, 1999; Schweisfurth, 2011). Faculty cannot articulate the 
benefits of implementing academic reforms and do not associate NHEM with changes in 
teaching and learning (A6, C4). DoHE/SHEC officials were also unsure about the effects of the 
policy on teaching behavior or syllabus (A15, A1, B3). Thus, there is little political support for 
the reform amongst any group of actors in the policy subsystem. They do not feel the need to 
mobilize resources or make structural changes to support the reform (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 
2007; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Weible, 2007).  
Third, a poor understanding of the reform’s theory of action prevents institutions and 
states from developing appropriate technical capacity to undertake the reforms. States have not 
invested in retraining faculty and creating technical capabilities needed to carry out new tasks, 
even though this is a crucial aspect of decentralization efforts and instituting behavioral change 
(see Bjork, 2003; Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983).  
NHEM’s instrument design does little to address the poor interpretation of the theory of 
action. In fact, the policy document does not clarify if and how the semester system and choice-
 
125
 As many as two thirds of the colleges in sample states are private. Academic reforms are the only part of NHEM 
that directly affect teaching and learning practices in these institutions (other reforms have indirect affect through 
changes in autonomy, affiliation, and accreditation). Yet, the policy has made no effort to ensure that this reform is 
understood and implemented well in private colleges. There is little data about faculty quality, student-teacher ratios, 
or mechanisms to enforce minimum standards in these institutions (Pushkar, 2018; Sen, 2017). This raises serious 
doubts about the effect of NHEM on education quality in a vast part of the state higher education system.   
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based credits will change the academic experience for students (NHEM, 2013, pp. 118-120). The 
policy only uses hortatory tools for promoting these reforms. And none of the other instruments 
are calibrated to allow investments in faculty-development and training administrators in the 
state. These investments would be a first step in improving the outcomes of the reforms.  
As noted in Chapter 4, NHEM does not clarify the common theory of action that ties 
together all the reforms. As a result, states have chosen to implement the parts they are more 
familiar with. This piecemeal implementation of reforms has been noted in other countries such 
as Vietnam, Indonesia, Hong Kong, etc. (Morris & Scott, 2003; Pham, 2018; Tran, 2014). 
Though academic reforms are more known to states, they cannot work as intended in affiliating 
state universities where faculty and colleges have little autonomy. Without accompanying 
structural reforms, the semester system has created delays in the academic calendar and reduced 
the teaching time available to faculty. As a result, Punjab is now considering if it should continue 
with the system or not. And Kerala is reconsidering the use of internal examinations. These are 
unintended consequences of piecemeal implementation of reforms. Thus, the poor 
implementation of these reforms is also a product of NHEM’s design and lack of communication 
about the interrelated nature of the reforms.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter is dedicated to answering research questions about the implementation of 
NHEM reforms and whether NHEM’s theory of action was followed in the states. The chapter 




The evidence on the implementation of all the reforms and their planning and monitoring 
suggests that states have interpreted the reforms in a very different manner than NHEM intended. 
Affiliation reforms have largely been ignored in Kerala and Punjab. Odisha and West Bengal 
have made attempts to create new universities, but reforming the affiliation system and 
developing alternate solutions for the future has not been their primary goal. Autonomy reforms 
in universities have been entirely neglected and have not been very successful in colleges either. 
Importantly, autonomy is interpreted as the status granted by UGC and not as a broader set of 
processes that make colleges independent of the DoHEs and affiliating universities.   
Accreditation, which is a process largely dependent on an external agency, has been 
much more welcome as a means of quality assurance. However, the coverage of accreditation 
has been limited to government and government-aided institutions. Most private institutions are 
still unaccredited and have little interaction with the DoHEs and universities for quality 
assurance. Lastly, the limited implementation of semester and choice-based credit system has 
been in line with the constrained structures in which colleges operate, their limited technical 
capacity, and paltry financial resources.  
In this section, I discuss the common patterns across the findings. I argue that the 
NHEM’s lackluster performance with vertical decentralization of academic and administrative 
powers can be attributed to a few inter-related reasons. The first, beliefs and interests of actors in 
the state policy coalition are incongruent with NHEM’s beliefs. Second, there are financial and 
technical resource constraints that determine what states can implement. Variations in these 
factors explain the differences in reform implementation across states.  
As elaborated early in the chapter, the implementation analysis uses advocacy coalition 
framework (ACF) and institutional theory to synthesize the findings about implementation. The 
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state policy subsystem consists of various actors actively trying to affect policies such as DoHEs, 
SHECs, public universities, government colleges, aided colleges, and private colleges (see 
(Sabatier, 1988, p. 139). I treat the DoHEs, SHECs, public universities, and government colleges 
as one policy coalition. Close administrative relationships with the state facilitate natural 
coordination amongst the actors. Their dependence on the state also supports a common set of 
policy beliefs. These beliefs are discussed in detail in the next section. In this sense, the higher 
education subsystem has a policy monopoly headed by DoHEs which is a dominant actor in the 
coalition.  
The belief systems and resources of advocacy coalitions shape policy implementation. 
Belief systems are the “basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions” shared by the 
coalition actors (Sabatier, 1988, p. 139). Resources include legal authority, financial resources, 
expertise, leadership, etc. (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007, p. 198). The following sections analyze 
how beliefs and resources shape the implementation of NHEM.  
Beliefs of the Advocacy Coalition  
Role of policy and secondary beliefs is central to advocacy coalition framework (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2007; McLaughlin, 1987; Williams & Young, 1994). Belief systems are the glue 
that bind advocacy coalitions together and inform resource allocation and implementation 
choices. However, ACF does not show how institutionalized belief systems shape organizational 
actors and individuals through structures and routines. I bring in elements of institutional theory 
to explore how faculty and administrators’ belief systems and structures interact to shape their 





Academic Autonomy and Professional Identity  
According to ACF, policy coalitions (including the universities, colleges, DoHEs and 
SHECs) subscribe to a common belief system (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1999). Beliefs are the values, normative and causal beliefs held in common by members 
of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier, 1988, p. 188). ACF’s belief systems are not entirely different 
from the taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and norms that inform individual behavior in 
institutionalized organizations (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Zucker, 1977).  
Most of the research done using institutional theory in Western education systems 
presents educational organizations as institutionalized systems (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Ogawa et al., 2003). That is, these organizations draw legitimacy from 
adopting practices, myths, and ceremonies that are a part of their organizational environments 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1992). They leave their technical core (of teaching or 
research) relatively unsupervised and operate on a logic of confidence that lower levels of the 
organization are following what the leadership adopts at the institutional level (Meyer & Scott, 
1992). True institutional change is difficult because the schools or universities shield their 
instructional or research core from external pressures.  
Early formulations of institutional theory specify that the protection of the technical core 
is related to American values about local control over education, and the conflicts that arise when 
teachers’ professional authority is seen to be encroached by externally imposed theories or logics 
of education (Meyer & Rowan, 1978, p. 80). In Western higher education systems, the autonomy 
of the institution and faculty from the state are considered fundamental features of the 
institutions (Abrutyn & Turner, 2011; Berdahl, 1990; Neave & Van Vught, 1994). I argue that in 
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a different social and political context, such as with public institutions in India, the basis of the 
logic of confidence changes.  
The evidence discussed in this chapter shows that state colleges and universities primarily 
see themselves as public/government organizations whose technical core lies in adhering to the 
rules and prescriptions laid down by the state. The faculty as well as institutions draw their sense 
of identity and legitimacy from the administrative structures, processes, routines, and conditions 
defined by those state rules and prescriptions. Faculty at publicly funded or aided institutions 
primarily view themselves as civil servants. This observation has been made regarding school 
reforms across Asian countries (Bjork, 2003; Morris & Scott, 2003; Tran, 2014).  
As a result, the main concern for faculty is preserving the service conditions and daily 
routines they are familiar with. For instance, faculty unions in states only deal with the DoHEs 
about matters of compensation, retirement benefits, promotion processes, etc. for their members. 
Academic freedom is not a primary aspect of faculty’s professional identity. Their routines and 
practices are based on the myth that centralized control over academic matters and 
administration is more effective than decentralized control (see Honig & Hatch, 2004). This 
explains why both college and university faculty amongst the respondents agree that university 
faculty feel they are in a better position to make curricular decisions and design assessments than 
college faculty.  
The limited academic autonomy of faculty, particularly in the colleges, is also reinforced 
by the financial and administrative realities of the institutions. The university and government 
colleges depend almost entirely on the state for funding, recruitment, interactions with other 
stakeholders. The universities look to the DoHE for policy leadership and colleges look to the 
university for academic direction. The salary and retirement benefits of university and 
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government college faculty are determined by the state because they are public employees. Thus, 
financial dependence, legal constraints, and decades of limited autonomy have created 
institutional cultures where the academic identity is not supported. Merton noted this as an effect 
of bureaucratic structures, whereby “primary concern with conformity to rules interferes with the 
achievement of the purposes of an organization” (Merton, 1940, p. 563).  
NHEM’s theory of action is based on a very different conception of faculty autonomy. 
The reforms are based on a decentralization myth that directly challenges the existing myth with 
which the institutional structures and routines are coupled (see Hallett, 2010). This results in 
many of the reform responses seen in this chapter. For instance, autonomy reforms require the 
universities to share academic control with college faculty and encourage college faculty to use 
their enlarged academic authority to make curricular and assessment decisions. This faces two 
types of resistance. First, from the university and state whose administrative and academic 
superiority is threatened. They attempt to partially address (bridge) external reform requirements 
by using classifications like autonomous colleges to show a degree of compliance without 
actually giving up control (see Honig & Hatch, 2004). Second, faculty and institutions resist 
autonomy and academic freedom because it adds to the number, diversity, and complexity of 
their tasks. Many institutions buffer themselves by simply not applying for autonomy, even when 
NHEM inducements are attached.  
Similarly, in the present affiliation system, the relationship of the university and DoHE 
with private colleges is limited to administrative and bureaucratic matters. Universities only 
transact with colleges for providing affiliation and conducting examinations. They do not inspect 
the institutions and enforce affiliation standards for the fear of causing conflict or discovering 
discrepancy. The logic of confidence rests in the affiliated institutions following rules and 
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standards about physical infrastructure and resources. The DoHE, which does not fund them, 
also maintains no relationship with them other than approving affiliation. The few private 
colleges that do approach the state for policy matters do so for fee regulation or funding, not for 
academic matters.  
There are also some inter-state differences in how concerns about autonomy and private 
colleges are framed. These are informed by the larger political and organizational environment of 
the state (see Meyer & Rowan, 1978; Sabatier, 1998). Kerala’s political culture is much more 
supportive of an equity-based framing because of the wider political mobilization as well as 
communist/Marxist ideological roots of its political parties (Harriss & Törnquist, 2015; P. Singh, 
2011). As a result, the state was more concerned about effects of autonomy on inequitable 
admission practices, affordability of education, and mechanisms for redressal of student 
grievances. Here, the equitable and fair nature of centralized processes adds to their legitimacy.  
Meaning of Quality and Systems for Quality Assurance  
Introduction of external quality assurance has run into concerns about institutional 
autonomy in other nations as well (Amaral et al., 2009; Hoecht, 2006; Hou et al., 2015). The 
primary reason for this appears to be the perception of encroachments on faculty autonomy. 
However, I observe something different in India. The beliefs about what quality higher education 
means and how it can be assured follow the logic of bureaucratic standardization and uniformity 
and not academic autonomy. This belief system reflects in the actions regarding affiliation 
reforms and academic reforms in states. 
As mentioned in the discussion about affiliation reforms, state systems don’t share a 
unified and clear vision about the role of state universities in quality assurance. Underlying this 
lack of clarity are important questions about what qualifies as good higher education; what the 
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purpose of quality higher education is; which teaching, learning and assessment principles make 
for a quality education; and which systems are appropriate for quality assurance. Instead of 
grappling with these questions, which can create conflict within organizations, the state system 
relies on the logic of confidence in the affiliation system (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978). As 
a centralized process, this myth has been rationalized and has a taken-for-granted quality. It 
suggests that the question of quality is settled by the university and is dependent on curricular 
and assessment standardization and comparability across a university.126  
Conversations with faculty and institutional leaders show that many of them do not 
consider concepts of curricular choice, customization of curriculum, continuous assessment by 
the faculty that teaches a student, and assessment methods other examinations as integral parts of 
high-quality higher education. Instead, a standardized curriculum and assessment system are the 
hallmark of good education. This presents a problem for NHEM reforms, whose intent is vertical 
decentralization of academic powers to colleges and students. This intent is antithetical to the 
concept of quality and quality assurance in the state university system. Even if it is implemented 
(like the implementation of internal assessments in Odisha, Punjab, and West Bengal), it is so 
narrowly defined and prescriptive that it leaves little scope for the exercise of faculty autonomy. 
Most states have chosen to implement academic reforms such that they have little effect on how 
faculty teach in classrooms.  
The issue of quality assurance also affects the relationship between colleges and 
affiliating universities. Universities are primarily concerned about colleges gaming the system in 
 
126
 This conclusion is supported by the fact that primary academic concern of many interviewees was with 
maintaining the external and internal validity of the university and college’s assessment system, not with what 
students learn or with their research outputs. This suggests that the organizational processes are not designed to 
produce students with the most relevant knowledge or skills, even though this is the espoused goal of all institutions. 
The processes are designed to ensure that all students earning a credential are tested using the same standard and 
thus comparable across colleges.  
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a way that jeopardizes the legitimacy of a university degree’s validity. These concerns are not 
completely invalid. Operations of many private institutions in India are suspect (Singh, 2003; 
Tierney & Sabharwal, 2017). But complaints about the quality of private institutions are only 
employed to deflect calls for autonomy reforms. If the university processes were designed 
around improving quality rather than validity, they would engage more deeply in enforcing 
standards in affiliated colleges and support the improvement of teaching practices. There would 
also be more proactive efforts to design effective solutions for the affiliation problem at the 
policy subsystems level.  
The belief system puts more faith in quality assurance systems that are managed outside 
the colleges. This is seen in the positive attitudes of the institutions towards accreditation 
reforms.127 Even though most institutions are unable to point to the exact mechanism through 
which accreditation improves their quality, many actors profess faith in the process.  
There are small differences in the state-level belief systems. Though Kerala has been very 
resistant to the idea of autonomy, it has dealt with quality assurance by creating its own State 
Assessment and Accreditation Council. The council prepares the unaccredited institutions in the 
state to receive accreditation. The SAAC also acts as a venue for the SHEC and DoHE to 
collaborate with colleges and universities to institutionalize quality assurance and quality control 
mechanisms (which is not possible with a national accreditation agency). This is inconsistent 
with other observations made about the difference between Kerala’s culture and belief system 
and those of the other sample states.  
In comparison, Odisha and West Bengal have created a standardized curriculum for 
undergraduate education across the state. This move also controls quality, but it further 
 
127
 Similarly, there is active participation in the National Institutional Ranking Framework.  
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centralizes the system. In the current system of affiliation and limited academic autonomy, a 
standardized curriculum may be effective in maintaining the quality of what is taught in colleges. 
However, standardization does little to prepare colleges for taking on more responsibilities of 
improving their curriculum, teaching, instruction, or assessment in the future. It creates more 
reasons to perpetuate a centralized system of quality control. It also takes away the ability of 
regional universities to innovate in terms of curriculum. This hindering of diversity and 
innovation in undergraduate education in the name of quality assurance shifts college education 
one step closer to the pattern of school education in India. It is diametrically opposed to the idea 
of decentralization, academic autonomy, and innovation that has been repeatedly stressed in 
federal policy documents (MHRD, 2020; NHEM, 2013b; Yash Pal Committee, 2009).  
Interests and Political Will 
Apart from belief systems, I also find that actors are motivated by their self-interest. 
Though ACF uses beliefs as a foundational concept, studies using the theory have found that 
interests (along with trust and perceived influence/resources of others) can shape coalition 
formation (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007; Nohrstedt, 2010). Interests play a large role in shaping 
implementation in the literature on decentralization primarily drawn from the public 
administration. Local political will is informed by interests of actors and it is one of two main 
factors crucial for decentralization (Bray, 2013; McGinn & Welsh, 1999). This implies that in 
state higher education systems, interests of DoHEs, political/bureaucratic leaders, faculty and 
administrators also determine reform implementation.  
Patronage politics in higher education provides insight into the nature of self-interests 
that resist any decentralization in state universities. Higher education is a source of patronage in 
India. Public universities and colleges make faculty and staff appointments, award affiliation, 
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and award contracts for procurements and construction. The present system allows DoHEs the 
ability to interfere in these decisions and creates opportunities for rent seeking and corruption 
(Kaul, 1993; Krishnan, 2014). Governance and autonomy threaten to upset this system by 
introducing more transparent governance systems for universities, reducing the number of 
affiliated institutions, etc. Thus, DoHEs and its leaders are more likely to protect the existing 
system and this limits local political support for some NHEM reforms.  
There are other examples of self-interest driven actions of actors. Universities are not 
interested in affiliation reforms because they have a clear financial incentive to support the 
existing system. It brings in affiliation-related fees that are an important source of revenue for 
many state universities. This is more notable in states like Punjab than in Odisha. Within 
universities and colleges, individuals serving as administrators or faculty in colleges also have 
interests in supporting centralized systems. Decentralization reforms will increase the emphasis 
on institutional and individual performance standards. This increase in accountability is resisted 
by those in the system. Similarly, faculty in colleges that apply for autonomy express fears of 
losing job security and being subjected to higher performance standards (A8, A15, B7, B8, C2, 
C4). 
Resource Constraints  
According to the advocacy coalition framework, the resources within subsystems as well 
as resources available to coalitions determine their implementation strategies (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The resources determine which coalition or which actor in the coalition 
prevails. Resources do not just mean financial or physical resources. Technical expertise, legal 
authority, mobilizable supporters, normative power, etc. are also resources (Sabatier & Weible, 
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2007). In this study, I concentrate on the effects of financial resources and technical capacity of 
the advocacy coalition and how it informs implementation. 
Financial Resources 
Financial resources are critical for any decentralization effort (Rondinelli et al., 1983). 
The paucity of financial resources at the state level dictates whether the implementation of 
multiple reforms works as policy planners would like. Reforms in college autonomy and 
accreditation often are subverted by poor quality or inadequate infrastructure. The reluctance of 
states to increase their payroll burdens leads states to not fill their vacant faculty positions or to 
not take steps to reduce student-teacher ratios to levels conducive to academic reforms. Most 
states are also unwilling to create new universities due to the same fear.  
This chapter has already discussed how policy subsystems have taken a diluted approach 
to a reform to work with the available faculty and physical resources. For instance, while choice-
based credit reform has been implemented, colleges cannot offer a large variety of courses due to 
shortage of faculty and infrastructure. Perceptions about resources can be very important for 
faculty and administrators, even when they are not considered so by policy makers (Jessop & 
Penny, 1998; Schweisfurth, 2011). Academic decentralization, autonomy, and curricular freedom 
become contentious matters when faculty teach in a dilapidated building, don’t have access to a 
library, or manage a very large number of students.  
Faculty shortages also prevent institutions from applying for autonomy, because they do 
not have enough manpower for the additional tasks of managing assessment. Most of the 
available solutions for affiliation require some major form of investment from the states which 
leads them to stall this reform. Resource constraints can explain why a state like Kerala, which is 
a front runner in other reforms, has done little to address affiliation reforms in the state. The state 
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has made investments in accreditation reforms, establishing a State Accreditation Council, 
funding an active SHEC, etc. These investments are small compared to the infrastructure and 
payroll costs of establishing new public universities for affiliation reform. The state has not made 
this commitment.   
Technical Capacity 
The operation of SHECs as well as implementation of other reforms highlights the 
limited technical capacity at various levels of the sub-system. Capacity refers to the technical 
know-how, training, or experience that allows individuals to carry out tasks. Technical capacity 
and prior exposure shapes the sense-making process of individuals (Spillane et al., 2002). The 
sensemaking process uses the existing knowledge schemas and attitudes to interpret new ideas 
and take actions in response to them.  
NHEM reforms introduce several new types of tasks at the state and institutional level. 
For instance, implementation of examination reform requires affiliated college faculty to design 
internal assessments that connect their curriculum and classroom teaching with student 
evaluation. All states have implemented this reform without extensive training for the college 
faculty. The prior experiences and training of college faculty does not expose them to designing 
assessments either. Without technical capacity, sense-making processes of individuals lead them 
to focus on superficial features of changes rather than the deeper relationships or to misinterpret 
new ideas as familiar ideas (Spillane et al., 2002). As a result, faculty have turned to their 
knowledge of familiar and traditional methods such as mid-semester exams to conduct internal 
assessments. They do not question whether these methods add any value to classroom teaching 
and learning. The poor implementation of the reform in Kerala has invited criticism for being 
ineffective and inconsistent (The Hindu, 2020). Decentralization of powers before building 
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technical capacities at lower levels has led to policy failure and unintended negative impacts in 
many other cases (see Hanson, 1998; Tran, 2014).  
Similarly, faculty have no experience in using academic autonomy to design or customize 
a part of the course syllabus. They are not trained to provide academic advising for choice-based 
credit systems. State higher education institutions lack the administrative and leadership capacity 
to deal with new processes such as strategic planning, creating data systems, and introducing 
accountability through means other than accreditation. They are also ill-equipped for managing 
institutional transitions required to create cluster universities or convert autonomous colleges 
into affiliating universities. The technical capacity could have been built in the form of SHECs. 
However, most states have not given enough financial and manpower resources to SHECs for 
them to develop expertise on the reforms.  
Implications for Policy Design  
The implementation analysis of NHEM reforms uncovers multiple challenges in the 
process. This discussion analyzes how NHEM’s policy instruments have failed because of their 
design and poorly-formed assumptions about state and institutional responses to the policy.  
NHEM’s policy design did anticipate some resistance to reforms. In early stages of 
formulation, the policy included reforms as a pre-condition for participation. This was done 
because of the federal government’s prior experiences with implementing reforms at the state 
level (Agarwal & Ostrom, 2001; Dyer, 2000; Sadoway, Gopakumar, Baindur, & Badami, 2018). 
NHEM uses participation in the whole program as an inducement to undertake SHEC reforms. 
This aspect of the reform has been successful. Its inducements for accreditation have also been 
effective in improving accreditation rates in states.  
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However, it appears that the policy makers did not identify or anticipate other sources of 
resistance such as belief systems and local interests. This identification is important because each 
type of resistance would require a specific policy instrument to address it. Instruments need to be 
based on accurate assumptions about behavioral responses in states and institutions (see 
McLaughlin & Jordan, 2004; Schneider & Ingram, 1990; Vedung, 2011).  
The policy instruments deployed for affiliation reforms, autonomy reforms, and academic 
reforms have been too weak. For instance, the policy design assumes that the challenge with 
converting clusters of colleges or autonomous colleges into universities is primarily a resource 
problem that can be solved through an infrastructure-focused grant. However, the 
implementation of these ideas has run into legal, political, and coordination challenges that the 
policy design did not account for. Federal implementers did not develop any technical support 
mechanisms to help states develop solutions to these challenges.  
Similarly, the design of policy solutions about autonomy reforms at universities and 
colleges are unaware of the depth and strength of belief systems in states that oppose the 
reforms. Financial inducements only address a part of institutional concerns. Implementation of 
autonomy would also require mobilization of political support from faculty and strong 
leadership. For states to adopt a broader interpretation of autonomy, NHEM will need to engage 
with the ideas of state level actors and promote alternate conceptions of academic identity and 
quality assurance (Hallett, 2010; Hartley et al., 2016; Kezar, 2013).  
Further, the policy employs hortatory tools for promoting university autonomy and 
academic reforms. As discussed earlier, political support for university reforms is weak because 
universities are a source of patronage and influence for the DoHE and political leaders. Hortatory 
tools alone cannot convince DoHEs to relinquish control over universities. Powerful financial 
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incentives will be required to build local support or strict federal mandates will be needed to 
override local political interests. Even more surprising is the fact that NHEM does not support 
implementation of academic reforms with significant investments in technical capacity building. 
Technical capacity and exposure can counter the effects of institutional culture and help in 
changing individual behaviors (Hanson, 2001; Kezar & Eckel, 2002; Spillane et al., 2002). 
While analyzing the implementation of NHEM reforms, it would be unfair to ignore the 
limitations in the federal implementation efforts. This study does not cover data on the federal-
level decision making regarding the implementation of NHEM reforms. However, analysis of 
state-level implementation of reforms sheds light on the narrow and centralized policy 
instruments employed by the federal government to implement reforms. NHEM is a federal 
policy and it operates in an institutional environment that is not very different from the state 
higher education systems. In many areas, the policy design, and ideas it embodies seem 
incongruous with the implementation processes and monitoring methods adopted by federal 
authorities. For instance, a policy that advocates for academic and administrative autonomy for 
state institutions should not use restrictive funding components and narrow spending criteria in 
calibrating its policy instruments. And a policy that acknowledges limits in the technical capacity 
of the states should invest considerably more in building those capacities. Even in reforms where 
hortatory tools have been employed, the federal government can build normative pressure by 
collecting data and reporting on the lack of changes. However, many reforms such as university 
autonomy, affiliation reforms, have been ignored by the implementers.  
An acknowledgement of these flaws is necessary to inform any future policies that 
attempt to introduce higher education reforms in the state university system. The National 
Education Policy 2020 includes reforms such as promoting multidisciplinary education and 
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curricular choice for students, compulsory accreditation, academic autonomy, and limitation of 
affiliation. Thus, the lessons learnt from state and federal level implementation of NHEM 




Chapter 7. Towards Better Practice: An Informed Approach to 
Higher Education Reform in India 
The National Higher Education Mission (NHEM) was the first comprehensive higher 
education reform policy adopted in India. Launched in 2013, this policy was aimed at funding 
state universities and initiating large-scale reforms in states and state university systems. The 
policy employed federal funds to incentivize state participation in the program based on meeting 
certain reform pre-conditions.  
Implementation of school policies and their evaluation has received a fair bit of scholarly 
attention in India (Dyer, 2000; Mangla, 2015; Savicks, 2017). This is the first study analyzing 
the formulation and implementation of a federal higher education policy across a sample of 
Indian states. Previous studies have either looked at the implementation of specific reforms like 
changes in the examination system (Zachariah, 1993) or analyzed the challenges faced by higher 
education in India (Agarwal, 2009; Kapur & Mehta, 2007; Sunder, 2012). Few studies have 
addressed questions about processes of policy implementation in the vast network of Indian state 
universities or examined the processes through which higher education policies get made at the 
federal or state level (Ayyar, 2009; Chakrabarti & Sanyal, 2017a).  
This study addresses two broad areas of inquiry about NHEM. The first is the context and 
actors involved in formulating NHEM and the theory of action used by the policy enactors at the 
national level. The second is the extent of reform implementation in states and whether the 
national theory of action was followed. Chapter 4 of this study looks at the policy formulation 
process at the federal level to understand the main elements of the policy’s design and its causal 
theory. I find that the Ministry for Human Resource Development (MHRD) is a dominant part of 
the higher education policy subsystem in India (see Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & 
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Sabatier, 2007). The states and other federal stakeholders are not an active part of the policy 
making process. Further I find that the causal logic applied in the policy is unclear, with the 
policy goals not closely related to the policy instruments (see Linder & Peters, 1984, 1989).  
I argue that NHEM’s reforms are based on the logic of horizontal and vertical 
decentralization of higher education states. That is, decision-making for academic, 
administrative, and governance matters is being horizontally devolved from the State 
Departments of Higher Education (DoHE) to State Councils of Higher Education (SHECs). And 
vertically to universities, and colleges (see Bray, 2012; Mcginn & Welsh, 1999). However, this 
is the policy’s theory in use, not its espoused theory (see Argyris & Schon, 1974).  
Using this understanding of NHEM’s policy design, in Chapters 5 and 6, I consider 
policy implementation within the higher education subsystem of each of four states: Kerala, 
Odisha, Punjab, and West Bengal. The states were sampled to represent diverse institutional 
capacity to implement reforms, performance in receiving and spending NHEM funds, 
educational and economic indicators, and region.   
The study adopts the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as an analysis framework. I 
examine structures and actors within the policy subsystems, and how their interests and resources 
shape implementation (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007; Sabatier, 1988). Specifically, I analyze 
evidence on the operation of the federal policy instruments in the states, the extent to which the 
causal logic of the policy is followed, and its eventual effects on institutions, processes, and 
individuals (see Howlett, 1991; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). 
The implementation analysis identifies the belief systems, resources, technical capacities, and 
interests that interact with policy incentives to shape the actions of individuals and institutions at 
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the state level (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Saetren, 2014; Spillane, Reiser, & Reimer, 2002; 
Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977).  
Broadly speaking, I find that states primarily treat NHEM as a federal funding program. 
The policy’s comprehensive reform agenda receives much less attention during implementation. 
States have had varied levels of success with five main reforms in NHEM: creation of State 
Higher Education Councils (SHECs); affiliation reforms; autonomy and governance reforms; 
accreditation reforms; and academic and examination reforms. All the states have created 
SHECs, but only Kerala’s council operates as a relatively autonomous body from the Department 
of Higher Education (DoHE). For the most part, DoHEs have not shared planning, monitoring, or 
financial authority with SHECs. Academic and examination reforms have been implemented by 
most states, but they have not led to substantial changes in teaching-learning practices or 
students’ curricular choice. While more colleges have become accredited and attained autonomy 
under NHEM, states have not created plans to address academic autonomy of universities or the 
size of the affiliation system.  
This chapter synthesizes these findings about the higher education system and how they 
affect policy formulation and implementation in India. I start the discussion by developing a 
typology of the factors that affect higher education policies in India. I discuss how the 
formulation and implementation of any higher education policy should consider four factors: 
political support; technical capacity; higher education culture; and financial resources. After 
defining these factors, I apply the typology to understand the implementation of NHEM reforms. 
I consider how the policy formulation process was related to each of these factors. Lastly, I 




A Four-Factor Framework for Higher Education Reform Policy in India 
NHEM includes multiple reforms that trigger change processes at different levels of the 
state higher education systems. The contextual complexity and peculiarities of Indian higher 
education institutions create different types of implementation challenges, ranging from a poor 
translation of reforms and proforma compliance to non-compliance. Chapters 5 and 6 identified 
the challenges faced in NHEM’s implementation. Here, I revisit and synthesize the findings to 
identify four types of factors that determine implementation of higher education reforms in 
Indian states: political support; technical capacity; institutional culture; and financial resources. 
The factors vary by the state policy systems, interact, and influence each other.  
This framework operates within ACF’s conception of a policy subsystem. But it also 
draws on implementation literature from developing countries. The salience of factors can 
change by state and by type of higher education policies. The framework serves as a heuristic to 
understand the complex web of relationships that need to be influenced to create any systemic 
changes in state higher education systems in India, even when other reforms do not share 
NHEM’s underlying theory-in-use of decentralization. This analysis can be used to anticipate 
implementation challenges, question assumptions, and design policy instruments in future 
policymaking (see Elmore, 1985).  
Political Support 
The decentralization literature from developing countries considers various challenges in 
devolving powers vertically and horizontally. Several studies on decentralization of school 
education in Asian countries show that the lack of political consensus or support at the local level 
often leads to failure of decentralization (Bray, 2012; Gershberg, 1998; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; 
Mukundan & Bray, 2004; Naidoo, 2002; Tran, 2014). I define political support as the consensus 
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regarding the value of decentralizing power amongst the state-government and other 
stakeholders at the state and local levels128. Political challenges for decentralization stem from 
issues regarding loss of power and authority, whether through rules and laws or in practice. 
According to McGinn (1999, p. 88), “changes of hierarchical relationships and locations of 
power reflected in functions defined by laws and regulations must be negotiated among political 
parties, parliamentarians, civil service commissioners, particular ministries, trade unions and 
professional associations…The complexity of the negotiated changes poses the greatest 
‘political’ challenge to decentralization.” 
Studies show that the strength of non-state actors in civil society and strong local 
governance can create supports for education decentralization (Heller, 2001)129. Several case 
studies done on India look at governance and education decentralization efforts in Kerala 
through the 1980s and 1990s (Hanson, 1998; Heller, 2001; Mukundan & Bray, 2004; Singh, 
2011). Though all of these efforts have not been successful, they point towards political and 
cultural support for devolution of authority across public systems. Decentralization and 
negotiation of power-sharing agreements between different levels of the state or entities have a 
greater scope for succeeding when they are negotiated rather than imposed (Hanson, 1998). That 
is, competing centers of power must be encouraged to interact and create a common vision for 
decentralization. While these strategies may be more appropriate for the policy-making phase, 
policy instruments can also be used to drive consensus. For instance, faculty unions can support 
 
128
 This formulation is slightly different from Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema's (1983) classification of political 
factors. I do not include the technical capacity of federal or state-level organizations to support decentralization 
within the concept of political support. I consider these to be separate factors.  
129
 China’s experience with decentralizing the governance of higher education shows that a federally led process can 
also be successful (Mok, 2001). However, the nature of China’s political system is different from India. It requires 
less consensus for policy implementation and the opportunity for participation in decision making is different.  
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decentralization if enough job training, minimum salaries, job security, etc. are part of the 
policy’s design (Hanson, 1998).  
Higher Education Culture  
Political support does not address all the complexities noted in the implementation of 
NHEM. Specifically, these categories fail to recognize the institutionalized norms in higher 
education that shape actions of organizations and individuals (Spillane et al., 2002). Drawing on 
institutional theory, I define higher education culture as taken for granted beliefs and attitudes of 
individuals towards concepts fundamental to the education enterprise. This includes questions 
about the aims of higher education, role of the state in higher education, meaning of academic 
autonomy, etc. The beliefs are sustained and reinforced because they are embedded in 
institutional structures and routines (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1992). This culture 
supports sense-making processes of individuals that affect reform implementation (Firestone et 
al., 1999; Spillane, 2000; Vesilind & Jones, 1998).  
Challenges created due to the incongruence between institutionalized culture and reform 
ideas are distinct from political and technical capacity challenges. Taken-for-granted beliefs act 
at a subconscious level and filter the institutions’ (or individuals’) understanding of the nature of 
the reform, its political impact, or the need to build technical capacity to implement it (D. K. 
Cohen, 1990; Hill, 2001). During implementation, new meanings of reforms can be interpreted 
in such a way as to align with existing belief systems (Coburn, 2001; Hargreaves, 1998). 
Teachers and faculty can adopt the language of reforms without any discernible change in their 
practice (Clarke, 2003). This institutionalized culture is not limited to a college or university or 
DoHE, it can refer to the informal norms and attitudes that pervade the entire policy subsystem 
(Weible & Sabatier, 2009).  
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Policies that require deep change in the value and belief systems of individuals tend to be 
more difficult to implement (Hanson, 1998; Spillane et al., 2002). However, sense-making is a 
group process and institutional leadership can reorient this process (Coburn, 2001). Moreover, 
institutional culture is also affected by institutional structures, laws, norms in the organizational 
field, incentives, etc. (Hanson, 2001; Kezar & Eckel, 2002b). Rather than assuming rational 
behavior, policy instruments need to acknowledge the complexity of individual behavior in an 
organized environment. This opens avenues to address higher education culture at multiple levels 
and through different means. Reframing higher education issues, changing incentive structures 
for faculty and institutions, and training leadership to gradually change expectations are some of 
the options available to policy makers (Hanson, 2001; Ingram & Schneider, 1990; Kezar, 2013; 
Varghese, 2004b).  
Technical Capacity  
Technical capacity is another challenge that appears frequently in decentralization 
literature (Gershberg, 1998; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Naidoo, 2002; Tran, 2014). In looking at 
the process of involving local communities in Kerala in school management, Mukundan & Bray 
(2004) found that “active workers who understood the nature of the tasks were in short supply”. 
Though an oversimplified definition of technical capacity, it aptly captures the challenges faced 
in many decentralization efforts. Individuals do not have the knowledge, skills, and experience to 
use the power being delegated or devolved to them (McGinn & Welsh, 1999). These include 
administrative and leadership capacity to manage new institutional priorities and engage in 
strategic planning, faculty’s ability to teach and undertake other duties, etc. (Dyer, 1999; 
Govinda & Bandyopadhyay, 2006; Rondinelli, 1981).  
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Decentralization has been more likely to work when policies strengthen local capacities 
and leadership and provide support to institutions through professional and well-managed 
structures (Dyer et al., 2010; Green, 2005; Guess, 2005). Building technical capacities requires 
an understanding of the technical needs of all the different actors in the policy subsystem, not 
just educational institutions. It also requires some thought about existing or new institutional 
arrangements needed to address the existing gaps (Govinda & Bandyopadhyay, 2006). In a large 
system, policies also need to consider the scale at which capacity building is required and plan 
decentralization accordingly. Hanson (1998) notes that the process of decentralization is more 
likely to succeed when it is phased. That is, authority or power is only transferred to parts of the 
system that meet criteria of readiness and have developed technical capacity. This helps in 
maintaining the momentum for decentralization without risking failure.  
Financial Resources 
Lastly, I consider a fourth category of challenges: adequacy of financial resources 
(McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Parry, 1997; Rondinelli et al., 1983). The adequacy of financial 
resources determines if incentives for policy implementation are large enough to encourage 
compliance, if capacity building can take place, and if policy makers are committed to reforms or 
decentralization. Financial resources may also be directly related to actual shortage of physical or 
human resources in the system that is being reformed. Decentralization efforts from developing 
countries are replete with cases where school or higher education systems suffer from acute 
shortage of basic resources (Bjork, 2003; McGinn & Welsh, 1999; Naidoo, 2002; Tran, 2014). In 
designing decentralization policies, federal and state governments need to assess if the financial 




Interrelated Nature of Factors 
The factors affecting policy implementation operate in an inter-related manner and affect 
each other. For instance, lack of political support for decentralization can have a direct effect on 
implementation through insufficient enactment of administrative and legal changes that support 
formal decentralization of powers (Rondinelli et al., 1983, p. 77). But it can also act through 
other channels. Limited political support can lead to lesser financial resources being allotted for 
technical capacity building at the lower levels. The technical capacities and experiences of 
individuals reinforce their sense-making processes and shapes the higher education culture. In 
another example, systems with bureaucratic or centralized higher education cultures can harbor 
doubts about the fundamental efficacy of decentralization as a solution to any problem. The 
system’s culture prevents creation of technical capacities for certain tasks at lower levels of 
organizations because the logic of decentralization is not accepted (Bjork, 2003). Thus, the 
interrelationships between the factors can create a vicious circle that resists attempts at 
decentralization and reforms (Govinda & Bandyopadhyay, 2006).  
Understanding NHEM Reform Implementation Considering the Four Factors 
This study shows that states have treated NHEM as a means of getting additional federal 
funds for infrastructural development. It is not viewed as a comprehensive program for 
reforming state higher education systems. Particularly, NHEM has not sparked processes of 
planning or solution generation on issues like affiliation reforms and operational autonomy of 
universities (Sahoo & Rout, 2019). Some reforms such as the creation of SHECs, accreditation, 
or implementation of academic reforms have been implemented with varying degrees of fidelity. 
Viewed from the prism of the framework discussed above, the challenges in implementing 
reforms seem complicated but not insurmountable. The discussion highlights the interrelated 
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nature of reform challenges and how policy instruments can address them. This section also 
touches upon the inter-state variations in policy implementation.  
Lack of Political Support in States 
NHEM reforms lack political support in the states. Various actors in the policy subsystem 
like DoHEs, political leadership, SHECs, universities, and colleges, have their own interests and 
reasons for not supporting the reforms. As a result, there is limited local will to change the 
current arrangements of administrative, academic, and financial power sharing. 
The DoHE and political leadership have a few reasons to not promote some NHEM 
reforms. State higher education is centralized and a lot of powers rest with the DoHEs (Jayal, 
2020; Singh, 2003). NHEM reforms threaten this concentration of power, with DoHEs from 
multiple states expressing this concern in the regional consultations during the NHEM’s 
formulation. Decentralization reforms usually prompt difficult questions about who should raise 
financial resources, who gets to spend them, and on what (Naidoo, 2002; Rondinelli et al., 1983). 
NHEM reforms raise similar concerns in states. DoHEs have retained control over most activities 
that deal with financial resource allocation, planning, and performance management of 
institutions. As some interviewees suggest, NHEM may have even spurred DoHEs to increase 
their control over SHECs because federal funds began to flow through the SHECs. NHEM 
provides few incentives for DoHE to effectively devolve their powers to SHECs or any other 
autonomous bodies. The policy implementation pays little attention to monitoring the 
development and day-to-day activities of SHECs. 
An important explanation for the reluctance to share control is that universities and 
government colleges are a source of patronage-based politics in India (Krishnan, 2014; Tierney 
& Sabharwal, 2018). Colleges can be profitable enterprises that also offer politicians a chance to 
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build a positive image of serving the society (Price & Srinivas, 2014). Politicians and big 
businesses possess political resources that allow them to establish such institutions (Thachil, 
2009). These resources include influence over public universities for granting affiliation to a 
college (Kaul, 1993; Krishnan, 2014; Thachil, 2009). Control over universities offers other 
means for servicing patron-client relationships or corruption such as hiring for public 
institutions, approving service or infrastructural contracts, etc. (Dash, 2017; Kapur & Mehta, 
2017; Kaul, 1993). Governance reforms reduce the DoHE’s and political influence in 
appointments, and administrative reforms add transparency in contracting decisions. Crucially, 
this limits the points of discretionary decision-making where the DoHE and politicians can use 
their influence or seek rent. This prospect of losing a political resource reduces political support 
for many NHEM reforms related to autonomy.  
The reforms are also opposed by other actors in the policy subsystem. It is not entirely 
clear if universities and colleges support NHEM reforms that affect their operations. As observed 
with school reforms, changes that make university management more professional, set higher 
performance expectations, and threaten job security  are resisted by faculty and faculty unions 
(Beteille et al., 2016; G. Kingdon & Muzammil, 2009; G. Kingdon & Teal, 2010). Institutional 
leadership does not support any radical changes to financial or governance reforms that increase 
competition and hold them accountable to specific outcomes. Any changes that affect existing 
terms of service and job expectations for faculty or leaders also create resistance. This study does 
not document overt resistance because none of the DoHEs have applied pressure to provide 
substantial autonomy to universities or public colleges yet. The resistance from faculty and 
administrators may become more overt if the policy is enforced. For instance, faculty can 
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mobilize and launch formal campaigns against autonomy, approach the state, go on strike, etc. 
(Jayal, 2020; Prakash, 2011; Praveen, 2013). 
One would assume decentralization should find political support from actors who are 
most likely to benefit from the effects of the reforms. For NHEM, this would include students, 
local communities where colleges or universities operate, and prospective employers/industries. 
However, I find that these actors are not an active part of the policy coalition in the states (see 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). NHEM’s engagement with student-led organizations or civil 
society organizations has been negligible. There is little evidence on how interests of students 
and local communities are represented in the formulation of reforms, their implementation, or in 
the governance of any college or university in India. This suggests that the higher education 
system has weak opportunity structures for participation (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007). 
Students unions are one avenue available to students, but their co-optation by major political 
parties has made them ineffective at representing student concerns about academic quality and 
employment opportunities (Altbach, 2017). 
Observations about lack of bottom-up participation and support for reforms echoes 
experiences of school policies encouraging decentralization in Indian states. Those efforts 
suffered due to weak political participation and capacity within the communities (Mukundan & 
Bray, 2004). Businesses, which have been actors in higher education reforms in the US, do not 
appear to be a part of the Indian policy subsystem in the same way. That is, they do not 
collectively express their concerns about quality of graduates, needs of the labor markets, or 
attempt to influence curricula (see Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones, & Vega, 2013, 2011; 
Komljenovic & Robertson, 2016).  
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Having discussed the similarities, I now consider the inter-state differences in political 
support for reforms. Kerala illustrates how political support for reforms can vary by the nature of 
reform and specific political context of a state. In Kerala, all the actors appear supportive of 
establishing a new state-level accreditation system. The state has a distinct political culture that 
has allowed greater decentralization in public service provision and higher state responsiveness 
to citizens (Heller, 2001; Singh, 2011). The presence of politically active faculty unions also 
changes the mix of higher education actors. Kerala is the only sample state where the Minister of 
Education has professional experience in higher education. And yet, Kerala also stands out in its 
vehement opposition to college autonomy. Here autonomy has been framed as a way for the state 
to stop funding higher education and for private institutions to avoid using equity considerations 
in offering admissions. This framing considerably reduces its support across groups in the states 
and it becomes the one reform where Kerala lags significantly behind other states (Praveen, 
2013).  
Odisha has some political support for reforms, perhaps rooted in the political stability and 
political leadership’s commitment to reforms across the state (Sahu & Panda, 2018). It was one 
of the first participants in NHEM and is also part of a World Bank higher education project. This 
support is relatively recent and perhaps not enough to catapult Odisha to the same level of 
performance as Kerala. However, if it continues, the state may be able to make significant 
progress in implementing NHEM reforms.  
The geometry of political support for reforms differs a little in West Bengal. The state’s 
political leadership has chosen to expand higher education access by creating new affiliating 
universities across the state, but this has not been done as part of NHEM with the specific aim of 
addressing affiliation problems. As a result, the state’s SHEC is not very powerful or active, and 
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its performance in other reforms does not stand out. The political support for more investment in 
higher education is not always accompanied by political support for reforms.  
In comparison, the political support for and interest in reforms in Punjab is very. limited. 
Actors in the state have not even insisted on a functional SHEC or implemented choice-based 
credit reforms. Faculty unions have been weak actors because of acute faculty shortages. Other 
explanations for the lack of political interest in higher education in Punjab stem from the socio-
economic conditions in the state. Interviewees suggest that the high rate of migration to other 
countries right after high school has been dampening enrollments in the state. Increasing rates of 
substance abuse are also linked to a lower interest in higher education enrollment. Lastly, a 
predominantly agricultural economy and related social culture in the state puts other issues ahead 
of concerns about education and skilling. 
Political support for reforms is a perplexing phenomenon across states. All the sample 
states have enough political support to participate in NHEM and invest the state’s share in the 
new policy. And yet, the commitment for NHEM’s reforms appears to be limited. This 
observation is in line with paradoxes about Indian social policy making noted by Mooij (2007). 
In India political regimes need social policies to maintain regime legitimacy, but they lack 
political commitment to provide the requisite resources and implementation efforts. Mooij chalks 
this up to a complex combination of indifference, poor accountability systems, corruption in 
implementation, and centralized policy making processes. In other words, it is a situation born 
out of the political culture of the country and the nature of its voters that is not easy to change.  
Bureaucratic Higher Education Culture  
Chapters 5 and 6 discussed different aspects of the belief systems in states that shape 
NHEM reform implementation in India. The higher education culture of states consists of taken 
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for granted beliefs and attitudes. They are embedded in the structures and processes of an 
institution. I suggest that three aspects of state higher education cultures matter for NHEM 
implementation. First, state actors still believe in state-centric models of governing and 
managing higher education. Second, the bureaucratic identity of faculty and institutions is more 
salient than their academic or professional identity. Third, quality and quality assurance are 
believed to be based on uniformity and standardization rather than on academic autonomy and 
differentiation in curriculum and assessment. These beliefs reinforce a centralized and 
bureaucratic culture.  
NHEM reforms clash with this worldview because they offer alternative visions (or 
myths in the language of institutional theory) that are diametrically opposed to the tight coupling 
that exists in the states (Hallett, 2010). These myths are based on horizontal decentralization of 
governance powers to SHECs and vertical decentralization of academic and administrative 
powers to universities and colleges.  Affiliation and accreditation reforms also try to decentralize 
quality assurance functions by distributing them amongst multiple actors. The actions of the 
DoHE, universities, and colleges are informed by and attempt to preserve this view of higher 
education management in the states. States adopt strategies to shield their current practices from 
the new myths of decentralization through proforma compliance, creative interpretation of 
academic or advisory reforms, and ignoring some reforms that are not accompanied by enough 
pressure from the new policy (see Honig & Hatch, 2004; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008).  
From the point of view of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, higher education culture 
is easily interpreted as a belief system consisting of policy core and secondary beliefs (Jenkins-
Smith et al., 2007). These beliefs hold the policy coalition together and determine the 
implementation strategies with respect to NHEM. Applying an institutional perspective helps in 
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elaborating how this belief system relates to routinized processes and structures that become 
difficult to change.  
I argue that, unlike Western systems, the academic or professional autonomy of faculty in 
higher education institutions is not a salient feature of the institutions in India (see Berdahl, 
1990; Neave & Van Vught, 1994). The state higher education systems are tightly coupled with 
the myth of state authority and centralized decision making perpetuated by their institutional 
environment (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977, 1978). Maintaining practices that support this coupling 
is more critical to institutional stability than protecting the “academic” core or identity of the 
institutions and faculty. The logic of confidence in this system is held together by following 
bureaucratic means for public institutions rather than faith in the professionalism of higher 
education faculty or administrators (Meyer et al., 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This has a few 
implications for the state higher education culture.  
Individuals within this culture view themselves as civil servants and not academic 
professionals (Bjork, 2004; Mukundan & Bray, 2004). Their identity with relation to the 
institutions is informed by terms of their service like the number of hours they work, their salary, 
promotion, and retirement benefits, etc. Their technical capacities, work routines, and norms 
promote rule-following and compliance. For example, faculty speak about autonomy reforms 
mainly in terms of the increase in examination and assessment responsibilities and number of 
hours worked. The discussion about autonomy’s effect on their ability to design curricula or 
assessments is negligible. Most of them do not believe that they have the authority or ability to 
make curricular decisions. They do not contest the centralized curriculum of affiliating 
universities as something that encroaches upon their academic freedom.  
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Publicly funded universities and colleges view themselves as public institutions rather 
than autonomous academic institutions. They maintain their legitimacy by adhering to state-
defined rules and regulations about their operations. Internal organizational processes and 
structures are designed to this end, rather than achieving academic outcomes. For instance, most 
of the reporting and monitoring in NHEM has been about rule-based and timely spending of 
infrastructure grants. Colleges and universities have few comments about the quality and impact 
of implementing choice-based credit systems or examination systems. In another example, 
colleges do not understand autonomy as a holistic decentralization of powers to a college or to its 
faculty. Autonomy has value because it is understood as a marker of quality awarded by a federal 
authority, the University Grants Commission (UGC). Most respondents do not trust colleges to 
self-regulate. These concerns are particularly strong when it comes to private colleges.  
Relationships between institutions, the DoHE, the SHEC, and affiliated colleges, also 
follow institutionalized norms. Relationships are designed to show compliance to predefined 
rules and processes, not to increase institutional accountability or to maintain the academic 
autonomy of institutions involved. Like myths, the rules, processes, or standards set by a higher 
authority (state or university) are rationalized and taken for granted. For example, the myth of 
affiliation has been rationalized to the point that it is not questioned by institutions as a method 
of quality assurance. It is based on the logic that centrally controlled systems are of good quality 
because they are fair and uniform across institutions. Institutions only complain about affiliation 
because of a procedural issue, that managing examinations at a large scale create logistical 
difficulties and delays. There is little faith that any non-public entity or individuals can self-
regulate and manage quality. Hence, the whole system prefers to rely on a public university’s 
patchy system of affiliation rather than the concepts of institutional autonomy and competition.  
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Similarly, the DoHE’s attitude towards SHECs is a passive institutional response 
motivated by a fundamentally different view of higher education management. The DoHE and 
institutions do not believe that any institution outside of the DoHE should have the authority to 
plan and or monitor the development of higher education. These functions are considered the 
state’s responsibility. And so, they are not decentralized to SHECs.   
The state belief systems described above are not entirely uniform, however. The existing 
variation in the states proves that the bureaucratic view of DoHEs, universities and colleges is 
not a static or uniform cultural reality. Differences in states show that state political and 
bureaucratic cultures can align themselves with a new myth and initiate change. States with 
historically strong academic traditions and greater institutional independence across different 
social sectors (such as Kerala) have a slightly different balance of bureaucratic and academic 
identities within the higher education systems.  
Kerala is the only state in the sample that stands out in its approach towards the 
relationship between DoHEs and SHECs (outside the sample, states such as Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka may exhibit similar tendencies). This difference in balance is reflected in the stronger 
and larger academic leadership appointed to the SHEC, the small periods of vacancies in 
appointments to the SHEC, and greater financial commitment and autonomy given to it. The 
bureaucratic identity in the state is strong enough that the management functions like planning or 
implementation of federal policies like NHEM is still retained by the DoHE. Still, the Kerala 
council undertakes more expansive activities than Councils in West Bengal and Odisha. Kerala’s 
implementation of outcome-based education, the creation of a state-level accreditation system, 
and the enactment of an institution-level data collection system show that the DoHE’s approach 
towards higher education allows a wider berth for non-state actors like the SHECs. In another 
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example, Kerala’s quality assurance systems based on accreditation are more likely to rely on a 
decentralized network of universities and colleges.  
In comparison, Odisha’s and West Bengal’s efforts to standardize undergraduate 
curriculum across all universities show continued tendencies towards centralization and 
uniformity. The faith in uniformity is such that Odisha and West Bengal have created 
standardized undergraduate curriculums to maintain quality across all universities in the states. 
This illustrates the considerable distance between the extant higher education culture and 
NHEM’s theory-in-use. Punjab’s higher education culture is like that of Odisha and West 
Bengal. The state’s implementation of semester reforms has been in line with other states, but it 
lags in the implementation of choice-based credit system at the undergraduate level. It also has 
made no efforts, whether decentralized or centralized, in the field of quality assurance.   
Given the inter-state variations, it is possible for federal policies to nudge states along the 
spectrum towards greater decentralization. Challenging institutionalized practices and deeply 
held myths is not an easy process. Certainly, NHEM’s over-reliance on hortatory tools is not 
likely to yield many results in the state higher education systems. However, cultures can be 
changed with systematic and multi-pronged approaches. Beliefs and processes that support them 
can change through developing supportive leadership at state and institutional levels; providing 
stronger financial incentives; creating new accountability regimes; and engaging in continuous 
capacity building. I discuss these in greater detail during the discussion on implications for future 
policies.  
Limited Technical Capacity 
NHEM’s theory of action decentralizes several functions that are a critical part of the 
policy’s design. However, it does not consider if the state higher education systems have any 
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extant capacity to undertake these activities. For instance, SHECs are supposed to support 
strategic planning at institutional and state level; conduct performance monitoring; build data 
management systems, etc. (NHEM, 2013, p. 153). These capacities are not just missing in 
SHECs; they are not available as well in DoHEs or public universities. Universities and colleges 
are supposed to undertake strategic planning and manage complicated organization transitions 
like developing cluster universities or divide the universities into smaller affiliating universities. 
College faculty need the academic capacity to create and appropriately use internal assessments 
at a large scale and to conduct effective curricular revisions, etc. Interviews with institutional 
leaders and faculty indicate that these capacities are not present in the state system. Even 
institutions that have gone through the processes of change are unable to articulate the transition 
process was managed. Let me explain this.   
The use of strategic planning in NHEM presents one example of the lack of technical 
capacity leading to limited use of a tool. Most state higher education institutions, their faculty, 
and leaders have not created strategic plans before. The scope of the plans they have created for 
NHEM is limited to the NHEM funding components an institution is eligible for. The 
articulation of a long-term vision, targets, and short- and long-term strategies are missing from 
NHEM plans. Student-level outcomes data are not measured or analyzed in any state. Data 
gathering is sporadic and at the request of the DoHE. Other than Kerala, no other state has 
created a system for regularly collecting data. Even there, the data is collected at the institutional 
level making sophisticated analysis at student or department level impossible.  
The fact that the planning process is guided by DoHEs rather than SHECs also points to 
the continued bureaucratic influence and lack of academic input in higher education planning. At 
a systemic level, states are unable to grasp the complexities and details of strategic planning for 
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higher education. For instance, one bureaucrat in Odisha explained that strategic planning is of 
no use. Planning is only useful when institutions are given a fixed budget and a timeline to spend 
it. State and institutional plans across states lack detailed information about processes and 
resources required at institutions to implement any of the NHEM reforms. This is particularly 
noteworthy because NHEM emphasizes the importance of planning as the first step for further 
reform implementation. A national expert familiar with education planning called NHEM’s 
planning a ‘form filling exercise”. He noted that NHEM had not supported careful creation of 
state plans and had not used technical experts to review and revise plans (F3).  
Examination reforms and introduction of continuous internal assessment provides another 
example of limited technical capacity at the faculty level. This study does not collect detailed 
data about faculty attitudes towards the academic reforms and the mechanisms through which it 
affects the practice of teaching and learning. However, some broad observations emerge from the 
faculty interviewed for the study. Faculty in most colleges are a product of a university system 
that has used annual external evaluations for decades. Their exposure to different assessment 
methodologies or pedagogies has been limited. Past experiences and training limit their capacity 
to understand reforms. Though states like West Bengal allow a third of the evaluation to be done 
by the faculty teaching the course, the faculty report using the same summative examinations in 
the classroom that are used at the university level. The faculty in this study were concerned about 
the quality of their teaching and what their students learn, but their mental models did not allow 
for instant adoption of different methods without external intervention.  
NHEM’s policy instrument design has not been calibrated to support capacity building in 
states. Most funding components only support infrastructural development. This leaves key 
concerns about technical capacity unaddressed. The hortatory tools are typically weak policy 
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instruments. They are particularly ineffective in systems that have limited financial resources, 
where the higher education culture is not supportive of the right interpretation of reforms 
(Hanson, 2001; Kezar & Eckel, 2002b), and where technical capacity for implementing the 
reforms is poor (Bjork, 2004).  
Limited Financial Commitment of Federal Government and States  
Though not discussed in detail in the implementation chapters, the issue of lack of 
financial resources looms large over Indian higher education and NHEM’s implementation. As 
observed in this study, financial factors affect the operation of the policy instruments in a few 
important ways. Firstly, NHEM’s main assumption about state participation in the policy is that 
the amount of NHEM funds is enough to entice states into implementing the reforms. While the 
funds are enough for states to engage in pro-forma compliance for some reforms like SHECs, 
they are not large enough to ensure all reforms are well implemented. The financial incentives 
provided by the federal government do little to offset the concerns of DoHEs regarding their loss 
of control over higher education management.  
The NHEM reforms also trigger many future financial liabilities for states, without 
adequately compensating them financially. Most of the NHEM reforms require expansion of 
faculty or administration. The instrument design and calibration only focus federal funds on 
infrastructure development. This leaves most of the recurring expenditure on payroll, capacity 
building, institution building, etc. up to the states. Respondents in Kerala and Punjab particularly 
commented on this issue. Affiliation reforms require the states to create several new universities. 
Autonomy and governance reforms necessitate the expansion of administrative positions within 
the universities. Academic and examination reforms can only work when the faculty-student 
ratios are reduced significantly. Existing faculty vacancies in states suggest that states don’t have 
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the resources to make these investments and funding commitments (Agarwal, 2009; Ravi et al., 
2019).  
States also seem to lack the resources to compensate existing universities for the 
considerable loss of affiliation revenue (Chinara & Rout, 2020; Panigrahi, 2018). This loss of 
revenue is larger in states like Punjab where universities already rely heavily on student fees. In 
Odisha, the loss of revenue cannot be easily compensated because the state serves large numbers 
of tribal students that are supported through scholarships. The paying capacity of students in the 
state is much lower than in more developed states such as Kerala and Punjab.  
Resource constraints are not always an absolute lack of funds at the state level. In some 
cases, it is an issue of resources not being prioritized for implementation of the reforms 
suggested in NHEM. Let me explain this. West Bengal has created new universities outside of 
NHEM and unrelated to NHEM’s affiliation reform agenda. This shows that the state is capable 
of finding financial resources when expansion of higher education is part of the state leadership’s 
agenda. It is possible that these investments fulfill electoral promises regarding access to new 
universities in under-served areas of the state. However, this does not imply West Bengal 
dedicated resources to implementing all the NHEM reforms. A possible reason is that funding 
systemic reforms that have distant benefits provides no immediate electoral benefit.  
Willingness to invest financial resources is also a temporal matter. Kerala has been 
investing consistently in higher education for many more decades than other states like Odisha 
and West Bengal that had long periods of low investments. As a result, the state’s educational 
access and infrastructure is stronger, and the state can concentrate on reforms needed to improve 
quality (A15). In states with a history of low investments, the intensity of investments seen today 
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could be making up for decades of limited support to the sector. Such investments are also more 
likely to address basic infrastructure before they move on to governance or academic reforms.   
Financial resources also directly affect technical capacity for reform implementation. 
SHECs need a sizable budget to hire technical expertise, engage with institutions, invest in data 
collection systems, etc. Universities and colleges cannot undertake many of the systemic changes 
without extra funds for faculty and administrators who can devote time to reforms. Any efforts to 
train and orient faculty and administrators towards academic, administrative, and financial 
autonomy will also require investments in an institutional infrastructure developed for this 
purpose. Administrators in Odisha and West Bengal raised valid concerns about the lack of 
physical resources in rural colleges. Faculty working without adequate buildings, furniture, and 
libraries cannot be expected to exercise academic autonomy. Currently, neither the states nor the 
federal government are allocating enough financial resources to support the implementation of 
large-scale reforms in higher education.  
Implementation Challenges Rooted in Policy Formulation 
The factors that affect NHEM’s policy implementation have roots in the policy design. 
Chapter 4 described the process of NHEM’s formulation as well as the nature of the federal 
policy subsystem. Here, I discuss how the policy making process is related to the implementation 
of NHEM reforms. Firstly, the policy design process did not yield policy instruments that were 
well aligned with the policy’s reform goals. Secondly, the policy making process was not used to 
build consensus about the policy goals and implementation amongst the states.  
NHEM has broad distal goals of achieving improvements in access, equity, and 
excellence. The policy acts on these goals through proximate instrumental goals of creating 
systemic reforms in the states. A few policy instruments are employed to achieve this (see 
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McDonnell & Elmore, 1987; Schneider & Ingram, 1990).. Funding inducements are used to 
promote accreditation and college autonomy. Capacity building (investments for future capacity) 
and system-change tools (legal changes in division of authority) are used to promote affiliation 
reforms and establishment of SHECs.  Though called mandates in the policy, hortatory tools are 
used to support autonomy and governance reforms, academic, and examination reforms in public 
universities. That is, the policy only exhorts states to adopt these changes without assigning 
financial incentives, capacity building investments, or technical assistance.  
The most glaring flaw in this policy design is that the policy does not have a clearly 
defined causal logic that links policy instruments with state-level implementation behaviors and 
the distal policy goals. The policy makers borrowed the problem definitions and solutions from 
existing reports and research and layered it on an existing set of funding priorities (see Peters, 
2018). Reforms goals were added to the policy design without ensuring the instrument design 
adequately supports their implementation. As a result, the policy design makes untenable 
assumptions about compliance at the state level that eventually scuttle implementation. For 
instance, NHEM’s instrument design did not anticipate that while federal incentives could ensure 
that states created SHECs, local political will and higher education culture would lead to their 
cooptation by DoHEs. Additionally, NHEM’s design does not recognize the vast differences 
between the centralized higher education culture of the state institutions and decentralization 
logic followed by NHEM reforms. The policy design does not anticipate the extensive 
engagement and capacity building that would be needed to bridge the gap in understanding about 
the reforms arising from the state culture. Left to implement the reforms without strong 
guidance, many states and institutions adopted minimal or proforma approach to implementing 
academic or planning process reforms.  
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Specifying the causal logic of the policy is as much a tool for policy design as it is for 
communicating the intent of policy makers (Linder & Peters, 1984), but NHEM lacks a cohesive 
espoused theory. Though the theory of decentralization is in use, it has not been explicitly stated 
or woven through the reforms. As a result, the reform prescriptions of NHEM appear to be a 
laundry list of changes. This means that the policy implementers may or may not have noted the 
intended interrelatedness of the reforms. Building political support for each reform is challenging 
in this case. Without an explicitly stated logic or set of causal mechanisms, it is quite possible for 
a policy to be interpreted and implemented in ways that are contrary to the intent of policy 
makers.  
Did the policy design process involve stages in which the design of the policy was 
scrutinized or consensus with states was built? I do not find this to be true. The federal policy 
makers were aware that reform implementation would take a long time to unfold and strengthen, 
but they did not doubt the design of the instruments. In fact, they appeared to be confident that 
the policy had been through consultations with states and multiple other stakeholders. However, 
the evidence discussed in Chapter 4 shows that this view is not entirely accurate. NHEM was not 
extensively discussed with other federal level and state level actors. 
Because the policy’s solutions were borrowed from prior reports from federal agencies, it 
was assumed that the solutions were appropriate and had been informed by experts. However, 
converting a policy solution into an effective instrument requires refining and redesigning 
(Linder & Peters, 1984), and NHEM’s policy makers did not engage in this process. Lack of 
formal engagement with a wide range of stakeholders during formulation prevented the policy’s 
causal logic from being closely scrutinized.  
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The Indian policy making process in certain sectors is not as pluralistic as Western 
democracies. During the formulation stage, the opportunity structure for participation at the 
federal level allows little effective space for states or other actors to participate in policy making 
(see Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The federal government requires limited consensus amongst 
other actors to create a new Centrally Sponsored Scheme (see Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Indeed, 
it is assumed that states would not refuse to implement CSSs because the bait of any financial 
assistance from the federal government is too strong to refuse (Kolhatkar, 2012, p. 127).  
Due to the hierarchical distance between federal policy makers and eventual beneficiaries 
of the policies, the beneficiaries in developing countries are often unable to participate in the 
policy making process (Thomas & Grindle, 1990). However, interests and concerns of states and 
institutions play out later when political resources are employed to affect the policy 
implementation (Mooij, 2007; Thomas & Grindle, 1990). NHEM’s implementation validates this 
observation. At the implementation stage, the state is guided by the internal political support for 
the policy and policy instruments. The policy formulation process had not built any consensus 
within states regarding the meaning of the reforms or their rationale. NHEM’s regional 
consultations were designed to give a semblance of consultative policy making process rather 
than to really inform the policy design or to build any familiarity and support for the reforms in 
the states. 
The analysis of NHEM’s formulation and implementation also highlights some 
interesting similarities between the federal and state policy subsystems. In many ways, the 
centralized and bureaucratic culture that is seen in the states is also present at the federal level. 
For instance, DoHEs in states are reluctant to share their powers with SHECs or other 
autonomous bodies. Similarly, the federal government used NHEM as an instrument of 
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centralizing funding powers and limiting the influence of UGC. And though NHEM mandates 
the creation of SHECs and their involvement in making NHEM plans, MHRD does not 
coordinate with SHECs for the implementation of NHEM. 
Federal policy makers make the same assumptions about compliance of policy mandates 
by states that DoHEs make about universities and colleges. And though NHEM’s guiding 
principles include bottom-up approaches and decentralized decision making, the policy’s 
formulation was tightly centralized. The same is reflected in planning processes at the state level 
where institutions are given the autonomy to create needs-based plans, but only within a 
narrowly defined framework set by the state.  
These similarities point to an overarching centralized policy process that includes the 
state universities, state governments, and the federal government. The federal system suffers 
from the same issues of excessive centralization that NHEM is trying to address in the state 
systems. In this sense, the policy making processes would be the first area where the federal 
government can demonstrate decentralized and collaborative decision making it wants to 
promote in the states.  
Implications for Future Policies 
The findings discussed in this study highlight some general and some specific issues with 
the formulation and implementation of NHEM. As noted earlier, this study comes at an 
opportune moment. The federal government has launched an ambitious National Education 
Policy in 2020 (continued from the NEP 1968, 1986, and 1992). The policy suggests more 
ambitious versions of the reforms than those implemented under NHEM. The federal 
government is yet to announce programs and funding modes that will be used to implement NEP 
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2020. The findings of this study can inform how new policies are operationalized. Broadly 
speaking, changes are required in the policy making strategies as well as policy design.   
Firstly, any new policy needs to carefully engage with evidence about the success or 
failure of previous policies. However, it is more likely that such evidence does not exist due to 
the limited scholarship on higher education policy in India. In this case, an important task of the 
MHRD and DoHEs is to produce evidence for the policy problems and solutions they are 
considering. At present, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that academic reforms or 
governance reforms are likely to affect the quality, access, or equity in higher education130. It is 
possible that some colleges and universities (like those with established reputation, sources of 
funding, tradition of good governance) stand to benefit from NHEM reforms while students in 
other institutions may suffer due to additional autonomy or new examination systems. A part of 
the future implementation plans for reforms must include an extensive evaluation of which 
reforms solutions are necessary for the system. Apart from informing the new policy design, 
evidence creation can serve in creating awareness and building consensus about reforms.  
Secondly, the federal policy design needs to devise strategies to counter the lack of 
cultural support and political will for decentralization in higher education. A first step would be 
to approach cultural change through leadership development. Training and support agents of 
change among state bureaucracies, universities, and colleges will be crucial for interpreting 
reforms and sustaining a momentum for change. This would require significant investments in 
building leadership capacities at state and institutional levels. A related step would be to build 
 
130
 For instance, a forthcoming study has found that differences in governance practices and attitudes across 
engineering colleges in India reflects in research output but not in teaching-learning outcomes of institutions 
(Loyalka et al., 2020). 
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bottom-up support for decentralization by engaging with college and university faculty and 
providing them with tools to appreciate and use academic autonomy.  
Thirdly, in designing higher education policies, the federal government should adopt a 
more comprehensive and systemic approach to reforms. Overcoming lack of political support 
and incompatible state higher education cultures may require more than the traditional 
inducements, mandates, and capacity building instruments that work alone. States may need 
changes at a larger scale that alter the basic structures and resources in a policy subsystem. This 
may include the use of new performance management metrics at state and institutional levels; 
deregulation of fees to promote competition and financial autonomy amongst institutions; 
stronger laws preventing for-profit colleges; establishing information portals that provide 
students information on employment, cost of attendance, and faculty details about colleges and 
universities, etc.  
These processes signal a federal shift from an ‘interventionist-state’ to an ‘evaluative 
state’, one that uses ex ante governance to control institutional or individual behavior (see G. R. 
Neave & Van Vught, 1994; G. R. Neave & Vught, 1991). By creating closer links between 
measurable aspects of institutional performance and their regulatory environment, these systems 
can strengthen performance accountability, reduce DoHE’s apprehension about misuse of 
institutional autonomy, and increase student participation in accountability mechanisms. The 
process of accreditation already achieves something similar. Bolstering it with a range of 
autonomously managed regimes can support the creation of a more balanced higher education 
ecosystem in the states. Some of these changes may require reforms, expansion, and 




Fourth, the federal policy makers need to adopt more inclusive policy making strategies 
to formally engage with states. Even though past experience with policy learning in India has 
been limited, this prescription is worth repeating (Ayyar, 2005, 2009; Banerji & Mukherjee, 
2008). As mentioned by an international expert (F6), the creation of reform policies such as 
NHEM requires multiple consultations over a long period of time with each state to align 
priorities and create support for reforms. The consultations should involve the state, different 
levels of government funded and private institutions, faculty unions, and other stakeholders in a 
state. Organizations like the World Bank take similar approaches over long periods of time to 
create their interventions (F6). Federal programs such as Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan were also 
developed after extensive consultation and collaboration with multiple levels of state institutions 
(F3).  
Engagement with stakeholders would serve several purposes. It helps in anticipating 
implementation challenges (Hanson, 1998). It informs policy makers about the failures of 
previous policies (Sabatier, 1987; Van der Knaap, 1995). The resulting policy design can be 
based on more realistic assumptions about state and institutional-level responses to reforms. The 
framework of four-factors discussed in this chapter can inform assumptions underlying policy 
instruments and develop more effective designs.  
Consultative policy making is likely to lead to better implementation results because it 
builds political support for the new policy (Fiske, 1996; McGinn & Welsh, 1999). Careful use of 
evidence and description of potential benefits may thaw some of the interest and culture-based 
opposition to reforms (Fiske, 1996). Clear communication and dialogue about a policy’s 
components makes states and institutions aware of the federal government’s intent (Weaver, 
2009). It also clarifies the theory of action used by the policy. Consultation can also serve as a 
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venue for actors within the state to come to compromises about how the policy will be 
implemented in the state. For instance, DoHEs and SHECs can reach a better understanding 
about division of powers when the process is mediated by the federal government. A longer 
period of engagement also assures states that the federal implementers are serious about reforms 
and intend to support them.  
More inclusive policy making would also entail engaging with policy and higher 
education experts at the federal level. While bureaucrats are highly knowledgeable about 
government processes, drafting higher education policies for specific sectors requires subject-
matter expertise. It also requires technical skills of policy design such as logic mapping, 
articulating a theory of change, defining outcomes, etc. (Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014; Linder & 
Peters, 1984). Drafting of policy documents also requires careful weaving of values and problem 
framing with technical details of policy instruments (Stone, 2012). Consultation with experts at 
the formulation stage may help avoid some of NHEM’s seemingly informal processes of policy 
analysis and drafting.  
Lastly, the federal policy planning process should also include a clearer plan and 
monitoring system for the federal implementation agencies. Though the federal-level 
implementation has not been the focus of this study, the evidence from states shows federal 
implementing authorities did not engage adequately with states regarding reform 
implementation. The federal implementing authorities need to develop expertise in various 
aspects of the reforms they are promoting such that they can guide state-level implementation. 





Contribution to Theoretical Literature 
This study primarily uses advocacy coalition framework and institutional theory to 
understand the formulation and implementation of higher education reforms in India. Both these 
theories have roots in Western, specifically American, polities. Applying them in the context of a 
developing country highlights interesting differences in their applicability in varied political and 
organizational contexts.  
Advocacy Coalition Framework has been revised to improve its applicability to political 
systems that are less pluralistic than the American System (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Two 
internal subsystem factors have been added to account for different subsystems, openness of the 
political system (number of venues available for influencing decision making) and degree of 
consensus (level of agreement between actors) needed for policy change. Developing countries 
are usually low on openness of participation and have weak norms of compromise (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007). Using these factors makes it easier to apply ACF to systems in countries where 
the state plays an oversized role in the policy formulation or implementation.  
However, I find that these inclusions are insufficient in capturing policy subsystems 
where the dominance of one actor determines the diversity of actors and their sources of power 
in the subsystem. For instance, in Indian states, the government influences public universities 
and colleges to the point that separating beliefs of these institutions from interests of the DoHEs 
becomes difficult. The affiliation structure and academic centralization is such that it severely 
limits the interest of private colleges in participating in policy making or implementation. As a 
result, the subsystem doesn’t just have a limited number of venues to influence decision making, 
it suffers from a lack of diverse actors and coalitions. ACF’s elements such as coordination 
between actors, formation and maintenance of coalitions, and use of resources and strategies to 
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influence policy add less analytical depth in such a system. This underscores an important 
limitation of ACF, that the theory is less suited for subsystems with policy monopolies or few 
policy actors.  
ACF suffers from another limitation, that of dealing with interactions between 
subsystems at different levels of government. In the case of NHEM, changes in the federal 
subsystem play an important part in influencing the states. Many actors, such as education 
experts and institutions like the World Bank, move between subsystems carrying ideas and 
practices. Also, the Indian federal bureaucracy draws officers who serve early parts of their 
careers in states. Thus, in some sense, subsystems at various levels share important actors. For 
instance, in Odisha, the presence of the World Bank supports the implementation of NHEM 
reforms to some extent. ACF provides few analytical tools to understand such relationships 
between related subsystems and common actors in large federal democracies.  
ACF’s belief systems are useful in understanding how policy actions of the coalitions 
affect formulation and implementation. However, the theory has limited value when it comes to 
understanding the complicated relationship between belief systems and groups of organizations, 
or individuals. ACF emphasizes the importance of explicitly articulated beliefs and coordination 
strategies in the operation of coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2007). However, this view is 
inadequate for analyses where actors share taken-for-granted beliefs that may not be clearly 
articulated but still lead to individuals and organizations working in a coordinated or concerted 
manner. Using institutional theory in this context is illuminating because it supports 
implementation analysis within universities and colleges. To my knowledge, this is the first 
study that attempts to use this theory to understand policy implementation in the Indian 
education system.  
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Most of the existing work on institutional theory, particularly in education, has largely 
been in developed countries. I find that these analyses assume a much higher degree of 
independence between the institutional domains of education and the state (see Abrutyn & 
Turner, 2011). Simply put, educational organizations have a degree of structural and symbolic 
independence from the “state” or government. This freedom allows the development of ritual 
classifications and myths specific to the organizational field. This also allows for schools and 
colleges to respond independently to environmental pressures for change (see Honig & Hatch, 
2004).  
Applying institutional theory in India illustrates a very different type of national context 
where the organizational field of higher education has little institutional autonomy from the state. 
The state is still directly involved in service delivery in areas such as health, public distribution, 
school education, higher education, etc. Thus, the norms and schemas of the state pervade 
organizational fields that are normally considered autonomous in countries. As a result, 
education institutions are tightly, not loosely, coupled with myths supported by their immediate 
organizational environment. Indian higher education presents the case of highly institutionalized 
organizations where teaching and research practices in universities and colleges are tightly 
coupled with the myth of centralization supported by the government. The public colleges and 
universities in this study operate like an extension of the state. This presents a novel situation 
that is not extensively addressed using institutional theory, that is, the process of change in 
institutions that are already strongly coupled with an alternate myth from the environment. 
The findings of this study also have implications for countries other than India. A lot of 
extant research focuses on the strength of global reform scripts (like New Public Management) in 
triggering policy changes in developed and developing countries that are increasingly 
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homogenizing education systems (Bromley & Meyer, 2015a; Drori et al., 2006; King, 2007). 
However, this study shows that while the rhetoric and logic of NPM reforms may be implicitly 
employed in the policy talk, policy implementation in India is not entirely aligned with these 
scripts. The country or region’s local politics, educational culture, and technical capacity are 
important factors that give a different form to scripts. The study confirms findings from other 
Asian and European nations suggesting that NPM reforms in education tend to be interpreted 
differently by each country in light of the local context and culture (Bjork, 2003; Donina & 
Paleari, 2019; Mok, 2003; Pizmony-Levy, 2011; Tran, 2014). In India, and possibly in other 
South Asian nations that share the affiliation system and British colonial past, NPM-style 
reforms are interpreted through a prism of centralization and bureaucratization that are 
predominant aspects of the higher education culture in the country.  
The Indian experience also raises interesting questions about whether international 
organizations are equally influential in proliferating global reform scripts in all countries (Boli & 
Thomas, 1999; Kim & Boyle, 2012). The findings about NHEM’s formulation show that the 
federal government in India is able to control the stage and mode of involvement of multilateral 
agencies like the World Bank in the policy design and implementation processes. The federal 
government chose to involve international experts and organizations at the consultation stage 
when it wanted to build broader domestic support for the reform agenda (Schriewer & Martinez, 
2004; Steiner-Khamsi, 2014). Even at that stage, the government and bureaucrats determined 
which feedback from consultations was accepted into the policy document. This supports some 
existing evidence that, at least in the area of education, the Indian government has been able to 
buffer and control the involvement of international actors (Colclough & De, 2010a).  
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I suggest that this is possible due two main reasons. One, that India is relatively less 
dependent on foreign aid for its development. Thus, the federal government is under little fiscal 
pressure to accept international organizations. Second, due to its large size and geopolitical 
importance, international organizations wish to maintain a foothold in India. Thus, they are more 
willing to negotiate the terms of engagement than they might be in smaller nations. It is possible 
that similar observations can be made about the influence of international agencies in domestic 
policy making in China.  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
This study presents findings about the formulation and implementation of a national 
higher education reform policy in India. The study considers the actors and processes involved in 
the creation of the policy at the federal level and explores the connections between the policy’s 
design and goals. At the state level, the study throws light on how and why different actors make 
implementation choices. This study is the first analysis of the National Higher Education 
Mission. Importantly, as the first study that explores higher education policy implementation at a 
national level in India, it produces important evidence about the institutional structures and 
relationships that shape policy implementation in Indian state university systems.   
The study does have some limitations. The most notable is that the implementation 
analysis was done six years after NHEM was first introduced. Ideally, reform implementation 
would be studied after a few more years when the policy and practices have been 
institutionalized in states (Sabatier, 1988). This study may have failed to capture some latent 
effects of the policy’s implementation that would take longer than six or seven years to become 
apparent. However, doing the research later in the implementation period could have missed 
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responses of bureaucrats and leaders initially involved in implementation as they tend to move to 
other positions.  
ACF suggests that a subsystem should be studied over a period of a decade to understand 
the nuances and shifts in relationships (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). As NHEM has now been 
subsumed under the new National Education Policy 2020, future studies using the same policy 
may not be possible. However, further research or a second wave of data collection can focus on 
how the implementation of NHEM reforms has evolved over multiple policies. Such evidence 
would be a useful validity check for the present study and may highlight different challenges or 
opportunities in the implementation.  
Due to the scope of dissertation research, this study was limited to federal formulation 
and state-level implementation. Though responses from preliminary interviews with federal 
implementers were used to sample the states, the study did not formally collect evidence on 
processes of implementation at the federal level. Federal implementation agencies are a crucial 
link in translating the design of any federal policy into implementation at the state level. It is 
possible that some shortcoming of implementation observed in this study at the state level are a 
product of implementation limitations at a higher level. For policy learning to occur with the 
federal subsystem, further research is needed to understand the processes and actors involved at 
this level. Was implementation of NHEM at the federal level as insular and tightly controlled by 
MHRD as its formulation? Were other national and international organizations contributing to 
the implementation? Evidence on these questions can create a richer understanding of the 
strength and limitations of policy implementation at the federal level.  
This study briefly touches upon the relationship between Departments of Higher 
Education in the states and other actors such as private institutions, faculty unions, and 
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businesses. It describes them as peripheral members of the policy coalition led by the DoHEs. 
However, the evidence collected in the study and the description are limited due to the scope of 
NHEM. In other words, there may be other policies or issues where these actors are active 
participants. Moreover, these actors may interact with the state through other venues, formal, or 
informal channels that were not observed as a part of this study. Consequently, the influence of 
these actors may be underestimated in the study. For instance, the study hints at the relationship 
between private colleges and the political leadership of the states through patronage-based 
relationships. More than two thirds of colleges in the sample states are private. It is unlikely that 
such a large majority of actors in any subsystem would be peripheral actors. However, it is 
possible that their influence operates through channels that are not easily observable or operate 
outside the higher education policy subsystem.  
Patronage politics and corruption are known to be a part of teacher labor markets and 
policy implementation in the Indian school education system (Beteille, 2009; Beteille et al., 
2016; G. Kingdon & Muzammil, 2009). Further research into such relationships is required in 
higher education. Anecdotally, politicians are linked to higher education through the for-profit 
operation of private colleges and universities, use of off-the-books fees and payments for 
providing admissions, through transfers and selection of leadership in public institutions, and 
through interference in the decision making at public universities and colleges. These issues are 
closely linked to ownership of educational institutions by politicians and businessmen, use of 
educational institutions for circumventing land use regulations or as a front for routing cash-
based election financing, etc. There is little information on and oversight of the operations of 
private institutions and their relationship with the state, affiliating universities, and other actors 
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in the subsystem. More knowledge about these matters can provide explanations for many 
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Appendix A: Higher Education Policy Making in India 
To understand the processes that lead to the development and implementation of NHEM 
or to map the scope of the policy, it is important to describe the institutional ecosystem for higher 
education in India and where state universities fit into it. This note details the higher education 
policy making structures at federal and state levels for a foreign audience.  
Institutional Landscape 
Policy formulation for primary, secondary, and postsecondary education is a shared 
responsibility of the federal and state governments in India. While education primarily appears as 
a state subject in the constitution, the strong residual powers of the federal government in all 
matters critical to the nation’s development make education an area of contestation between the 
federal and state governments (Agarwal, 2009; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013).  
India has three broad types of education institutions, the first are federally-funded unitary 
or affiliating institutions and deemed universities131 such as University of Delhi, Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, Indian Institutes of Technology, Indian Institutes of Management, Central 
University of Gujarat, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Science etc. The 
second category of institutions are privately-owned deemed universities such as Ashoka 
University, Manipal University, Vellore Institute of Technology, etc. Both these types of 
institutions are under the purview of the federal government; their funding; regulation; and 
policies are handled by the federal Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) directly 
or by the University Grants Commission (Jayaram, 2004; Tierney & Sabharwal, 2018). These 
 
131
 An accreditation awarded to specialized higher education institutions by MHRD which allows them degree-
granting status, same as a university. Deemed universities usually engage in specialized areas of study and not in the 
traditional liberal arts, humanities, or STEM disciplines. 
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two categories of institutions account for a little over 6% of the enrollments in the country 
(MHRD, 2013).  
The majority of higher education enrollments are in the third type of institutions: the 
public state universities132 and their constituent or affiliated colleges. As colleges do not have 
degree granting powers, they must be affiliated to a university in order to admit students. Very 
few institutions in the first two categories are allowed to affiliate colleges. Thus, the bulk of the 
colleges are affiliated with only a small number of public state universities. In 2017, 285 state 
universities affiliated about 39,000 colleges. Of these, 78% of the colleges are privately 
managed. Remaining colleges are fully or partly funded by the government (MHRD, 2018). This 
portion of the higher education system is primarily governed by acts of state legislatures. The 
responsibility for their regulation and funding rests with the state governments.  
The federal government also funds state universities through the UGC (Goldman et al., 
2008; Malik, 2020). However, federal funding for higher education has been far from equitable 
and it has been argued that the federal grant-in-aid system promotes inefficiencies in state 
universities (Agarwal, 2006a). The federal public institutions are funded for both infrastructure 
and operating costs and they enjoy greater governance and academic autonomy than state 
university systems (Tilak & Varghese, 1991). By comparison, the states receive far smaller 
grants-in-aid that only cover part of the infrastructural expansion of state universities and are 
usually based on the previous year’s allocation (Agarwal, 2006b; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013; Tilak 
& Varghese, 1991). NHEM is designed to deal exclusively with public state universities and 
their publicly-funded affiliated colleges.  
 
132
 In the past 15 years, privately owned universities have also been established in states, they now number to 262. 




Higher Education Policy Formulation at The Federal Level 
The federal government has the power to influence the policies or functioning of state 
universities either directly through MHRD or through regulatory institutions like University 
Grants Commission (UGC) (Ayyar, 2009; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013). Within the MHRD, there 
are two different types of policy actors. Career bureaucrats; political appointees such as the 
Union Minister and State Minister of MHRD. The bureaucracy is often closely involved in 
authoring most policy options and directives issued by the MHRD, even when the genesis of the 
idea is in the political sphere or the ultimate choice of instrument is made by the Minister 
(Ayyar, 2009; Jain, 1987; Mathur, 2013). 
 UGC is an overarching regulatory body for all degree-granting institutions across the 
country. Its powers include setting standards for faculty qualifications; infrastructural 
requirements; minimum standards for doctoral education; requirements for affiliated colleges to 
get public funding, physical inspections of states universities, etc. (A. Singh, 2004). Though 
UGC was envisioned as a national higher education regulator, the fact that it could not censure or 
de-recognize state universities for poor performance gave it weak enforcement powers (Agarwal, 
2006b). The other important regulator for universities and colleges is the All India Council of 
Technical Education. Unlike the UGC, its functions are limited to regulation and only for 
engineering, management and other technical institutions (Singh, 2004).  
At various times, government think tanks and planning outfits have also been an 
important part of the policy formulation process at the federal level. The Planning Commission 
(now called NITI Aayog) and the National Knowledge Commission were responsible for 
highlighting higher education policy problems and solutions (Carnoy & Dossani, 2013; Chitnis 
& Altbach, 1993). In addition to state actors, the World Bank, has been a source of ideas, 
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technical expertise and funds with regards to particular higher education policy issues 
(Colclough & De, 2010b; Kapur & Mehta, 2007).  
 
Higher Education Management and Policy Formulation in States 
Policies for the state universities are primarily governed by State University Acts and the 
statutes within them. Most of the rule-making for these institutions is done by the state 
departments of higher education or DoHEs (Stella, 2004). DoHEs determine the funding for 
existing institutions; enforce UGC standards in the state; determine service rules for any 
publicly-funded employees in the system; provide permissions for new colleges, new programs, 
and new universities; etc. Though DoHEs have powers to undertake other activities, most of their 
governance of higher education is rule driven.  
In addition to DoHEs, as of 2012, eight states had State Higher Education Councils 
(SHEC) to contribute to the policy formulation process in the states. The SHECs are state-level 
bodies that can have a range of functions including strategic planning for higher education in the 
state, advising the state government on higher education regulations, promoting quality 
assurance in state colleges and universities, and disbursing public funds to institutions. In 2012, 
only five SHECs were considered actively functioning. Their roles were mostly limited to 
advisory, and quality assurance functions (Larsen et al., 2014). NHEM carves out a more 
influential role for SHECs in state-level policy making and governance.  
Kapur & Mehta (2017) have argued that the haphazard institutional ecosystem and 
ineffective quality-control mechanisms in India can be traced to the lack of pro-active policy 
formulation in this sector. In the absence of preemptive decision-making by states, many current 
policies are shaped by legal challenges mounted in courts. The High Courts and Supreme Court 
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have played a disproportionately large role, and given contradictory judgments, in shaping higher 
education policies on admissions, fee regulation in private colleges, hiring, firing or promotion of 
faculty etc. (Kapur & Khosla, 2017).  
Growth of State Higher Education Institutions 
States mainly consist of two types of universities and three types of colleges. Public 
universities and private universities; and government funded colleges, partially funded colleges, 
and private colleges. In order to control the quality of colleges, they must be “affiliated” with a 
public university in the state. This university controls their curriculum, assessments, and hold 
degree-granting power. 
Through 1980s, states faced a rising demand for higher education as more students 
graduated from the school system. However, the federal government’s financial support for state 
higher education was not increasing at the same pace and states did not have financial resources 
to create new public universities (Agarwal, 2006; Carnoy & Dossani, 2013). So, states began to 
allow more private colleges to operate accommodate the enrollments. While there has been a 
steep increase in numbers of and enrollments in private colleges, budgets for higher education 
within states have not risen proportionally (MHRD, 2013, p.52). As a result, public universities 
have not been able to build the capacities to manage their affiliated colleges. The quality of state 
university systems has declined compared to federal universities.  
In states, the private colleges operate under close academic control of state universities. 
But DoHEs do not closely control or monitor their operations and finances (Carnoy & Dossani, 
2013; Kaul, 1993). Through the late 1980s to 2000s, the federal government attempted to tighten 
quality standards through UGC. Transparent quality regulations and guidelines for autonomous 
colleges were one such attempt. But much of the actual expansion of higher education 
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enrollments was dependent on state universities, state governments, and their ability to enforce 
standards on affiliating institutions.  
As European higher education systems grew and faced financial pressures, the 
governments moved from a rules and compliance-based accountability system to outcomes, 
targets, and standards-based system (Neave, 1988; Neave & Vught, 1991). Carnoy and Dossani 
(2013) note that despite the massification of higher education in India, the governance regime 
did not move from a state-controlled model to state-supervised and or evaluative state model. 
They suggest that this failure of the governance evolution was due to the limited interest of state 
governments in relinquishing direct operational control over state universities and indirect 
control over the process of private expansion (pp.608).  
Thus, Indian state higher education systems developed along a unique trajectory as ‘over-
regulated yet under-governed systems (Qamar, 2020). They continued to hold on to centralized 
control systems for financing, administering, and managing public universities and colleges. 
Through state universities, they also maintained academic control over private colleges. 
However, they developed few accountability and monitoring systems that would hold institutions 





Appendix B: Code Book 
Global Codes: State Name/Federal, Interviewee Institution Type, Interviewee Level  
1. Federal level 
a. Timing of policy  
b. Stakeholders 
c. Sources of problems and solution 
d. Instrument choice 
e. UGC 
f. Theory of action  
2. SHEC Reforms 
a. Membership of SHEC 
b. Responsibilities of SHEC 
c. SHEC & NHEM 
d. Policy Theory of action 
3. Accreditation 
a. State statistics 
b. Programs for accreditation 
c. Policy Theory of action 
4. Affiliation reforms 
a. Cluster universities 
b. Conversion of autonomous colleges 
c. Reduction of university size 
d. Policy Theory of action 
5. Autonomy 
a. Universities (governance reforms) 
b. Colleges (autonomous status) 
c. Colleges (unrelated to autonomous status) 
d. Policy Theory of action 
6. Academic reforms 
a. Choice-based credit system 
b. Semester system 
c. Examination changes 
d. Policy Theory of action 
7. NHEM Plan 
a. Capacity to plan, implement 
b. Flexibility for institution 
c. Plan rationale detail 





8. Other reforms 
a. Administrative reforms 
b. Equity initiatives 
c. Special projects highlighted in states 
d. Research and development 
9. Characteristics of reforms imp 
a. Ignored - Not at all 
b. Implemented - Proforma or Minimal 
c. Implemented – Limited 
d. Implemented – Reasonable 
e. Implemented - With fidelity 
10. NHEM Challenges 
a. Interpretation understanding - any reform 
b. Centralization 
c. Culture - initiative, leadership, accountability 
d. Frequent changes - in Policy and in institutions 
e. Fund utilization pressure 
11. Data, evidence and monitoring 
a. Data collection - any responses 
b. Monitoring mechanisms – reporting, inspections, targets 
c. Rule based implementation – proformas, utilization certificates 
12. Effects positive and negative 
a. NHEM as infrastructure grant 
b. Change in institutional culture 
c. Changes in non-funded institutions 
d. Higher minimum standard 
e. Teaching, learning, student satisfaction   
13. Miscellaneous codes 
a. Benefits to students 
b. Business 
c. Local politics - caste, region, religion  
d. Finances of universities and colleges 
e. Mistrust of private operators 
f. Policy clarity 







Appendix C: University Grants Commission & Ministry of Human 
Resource Development  
 
UGC is the main regulator for higher education in India for the last five decades. The 
UGC is an autonomous body but it works in coordination with the MHRD (A. Singh, 2004). In 
the years leading up to NHEM’s formulation, the MHRD had attempted to replace UGC with the 
National Higher Education Research Council. NHEM was another attempt to reduce the funding 
capacity of the UGC. In the interviews, policy makers mentioned a few reasons for limiting 
UGC’s influence. The first was that UGC was a standard setting body, not a funding body. In 
managing the funding, it had ignored its more critical role of setting and upholding minimum 
standards (F1, F2). Interviewees also suggested that UGC’s poor prioritization of resources had 
weakened state universities. “[State universities]…were always given step-treatment by the 
UGC, priority for UGC was funding central universities. So, there was a long-standing grouse of 
the states and state universities that adequate funding was not coming from UGC”.  
Complaints about corruption and mismanagement at the UGC was cited as another reason 
to reduce their involvement in funding higher education (F1, F2, F6). Corruption scandals had 
mired the UGC’s reputation (The Indian Express, 2012; Tierney & Sabharwal, 2017). The 
Tandon Committee had been established to review UGC’s role in approving ‘deemed 
universities’ of dubious quality (Tandon Committee, 2009). According to one interviewee, “there 
was a lot of negative press, about UGC and its role in the deemed Universities. There was almost 
a spawning of hundreds of deemed universities around 2008 or something…they got a lot of bad 
name because of it”.  
MHRD officials did not discuss the possibility of reforming or empowering UGC such 
that it could implement NHEM appropriately. Other interviewees from the federal policy making 
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circles agreed that the UGC had been ineffective and needed reforms (F4, F6). However, they 
did not suggest that UGC needed to be entirely replaced or dismantled. As pointed out by an 
academic expert aware of conflict, the UGC’s capacity is largely dependent on decisions made 
by the MHRD. According to the expert, “UGC is an independent entity but it gets all its money, 
appointments, etc. from the MHRD. On paper, you might say UGC is free, independent, 
autonomous. Actually, in that sense, it is not.”. They pointed out that the number of members 
and officers at the UGC had remained the same since its establishment in the 1950s (F3). Yet, 
the expected functions and the number of institutions it managed had increased manifold. The 
organization had inadequate manpower to conduct inspections, enforce quality standards, and 
develop funding norms for all state universities. Further, the interviewee mentioned that 
appointments of the UGC members, Chairman, senior officials, and UGC’s financial allocations 
were eventually determined by the HRD department bureaucrats and Ministers133. Thus, MHRD 
had the power to reform the UGC’s technical capacity within the existing legislative and 




 Through the entire duration of NHEM’s formulation, the position of UGC’s Chairman was vacant due to lack of 
suitable candidates (Samuel, 2012). UGC’s Vice Chairman has been serving as acting-Chairman from February 
2011 to October 2013 and was eventually appointed Chairman (Gohain, 2013). Appointment decisions are ratified 
by the MHRD.  
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Appendix D: Role of International Organizations  
Amongst international organizations, the World Bank, European Unions’ European 
Commission, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) have 
participated in education policy making and program implementation previously. The World 
Bank is far more active than other international organizations in the higher education space. In 
general, the Indian federal government has resisted receiving funds and sharing policy-making 
powers with international organizations to a much larger extent than other developing nations 
(Colclough & De, 2010b). Thus, these organizations have limited lending for education projects 
and the power to involve them in policy design rests with the MHRD.  
The World Bank was not directly involved in the policy formulation process. However, 
reform ideas and program design from World Bank projects have been woven into NHEM (F1, 
F2). MHRD worked with the World Bank on tertiary education projects at the state and federal 
level. Notably, the Technical/Engineering Education Quality Improvement Project (I) from 2003 
to 2009 and its subsequent iterations (from 2010 to 2020) were joint projects for quality 
enhancement in engineering colleges (World Bank, 2020). Apart from enhancing infrastructure, 
these projects sought to develop management capacity; support planning, administrative, 
financial, and academic reforms in engineering colleges; and ensure academic autonomy for 
colleges (Blom & Cheong, 2010; Dubey et al., 2019).  
The interviewees within the MHRD explicitly point to their experience with the TEQIP 
projects as an influence in designing new programs for higher education As mentioned by an 
interviewee (F2), “NHEM draws its inspiration, so to speak, a World Bank TEQIP project. 
TEQIP 1, TEQIP 2, so we had a lot of good learnings from there. Many of the things of the 
TEQIP project of the World Bank were incorporated into the policy”. World Bank’s projects also 
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technical aspects of policy design like the measurement of outcomes (F1, F2). NHEM’s outcome 
framework was similar to Bank project in measuring research output of departments, their 
teaching and learning outcomes, student success, etc. (World Bank, 2017). World Bank drew on 
the same set of domestic policy experts as MHRD. Dr. Kumar and Ms. Mishra (author) were part 
of a policy network that was accessed by both the World Bank and the MHRD. Such experts also 
created informal channels for carrying ideas back and forth from one system to another, 
influencing federal and state policies in the process  
Officially, the World Bank got involved in the late stages of NHEM’s development. This 
was after all the major decisions about the design of the policy such as reform pre-requisites, 
funding components, specifics of reform expectations, etc. had already been made. MHRD 
invited them to host regional consultations for the policy (F1, F5, F6). Other international 
organizations such as Rutgers University also participated in some of these consultations 
(USIEF, 2013). Association with international organizations may have lent more legitimacy to 
NHEM. Also, it allows for the policy makers to claim that a wide range of stakeholders 
participated in the process. As mentioned by F1, “many institutions we consulted…we also 
consulted the World Bank...We also got inputs from some universities in the USA”.   
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Appendix E: Provisions of SHEC Guidelines 
The SHEC guidelines contain multiple specific provisions regarding the membership and 
division of powers between SHECs and DoHEs. Here, I present some of these provisions to 
illustrate the logic followed by the guidelines. It is worth keeping in mind that though the 
guidelines are well though-out, the monitoring of their implementation in a large policy like 
NHEM would be challenging.  
Another example, SHEC leadership must be appointed on the recommendation of a 
selection committee134 and academics should serve as the Chairman of the SHEC (as opposed to 
the Minister of Education or Chief Minister). This explicitly addresses concerns about political 
appointees, bureaucrats, or retired bureaucrats getting involved in SHECs when they lack the 
technical expertise for the role. To draw a diverse membership, SHECs must include three VCs, 
two principals, and 10-15 representatives from fields of arts, technology, business, and civil 
society (NHEM, 2013, p. 150). To ensure that the SHECs remain active, NHEM suggests that 
the SHEC should meet once in every quarter and at least a third of the members must be present. 
The procedural details and standards set by NHEM are difficult to implement as mandates. 
To decentralize the powers of DoHE, NHEM guidelines insist on the inclusion of specific 
responsibilities in the SHEC Acts that clarify the division of powers between the SHECs and 
DoHEs (NHEM, 2013, p. 153). Many of the functions included in SHEC guidelines are currently 
not performed by at all in the states. By defining the SHEC functions, the federal government is 
attempting to increase the scope of what management of higher education means. For instance, 
 
134
 These stipulations attempt to limit DoHE’s ability to control SHEC appointments or politicize the process which 
is a persistent concern in Indian Universities (Jayal, 2020). NHEM goes so far as to specify the composition of the 
selection committee (NHEM, 2013, p. 150). Similarly, NHEM specifies that SHEC’s administrative and secretarial 
staff must be brought for short periods of time from other departments, institutions, or appointed on contract 
(NHEM, 2013, p. 151). I believe such provisions intend to prevent the SHEC from becoming like other bureaucratic 
organizations and maintains their flexibility to hire experts as needed.   
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state and institutional level strategic planning for higher education, monitoring progress, 
analyzing institutional data, etc. are not part of the higher education culture in India (Blom & 
Cheong, 2010). The NHEM guidelines assign these functions to SHECs (NHEM, 2013, p. 153). 
Additionally, NHEM assigns academic functions to SHECs, i.e., any initiatives and programs 
that improve higher education quality in the states such as accreditation, promoting autonomy, 
faculty development programs, curricular standards, etc. SHECs are also assigned the 
responsibility of advising the DoHE on important matters. NHEM guidelines also route NHEM 
funds through the SHEC and mandate their involvement in creating and sending the NHEM state 
plans to the federal government (NHEM, 2013, p. 170, 172).  
The specificity of NHEM’s guidelines with regards to the powers and responsibilities of 
SHECs reflects the intent of decentralizing powers in favor of an autonomous institutions outside 
the DoHE. However, they also require a robust monitoring system and resource support. 
NHEM’s federal implementation strategy includes little to no details on how the functioning of 
SHECs will be monitored. Larsen et al., (2014) mention the importance of impact assessment in 
making autonomous bodies like SHECs more effective. However, NHEM does not include these 
details in implementation plans. At the federal level, the Councils were not formally involved in 






Appendix F: Strategic Planning and Monitoring 
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NHEM was supposed to initiate the creation of state higher education plans and 
institutional plans. These plans would articulate the vision and outcome targets of each state. 
Specifically, these plans were supposed to be used by the state to raise and allocate resources 
from sources other than NHEM and address the roadmaps for states to implement reforms 
(MHRD, 2012, p.17). While the process of NHEM planning has largely been decentralized and 
informed by the needs of institutions, the scope of the NHEM plans has been strictly limited to 
the specific components that are funded by NHEM. This primarily results in plans for the 
standard grants for infrastructure improvement in universities and colleges. The state and 
institutional plans are limited to the details of each component under which the state requests 
NHEM funds. The planning process is not periodic, there is no evidence of annual or regular 
five-year planning in the sample states.  
Kerala deviates from the other states in some respects related to planning. Their State 
Perspective Plan is very detailed and includes plans and targets for reform implementation in 
higher education. The same is not true for other states, they lack specific outcome targets, ways 
of measuring progress, and plans of implementation. NHEM has also been unsuccessful at 
creating data systems that can help in monitoring targets and performance beyond the utilization 
of federal funds. Recently, Kerala has become the first state to institute an annual online data-
collection system. Data gathering is still sporadic and at the request of the state or NHEM, 
student-level outcomes data are not measured or analyzed in any state.  
Table A1. Differences and Similarities in NHEM Planning Across States 
 Kerala Odisha Punjab West Bengal 
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Source: Planning documents from state websites, college websites, and university websites.    
 
Decentralized Planning and Actors Involved 
All the sample states have undertaken some type of strategic planning activity within the 
last decade, but they are unrelated to NHEM (captured in the first row of Table A1). These plans 
are initiated by the DoHE independent of NHEM. They give recommendations for improvements 
in the state higher education system but do not include specific commitments or targets for 
financial allocations. Importantly, other than Kerala, none of the state plans include specific 
reform and other outcomes in their plans. Kerala’s planning commission has created a much 
more detailed and monitorable plan of action for all sectors, including higher education. During 
interviews in universities and colleges, state plans were never mentioned or referred to by the 
faculty or leaders135. This points to the fact that they are not frequently or widely used to guide or 
measure the state’s progress. This happens to be true for Kerala as well. This could be because 
the state planning commission is a different entity from the DoHE and the educational 
institutions. The level of coordination between these two could be infrequent.  
 
135
 The plans have been retrieved from college websites.  
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States plans created specifically for NHEM also do not fulfill the wide-ranging purpose 
of strategic planning. States continue to undertake planning processes in a sporadic and 
inconsistent manner. Some respondents in Kerala indicated that the DoHE had requested 
universities in Kerala to make detailed strategic plans with academic, research, and 
infrastructural expansion targets in 2015-16 (A9, A3)136. However, they were not aware of what 
had happened to those plans. The DoHE did not provide funding or feedback for the plans. 
Universities were asked to create separate plans for NHEM (A9).  
Apart from strategic planning, NHEM also insisted on bottom-up planning for higher 
education in the state. This meant that colleges and universities were supposed to create 
institutional plans that would be integrated into state plans (MHRD, 2013, p.85). The data 
collected suggests that NHEM’s planning process has largely been decentralized and driven by 
colleges and universities. However, its scope has been narrowly limited to NHEM components. 
All the college leaders in the sample showed familiarity with the NHEM plan for their institution 
and were able to discuss why the college requested for specific infrastructural projects. Though it 




 Kerala has taken another step for state-wide planning that stands out in comparison with other states but there is 
little evidence of its implementation. Kerala government colleges have been asked to create an infrastructure master 
plan. This is a laundry list of buildings and equipment that an institution needs to improve its quality, presumably to 
achieve the highest accreditation level. A semi-public technical consultancy organization (KITCO) created these 
plans for the institutions and the state plans to address these plans through the Kerala Infrastructure Investment Fund 
Board (A1, A6, A9, A12). However, these plans are limited to infrastructural development. I could not find any 
targets and deadlines related to their addressal. Importantly, they are limited to government colleges, which are 
fewer than a fifth of the total number of colleges in the state.  
137
 Most states follow a seniority-based system for appointment of Principals. As a result, many faculty members 
only become principals towards the end of their tenure. They tend to retire after serving as Principal for 1-3 years 
(A6, A8, B4, C3, C6, D4). Continuity of leadership becomes an important issue for government colleges. University 
appointments happen for a period of five years; thus, they don’t face the same challenge.  
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Most participating colleges follow a similar process for planning. The plans are created 
by the NHEM governing body consisting of the Principal, the NHEM coordinator and 
participants from faculty committees on college development (A9, A6, B4, B5, C5, D6). 
Department heads are asked to send their proposals and requests. The NHEM governing 
committee collates these requests keeping the federal guidelines in consideration. All the 
colleges claimed that one student was part of their development council, but they could not point 
to the exact contributions made by students.  
Interestingly, interviewees in charge of implementing NHEM in the college were usually 
not aware of the exact process of creating the plans. They assumed that the college leadership 
had done appropriate prioritization of the needs of the college and could not remember if they 
had participated in making a departmental plan (A7, B5, C2, C4, C7, D4, D9). It suggests that 
the decentralization of planning does not consistently involve all faculty members systematically. 
Perhaps it only included department heads and senior faculty. A survey of rural colleges in 
Odisha participating in NHEM also showed that fewer than half of that faculty were aware of the 
exact provisions of the policy, of the financing conditions, and the academic reforms (Sahoo & 
Rout, 2019).   
Universities follow a similar process. The faculty make departmental plans that inform 
institutional plans. University NHEM plans go through approvals by the faculty committees, 
senate, and university governing bodies (A3, B2, C5, D7). Interviewees confirmed that DoHEs 
and SHECs did not influence institutional priorities regarding the grants (A3, A6, A9, B3, B5, 
C1, C3, D3, D6). 
Limited Scope of NHEM Planning  
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As mentioned earlier, NHEM planning is decentralized but its scope is very limited at the 
state and the institutional levels. An analysis of the publicly available NHEM plans for states 
shows that the plans are essentially limited to the components through which NHEM’s first 
(NHEM 1.0) and second stage (NHEM 2.0) of funding have occurred. The plans submitted for 
NHEM 1.0 in 2013-14 included some contextual information about the state’s vision, education 
statistics, and rationalization of the main targets the plan addresses. By NHEM 2.0, funding took 
place through a web-based portal called Challenge Level Funding. Only Kerala138 and West 
Bengal’s plans include some analysis of past progress. Most NHEM 2.0 only list the technical 
specifications of the grants sought from the federal government. Kerala’s NHEM 2.0 plan is an 
exception.  
And even if more detailed plans were made, they are not available on the DoHE or 
NHEM’s websites. As shown in Table A1, the sample states have not shared substantially 
detailed NHEM plans that include planned activities for academic, affiliation, examination, or 
administrative reforms. Further, state plans do not include precise timelines and targets for the 
activities and reforms, they only include the financial allocations and time periods for their 
utilization.  
Similarly, most college and university NHEM plans do not go beyond NHEM 
components. When asked about academic components of the NHEM plan, respondents often 
indicated that NHEM had no relation to academic plans of the institutions and it was only an 
infrastructural grant (A1, A3, A8, B5, B7, C3, C5, C11, D1, D4, D6). Institutions concentrate on 
those parts on NHEM where they can get funds. Depending on the accreditation grade and 
 
138
 The second plan document published by Kerala includes their experience and progress with academic reforms. It 
also expresses reservation regarding an over-emphasis on NAAC accreditation for determining NHEM fund 
eligibility and NHEM’s insistence on autonomy which Kerala is not is support of. West Bengal’s plan includes a lot 
of statistics but it is less informative about the future strategies and challenges in implementing the policy. 
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autonomous status, the colleges and universities can only apply for specific components of 
NHEM. For instance, a vast majority of participating universities and colleges apply for the most 
widely available component, infrastructure grants139.  
In formulating the plan, the universities and colleges are most concerned about adhering 
to the rules and procurement requirements that need to be followed in creating the DPRs. The 
assessment and prioritization of needs is driven by the self-assessment reports140 created during 
accreditation. The grants provided by NHEM are small enough that only allow the most 
important priorities can be addressed. Colleges and universities do apply for grants from the 
University Grants Commission. But these tend to be infrequent or they are research grants 
provided to individual faculty.  
The limitation of strategic planning under NHEM becomes clearer when it is compared to 
the funding process and project management undertaken by the World Bank in Odisha. The 
sample consists of one institution that was a part of both NHEM and the Bank project. The 
interviewees noted that the first difference between the processes was in the short timelines for 
NHEM plans. NHEM required states and institutions to submit plans within one to two months 
from the initial agreement about the state’s participation (B7, B10, D6). Departmental and 
institutional proposals for the Bank project were created over 6-8 months. Additionally, the plans 
included more details about technical capacity building efforts and creation of institutional 
arrangements for coordination between the departments involved in the project.  
 
139
 Plans are made in accordance with the federal guidance for the component and presented in the form of Detailed 
Project Reports (DPRs). DPRs are common amongst public institutions in India, they are cost estimates for projects 
provided by the public works departments and procurement agencies. 
140
 Created as a first step in the accreditation process, the self-study reports (SSRs) include several details about 
infrastructure, academic processes, teaching & learning, quality assurance, etc. in an institution. These reports are 
often far more detailed and readily available on institutional websites than NHEM plans 
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A review of the World Bank documents shows that their plans also focus on governance, 
academic and curricular reforms. They differ from NHEM in the detailed measurement of 
progress and associated timelines for the targets. They use faculty and student surveys, 
administration surveys, and management information systems to capture details on faculty- and 
student-level academic, research, and governance outcomes. When compared to NHEM, the 
plans created for the World Bank project pay much more attention to the capacity building, 
institutional processes, and structures that need to be altered to achieve the project targets. The 
amount of World Bank funds is larger and committed over a longer period than NHEM. The 
dependability of funds for the entire duration of project also makes the World Bank planning 
process reliable for the universities and colleges. Meanwhile, NHEM still faces delays in fund 
disbursement from the federal and state governments, making plan implementation that much 
more uncertain (B3, C8, C11).  
Attitudes Towards Planning  
Consistent observations regarding the limited nature of the planning process under 
NHEM suggests that strategic planning and outcome monitoring are still not an integral part of 
higher education management in any of the sample states. Strategic planning is not a common 
activity in universities or government and aided colleges. In fact, most of the faculty in the 
colleges and universities are unaware of the existence of any institutional plan (other than 
NHEM) and have never participated in such a process (A9, A6, A15, B7, D5, D7). Apart from 
limiting the sources of funds that the plans seek, they also take a short-term and narrow view of 
planning. Planning is largely interpreted in financial terms and financial plans usually cover only 
those resources that are necessary for the institutions. This means that the long-term strategic 
direction of the institutions, academic, and research plans are not articulated.  
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The state’s attitude towards strategic planning beyond NHEM components is reflected in 
the response of one of the administrators (B8): “You see, there was supposed to be a plan. The 
individual colleges were supposed to submit their institutional development plans, which was to 
be consolidated into a state development plan and then submitted to the government of India. But 
frankly those plans do not have any serious significance because, unless you tell a college or any 
entity how much money you have, and therefore make a plan accordingly. No one can make a 
plan otherwise.... So, this theory of initially collecting a plan and then subsequently giving 
money is a farce. My personal view is that unless you fix clearly that this is the amount of money 
that we are going to support you, now tell me what you can do with this amount, there can be a 
better and precise planning happening... at the end of the day…the state planning happens top 
down. This bottom-up whatever information goes is of no use…” 
Another instance of limited planning is shown in the case of a university created out of an 
autonomous college in Odisha. The interviewees in the institution or the university’s website 
could not provide a strategic plan for the new university. The faculty in charge of NHEM 
implementation remembered that a five-year plan had been created when the university was 
envisioned but he had not read or used it (B7). He referred to the Detailed Project Report (DPR) 
that included all the necessary elements (infrastructural components). The interviewees could not 
confirm why that college was converted to a university, how the different new sections of the 
university administration were managed, what type of academic, research, governance or other 
targets being pursued by the university, etc. Again, these details were not shared on the 
university's website either. 
The limitations in the planning process affect the capacity building for these activities 
within the state. SHECs were supposed to be active in introducing the concept of outcome-based 
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strategic planning in the states. They also needed to create the technical capacity to undertake 
these time-consuming activities. As discussed in the previous chapter, SHECs are not involved in 
holding planning or reform capacity building in the states. Instead, the DoHE has been in-charge 
of the process. As explained by a respondent in West Bengal (D4) “[DoHE] have done a series of 
workshops. ...Starting from...construction of the Project-Monitoring Unit, they have instructed us 
in everything. Very lucidly...to the colleges. Repeatedly they arrange for workshops, for 
interaction meetings. Initially for final preparation of DPR, then how to go for tendering, then 
how to procure, what is are the differences in procuring different items. The process in 
complicated, they can’t simplify it”. The nature of trainings for NHEM planning are usually 
about the rules and technicalities of making plans and utilizing funds (A9, B3, B9, C2, C4, C5, 
D1, D2, D5). 
Monitoring and Outcome Evaluation 
NHEM’s vision document includes many instances the terms ‘norm-based’, ‘outcome-
based’ and ‘performance-based’ funding. NHEM also refers to the creation of a state-wide 
management information systems that track students and faculty outcomes (MHRD, 2013, p. 88, 
113). Target setting and outcome management are also crucial aspects of educational planning 
that instill accountability to educational organizations. The data collected on plan monitoring 
from the sample states suggests that while the state does collect some information from 
institutions, it is not detailed enough or systematically collected to aid monitoring and 
assessment of progress.  
363 
 
NHEM’s earliest version shared the idea of holding regular academic audits141 in 
institutions as a means of improving academic quality. However, this idea was not familiar to 
most respondents and there was no evidence of it being pursued by the federal implementation 
authorities (A7, B9, A12, A7, A8). The current monitoring system followed in states is 
spearheaded by the DoHE and the utilization of federal funds is the main target that is tracked. 
States like Kerala also have a technical support group (engineering and academic experts) to 
make physical inspection visits to colleges. The principals and NHEM coordinators of colleges 
and universities participate in review meetings with the DoHE and discuss their challenges (A3). 
Currently, the data collected regarding NHEM implementation is about the following 
broad areas: progress on infrastructure development and funds spent, enrollment details such as 
gender and reservation-category wise enrollment, and academic outcomes at college level like 
graduation rate, employment rate (A3, A2, A5, A7, A8, B1, B6, B7, B8, B9, C2, C3, C4, C8, 
C11, D4, D5, D6, D7). Respondents at universities and colleges believed that they provided 
DoHE with ample data regarding their institution whenever the MHRD or DoHE requested. 
None of the sample states had a student-level information system that would allow for detailed 
analyses of student progress by gender, region, caste, etc. The institutions compile the data 
whenever it is requested by any external agency.  
Kerala has instituted a State Higher Education Survey to do periodic data collection. But 
this system is only a form-based college-level data collection system that does not provide 
student-level or faculty-level information. Odisha manages its student admissions through a 
central portal called SAMS but the remaining journey of a student through the higher education 
 
141
 Academic audits refer to faculty-led assessment of the curriculum and teaching and learning practices followed 
in an institution. NHEM also mentioned that institutions must collect details regarding the qualifications and 




system is not online. Talking about their timely data collection process, one DoHE administrator 
in Kerala (A12) explained: “We give Google forms to all colleges, they all fill, and we get the 
real time data about all the activities in the colleges. All kinds of data are available through this. 
We get this data from the principal about their current… the infrastructure facilities like lab 
equipment and classroom teaching learning activities, furniture etc. All furniture and equipment 
purchased within NHEM are geo tagged…most of this infrastructure work is done through 
public works department, so we have to have a monthly review because public works department 
are very slow. We do not collect data on academic or research outcomes. Actually, that kind of 
academic audit is not there…” 
The success of NHEM is not viewed or tracked by linking resources spent with academic 
or research targets (A9, A3, A5, C5, C7, D2, D3, D5). When talking about exact outcomes of 
NHEM funds, most interviewees responded that improving infrastructure obviously affects all 
the students and this does not need to be quantified. Instead of outcomes and efficiency of 
resource employment, timely and rule-bound utilization of NHEM funds is the focus of review 
meetings done by DoHE and the institutions (A5, A12, B1, B3, B6, B8, C1, C4, C5, D5, D6). 
Some respondents in DoHEs were very clear about the fact that the state was still working on 
solving basic infrastructural problems (B1, B8, C11, D3). An input-output comparison in this 
situation would not be the best use of resources. The lack of access to IT specialists required to 
establish and maintain high quality data collection systems was also noted as a challenge (B1, 
C11). Institutions and SHECs lack the funds to make such investments.  
Universities and colleges also did not view data collection and analysis as an urgent need. 
In some institutions, my questions regarding monitoring of NHEM outcomes were sometimes 
confused with the function of Internal Quality Assurance Cells created after accreditation or with 
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the implementation of outcome-based education (A3, A12, B5). Other institutions pointed to the 
fact that their faculty were highly motivated and reputed, or they admitted some of the best 
students in the state and hence there was no need to collect data on research performance or 
graduation rates, etc. (A3, A8, B4). The following discussion about outcome monitoring is a 
good example (A8):  
“Aah outcome, yes, yes, in our college we don't have such an outcome program because 
our pass percentage is very high. When compared to any other, it is very high. We do not have 
such a discussion because if even forty people are entered in our B.Sc. Only two or three people 
get into any other course …and in the final year about thirty-eight or thirty-nine students are 
there and …about fifteen or sixteen people get the M.Sc. admissions, from our departments, so 
we don't have such a discussion and on that aspect. We have a plan...to increase the student’s 
strength here.  Outcome-based is getting implemented here now…that is the plan of the UGC. 
During the NAAC visit they asked about the outcomes our programs” 
Implications for NHEM  
Strategic planning, norm-based management and performance-based funding are some of 
the key principles reiterated throughout NHEM’s vision document and website. If instituting the 
process of strategic planning processes at the state and institutional level was an important goal 
of NHEM, the progress on it has not been very promising. While states and institutions have 
used institutional plans and State Higher Education Plans to received NHEM funding, they have 
been reduced to narrow proformas that NHEM’s federal authorities released. The scope of 
planning under NHEM has been limited to the resources and areas that the federal government 
has indicated. Crucially, unless NHEM provides another round of funding, states and institutions 
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are unlikely to repeat such planning processes. The evidence collected in this study suggests that 
NHEM has not fundamentally altered performance management in any way. 
One encouraging observation during the data collection has been the decentralized nature 
of planning. Colleges and universities have had control over the process of making plans, even if 
the timeline for creating the plans was extremely short and the scope of the plans was limited. In 
this sense, NHEM’s funding has probably been used to address problems identified through 
bottom-up planning. However, bottom-up planning cannot be very useful or effective if it is very 
limited in its scope and does not encourage the institutions to think strategically about their 
future and resource utilization.  
Apart from the failure of NHEM in terms of promoting broadly scoped plans, the policy 
has failed to draw enough attention to the reforms that it claims to be contingent on. NHEM 
suggests a broad range of reforms that are changing important relationships and structures in the 
state university systems. These include affiliation reforms, autonomy and accreditation, and 
academic reforms. To change institutional and individual behavior in line with the reform intent, 
the states would ideally in engage a long process consulting stakeholders and developing a 
course of action for transitioning each aspect of institutional and sectoral operations to the new 
model suggested by NHEM.  States have addressed reforms in a few sentences that promise 
implementation. Coherent strategies showing exact financial commitment to the reforms, 
management of behavioral and organizational changes, and capacity building activities to 
support the transition, etc. have not been shared.  
NHEM’s federal level implementation promises outcome tracking and the establishment 
of management information systems the state level. Other than Kerala’s State Higher Education 
Survey, there are no other examples of systematic data collection efforts in states. Moreover, 
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states have no sense of the outcomes related to NHEM implementation. There is an accounting 
of infrastructure and equipment, but academic outcomes and research outcomes are not a part of 
the performance management vocabulary in the states. NHEM has not been able to institute 
target-based planning in the states unless the target monitoring is fund utilization. The repeated 
discussion of procurement and spending rules under NHEM and sending utilization certificates 
points to the focus on the bureaucratic and administrative aspects of implementing NHEM rather 
than the process and outcomes of academic and institutional changes. 
368 
 
Appendix G: Legal Provisions: SHEC Acts 
The first source of differences between implementation of SHEC reforms by the states 
can be the legal provisions through which each state creates their councils. All four states have 
passed acts in the state legislatures. I compare them to determine if there are any significant 
differences in the powers and responsibilities of the Councils. Other than the membership 
structure and leadership of the Council, there are no important differences in the Acts that make 
any state stand out from others.  
None of the SHECs appear to lack legislative legitimacy. All the SHECs are “statutory 
bodies”, as mentioned by repeatedly by interview respondents. It is widely believed that SHECs 
derive their power from a law, not from the policy agenda of an administration. All the Acts 
provide similar type of powers to the Councils and the correspond with the guidelines included 
in NHEM. All SHECs enjoy legislative sanction for making state and institutional plans, 
coordination between state agencies, designing and implementing academic policies, and 
advising the state on policies. Importantly, monitoring and evaluation functions are only allowed 
in Punjab and West Bengal. Both Kerala and West Bengal Councils also give their SHECs 
additional responsibilities beyond NHEM guidelines. This suggests that the differences in the 
operation of SHECs are determined by something other than the legal provisions.  
The Kerala Act prescribes the largest governing structure for the Council. It has three 
governing bodies (Advisory, Governing and Executive) with about 60 members in total. This 
SHEC draws of a very wide range of representation from different departments of the 
government, academic fields, and sectors of the economy through their three-tiered governing 
system. Most of the appointments to these councils are either ex-officio or nominated by the state 
government and the structure seems cumbersome and too large to be managed. The Act specifies 
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the meetings should occur twice every year. It does not appear that all the councils of SHEC 
meet or take active action equally often. KSHEC’s website shows that between the Council’s 
reappointment in 2017 and July 2020, the Advisory council has met once, the Governing Council 
has met four times (thrice in 2018, once in 2020) and the Executive Council meets 4-5 times 
every year142. The minutes show that Advisory Council and Governing Council approve broad 
decisions while the Execute council tracks progress on specific committee reports etc.  The 
Executive council only consists of the Vice Chairperson, Member Secretary, one VC, five 
nominated members and the DoHE representative. The first two, in Kerala, are full-time 
appointments dedicated to the SHEC. Thus, it is easy for the executive council to meet regularly 
with one-third of the members and continue working.  
Odisha’s Council is new and is the closest in structure to the NHEM recommendations. 
The leadership consists of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson and Member Secretary. There are 
fifteen other ex-officio members appointed by the government such as VCs, principals, and 
representatives from various academic fields etc. The Vice-Chairperson and Member Secretary 
are the only full-time officers who are supposed to work exclusively for the SHEC. The Odisha 
Council does undertake many activities, but they do not have a website where the details of their 
meetings decisions can be found. A possible explanation is that Odisha SHEC was fully 
constituted only in 2019 (B1), so far it has not had the additional manpower required to create a 
website or start other programs.  
The Punjab Council does not appoint any academics in the SHEC leadership. 
Chairperson and Vice Chairperson are the Chief Minister and Minister of Higher Education. All 
the other 18-23 members are either administrators from the department of higher education, 
 
142
 Out of the four states, only Kerala SHEC has the minutes of all the meetings shared publicly on the website. 
Publicly sharing information is one of the basic principles of good governance and transparency.  
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MHRD, finance VCs, Principals or representatives of academic fields nominated by the 
government. None of the members seem dedicated only to the SHEC. The Punjab Council does 
not have a website and has not held a meeting yet.  
West Bengal council also predates the NHEM council. The Act appoints four leaders for 
the council that are full-time members. The remaining 28-30 are ex-officio members, all state 
university VCs, some principals, individuals representing different departments, civil society, 
and academic fields. West Bengal’s council has only one tier, but it is a large one. The Act does 
not specify the frequency of meetings for the Council. Interviews indicate that the Council has 
met at least twice in the year 2019-2020 (D1), but the minutes of the meetings are not available 
publicly. The only available minutes of the meeting from 2016 are on the DoHE’s website, not 
the SHEC’s.  
Other than the leadership and membership requirements, SHEC Acts for the four states 
do not have any substantive differences in the laws that govern them. Importantly, the sample 
states share many similarities in their SHEC Acts. For instance, the state governments are 
responsible for appointing the leadership of all the Councils. Further, the ability to hire additional 
staff, experts, or make any financial decisions is also subject to state approval for all the 
Councils. Most of the Councils have academic, advisory, planning, and coordination 
responsibilities. The older councils, in Kerala and West Bengal, also have some responsibilities 
that are beyond NHEM. However, the Councils established later limit the role of their SHECs to 
the specifications of NHEM and they mention the coordination of NHEM as a responsibility of 
the SHEC. It is worth noting that Kerala’s Council is the only one that does not have monitoring 
or evaluation functions in its Act and is expected to conduct active capacity building for state 
institutions. Despite the similarities in basic responsibilities and influence of state governments, 
371 
 







Appendix H: Affiliation, Centralization, and Quality Control 
The affiliation system is a basic structural feature of higher education in India, 
particularly in the state universities. India’s colonial legacy naturally predisposed it towards 
following an Oxford-Cambridge model of university-college organization (World Bank, 2011). 
These systems are now unique to India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. In the affiliation 
system, degree granting authority is limited to universities while colleges are centers for 
undergraduate teaching. Consequently, all colleges must be affiliated with a university. 
Affiliating powers are only given to public universities in states. Very few federally funded 
universities affiliate colleges. Thus, state funded public universities manage a vast majority of 
undergraduate education through affiliation, and postgraduate education on their campuses.  
University Academic Councils approve the types of programs that are offered in colleges 
and the curriculum for the programs (Raza, 2009; Zachariah, 1993). Any changes in the program 
or courses must go through bureaucratic channels for university (and in some cases DoHE) 
approval. Additionally, the universities are in-charge of designing and grading examinations, and 
processing degrees for all the undergraduate students they enroll. At a small scale (with 15-30 
colleges) this system allows the university to maintain academic standards while colleges shape 
the academic experiences of students through classes, tutoring, and extra-curricular activities. 
Undergraduate instructors can use considerable autonomy in designing tutorials and internal 
assessments and are part of the University Board of Studies (Gajendragadkar Committee, 1971, 
p. 16). This ensures flexibility in curriculum design and operations while maintaining standards 
of quality. These processes of coordination, two-way communication, and quality control begin 
to fail when the number of colleges increases, and the colleges are physically distanced from the 
university. State universities in India affiliate anywhere between 40 to 700 colleges and can 
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enroll up to 300,000 students. As few as four or six public universities can affiliate students in a 
state spanning 120,000 sq miles. 90% of undergraduate students in the country enroll in affiliated 
colleges (MHRD, 2013, p.67)  
In this South Asian version of the affiliation system, all college faculty cannot be 
represented in Academic Councils or Board of Studies of the affiliating University because of 
their sheer numbers. This severs the link between curriculum and teaching. Assessment methods 
are not determined by the faculty, the university is restricted to options that can be administered 
for thousands of students (MHRD, 2013, p.68). This system affects student learning because 
undergraduate teaching is separated from curriculum and assessment design decisions 
(Gajendragadkar Committee, 1971). The system is not designed to be responsive to small 
changes in student needs or the labor markets. Though the use of standardized assessments can 
help in stratifying colleges by academic performance and identifying poor performers, few 
Indian universities systematically withdraw or cancel affiliation of colleges or run quality 
enhancement initiatives for them (NHEM, 2013b).  
Apart from being ineffective at controlling quality, the affiliation system also creates 
immense administrative burden for universities (Soneri, 1990, p.7). Universities must dedicate 
resources to the examination process, which detracts from teaching and research. Conducting 
end-of-year or end-of term examinations are massive logistical operations and coordinating them 
across a large physical area creates delays. As a result, universities are unable to maintain 
academic calendars, declare results on time, conduct reassessments on schedule, and graduate 
students on time (National Knowledge Commission, 2009). The rigid control of the university 
prevents high quality colleges from being innovative (Yash Pal Committee, 2009). 
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NHEM’s view on affiliation, both in terms of the nature of the policy problem and the 
possible solutions is drawn from reports presented by federally appointed committees, policy 
documents, and reports by independent agencies. The growing size of the affiliation began to 
raise flags in 1971 when the issue was discussed at length in the Gajendragadkar Committee 
(1971) report. This was followed by a repeated discussion of the issue in the National Education 
Policy 1986, the National Education Policy Plan of Act in 1992, the National Knowledge 
Commission in 2007 and the Yash Pal Committee in 2007.   
Solutions for Affiliation  
The affiliation system, particularly at a large scale, perpetuates academic and 
administrative centralization in the higher education system. It prevents universities from 
concentrating on research and postgraduate education and limits academic autonomy and 
responsiveness to student and labor markets in colleges. The theory of action for policy solutions 
is based on reducing the size of the university. Previous policies have discussed three different 
solutions to alter the existing affiliation system into a form that is more manageable and 
acceptable.  
The first solution was offered by the Gajendragadkar Committee in 1971. The committee 
noted that for colleges to have any meaningful say in their academic matters, all college 
principals must be a part of the affiliating university’s Academic Council. Academic councils 
cannot function with more than 30 or so principals. Hence, universities must not affiliate more 
than 30 colleges. For instance, in talking about one of the largest universities of the time, the 
report notes that “no reorganization of Calcutta University, however radical or ingenious, can be 
of avail unless its size is reduced drastically”. This solution is based in simple principles that 
reasonably sized universities can effectively engage in participative decision making with their 
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affiliated colleges. The committee suggested that the UGC should create regulations limiting 
university size. UGC did introduce an affiliation reforms package in 2011 that suggested 
universities should not have more than 50 affiliated colleges and not more than 12 miles from the 
college (UGC, 2011b). 
Despite UGC’s elaborate report on affiliation reforms, the federal government did not 
issue a mandate to limit the size of state universities. States have also not taken concrete steps to 
reduce the size of existing universities. As reflected in some interviews, states governments do 
not have the financial resources to create multiple new state universities (A15, A3, F5). Hence, 
they have chosen to allow the expansion of higher education within the existing state university 
structures. Following the same logic as previous policies, NHEM proclaims that state universities 
should not affiliate more than 100 colleges. However, neither does NHEM issue an explicit 
mandate regarding limits on university size. Nor does it provide any financial incentives for 
states to split existing universities. Though affiliation reforms are part of the ‘prerequisite 
reforms’ for NHEM, the relationship between the policy instruments and outcomes for this 
particular solution is weak even at the design stage. Also, little justification is provided for the 
changes in federal standards on the acceptable number of affiliated colleges (from 30 to 50 to 
100).  
A less resource intensive solution mentioned across policies, including NHEM, is the 
conversion of regular colleges into autonomous colleges that can eventually become degree 
granting institutions. The University Grants Commission has granted ‘autonomous’ status to 
colleges with proven ‘high quality’ since late 1980s. This status gives colleges greater autonomy 
over their curriculum and assessment. Autonomous colleges appear as a solution for affiliation as 
well as academic centralization in the Kothari Commission report in 1966, National Policy on 
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Education in 1986, Gnanam Committee in 1990, and Yash Pal Committee report in 2007. There 
are two main issues with this solution. Firstly, UGC does not deem many colleges fit to be 
autonomous. There were only 414 such colleges (out of 34,000) in the country before NHEM 
was launched (MHRD, 2013, p 71). Thus, they do little to reduce the affiliation burden of state 
universities. Also, university regulations usually do not allow autonomous colleges full academic 
autonomy. They can only deviate by 20% from the university curriculum. University control 
over program design and offerings continues unchanged. This does not prepare autonomous 
colleges to eventually become universities. NHEM promotes autonomous colleges in the states 
by providing large grants for converting autonomous colleges into universities. Other than this, 
the process of accreditation supported through NHEM is also supposed to encourage more 
colleges to become autonomous. The financial incentives attached to this policy solution are 
clearer and substantial. 
The creation of cluster colleges is the third solution to large-scale affiliation by state 
universities. This idea has been discussed in various forms in multiple policy documents (Biswas 
& Prakash, 2005; Kothari Commission, 1966; UGC, 2011b). Different variations of this solution 
draw on the same basic idea; four to six well-established colleges within a few miles of each 
other can pool resources and faculty to operate as a cluster university. This reduces the burden on 
the affiliating university, minimizes the need for new appointments, and including multiple 
colleges maintains a sense of collective accountability (UGC, 2011b; Yash Pal Committee, 
2009). Kerala was the only state that experimented with the idea of cluster universities in late 
2000s. They started with three voluntary clusters but were not successful in establishing any 
universities (Tharakan, 2017). NHEM revives the idea and assigns the largest number of 
resources for cluster university proposals from states. 
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Appendix I: Challenges in Fostering Institutional Autonomy  
The idea of promoting university and college autonomy is far from new in Indian policy 
circles. Yet, it is reform goal that that has constantly evaded implementation. The National 
Knowledge Commission (2009) and Kanti Biswas Committee (2005) acknowledge that it is 
likely to be a resource intensive process that requires a fundamental overhaul of higher education 
governance in the country. Yash Pal Committee (2009) mentions that political and vested 
interests are responsible for the maintenance of the status quo. They also point that university 
and college faculty have often been reluctant to make use of the autonomy they do have, and 
they prefer to maintain the centralized system they operate in (p.49).  
University and college autonomy is also resisted by DoHEs and the political class. 
Gnanam Committee’s report (Soneri, 1990) provides a rare glimpse into the subtle changes made 
by political leaders that dilute policy suggestions aimed at political decentralization made by 
committees. This report includes both original recommendations of the commission and the 
changes made by the Central Advisory Board for Education (CABE) before accepting them. 
Suggested and accepted recommendations differ in important ways in some cases. For instance, 
the committee called for an absolute non-inclusion of political functionaries in university 
administration and accepted recommendations allow university appointees the “freedom to 
associate” with political parties. The accepted recommendations specify state universities need 
academic and administrative autonomy, but their financial freedom should be limited as they are 
publicly funded. For multiple recommendations, the accepted CABE versions employ more 
vague or weaker language to ensure that some political control over state universities can be 
maintained. Along with Yash Pal Committee’ observations on vested interests, this points to the 
fact that universities are a source of patronage and influence within states (Krishnan, 2014). 
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Their autonomy does not just threaten DoHEs control over the funds, it also threatens the source 
of patronage for political leaders.  
Findings from the Kanti Biswas Committee (Biswas & Prakash, 2005) present another 
explanation for the failure of autonomy and related reforms in states. This explanation is based in 
institutionalized culture of universities and colleges that prevents them from envisioning an 
alternate model of higher education governance. The Committee surveyed faculty nationwide 
about university and college autonomy. The support for more university autonomy is clearly 
visible in the survey responses, about (90%) favored depoliticizing university appointments, 
allowing universities and colleges to run self-financing programs, and encouraging more 
professional administration of universities. In contrast, the support for academic autonomy of 
colleges is not unanimous. Most respondents were satisfied with the present system where the 
academic councils of universities determine the curriculum (60%) and conduct the examinations 
(64%), state government determines the standards for faculty recruitment (80%). Thus, very few 
respondents support decentralizing academic authority to colleges. The respondents also 
overwhelmingly trust the standard setting ability of national bodies like UGC, more than that of 





Appendix J: College Autonomy in Sample States  
Table A2. College Autonomy in Sample States 
 Kerala Odisha Punjab West Bengal 
Political opposition to autonomy Yes No No No 




























Assessment autonomy Yes: Autonomous colleges usually conduct their own 
assessment according to university guidance* 
Introduce courses and programs Changes subject to university approval, DoHE approval 
sought by government and aided colleges* 
Financial autonomy Government and aided colleges seek state permission 
Fee regulation Fee caps set for government and private institutions 
Hiring decisions Made by DoHE for government and aided colleges 
Source: Constructed by author using interview data 




Appendix K: Curricular Reforms 
NHEM suggested that universities must adopt more regular and rigorous procedures to 
ensure that their curriculum is updated and matches national and international levels (NHEM, 
2013, p. 120). Interviews with faculty at universities and colleges suggested that universities 
have not made substantial changes to these practices (C3, B10, A9, D7, C5). Curriculum is still 
updated by convening the Board of Studies in a particular department. The revisions happen 
every four to five years and they are reported in the accreditation reports created by institutions. 
When asked about the proportion of changes that are made with every revision, I did not receive 
any clear responses from the faculty. Other than Kerala, faculty in other states pointed out that 
the last curricular revision was done to divide the annual system into semester system and this 
change was substantial (C3, C2, B5, B2, D4, D9). As discussed in earlier sections, in the case of 
Odisha and West Bengal, these processes occur at the state level and not at every university.  
Some states mentioned that they have altered the curriculum to be more skill orientated. 
In the case of Punjab, these included minimal changes such as computer skill classes and public 
speaking classes (C5, C8, C11). In Odisha, the change has been more substantial and customized 
for each program. For instance, students in Economics take a course called Data Analytics and 
Computer Application while students in English programs take Principles of Translation or 
students is English Literature programs. While Odisha’s attempts at introducing skill 
enhancement courses are likely to useful to students, the syllabus is still dominated by courses 
that are taught using traditional methods and are not geared towards developing useful practical 
skills (C3). The curricular revision has been limited to a few courses and has not been 
accompanied with pedagogical or technical training. It suggests that states have not considered 
the issue of faculty capacity to impart skills.  
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Part of curricular reforms is the process of articulating programs and course outcomes so 
that teaching and learning practices can be aligned to meet those goals. Outcome based education 
(OBE) is a suggested reform under UGC guidelines and questions about its implementation are a 
part of the NAAC accreditation. Kerala is the only state where this process has been undertaken 
for all the universities and colleges irrespective of their accreditation status. As a result, the 
colleges and universities in Kerala present their course and program outcomes on their websites. 
Even in Kerala, the SHEC holds one OBE workshop with the Board of Studies at a university 
and expects the university to hold workshops in the colleges (A15, A2). The affiliated colleges in 
each university run well over a 100, sometimes 200 colleges. While the program and course 
outcome articulation can happen at the university level, it is difficult to imagine that they can be 
incorporated in the teaching and assessment processes without a significant amount of faculty 
training and examination reform.  
None of the other states have implemented OBE. But most colleges in the sample have 
been accredited and they have indicated that learning outcomes for all programs and courses 
have been defined. However, the college and university websites present a different picture. Only 
two colleges list their programs and courses on the website. One of the colleges has reasonably 
detailed learning outcomes for each course. In the other college, the learning outcomes are 
described in seven to ten-word sentences. The fact that course outcomes are not easily accessible 
in most colleges suggests affiliating universities have not put a lot of careful thought into OBE 
implementation yet. The process of OBE is meant to create closer linkages between higher 
education curricula, course design, teaching, learning and the labor market. The data suggests 
that nothing in NHEM’s implementation has explicitly or implicitly promoted these linkages.  
 
